Information Notice 1996-63, Potential Safety Issue Regarding the Shipment of Fissile Material

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Potential Safety Issue Regarding the Shipment of Fissile Material
ML031050508
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/06/1996
From: Haughney C
NRC/NMSS/SFPO
To:
References
IN-96-063, NUDOCS 9612040215
Download: ML031050508 (9)


K) JIM MCKNIGHT

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 December 5, 1996 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 96-63: POTENTIAL SAFETY ISSUE REGARDING THE

SHIPMENT OF FISSILE MATERIAL

Addressees

All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensees authorized to possess special nuclear

material in unsealed quantities greater than a critical mass.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert

addressees to an issue with potential safety significance regarding shipments using the fissile

material exemption provisions and general licenses. It is expected that recipients will review this

information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar

problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action nor written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

An NRC licensee recently informed NRC of a potential situation where one of the fissile material

exemptions in 10 CFR 71.53 would not have provided adequate criticality safety if large amounts

of an exempt concentration of fissile material were to be transported in the presence of a special

moderating material (i.e., beryllium). A recent contract was awarded to the licensee to process

weapons-usable enriched uranium materials. The waste product, a uranium-beryllium filtercake, met the fissile exemption provisions in 10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453. The presence of

beryllium in significant quantities in NRC-regulated fissile exempt shipments is extraordinary, and

was not considered in the development of the fissile exemptions in the regulations. NRC has

reviewed and verified the licensee's calculations, and has concluded that the current regulations

need to be revised to preclude criticality in fissile exempt shipments made under 10 CFR 71.53, and fissile shipments made underthe general licenses in 10 CFR 71.18 and 10 CFR 71.22. This

information notice is being issued to provide additional, timely notice, to licensees, of this

potential safety issue, while the regulatory revisions are made.

Discussion

The licensee proposed to employ the provision in 10 CFR 71.53(d), or the parallel provision in the

U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations, 49 CFR 173.453(d).

J//1

961204021 on jl4Pqt

PDR ETE OO~tc 99

IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 Section 71.53(d) exempts fissile material from the requirements in 10 CFR 71.55 and 71.59 (i.e.,

the additional requirements placed on fissile packages and shipments to preclude criticality),

provided the package does not contain more than 5 grams (0.18 ounces) of fissile material in

any 10-liter (610-cubic-inch) volume. The fissile exemptions appearing in 10 CFR 71.53 are

assumed to provide inherent criticality control for all practical cases in which fissile materials

exist at or below the applicable regulatory limits (i.e., independent calculations would generally

not be expected nor required). Consequently, the fissile exemptions generally do not place limits

on the types of moderating or reflecting material present in fissile exempt packages, nor the

number of fissile exempt packages that can be shipped in a single consignment, and do not

require that a transport index (see 10 CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality control.

Further, the fissile material exemptions and general license provisions allow any licensee to

make shipments without first seeking NRC approval.

A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, as

loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be

demonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the current regulations

would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is no

assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71 to address

exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g., deuterium and graphite) in the

shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material that can be

transported in a single consignment.

NRC has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE is a

shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials in question.

NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.

NRC notes that very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials with beryllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in such shipments, it is

important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality safety is provided where

fissile materials are transported with materials known or expected to have moderating properties

greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material

exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in

all cases.

I) :K,)

IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or the

appropriate NRC regional office.

Charles J. Haighney, Actirt Dire

Spent Fuel Project Office

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Technical contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS

(301) 415-8520

e-mail: exe@nrc.gov

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices

o k')~ Gu A 7-

Attachment I

IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 Page 1 of I

LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NMSS INFORMATION NOTICES

Info

rmation Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

96-57 Incident-Reporting Require- 10/30/96 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

ments Involving Intakes, Commission licensees

During a 24-Hour Period

that May Cause a Total

Effective Dose Equivalent

in Excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rem)

96-54 Vulnerability of Stainless 10117/96 All material licensees

Steel to Corrosion When

Sensitized

96-53 Retrofit to Amersham 660 10/15/96 All industrial radiography

Posilock Radiography licensees

Camera to Correct Incon- sistency in 10 CFR Part 34 Compatibility

96-52 Cracked Insertion Rods 09/26/96 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

on Troxler Model 3400 Commission portable gauge

Series Portable Moisture licensees and vendors

Density Gauges

96-51 Residual Contamination 09/11/96 All material licensees

Remaining in Krypton-85 Handling System After

Venting

96-47 Recordkeeping, Decommis- 08/19196 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

sioning Notifications for Commission licensees

Disposals of Radioactive

Waste by Land Burial

Authorized Under Former

10 CFR 20.304, 20.302, and Current 20.2002

v>

Attachment 2 IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

96-62 Potential Failure of the 11/20/96 All holders of OLs

Instantaneous Trip Function and CPs for nuclear

of General Electric RMS-9 power plants

Programmers

96-61 Failure of a Main Steam Safety 11/20/96 All holders of OLs or

Valve to Reseat Caused by an CPs for nuclear power

Improperly Installed Release reactors

Nut

96-60 Potential Common-Mode Post- 11/14/96 All holders of OLs or

Accident Failure of Residual CPs for nuclear power

Heat Removal Heat Exchangers reactors

96-59 Potential Degradation of 10/30/96 All holders of OLs or

Post Loss-of-Coolant CPs for nuclear power

Recirculation Capability reactors

as a Result of Debris

96-58 RCP Seal Replacement with 10/30/96 All holders of OLs or

Pump on Backseat CPs for pressurized-water

reactors

96-57 Incident-Reporting Require- 10/29/96 All U.S. Nuclear

ments Involving Intakes, Regulatory Commission

During a 24-Hour Period licensees

That May Cause a Total

Effective Dose Equivalent

in Excess of 0.05 Sv

(5 rems)

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 96-63 K> v2 December 5, 1996 This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or the

appropriate NRC regional office.

