Information Notice 2001-07, Unescorted Access Granted on The Basis of Incomplete And/Or Inaccurate Information
| ML011070235 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/11/2001 |
| Revision: | 0 |
| From: | Marsh L B Operational Experience and Non-Power Reactors Branch |
| To: | |
| References | |
| IN-01-007 | |
| Download: ML011070235 (4) | |
UNITEDSTATESNUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONOFFICEOFNUCLEARREACTORREGULATIONWASHINGTON,D.C.20555-0001May11,2001NRCINFORMATIONNOTICE2001-07:UNESCORTEDACCESSGRANTEDONTHEBASISOFINCOMPLETEAND/ORINACCURATE INFORMATION
Addressees
AllholdersofnuclearreactoroperatinglicenseswhoaresubjecttoSection73.56ofTitle10,oftheCodeofFederalRegulations(10CFR73.56),"PersonnelAccessAuthorization RequirementsforNuclearPowerPlants."
Purpose
TheU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)isissuingthisinformationnoticetoinformaddresseesofseveralrecentcaseswherecontractorsfailedtofollowNRCrequirementsfor conductingthebackgroundchecksusedbyNRClicenseestoauthorizeunescortedaccess.In somecases,licenseesgrantedunescortedaccesstoemployeesonthebasisofnonconforming backgroundchecksbycontractors.Recipientsareexpectedtoreviewtheinformationinthis noticeforapplicabilitytotheirfacilitiesandconsideractions,asappropriate.Thesuggestionsin thisinformationnoticearenotNRCrequirements;therefore,nospecificactionorwritten responsetothisnoticeisrequired.BackgroundOperatorsofnuclearpowerplantsarerequiredby10CFR73.56toestablishandimplementaprogram,aspartoftheirphysicalsecurityplan,forgrantingunescortedaccesstoprotectedand vitalareasofnuclearpowerplants.Theprogrammustincludeabackgroundinvestigationto identifypastactionswhichareindicativeofaperson'sfuturereliability.NRCRegulatoryGuide 5.66,"AccessAuthorizationProgramforNuclearPowerPlants,"andSection4.0ofNUMARC 89-01,"IndustryGuidelinesforNuclearPowerPlantAccessAuthorizationPrograms,"provide additionalguidancetolicenseesongrantingunescortedaccess.DescriptionofCircumstancesOnDecember3,1999,alicenseenotifiedNRCRegionIIthataninvestigatoremployedbyabackgroundinvestigationcontractorhadapparentlyfalsifiednumerousbackground investigationrecordssubmittedtosixutilities.Theinvestigatorrecordedthatprioremployment hadbeenverifiedforapplicantswhen,infact,theemploymenthadnotbeenverified.Ina secondcase,onDecember6,1999,alicenseenotifiedNRCRegionIVthataninvestigator employedbyasecondbackgroundinvestigationcontractorhadfalsified"developedreferences" forbackgroundchecks.NRCRegionIIwaslaternotifiedofthesamecasebyoneofits licensees.Thiscaseinvolvedover200records,fiveutilities,andsixplants.Inathirdcase,an NRCRegionIVSafeguardsInspectorfoundduringaninspectionthataninvestigatoremployed byathirdbackgroundinvestigationcontractorhadfalsifiedrecordssubmittedtothelicensee.
Thecontractorstatedthatprioremploymenthadbeenverifiedbycontactingtheapplicant'sML011070235 IN2001-07Page2of2previousemployerwhen,infact,onlypersonalreferenceshadbeencontacted.Inafourthcase,alicenseeinformedNRCRegionIIonSeptember11,2000,thataccessmayhavebeen grantedinappropriatelytofiveemployeesasaconsequenceofincompleteinformationin
"developedreferences"providedbythecontractorwhoperformedthebackground investigations.DiscussionSeverallicenseesgrantedunescortedaccesstoseveralindividualsonthebasisofnonconformingbackgroundinvestigations.Whentheproblemswerediscovered,thelicensees immediatelywithdrewtheunescortedaccessauthorizationspendingreviewsoftherecords.
Thereviewsfoundnoinformationthatwouldhaveprecludedgrantingunescortedaccessto theseindividuals.Workersatothernuclearpowerplantsmayalsohavebeengrantedunescortedaccessonthebasisofincompleteorfalseinformationprovidedinbackgroundinvestigationsbycontractors.
