IR 05000528/2007014
| ML071930456 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 07/12/2007 |
| From: | Caniano R Division of Reactor Safety IV |
| To: | Edington R Arizona Public Service Co |
| References | |
| 4-2007-009, EA-07-162 IR-07-014 | |
| Download: ML071930456 (7) | |
Text
UNITED STATE S N UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMI SS I ON uly 12, 2007
SUBJECT:
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000528/2007014 AND NRC INVESTIGATION REPORT 4-2007-009
Dear Mr. Edington:
This refers to information provided by your staff at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station on November 9, 2006, which indicated that a qualified senior operator, stationed as the reactor operator, falsified a record related to a steam generator blowdown (a back flushing activity to remove sediment in a steam generator). Specifically, your staff informed the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that on November 8, 2006, a senior operator, stationed as the reactor operator, mistakenly entered an incorrect blowdown constant into the plant computer and subsequently attempted to cover up the mistake by falsifying the blowdown record. The plant computer uses the blowdown constant to make calculations of thermal power for control room instruments. As a result of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Stations notification, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) initiated an investigation on November 20, 2006, into the circumstances surrounding this matter. NRC Inspection Report 05000528/2007014 has been assigned to this case.
Based on the results of the OI investigation, an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.9 was identified and is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs Web site at www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. Part 50.9 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations states, in part, that information required by regulation or license condition to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, the apparent violation involves inaccurate information (the falsified blowdown constant) on a required record, and the NRC is concerned that the senior operators action to change the blowdown record may have involved willfulness in the form of deliberate misconduct. A factual Summary of the OI report is enclosed.
In response to this event, your staff performed an investigation into the circumstances. Plant management counseled the senior operator and placed him on administrative leave pending the results of the investigation. Prior to the senior operators disciplinary hearing, the senior
Arizona Public Service Company 2 EA-07-162 operator resigned his employment with Arizona Public Service Company. In addition, plant management met with all operators and reinforced the expectation to self-report errors.
Our assessment of the incorrect blowdown constant in the plant computer is that the safety significance is very low because the error caused indicated thermal power to be non-conservatively lower than actual thermal power by a small amount (approximately 0.3 percent) for a limited duration (less than an hour). However, the NRC is considering escalated enforcement due to the apparent willfulness involved with the violation. Willful violations are by definition a particular concern to the Commission because its regulatory program is based on licensees and their employees acting with integrity. Therefore, a violation may be considered more significant than the underlying noncompliance if it involves willfulness.
A closed predecisional enforcement conference to discuss this apparent violation has been scheduled for August 30, 2007, at 8:30 a.m.
The decision to hold a predecisional enforcement conference does not mean that the NRC has determined that a violation has occurred or that enforcement action will be taken. This conference is being held to obtain information to assist the NRC in making an enforcement decision. This may include information to determine whether a violation occurred, information to determine the significance of a violation, information related to the identification of a violation, and information related to any corrective actions taken or planned to be taken. The conference will provide an opportunity for you to provide your perspective on these matters and any other information that you believe the NRC should take into consideration in making an enforcement decision. In addition, we request that, during the conference, your staff provide information regarding the following issues:
1) Since this issue involved a senior operator who felt compelled to cover up a mistake rather than admit it, we are interested in your current assessment of your operations safety culture, its contribution to this event, and any planned or implemented corrective actions.
2) We are interested in your evaluation of the process for determining the blowdown constant, the extent to which it contributed to the senior operators error in determining the incorrect constant and any planned or implemented corrective actions.
3) We are interested in your evaluation of your independent verification process, why that process did not prevent the use of an incorrect blowdown constant in this case, and any planned or implemented corrective actions.
4) We are interested in understanding the process you used in evaluating the trustworthiness and reliability of this individual and whether that is reflected in the Personnel Access Data System.
