JPN-88-049, Proposed Tech Specs Tables 3.1-1 & 3.2-1,deleting Requirements of Reactor Scram & Main Steam Line Isolation Functions for Refuel & Startup Modes
| ML20154F437 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 09/13/1988 |
| From: | POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154F430 | List: |
| References | |
| JPN-88-049, JPN-88-49, NUDOCS 8809190394 | |
| Download: ML20154F437 (12) | |
Text
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JPN 04 9 ATTACHMENT I PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES REGARDING DELETION OF REACTOR SCRAM AND MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION FUNCTIONS FOR REFUEL AND STARTUP MODES (JPTS-88-010) u J
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New York Power Authority James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant l
Docket No. 50-333 i
DPR-59 1
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ADOC O
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1.0 (cont *d) 1.
Refuel Mode - The reactor is in the refuel system trips and control rod withdrawal mode whsa the Mode Switch is in the Refuel interlocks in service.
Mode position. Mhen the Mode Switch is in the Refuel position, the refueling later-J.
Operahlt - A system, subsystem, train, component locks are la service.
or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified 2.
Run Mode - In this mode the reactor system function (s).
Implicit la this definition shall pressure is at or above 850 psig and the be the assumption that all necessary attendant Reactor Protection System is energized with instrumentation, controls, normal and emergency APRM protection (excludlag the 15 percent electrical power sources, cooling or seal water, high flux trip) and the RBM laterlocks la lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are
- service, required for the system, subsystem, train, com-ponent or device to perform its function (s) are 3.
Shutdown Mode - The reactor is la the shut-also capable of performing their related support down mode when the Reactor Mode Switch is in function (s).
the Shutdows Mode position.
K.
Operatino - Operatlag means that a system or a.
Hot shutdown means conditions as above component is performing its intended functions in with reactor coolant temperature >212*F.
Its required mammer.
b.
Cold shutdown means conditions as above L.
Qperatipo Cycle - Interval between the end of one with reactor coolant temperature refueling outage and the end of the subsequent f_212*r. and the reactor vessel vented.
refueling outage.
4.
Startup/ Hot Sta 9 - In this mode the low M.
Primary Cantalspent Integrity -
Pressure malt..eam line isoletion valve Primary containment lategrity means that the closure trip is bypassed, the Reactor drywell and pressure suppression chamber are Protection Sys*.ee is energised with APRM (15 intact and all of the following conditions are percent) and IRM neutran zoaltoring satisfied:
1.
All manual containment isolation valves on lines connected to the Reactor Coolant System or containment which are not required to be open during plant accident conditions are closed. These valves may be l
Amendment No g 4
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i JAFMPP TARLE 3.1-1 (cont *d) i l
REACTOR PROT E ION SYSTEM (SCRAM) Imusums.ATION REERg}g]q Minimum No.
Modes la Which Total of Operable Trip Level Fasaction Must be Number of testrument Trip reaction Settlag Operable Instrument Action l
Channels per Trip Chaamels (1)
Befuel Startup Rua Provided System (1)
(6) by Desiga for Both Trly Systems 2
APRM Downscale
'W2.5 IcJicated on X
6 Instrument A or a scale (9)
Chamaels 2
High Reactor 6 3045 psig X(8)
X X
4 Instrument A
Pressure Channels 2
High Drywell
( 2.7 psig X(7)
Z(7)
X 4 Instrument A
Prc2sure Channels 2
Resctor Low Water 3 12.5 la. ladicated X
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4 Instrument A
Level level Chamaels (DJ 177 in. atere the top of sctive fuel) 3 High water Level 5 34.5 gallons per X(2)
X X
8 Instrument A
in Scram Discharge Instrumen.2 volute Channels volume 2
Main Steam line 6 in normal full X
X X
4 Instrument A
High Radiation power backgrourA (16)
Channels 4
( 10% valve Z(5) 8 Instrument A
Isolation valve closure Channels Closure
- =iaeat no. yf, n, pf, ys,,1, g 41a
a t
4 L ')
JAFNPP IAJLE 3.1-1 (cp3* d)
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FE ACTOR _fROIECIIDM_SISIDi_iSCEAM) INS 7UMENIA_TIDH_EEQUIREM_EMI
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Minimum No.