Licenseesmayhavereceivedthebackgroundinformationdirectlyfromtheirbackground investigationcontractorsorindirectlyfromotherlicensees.Regardlessofthesource, licenseeshavefinalresponsibilityforthecompletenessandaccuracyofinformationusedin granting,denying,orrevokingunescortedaccesstotheirsitesfortheiremployeesorfor employeesofcontractors,vendors,orotherorganizations.Incompleteandinaccurate personnelqualificationdatacanconstitutenoncompliancewith10CFR50.9,"Completeness andaccuracyofinformation."Since1996,manylicenseeshaveelectedtousethePersonnelAccessDataSystem(PADS)toassistindecidingwhethertograntunescortedaccesstoanindividual.Licenseesmayneed tochecktheirplantrecordstodeterminewhetherproperbackgroundinvestigationswere completedwhetherPADSwasorwasnotused.Thisnoticerequiresnospecificactionorwrittenresponse.Ifyouhaveanyquestionsabouttheinformationinthisnotice,pleasecontactoneofthetechnicalcontactslistedbelow./RA/LedyardB.Marsh,Chief EventsAssessment,GenericCommunicationsandNon-PowerReactorsBranchDivisionofRegulatoryImprovementPrograms OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulationTechnicalcontacts:BradBaxter,NRRCharlesD.Petrone,NRRChuckHendren,NRR 301-415-1088301-415-1027301-415-3209 E-mail:bxb@nrc.govE-mail:cdp@nrc.govE-mail:chh@nrc.gov
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ListofRecentlyIssuedNRCInformationNotices IN2001-07Page2of2previousemployerwhen,infact,onlypersonalreferenceshadbeencontacted.Inafourthcase,alicenseeinformedNRCRegionIIonSeptember11,2000,thataccessmayhavebeen grantedinappropriatelytofiveemployeesasaconsequenceofincompleteinformationin
"developedreferences"providedbythecontractorwhoperformedthebackground investigations.DiscussionSeverallicenseesgrantedunescortedaccesstoseveralindividualsonthebasisofnonconformingbackgroundinvestigations.Whentheproblemswerediscovered,thelicensees immediatelywithdrewtheunescortedaccessauthorizationspendingreviewsoftherecords.
Thereviewsfoundnoinformationthatwouldhaveprecludedgrantingunescortedaccessto theseindividuals.Workersatothernuclearpowerplantsmayalsohavebeengrantedunescortedaccessonthebasisofincompleteorfalseinformationprovidedinbackgroundinvestigationsbycontractors.
Licenseesmayhavereceivedthebackgroundinformationdirectlyfromtheirbackground investigationcontractorsorindirectlyfromotherlicensees.Regardlessofthesource, licenseeshavefinalresponsibilityforthecompletenessandaccuracyofinformationusedin granting,denying,orrevokingunescortedaccesstotheirsitesfortheiremployeesorfor employeesofcontractors,vendors,orotherorganizations.Incompleteandinaccurate personnelqualificationdatacanconstitutenoncompliancewith10CFR50.9,"Completeness andaccuracyofinformation."Since1996,manylicenseeshaveelectedtousethePersonnelAccessDataSystem(PADS)toassistindecidingwhethertograntunescortedaccesstoanindividual.Licenseesmayneed tochecktheirplantrecordstodeterminewhetherproperbackgroundinvestigationswere completedwhetherPADSwasorwasnotused.Thisnoticerequiresnospecificactionorwrittenresponse.Ifyouhaveanyquestionsabouttheinformationinthisnotice,pleasecontactoneofthetechnicalcontactslistedbelow./RA/LedyardB.Marsh,Chief EventsAssessment,GenericCommunicationsandNon-PowerReactorsBranchDivisionofRegulatoryImprovementPrograms OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulationTechnicalcontacts:BradBaxter,NRRCharlesD.Petrone,NRRChuckHendren,NRR 301-415-1088301-415-1027301-415-3209 E-mail:bxb@nrc.govE-mail:cdp@nrc.govE-mail:chh@nrc.gov Distribution:INReadingFilePUBLIC
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ListofRecentlyIssuedNRCInformationNotices AccessionNo.:ML011070235TemplateNo.:NRR-052*SeepreviousconcurrencesOFFICEIQPB:DIPMNSC:IQPB:DIPMIOLB:DIPMSC:IOLB:DIPMOAC:NRRADIP:NRRNAMECHendren*DDorman*BBaxter*VOrdaz*GCwalina*TReis*DATE03/06/0103/20/0103/06/0103/05/0103/22/0103/21/01TechEdBC:IOLB:DIPMBC:IQPB:DIPMREXB:DRIPD:DIPMREXBC:REXB:DRIPPKleene*GTracy*TQuay*CPetrone*BBoger*JTappert*LMarsh04/10/0103/19/0103/27/0104/25/0105/02/0105/08/0105/11/01OFFICIALRECORDCOPY
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