Information Notice 2001-11, Thefts of Portable Gauges
| ML011920238 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/13/2001 |
| From: | Cool D NRC/NMSS/IMNS |
| To: | |
| Pettijohn S, NMSS/IMNS, 415-6822 | |
| References | |
| IN-01-011 | |
| Download: ML011920238 (6) | |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
July 13, 2001 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2001-11: THEFTS OF PORTABLE GAUGES
Addressees
All portable gauge licensees.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform
addresses of recent incidents of thefts of portable gauges, and to remind licensees of their
responsibilities to prevent loss and damage to portable gauges. It is expected that recipients
will review this information for applicability to their licensed activities and consider actions, as
appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this IN are not new
NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
In the period January 1996 through October 2000, NRC and Agreement State licensees
reported a total 156 thefts of portable gauges. Fifty-one occurred in the States of Texas and
Florida. Most of the thefts occurred when gauges were stored in vehicles parked in areas
vulnerable to theft. Only 40 percent of gauges reported stolen were reported as having been
recovered. Two of the 156 events involved attempts to sell the stolen gauges. In both of these
cases the gauge was returned to the owner. In another two events, gauges were found in
scrap metal when radiation monitors alarmed. In one event, only the source rod was found. In
the other case, the gauge was found intact.
In 83 percent of the thefts from vehicles, the vehicles were parked at locations other than the
licensees facilities or job sites. Of these cases, gauges were most frequently stolen from
vehicles parked at private residences (37 percent). In most of the cases involving the theft of
gauges from vehicles, the gauges were locked and secured, but frequently the gauges were
locked in an open truck bed, visible to passers-by.
The following are examples of some typical cases.
Case 1: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen from the back of a company truck
parked at overnight lodging in Brownsville, Texas. The gauge contained a 1.48 GBq (40 mCi)
Americium-241 source and a 0.30 GBq (8 mCi) Cesium-137 source. The licensee discovered
the theft the next morning, September 25, 2000, at approximately 7:30 a.m., and informed the
Texas Bureau of Radiation Control. The gauge case had been secured to the bed of the truck
by chains. The security chains had been cut and the gauge and the operator's tool box stolen.
A police report was promptly filed with the Brownsville Police Department.
Case 2: A moisture/density gauge was stolen from a company truck. The truck was located at
the home of an employee of the licensee in Homestead, Florida. The gauge contained 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) of Americium-241 and 0.23 GBq (6.1 mCi) of Cesium-137. The licensee notified
police and the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control. The Homestead Police prepared a press
release and offered a reward for the return of the gauge. A private individual reported finding
the gauge four days later, on July 6, 1999. The licensee stated that the gauge was not
damaged. It was determined that the employee did not follow procedures that require gauges
be stored at the licensee's facility.
Case 3: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen containing 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) of
Americium-241 and 0.3 GBq (8 mCi) of Cesium-137. The gauge was taken from the bed of a
pickup truck parked at a motel in Jacksonville, Florida, on March 31, 2000, between midnight
and 0600 a.m. The gauge was stored in an approved transportation package and was secured
to the vehicle by a chain. The chain was cut and both the gauge and case were taken. The
licensee notified the police of the theft.
Case 4: A portable moisture/density gauge was stolen when the pickup truck it was chained to
was stolen from the home of an employee. The gauge contained a 1.48 GBq (40 mCi)
Americium-241 source and an 0.30 GBq (8 mCi) Cesium-137 source. The gauge was locked in
its transport container, which was chained in the back of the truck. The truck was stolen early
on the morning of April 19, 2001. The theft was reported to the Tempe, Arizona, Police and a
reward was offered.
Discussion:
Thefts involving portable gauges appear to be occurring most frequently when gauges are
stored in vehicles parked in a non-work area. In addition to considering deterrents to thefts
such as locks, security considerations for portable gauges containing radioactive material
should extend to ways to minimize the threat of theft. The requirements for control and security
of licensed material are given in 10 CFR 20.1801 and 20.1802. Control and security
requirements may also be found on the NRC license and within U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) regulations.
The NRCs analysis of five years of theft data for portable gauges indicates that a large number
of gauges are stolen from trucks, even when they are secured with chains. To help reduce the
number of thefts, licensees may want to consider taking further precautions, such as: (1)
requiring gauges to be locked in covered vehicle compartments, (2) not parking vehicles in
areas vulnerable to theft, and (3) including a discussion of this IN in periodic or special gauge
user training, to increase awareness of this problem.