Modes in Wh' h Total of Operable Trip Level Function Must be Number of Instrument Trip runction Setting Operable Instrument Action Channels per Trip ChanaeIs (1)
Refuel Startup Run Provided System (1)
(6) )16) by Design for Both Trip Systems 4
Turbine Stop 10% valve X(4)(5) 8 Instrument A or C Valve Closure closure Channels NOTES OF TAtiLE 3,1_1 1.
There shall be two operable or tripped trip systems for each function, except as specified in 4.1.D.
Frca and after the time that the minimum number of operable instrument channel for a trip system cannot be met, that affected trip system shc11 be placed in the safe (tripped) condition, or the appropriate actions listed below shall be taken.
A.
Initiate insertion of operable rods and complete lasertion of all operable rods.rithin f our hours.
11.
Reduce power level to IRM range and place Mode Switch in the Startup Position within eight hours.
C.
Reduce power to less than 30 percent of rated.
2.
Permissible to bypass, if Refuel and Shutdown positions of the Reactor Mode Switch.
3.
Deleted.
4.
ISypassed when turbine first stage pressure is less than 217 psig or less than 30 percent of rated.
5.
The design permits closure of any two lines without a scram being initiated.
6.
When the reactor is suberitical and the reactor water temperature is less than 212*f", only the following trip functions need to be operable:
A.
Mode Switch in Shutdown It.
Manual Scram Aren<1= nt tao. pf, p 42
JATNPP TABLE 3.2-1 INSTERENTATION TRAT INITIATES PRIMARY __C0pTAIFPggr! ISEATIOff Minimum Number of Operable Instrument Chsanels Total Number of Instr = ect Chsanels Provided by 2esigs Ar n ;:
Pt.L_ILIE System (1)
Instrument Trio Level Settina for Both TriLSyltem:
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2 (6)
Reactor Iow Mater
>j 12.5 la. Indicated 4 Inst. Channels A
Level
)
Level ( 4177 in. above the top of active fuel) 1 Reactor High Pressure 675 psig 2 Inst. Channels 2
(Shutdows Coollag Isolation) 2 Reactor Low-Low-Low 4 IS la. above the TAT 4 Inst. Channels A
Mater Level 2 (6)
Migh Drywell Pressure f 2.7 psig 4 Inst. Channels A
2 High Radiation Malu 6 3 m Normal Rated 4 Inst. Channels 2
Steam Line Tummel Full Power Background (9) 2 Low Pressure Mais
> 825 psig (7) 4 nst. Channels i
Steam Line 2
High Flow Main Steam f 140% of ftated Steam 4 Inst. Channels 1
I Line Flow 2
Main Steam Llae Leak
,$40*F above max 4 Inst. Channels 3
Detectica Nigh ambient Temperature 3
Reactor Cleanup Sys-640*r above maz 6 Inst. Channels O
tem Equipment Area ambient High Temperature 2
Law Condenser vacuum
))S* Mg. Vac(7) (8) 4 Inst. Channels 3
Closes MSIV's x~ na-t ~. p. y. g. g. p. ps 64
JAFNPp IABLE 3.2-1 (Cont'd)
INSTRUMENTATION THAT INITIATES PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATI0H HOTES FOR TABLE L2..1 1.
Whenever Primary Containment integrity is required by Section 3.7, there shall be two operable or tripped trip systems for each function.
2.
From and af ter the time it is found that the first column cannot be met for one of the trip systems, that trip system shall be tripped or the appropriate action listed below shall be taken.
A.
Initiate an orderly shutdown and have the reactor in cold shutdown condition in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
B.
Initiate an orderly load reduction and have main steam lines isolated within eight hours.
C.
Isolate Reactor Water Cleanup System.
D.
Isolate shutdown cooling.
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3.
Deleted 4.
Deleted j
5.
Two required for each steam line.
l 6.
These dignals also start SBGTS and initiate secondary containment t
isolation, 7.
Only required in run mode (interlocked with 'Aode Switch).
j 8.
