Information Notice 2001-11, Thefts of Portable Gauges

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Thefts of Portable Gauges
ML011920238
Person / Time
Issue date: 07/13/2001
From: Cool D
NRC/NMSS/IMNS
To:
Pettijohn S, NMSS/IMNS, 415-6822
References
IN-01-011
Download: ML011920238 (6)


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 13, 2001 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2001-11: THEFTS OF PORTABLE GAUGES

Addressees

All portable gauge licensees.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform

addresses of recent incidents of thefts of portable gauges, and to remind licensees of their

responsibilities to prevent loss and damage to portable gauges. It is expected that recipients

will review this information for applicability to their licensed activities and consider actions, as

appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this IN are not new

NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

In the period January 1996 through October 2000, NRC and Agreement State licensees

reported a total 156 thefts of portable gauges. Fifty-one occurred in the States of Texas and

Florida. Most of the thefts occurred when gauges were stored in vehicles parked in areas

vulnerable to theft. Only 40 percent of gauges reported stolen were reported as having been

recovered. Two of the 156 events involved attempts to sell the stolen gauges. In both of these

cases the gauge was returned to the owner. In another two events, gauges were found in

scrap metal when radiation monitors alarmed. In one event, only the source rod was found. In

the other case, the gauge was found intact.

In 83 percent of the thefts from vehicles, the vehicles were parked at locations other than the

licensees facilities or job sites. Of these cases, gauges were most frequently stolen from

vehicles parked at private residences (37 percent). In most of the cases involving the theft of

gauges from vehicles, the gauges were locked and secured, but frequently the gauges were

locked in an open truck bed, visible to passers-by.

The following are examples of some typical cases.

Case 1: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen from the back of a company truck

parked at overnight lodging in Brownsville, Texas. The gauge contained a 1.48 GBq (40 mCi)

Americium-241 source and a 0.30 GBq (8 mCi) Cesium-137 source. The licensee discovered

the theft the next morning, September 25, 2000, at approximately 7:30 a.m., and informed the

Texas Bureau of Radiation Control. The gauge case had been secured to the bed of the truck

by chains. The security chains had been cut and the gauge and the operator's tool box stolen.

A police report was promptly filed with the Brownsville Police Department.

Case 2: A moisture/density gauge was stolen from a company truck. The truck was located at

the home of an employee of the licensee in Homestead, Florida. The gauge contained 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) of Americium-241 and 0.23 GBq (6.1 mCi) of Cesium-137. The licensee notified

police and the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control. The Homestead Police prepared a press

release and offered a reward for the return of the gauge. A private individual reported finding

the gauge four days later, on July 6, 1999. The licensee stated that the gauge was not

damaged. It was determined that the employee did not follow procedures that require gauges

be stored at the licensee's facility.

Case 3: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen containing 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) of

Americium-241 and 0.3 GBq (8 mCi) of Cesium-137. The gauge was taken from the bed of a

pickup truck parked at a motel in Jacksonville, Florida, on March 31, 2000, between midnight

and 0600 a.m. The gauge was stored in an approved transportation package and was secured

to the vehicle by a chain. The chain was cut and both the gauge and case were taken. The

licensee notified the police of the theft.

Case 4: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen when the pickup truck it was chained to

was stolen from the home of an employee. The gauge contained a 1.48 GBq (40 mCi)

Americium-241 source and an 0.30 GBq (8 mCi) Cesium-137 source. The gauge was locked in

its transport container, which was chained in the back of the truck. The truck was stolen early

on the morning of April 19, 2001. The theft was reported to the Tempe, Arizona, Police and a

reward was offered.

Discussion:

Thefts involving portable gauges appear to be occurring most frequently when gauges are

stored in vehicles parked in a non-work area. In addition to considering deterrents to thefts

such as locks, security considerations for portable gauges containing radioactive material

should extend to ways to minimize the threat of theft. The requirements for control and security

of licensed material are given in 10 CFR 20.1801 and 20.1802. Control and security

requirements may also be found on the NRC license and within U.S. Department of

Transportation (DOT) regulations.

The NRCs analysis of five years of theft data for portable gauges indicates that a large number

of gauges are stolen from trucks, even when they are secured with chains. To help reduce the

number of thefts, licensees may want to consider taking further precautions, such as: (1)

requiring gauges to be locked in covered vehicle compartments, (2) not parking vehicles in

areas vulnerable to theft, and (3) including a discussion of this IN in periodic or special gauge

user training, to increase awareness of this problem.