ChaSes J.Haugfey

Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director

Spent Fuel Project Office

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Technical contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS

(301) 415-8520

e-mail: exeenrc.gov

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices

96-63.IN *See Previous Concurrence.

OFC SFPO* Ic SFPO* l c SFPO* I c NRR/OECB* I c OGC* lc TEditor I

NAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee ENJenson EKraus*

DATE 10/10/96 10/10/96 10/10/96 10/10/96 11/25/96 11/25/96 OFC lIMOB lI SFP t I l- I I

NAME KRamsey CJH_ ney

DATE 1/27/96 W215196 Ia;v4 i _ _

N L S R

CO E & ENCLOSURE OC

C_ CO

C =COVER E EE= COVER N = NE) CQPT

IN 96-##

KJ i2 October ##, 1996 present in fissile exempt packages, nor the number of fissile exempt packages that can be

shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport index (see 10

CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality control. Further, the fissile material

exemptions and general license provisions allow any licensee to make shipments without

first seeking NRC approval.

A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be

demonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the current

regulations would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and since

there is no assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10

CFR Part 71 to address exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g.,

deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of

fissile exempt material that can be transported in a single consignment.

NRC has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE

is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials in

question. NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.

NRC notes that very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials-with

beryllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in such

shipments, it is important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality

safety is provided where fissile materials are transported with materials known or expected

to have moderating properties greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in this

case, the existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent

analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.

This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or

the appropriate NRC regional office.

Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director

Spent Fuel Project Office

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices

Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS

(301) 415-8520

e-mail: exe@nrc.gov

S:WPROJRXL1FIZ.IN See Previous Concurrence.

OFC SFPON* c SFPO l c SFPO * c NRR/OECBh* I c OGCN lc TEditor I

NAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee ENJenson EKraus *

DATE I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I--

I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 1 11/25/96 1 11/25/96 OFC IMOB I SFP I l _ lL,/

NAME KRamseyeK CJHa_ _ _

DATE 1I9 196 12- ?79 _6 _,,___. __ _ ________

C - COVER E = COVER & LNULUbUKIt N = Nu iurO

>-

considerations and shipping experience indicate that the criticality of fissile exempt

packages is not an immediate threat to worker and public health and safety, the possibility

of criticality in fissile exempt shipments has prompted NRC to revise 10 CFR Part 71, to

address the possible inclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g.,

deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of

fissile exempt material which can be transported in a single consignment.

NRC staff has also contacted the Department of Transportation (DOT) on this issue, as

DOT regulations contain a parallel provision to 10 CFR 71.53 (i.e., 49 CFR 173.453).

NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.

In practice, operating and administrative limits and procedures should prevent the

collection of fissile materials in amounts or geometries which could achieve criticality as a

result of any single change in the conditions necessary for criticality safety. Nevertheless, NRC notes that until the expedited regulatory revisions are made, good practice would be

for licensees to exercise caution in deciding whether to ship: (1) fissile materials with

materials known or expected to have moderating properties greater than water; or (2)

single consignments of fissile exempt packages in excess of 290 grams of uranium-235 or

180 grams of other fissile radionuclides. As demonstrated by the licensee in this case, the

existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent analysis, to

preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed

below, or the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

William D. Travers, Director

Spent Fuel Project Office

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices

Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS

(301) 415-8527 S:IPROJIRXLFIZ.IN See Previous Concurrence.

OFC lSFPO l - SFPO l f-0 e-O NRR/OECB l OGC l TEDITOR I

NAME RLeg -sAG EEas aman b affee WReamer EKraus

lATVS

LO#% IV.

I J.JIIAIgU

I(V

- ITO'I- l &.10

& I I 0 la;: I

1J1_IUa 1lIdav IIU I ,

Iva %

- II I

I I/on

Ef %I

OFC DWM I IMOB l SFPO I SFP

NAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney WDTravers

DATE I/ /96 / /96 / /96 I /96 l

C = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NO COPY

2

IN 96-##

/H October ##, 1996 shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport index (see §71.4) be

assigned to packages for criticality control. Further, the fissile material exemptions and

general license provisions allow any licensee to make shipments without first seeking NRC

approval.

A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be

demonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the current

regulations would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and since

there is no assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise

10 CFR Part 71, to address exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material

(e.g., deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount

of fissile exempt material which can be transported in a single consignment.

NRC staff has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue.

DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials in

question. NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.

NRC notes very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials with

beryllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in such

shipments, it is important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality

safety is provided where fissile materials are transported with materials known or expected

to have moderating properties greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in this

case, the existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent

analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or

the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director

Spent Fuel Project Office

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices

Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS

(301) 415-8520

e-mail: exe@nrc.gov

S:IPROJIRXLIFIZ.IN *See Previous Concurrence. OPP3 OFC SFPO* Ic SFPO* lc SFPO* I c NRR/OECB* I c OG TE TOR I

NAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee _____enson EKraus

DATE I /196 / /96 1 1/96 I/196 1 196 I /196

OFC DWM I IMOB l I

FlO Sl FPO I jI

NAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney WDTravers

DATE I/ /96 I /96 1 /196 / /96 J . I.. ==_

C = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NU COPlY