Bypassed when modo ewitch is not in run mode and turbine rtop valves are closed.
9.
The trip level setpoint will be maintained at gi3 times normal rat ed full l
power background. See note 16 to Table 3.1-1 for re-setting trip level setpoint just prior to the Hydrogen Addition Test, and tr,-setting of the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor for power levels belot 70%.
Amendment No. 3, 48, 67, 90 6C
JPN 049 ATTACHMENT II SAFETY EVALUATION FOR PkOPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES ltEGARDING DELETION OF REACTOR SCRAM AND MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION FUNCTIONS FOR REFUEL AND STARTUP MODES (JPTS-88-010)
A s/
New York Power Authority James A. l'atzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 DPR-59
o Attachment II to JPN-88-049 SAFETY EVALUATf0?1 I.
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES The proposed changes to the James A. FitzPatrick Technical Specifications amend page 4, Table 3.1-1( pages 41a, 42),
and table 3.2-1 (pages 64 and 65).
The changes are as follows:
Page 4:
Definition I.4 Startup/ Hot Standby Delete, "the reactor protection scram trips initiated b main steam line isolation valvo closure is bypassed when reactor pressure is less than 1005 psig."
Table 3.1-1 Reactor Protection System (SCRAM)
Instrumentation Requirement Page 41a Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure Delete "X(3)(5)" for refuel and startup modes Page 42:
Notes for Table 3.1-1 Delete Note 3, "Bypassed when reactor pressure is 1005 psig".
The symbola(
in front of 1005 psig was inadvertently omitted in a previous amendment.
i Table 3.2-1 Instrumentation That Initiates Primary Containment Isolation Page 64:
Low Condenser Vacuum Closes MSIVs Add Reference to Note "(7)"
Page 65:
Notes for Table 3.2-1 i
Change Note 8 to read, "Bypassed when mode switch is not in run mode and turbine stop valves are closed."
II.
EUREQSE OE_TiiE_EROP_QSED_ CHARGES I
The proposed changes delete reactor scram and main steam line (MSL) isolation functions from Tables 3.1-1 and 3.2-1 respectively for refuel and startup modes.
The conditional bypass signals for scram and isolation functions are provided by four pressure switches 02-3PS-51(A-D).
These pressure switches were installed after instability was observed in an early European Boiling Water Reactor during I
its startup.
Subsequent startup tests at Brownt. Ferry, a l
BWR 4 reactor as is FitzPatrick, showed that the instability l
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observed in the European reactor did not exist in a BWR 4.
Furthermore, these switches are set at the normal operating pressure of 1005 psig.
During refuel or startup mode, the reactor pressure is below 1003 psig and the scran and isolation functions are bypassed.
There-fore, the scram and isolation functions are unnecessary and will be deleted, and the pressure switches will be removed during the 1988 refueling outage.
III.
HiPACI_.QF THE PROPOSED CHANGES A reactor scram on MSIV closure was installed to provide an automatic means of reducing the severity of the consequences of MSL isolation.
The purpose of rcquiring MSIV isolation on low condenser vacuum is to provide an automatic means of isolating the reactor to limit the release of radioactive steam in the event of a breach of condenser integrity.
These scram and isolation functions are bypassed for refuel and startup modes to allow cold testing of the MSIVs and associated logic.
The pressure switches were installed because instability was observed in an early European Boiling Water Reactor during its startup.
Startup tests at Browns Ferry, a BWR 4 reactor as is Fitzpatrick, did not show any evidence of such instability.
Moreover, the pressure setpoint that allows conditional bypass of both scram and isolation functions in the refuel and startup modes is set at the normal reactor operating pressure of 1005 psig.
During these modes, the operating pressure is below 1005 psig, and these functions are bypassed.
Therefore, in essence, the pressure switches do not serve any useful purpose.
In startup modo, the reactor power is between approxi-mately 0-15% of full power.
The peak reactor pressure and the critical power ratio responses will be significantly below the limits established for transients during full power operation.
In the startup modo, the intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) subsystem and the Average power Range Monitor (ApRM) subsystem provide signals to the Reactor Protection System (RpS) to shut down the reactor.