NRC licensees are reminded of the recent change to the NRC Enforcement Policy (Federal

Register Notice 79139, dated December 18, 2000, regarding improper disposal of sources).

Under this revised policy, licensees cited for inadequate security and the loss of control of

moisture density gauges may face civil penalties of up to $15,000. This IN notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions about

the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the

appropriate regional office.

/RA/

Donald A. Cool, Director

Division of Industrial and

Medical Nuclear Safety

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Technical Contact:

Samuel L. Pettijohn, NMSS

(301) 415-6822 E-mail: slp@nrc.gov

  1. ML011920238 TEMPLATE NO.: #NRC =052 DOCUMENT NAME:g:\pettijohn\in2001.wpd *See previous concurrence

OFC MSIB-B* MSIB-B* Editor* MSIB-A* IMNS

NAME SPettijohn FBrown EKraus JHickey DCool

DATE 6/8/2001 6/19/2001 6/11/01 6/19/2001 7/10/2001

Attachment 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NMSS INFORMATION NOTICES

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

_____________________________________________________________________________________

2001-08, Update on the Investigation of 06/06/01 All medical licensees.

Supplement 1 Patient Deaths in Panama, Following Radiation Therapy

Overexposures

2001-08 Treatment Planning System 06/01/01 All medical licensees.

Errors Result in Deaths of

Overseas Radiation Therapy

Patients

2001-03 Incident Reporting 04/06/01 All industrial radiography

Requirements for Radiography licensees.

Licensees

2001-01 The Importance of Accurate 03/26/01 All material licensees.

Inventory Controls to Prevent

the Unauthorized Possession

of Radioactive Material

2000-22 Medical Misadministrations 12/18/00 All medical use licensees

Caused by Human Errors authorized to conduct gamma

Involving Gamma Stereotactic stereotactic radiosurgery

Radiosurgery (GAMMA KNIFE) treatments.

2000-19 Implementation of Human Use 12/05/2000 All medical use licensees.

Research Protocols Involving

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission Regulated

Materials

2000-18 Substandard Material Supplied 11/29/2000 All 10 CFR Part 50 licensees and

by Chicago Bullet Proof applicants.

Systems All category 1 fuel facilities.

All 10 CFR Part 72 licensees and

applicants.

2000-16 Potential Hazards Due to 10/5/2000 All licensees that process

Volatilization of Radionuclides unsealed byproduct material.

2000-15 Recent Events Resulting in 9/29/2000 All radiography licensees.

Whole Body Exposures

Exceeding Regulatory Limits

Attachment 2 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

______________________________________________________________________________________

2001-10 Failure of Central Sprinkler 06/28/01 All holders of licenses for nuclear

Company Model GB Series power, research, and test

Fire Sprinkler Heads reactors and fuel cycle facilities

2001-09 Main Feedwater System 06/12/01 All holders of operating licenses

Degradation in Safety-Related for pressurized water nuclear

ASME Code Class 2 Piping power reactors, except those who

Inside the Containment of a have permanently ceased

Pressurized Water Reactor operations and have certified that

fuel has been permanently

removed from the reactor vessel

2001-08 Update on the Investigation of 06/06/01 All Medical Licensees

Supplement 1 Patient Deaths in Panama, Following Radiation Therapy

Overexposures

2001-08 Treatment Planning System 06/01/01 All medical licensees

Errors Result in Deaths of

Overseas Radiation Therapy

Patients

2001-07 Unescorted Access Granted 05/11/01 All holders of nuclear reactor

Based on Incomplete and/or operating licenses who are

Inaccurate Information subject to Section 73.56 of Title

10, of the Code of Federal

Regulations (10 CFR 73.56),

Personnel Access Authorization

Requirements of Nuclear Power

Plants.

2001-06 Centrifugal Charging Pump 05/11/01 All holders of operating licenses

Thrust Bearing Damage not for nuclear power reactors, Detected Due to Inadequate except those who have

Assessment of Oil Analysis permanently ceased operations

Results and Selection of Pump and have certified that fuel has

Surveillance Points been permanently removed from

the reactor vessel

______________________________________________________________________________________

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit