IR 05000528/2007301
| ML072670537 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 09/21/2007 |
| From: | Gody A Operations Branch IV |
| To: | Edington R Arizona Public Service Co |
| References | |
| ER-07-301 | |
| Download: ML072670537 (12) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NU CLE AR RE GU LATOR Y C O M M I S S I O N ber 21, 2007
SUBJECT:
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 -
EXAMINATION REPORT 05000528/2007301; 05000529/2007301; AND 05000530/2007301
Dear Mr. Edington:
On July 27, 2007, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an examination at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3. The enclosed report documents the examination findings, which were discussed on August 21, 2007, with Mr. Fred Riedel, Director, Nuclear Training Department, and other members of your staff.
The examination included an evaluation of 5 applicants for reactor operator licenses, 3 applicants for instant senior operator licenses, and 2 applicants for upgrade senior operator licenses. The written and operating examinations were developed using NUREG-1021,
"Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 9. The license examiners determined that 10 of the 10 applicants satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55, and the appropriate licenses have been issued.
No findings of significance were identified during this examination.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Anthony T. Gody, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety
Arizona Public Service Company -2-Dockets: 50-528; 50-529; 50-530 Licenses: NPF-41; NPF-51; NPF-74 DISTRIBUTION:
Steve Olea Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, AZ 85007 Douglas K. Porter, Senior Counsel Southern California Edison Company Law Department, Generation Resources P.O. Box 800 Rosemead, CA 91770 Chairman Maricopa County Board of Supervisors 301 W. Jefferson, 10th Floor Phoenix, AZ 85003 Aubrey V. Godwin, Director Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency 4814 South 40 Street Phoenix, AZ 85040 Scott Bauer, Acting Director Regulatory Affairs Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Mail Station 7636 P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034 Jeffrey T. Weikert Assistant General Counsel El Paso Electric Company Mail Location 167 123 W. Mills El Paso, TX 79901 John W. Schumann Los Angeles Department of Water & Power Southern California Public Power Authority P.O. Box 51111, Room 1255-C Los Angeles, CA 90051-0100
Arizona Public Service Company -3-John Taylor Public Service Company of New Mexico 2401 Aztec NE, MS Z110 Albuquerque, NM 87107-4224 Geoffrey M. Cook Southern California Edison Company 5000 Pacific Coast Hwy, Bldg. D21 San Clemente, CA 92672 Robert Henry Salt River Project 6504 East Thomas Road Scottsdale, AZ 85251 Brian Almon Public Utility Commission William B. Travis Building P.O. Box 13326 1701 North Congress Avenue Austin, TX 78701-3326 Karen O'Regan Environmental Program Manager City of Phoenix Office of Environmental Programs 200 West Washington Street Phoenix, AZ 85003 Matthew Benac Assistant Vice President Nuclear & Generation Services El Paso Electric Company 340 East Palm Lane, Suite 310 Phoenix, AZ 85004 Chief, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Section National Preparedness Directorate Technological Hazards Division Department of Homeland Security 1111 Broadway, Suite 1200 Oakland, CA 94607-4052
Arizona Public Service Company -4-Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (EEC)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRS Director (DDC)
DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)
Senior Resident Inspector (GXW2)
Branch Chief, DRP/D (TWP)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (RLN1)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (GEW)
Team Leader, DRP/TSS (CJP)
RITS Coordinator (MSH3)
V. Dricks, PAO (VLD)
D. Pelton, OEDO RIV Coordinator (DLP1)
ROPreports PV Site Secretary (PRC)
SUNSI Review Completed: ___Y___ ADAMS: Yes No Initials: __JFD____
Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available Sensitive Non-Sensitive SOE:OB SOE:OB SOE:OB C:OB C:PBD C:OB JFDrake/lmb TOMcKernon KDClayton ATGody TPruett ATGody
/RA/ /RA/E /RA/E /RA/ RLNease for /RA/
09/07/07 09/04/07 09/04/07 09/17/07 09/21/07 09/21/07 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Dockets: 50-528, 50-529, 50-530 Licenses: NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-74 Report: 05000528/2007301, 05000529/2007301, 05000530/2007301 Licensee: Arizona Public Service Company Facility: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Location: 5951 S. Wintersburg Road Tonopah, Arizona Dates: July 20 through August 21, 2007 Inspectors: Jim Drake, Chief Examiner, Operations Branch Tom McKernon, Senior Operations Engineer Kelly Clayton, Senior Operations Engineer Approved By: Anthony T. Gody, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety-1- Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ER 05000528/2007301, 05000529/2007301, 05000530/2007301; 07/20-08/21/2007, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3, Operator Licensing Initial Examination Report.
NRC examiners evaluated the competency of 5 applicants for reactor operator licenses, 3 applicants for instant senior operator licenses, and 2 applicants for upgrade senior operator licenses at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3. The facility licensee developed the examinations using NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 9. The written examination was administered by the facility on July 20, 2007. NRC examiners administered the operating test on July 23-27, 2007. The license examiners determined that 10 of 10 applicants passed all portions of the examination.
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings No findings of significance were identified.
B. Licensee-Identified Violations No findings of significance were identified.
-2- Enclosure
Report Details 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA5 OTHER ACTIVITIES (Initial License Examination)
.1 Operator Knowledge and Performance a. Examination Scope On July 20, 2007, the licensee proctored the administration of the written examinations to all 10 applicants. The licensee staff graded the written examinations, analyzed the results, and presented their analysis to the NRC on August 6, 2007.
The NRC examination team administered various portions of the operating test to all 10 applicants on July 23 to 26, 2007. Most of the reactor operator and instant senior operator applicants participated in two dynamic simulator scenarios, a control room and facilities walkthrough test consisting of 10 system tasks, and an administrative test consisting of 4 administrative tasks for the reactor operator applicants and 5 administrative tasks for the instant senior operator applicants. The 2 applicants upgrading their reactor operator licenses to senior operator licenses participated in one scenario and took a control room and facilities walkthrough test consisting of 5 system tasks. Their administrative test consisted of 5 administrative tasks.
b. Findings Written Test: All of the applicants passed the written examination. For the written examination, the average score for reactor operator applicants was 86.66 percent, and the average score for senior operator applicants was 84.8 percent for the senior operator portion of the examination and 88.8 percent for the combined written examination. The reactor operator applicant scores ranged from 84 to 89.3 percent, and the senior operator applicant scores ranged from 76 to 92 percent for the senior operator portion of the examination and 86 to 92 percent on the combined examination.
Chapter ES-403 and Form ES-403-1 of NUREG 1021 require the licensee to analyze the validity of any written examination questions that were missed by half or more of the applicants. The licensee conducted a performance analysis for the written examination with emphasis on seven questions missed by 50 percent or more of the applicants. The licensee concluded that all questions were valid and conducted the necessary remediation with the applicants. After reviewing the licensees analysis, the examiners agreed with the licensee's assessment.
Operating Test: The licensing examiners determined that 10 of the 10 applicants passed all portions of the operating examination. During the operating examination, the examiners did not observe any generic weaknesses in operator performance.
The licensee submitted one senior operator administrative job performance measure for a change to the answer key. The licensee provided comments, as well as plant reference material to support their submission. The license examiners reviewed the-3- Enclosure
comments and material, as well as additional procedures and information provided to determine if any changes to the examination answer key was justified. For the job performance measure submitted, the licensee recommended accepting a site area emergency classification and associated protective action recommendations (PARs) vice the general emergency classification and associated PARs. Provided below is the JPM initiating cue, a summary of the licensee's recommendation and justification, and the examiner's resolution and justification.
SA-5: Initiating Cue:
You are in Unit 1.
A SGTR [steam generator tube rupture] > 200 gpm has occurred.
The crew tripped the reactor.
On the reactor trip a loss of power to the grid occurred.
DG [diesel generator] A did not automatically start.
HPSI [high pressure safety injection] Pump B has a white SEIS [safety equipment inoperable status] light illuminated.
The CRS [control room supervisor] entered the functional recovery procedure.
The crew has restored power to PBA-S03 (electrical bus) using the A DG and has started the A HPSI pump.
RVLMS [reactor vessel level monitoring system] indicated <21 percent in the outlet plenum 10 minutes ago, but now indicates >21 percent.
The secondary operator has stabilized the secondary plant using AF [auxiliary feedwater] Pump A and the ADVs [atmospheric dump valves].
Your task is to perform the duties of the Emergency Coordinator until relieved.
This is a time critical JPM.
Licensee Comment The Initiating cue provided the following pertinent information:
Steam generator tube rupture > 200 gpm and The secondary operator has stabilized the secondary plant using Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A and the atmospheric dump valves.
During the validation of the job performance measure it was incorrectly assumed that a loss of the reactor coolant system barrier as defined in Emergency Plan Implementation Procedure (EPIP) 99, EPIP Standard Appendices, Appendix A, Emergency Action Levels (EAL) EAL 1-7, steam generator tube rupture > 132 gpm with a prolonged release of contaminated secondary coolant occurring from the ruptured steam generator to the environment had occurred.
-4- Enclosure
However, Precaution and Limitation 1-7 provides the following clarification of what constitutes a "prolonged release" as used in the context of EAL 1-7 for steam generator tube rupture. As stated in the Fission Product Barrier Emergency Action Level [1-7], a
'prolonged release of secondary coolant' encompasses a main steam line break, feedwater line break, stuck open steam generator safety and/or atmospheric dump valve(s), and plant cooldown (i.e., to Mode 5) while steaming the affected steam generator to atmosphere. Given this definition and that the initiating cue also stated that the plant was stabilized (no cooldown in progress), there was no prolonged release of secondary coolant and no loss of the reactor coolant system barrier as defined in the precaution and limitations associated with the emergency action level. There was, however, a potential loss of reactor coolant system barrier as defined by Emergency Action Level 1-7 since the steam generator tube rupture of > 200gpm met the criteria for a potential loss of the reactor coolant system barrier as defined by Emergency Action Level 1-7, steam generator tube rupture 44 gpm.
A general emergency requires the loss of any two barriers and the potential loss of a third barrier. This job performance measure had a loss of the containment barrier, but only the potential loss of the reactor coolant system and fuel clad. Therefore, the correct classification for the condition provided in the job performance measure was a site area emergency.
Given this information the correct answer for the job performance measure should be a site area emergency classification and the associated PARs because of a potential loss of both fuel clad and reactor coolant system barrier AND loss of any additional barrier.
NRC Resolution After a careful review of the applicable documents, the NRC staff concurred with the licensee's recommendation. The job performance measure was corrected to a classification of a site area emergency and the appropriate PARs.
.2 Initial Licensing Examination Development Operating Examination Outline and Examination Package a. Examination Scope The licensee developed the examinations in accordance with NUREG-1021, Revision 9.
Licensee facility training and operations staff involved in examination development was on a security agreement.
The facility licensee submitted the operating examination outlines on April 23, 2007.
Examiners reviewed the submittal against the requirements of NUREG-1021, Revision 9, and forwarded comments to the licensee on April 30, 2007. The facility licensee submitted the draft operating and written examination package on June 18, 2007. Examiners reviewed the draft submittals against the requirements of NUREG-1021, Revision 9, and provided comments to the licensee for the draft operating and written examinations on June 23, 2007. The examiners conducted an onsite-5- Enclosure
validation of the operating examination and provided comments to the licensee during the week of July 09, 2007. The licensee satisfactorily completed comment resolution during the week of July 16, 2007.
b. Findings Examiners approved the initial examination outline with minor comments and advised the licensee to proceed with the operating examination development.
The chief examiner determined that the operating and written examinations initially submitted by the licensee were within the range of acceptability expected for a proposed examination and were satisfactory after comment resolution.
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Simulation Facility Performance a. Examination Scope The examiners observed simulator performance with regard to plant fidelity and reliability during the examination validation and administration.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Examination Security a. Examination Scope The examiners reviewed examination security for examination development and during both the onsite preparation week and examination administration week for compliance with NUREG-1021 requirements. Plans for simulator security and applicant control were reviewed and discussed with licensee personnel.
b. Findings Two potential examination security compromises occurred during examination development. The first potential compromise occurred when the licensee failed to disconnect the simulator feeds to the Emergency Response Data Acquisition and Display System (ERFDADS) terminals in the units before running two of the scenarios for validation. It was determined by the licensee that compromise of the scenarios was unlikely because the ERFDADS terminals at each unit were secured during the time period in question and the data was deleted. The second occurred when a simulator instructor obtained knowledge of the NRC examination under development and instructed a number of initial operator licensee candidates on May 31, 2007. The instructor was debriefed by the licensee's examination development team members. It was determined that his examination knowledge was limited to three job performance measures and that he had not discussed any information related to his examination-6- Enclosure
knowledge with the students. After debrief, the licensee examination development team was satisfied that no breach of examination security had occurred based on the individual's limited examination knowledge and his specific interaction with the students.
These issues were entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report/Disposition Requests 3003714 and 3023375. The NRC staff determined that these examination security issues were minor.
.5 License Applications a. Examination Scope The chief examiner reviewed all 10 preliminary applications and audited 2 of the license applications in accordance with NUREG 1021, Revision 9.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, including Exit Exit Meeting Summary The examination team presented a debrief to Mr. Pete Borchert, Director Operations Department, and other members of the licensee's management staff at the conclusion of the examinations on July 27, 2007. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
A subsequent telecommunication exit was conducted with Mr. Fred Riedel, Director, Nuclear Training Department, and other members of your staff on August 21, 2007. The findings as detailed in this report and applicant performance during the examination were discussed.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information or materials reviewed during the examination.
4OA7 Licensee - Identified Violations None.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION-7- Enclosure
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee Personnel Pete Borchert, Director Operations Department Fred Riedel, Director Nuclear Training Department Ed Bowers, Operations Pete McSparran, Operations John Cox, Operations John Wood, Training Alan Malley, Section Leader Daniel Marks, Regulatory Affairs Dan Hautala, Regulatory Affairs Tim Weber, Regulatory Affairs Mark McGhee, Operations Warren Potter, Training Larry Burton, Training NRC Personnel Anthony Gody, Branch Chief, Operations Greg Warnick, Senior Resident Inspector Jim Melfi, Resident Inspector Jim Drake, Chief Examiner Tom McKernon, Senior Operations Engineer Kelly Clayton, Senior Operations Engineer A-1 Attachment