NRC licensees are reminded of the recent change to the NRC Enforcement Policy (Federal
Register Notice 79139, dated December 18, 2000, regarding improper disposal of sources).
Under this revised policy, licensees cited for inadequate security and the loss of control of
moisture density gauges may face civil penalties of up to $15,000. This IN notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions about
the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the
appropriate regional office.
/RA/
Donald A. Cool, Director
Division of Industrial and
Medical Nuclear Safety
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards
Attachments:
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Technical Contact:
Samuel L. Pettijohn, NMSS
(301) 415-6822 E-mail: slp@nrc.gov
- ML011920238 TEMPLATE NO.: #NRC =052 DOCUMENT NAME:g:\\pettijohn\\in2001.wpd *See previous concurrence
OFC
MSIB-B*
MSIB-B*
Editor*
MSIB-A*
IMNS
NAME
SPettijohn
FBrown
EKraus
JHickey
DCool
DATE
6/8/2001
6/19/2001
6/11/01
6/19/2001
7/10/2001
Attachment 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NMSS INFORMATION NOTICES
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Information
Date of
Notice No.
Subject
Issuance
Issued to
_____________________________________________________________________________________
2001-08,
Supplement 1
Update on the Investigation of
Patient Deaths in Panama,
Following Radiation Therapy
06/06/01 All medical licensees.
2001-08
Treatment Planning System
Errors Result in Deaths of
Overseas Radiation Therapy
Patients
06/01/01 All medical licensees.
2001-03
Incident Reporting
Requirements for Radiography
Licensees
04/06/01
All industrial radiography
licensees.
2001-01
The Importance of Accurate
Inventory Controls to Prevent
the Unauthorized Possession
of Radioactive Material
03/26/01 All material licensees.
2000-22
Medical Misadministrations
Caused by Human Errors
Involving Gamma Stereotactic
Radiosurgery (GAMMA KNIFE)
12/18/00
All medical use licensees
authorized to conduct gamma
stereotactic radiosurgery
treatments.
2000-19
Implementation of Human Use
Research Protocols Involving
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission Regulated
Materials
12/05/2000
All medical use licensees.
2000-18
Substandard Material Supplied
by Chicago Bullet Proof
Systems
11/29/2000
All 10 CFR Part 50 licensees and
applicants.
All category 1 fuel facilities.
All 10 CFR Part 72 licensees and
applicants.
2000-16
Potential Hazards Due to
Volatilization of Radionuclides
10/5/2000
All licensees that process
unsealed byproduct material.
2000-15
Recent Events Resulting in
Whole Body Exposures
Exceeding Regulatory Limits
9/29/2000
All radiography licensees.
______________________________________________________________________________________
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
Attachment 2 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Information
Date of
Notice No.
Subject
Issuance
Issued to
______________________________________________________________________________________
2001-10
Failure of Central Sprinkler
Company Model GB Series
Fire Sprinkler Heads
06/28/01
All holders of licenses for nuclear
power, research, and test
reactors and fuel cycle facilities
2001-09
Main Feedwater System
Degradation in Safety-Related
ASME Code Class 2 Piping
Inside the Containment of a
Pressurized Water Reactor
06/12/01
All holders of operating licenses
for pressurized water nuclear
power reactors, except those who
have permanently ceased
operations and have certified that
fuel has been permanently
removed from the reactor vessel
2001-08
Supplement 1
Update on the Investigation of
Patient Deaths in Panama,
Following Radiation Therapy
06/06/01
All Medical Licensees
2001-08
Treatment Planning System
Errors Result in Deaths of
Overseas Radiation Therapy
Patients
06/01/01
All medical licensees
2001-07
Unescorted Access Granted
Based on Incomplete and/or
Inaccurate Information
05/11/01
All holders of nuclear reactor
operating licenses who are
subject to Section 73.56 of Title
10, of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR 73.56),
Personnel Access Authorization
Requirements of Nuclear Power
Plants.
2001-06
Centrifugal Charging Pump
Thrust Bearing Damage not
Detected Due to Inadequate
Assessment of Oil Analysis
Results and Selection of Pump
Surveillance Points
05/11/01
All holders of operating licenses
for nuclear power reactors, except those who have
permanently ceased operations
and have certified that fuel has
been permanently removed from
the reactor vessel