If MSIV closure occurs while the reactor is in the startup mode, the reactor will scram on high neutron flux or high reactor pressure.
The over-pressure protection analysis, for the limiting event of MStV closure at 100% power terminated by the high neutron flux scram, provides the bounding analysis for the pressure transient.
Thus, removing the pressure switenes and deleting the scram and isolation functions during refuel and startup modes will have no impact on plant operation.
IV.
EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Operation of the Fitzpatrick plant in accordance with the proposed changes would nok, involve a significant hazards consideration as stated in 10 CFR 50.92, since it would nat:
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, because these pressure switches were installed after instability was observed in an early European Boiling Water Reactor during its startup.
A series of reactivity and pressure perturbation tests were conducted as part of the startup test program at Browns Ferry, a typical BWR 4 design of the FitzPatrick type.
The tests showed that following the initial disturbance, all parameters returned to steady state values and the reactor stabilized.
In addition, the switches are set for bypass up to the normal reactor operating pressure of 1005 psig.
This means that the pressures which would allow the scram on MSIV closure and MSL isolation on LCV when the turbine stop valves are closed are outside the range of pressures for refuel and startup modes.
Thus, scram and isolation functions are bypassed and the pressure switches, in essence, are not necessary.
The consequences of inadvortent MSIV closure in those modes at or below 1005 psig will remain unchanged with the removal of the switches.
In the startup mode, the reactor power is between approximately 0-15% of full power.
The peak reactor pressure and the critical power ratio responses will be significantly below the l
limits established for trans.ents during full powcr l
i operation.
In startup mode, the Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) subsystem and the Average power Range i
Honitor (ApRM) subsystem provide signals to the t
Reactor protection System (RpS) to shutdown the reactor.
If MSIV closure occurs while the reactor is in the startup mode, the reactor will scram on high i
neutron flux or high reactor pressure.
The over-pressure protection analysis, for the limiting event of MSIV closure at 100% power terminated by the high neutron flux scram, provides the bounding analysis for the pressure transient.
If a loss of condenser vacuum I
event occurs during refuel or startup modes, the I'
turbine bypass valves would close to isolate the condenser, and operator action can be taken to manually close the MSIVs.
Therefore, removal of l!
pressure switches and deletion of scram and isolation functions do not increase the probability or the consequences of an accident.
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2.
Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, because the purpose for which the pressure switches were installed does not exist as discussed above, and the switches are set for bypass at 1005 psig, which is above the full range of reactor pressures for refuel and startup modes.
For this pressure range, scram on MSIV closure and isolation on LCV during refuel and startup modes of operstion are bypassed, and the pressure switches are not needed for any safety function.
Therefore, no new or different kind of accident can be created by tne removal of these switches and deletion of scram and isolation functions.
3.
Involve a significant reduction in margin of safety because the current setpoint for the pressure switches allows bypass of the scram and isolation functions for the full range of reactor pressures in the refuel and startup modes.
Furthermore, the operating limits of the plant are not determined by the setpoint of these switches.
The limiting plant transients are still those initiated from full power operation and not from operation in the refuel or startup mcdes with the scram and isolation bypass.
Therefore, the operating limits and the limiting safety system settings remain unchanged and the margin of safety is not reduced.
V.
I M PL E MERTATIO N_Q E__TH E_P_ ROP.0 S ED_C HANG E.S Implementation of the proposed changes will not impact the ALARA or Fire protection programs at Fitzpatrick plant, nor will the changes impact the environment.
VI.
CONCLUSION The changes, as proposed, do not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.
That is, they:
a.
will not change the probability nor the onsequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report; b.
will not increase the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type from any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report; c.
will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification;
d.
do not constitute an unreviewad safety question; and e.
involve no significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92.
VII.
REEEREECES 1.
James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Final Safety Analysis Report Sections 7.2, 7.3 and 7.5.
2.
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Safety Evaluation Report.
3.
General Electric Report EAS-20-0388, "Deletion of the Low Reactor Pressure Bypass Switch for Scram and Isolation for the James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant", dated April 1988.