Information Notice 1979-26, Breach of Containment Integrity

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Breach of Containment Integrity
ML031180182
Person / Time
Site: 05000000
Issue date: 11/05/1979
From:
NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-79-026, NUDOCS 7908220133
Download: ML031180182 (4)


SSINS: 6870

Accession No:

7908220133

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM4ISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEIENT

WASHINGTON, 0. C. 20555

November 5, 1979

IE Information Notice No. 79-26

BREACH OF CONTAIMNENT INTEGRITY

Description of Circumstances

On September 14, 1979, the Consumers Power Company (CPC) notified the NRC of

discovery at the Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant of a valve misalignment that

had resulted in containment integrity being breached for an indeterminate length

of time.

While preparing to perform a Type "C" leak test between two manual valves in a

3" bypass line around the main 48" containment ourge valve, plant personnel dis- covered that both of these manual isolation valves were locked in the open posi- tion. These valves should have been locked closed.

Investigation by the licensee

indicated that the valves may have been improperly positioned since April, 1978, when an efficiency test of the bypass line filters was performed. The plant has

operated at power for the major portion of that time period.

The valve misalignment had no actual impact on the public health.

However, in

the event of a desimn basis accident wherein fuel damage and release of primary

coolant inside the containment are postulated, the open valves would provide a

significant oath for a radioactive release from the containment.

The initial design purpose for the bypass system was to provide a long term

hydrogen control capability for the containment atmosphere following a design

basis accident.Y It was intended that after approximately 30 days following

an accident, when containment pressure and activity levels dropped sufficiently

to permit venting, this system would be manually valved to vent the containment

atmosphere, through high efficiency and charcoal filters, to the exhaust stack.

Thus the components in the bypass line beyond the two manual isolation valves

were not designed for the severe service they would be exposed to with the valves

ooen during the initial pressure surge of the desian basis accident, and signif- icant uncontrolled release would result. High radiation in the vicinity of the

bypass line would also make immediate closing of the manual isolation valves, even if identified as the source of leakaae, an extremely hazardous operation.

The principal cause for this event was inadequacy of the procedures addressing

proper use and oositioning of these valves.

The master containment integrity

valve line-up checklist, which is performed prior to each startup from cold

1/

Current MRC requirements call for the use of hydrogen recombiners to control

Rydronen builduo.

Palisades has recombiners installed.

IE Information Notice No. 79-26

November 5, 1979

Paqe 2 of 2 shutdown, did not include these valves. The filter efficiency test for the 3"

bypass line did not adequately specify the final oosition of these valves, and

this is the orobable cause for the valves being left incorrectly positioned.

The valve misalignment represents a case where human factors in the form of

inadequate procedures resulted in a loss of safety system function.

CPC has undated the above mentioned procedures to assure that orooer positioning

of these valves is addressed. Concurrently, CPC is reviewing other paths from

containment to assure that procedures and checklists are complete. CPC has also

hired a qualified consultant to perform an independent review for the same

purpose.

This Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a significant

occurrence. It is expected that recipients will review the information for

possible applicability to their facilities.

No written response is required.

If you desire additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director

of the aoDropriate MRC Regional Office.

IE Information Motice No. 79-26

November 5, 1979

LISTING OF IE INFORMATION NOTICES

ISSUED IN LAST SIX MnNTHS Information

Notice No.

79-14 Subject

Date

Issued

Issued To

NRC Position of Electrical

Cable Support Systems

6/11/79

All Power Reactor

Facilities with a

CP

79-15

Deficient Procedures

Nuclear Incident at Three

Mile Island

6/7/79

All Holders of Reactor

OLs and CPs

79-16

6/22/79

All Research Reactors

and Test Reactors

with OLs

79-17 Source Holder Assembly Damage 6/20/79

Damage From Misfit Between

Assembly and Reactor Upper

Grid Plate

All Holders

OLs and CPs

of Reactor

79-18

Skylab Reentry

7/5/79 All

OLs

Holders of Reactor

79-19

Pipe Cracks In Stagnant

Borated Water Systems At

PUR Plants

7/17/79 All Holders

OLs and CPs

of Reactor

79-20

79-21 NRC Enforcement Policy

8/10/7'

NRC Licensed Individuals

Transoortation and Commercial 9/7/79

Burial of Radioactive Material

Oualification of Control

9/14/7'

Systems

Emergency Diesel Generator

9/25/79 Lube (Oil Coolers

9

All Holders of Reactor

OLs and CPs and Production

Licensees with Licensed

Operators

All oowier and research

reactors with OL's

9

All oower reactor

facilities with

noeratina licenses

and construction permits.

All Dower reactor

facilities holding OLs

and CPs

79-22

79-23

I.

  • IE

Information Notice No. 79-26

November 5, 1979 LISTING OF IE INFORMATION NOTICES

ISSUED IN 1979 Information

Notice Mo.

Subject

Date

Issued

Issued To

79-24

79-25

Overoressurization Of

Containment Of A PWR Plant

After A Main Stream Line

Break

Reactor Trips At Turkey

Point Unit 3 And 4

9/28/79

All ow er reactor facilities

with a CP

10/1/79

All cower facilities with

an OL or a CP