Instead of a predecisional enforcement conference, you may request alternative dispute resolution with the NRC in an attempt to resolve this issue. Alternative dispute resolution is a general term encompassing various techniques for resolving conflict outside of court using a neutral third party. The technique that the NRC has decided to employ is mediation. Additional
Arizona Public Service Company 3 EA-07-162 information concerning the NRC's program is described in the enclosed brochure (NUREG/BR-0317) and can be obtained at www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/
adr.html. The Institute on Conflict Resolution at Cornell University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as an intake neutral. Please contact the Institute on Conflict Resolution at 877-733-9415 within 10 days of the date of this letter if you are interested in pursing resolution of this issue through alternative dispute resolution.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Roy J. Caniano, Acting Director Division of Reactor Safety Docket No.05-528 License No. NPF-41 Enclosure:
1. Factual Summary of OI Report 4-2007-009 2. NUREG/BR-0317 cc (w/Enclosure 1):
Steve Olea Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, AZ 85007 Douglas K. Porter, Senior Counsel Southern California Edison Company Law Department, Generation Resources P.O. Box 800 Rosemead, CA 91770 Chairman Maricopa County Board of Supervisors 301 W. Jefferson, 10th Floor Phoenix, AZ 85003
Arizona Public Service Company 4 EA-07-162 Aubrey V. Godwin, Director Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency 4814 South 40 Street Phoenix, AZ 85040 Scott Bauer, Acting General Manager Regulatory Affairs and Performance Improvement Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Mail Station 7636 P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034 Jeffrey T. Weikert Assistant General Counsel El Paso Electric Company Mail Location 167 123 W. Mills El Paso, TX 79901 John W. Schumann Los Angeles Department of Water & Power Southern California Public Power Authority P.O. Box 51111, Room 1255-C Los Angeles, CA 90051-0100 John Taylor Public Service Company of New Mexico 2401 Aztec NE, MS Z110 Albuquerque, NM 87107-4224 Geoffrey M. Cook Southern California Edison Company 5000 Pacific Coast Hwy, Bldg. N50 San Clemente, CA 92672 Robert Henry Salt River Project 6504 East Thomas Road Scottsdale, AZ 85251 Brian Almon Public Utility Commission William B. Travis Building P.O. Box 13326 1701 North Congress Avenue Austin, TX 78701-3326
Arizona Public Service Company 5 EA-07-162 Karen O'Regan Environmental Program Manager City of Phoenix Office of Environmental Programs 200 West Washington Street Phoenix, AZ 85003 Matthew Benac Assistant Vice President Nuclear & Generation Services El Paso Electric Company 340 East Palm Lane, Suite 310 Phoenix, AZ 85004 Chief, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Section National Preparedness Directorate Technological Hazards Division Department of Homeland Security 1111 Broadway, Suite 1200 Oakland, CA 94607-4052
Arizona Public Service Company 6 EA-07-162 Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (BSM1)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRS Director (RJC1)
DRS Deputy Director (WBJ)
Senior Resident Inspector (GXW2)
Branch Chief, DRP/D (NFO)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (RLN1)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (GEW)
Team Leader, DRP/TSS (CJP)
RITS Coordinator (MSH3)
V. Dricks, PAO (VLD)
M. Kunowski, OEDO RIV Coordinator (MAK3)
ROPreports PV Site Secretary (PRC)
K. S. Fuller, RC/ACES (KSF)
C. A. Carpenter, D:OE (CAC)
OE:EA File (RidsOeMailCenter)
D. Starkey, OE M. Ashley, NRR M. Vasquez, RIV M. Haire, RIV C. Maier, RIV M. Bloodgood, RIV W. Maier, RIV R4ALLEGATION SUNSI Review Completed: _MSH_ ADAMS: X Yes No Initials: _MSH_
X Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available Sensitive X Non-Sensitive S:\DRS\REPORTS\LTR_EA-07-0162_SRO_PV.doc ACES OB OB RPBD D:DRP RC/ACES MSHaire BWTindell ATGody NFOKeefe ATHowell KFuller
/RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
06/28/07 06/28/07 06/29/07 07/02/07 07/05/07 07/09/07 D:DRS RJCaniano
/RA/
07/12/07 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
FACTUAL SUMMARY OF OI INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 4-2007-009 On November 20, 2006, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI), Region IV (RIV) Field Office, initiated an investigation to determine if a qualified senior operator at Arizona Public Service Companys (APS) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) deliberately falsified blowdown records while on-watch as a reactor operator on November 8, 2006.
On November 8, 2006, the senior operator was conducting PVNGS procedure 40OP-9SB03, Operating the Steam Generator Blowdown System, which consisted of entering blowdown constants into the computer reflecting the blowdown flow path. During this procedure, the blowdown constant is entered into the plant computer and logged in the blowdown record. The senior operator inadvertently chose an incorrect blowdown constant, entered that incorrect constant into the computer, and logged that incorrect constant in the blowdown record.
Subsequently, after recognizing his initial error, the senior operator attempted to cover up his error by falsifying the blowdown record. Specifically, he lined out the incorrect constant (which reflected what he actually entered into the computer) and changed it to the constant he should have entered into the computer.
On November 8, 2006, the day shift Shift Manager identified the inconsistency between the blowdown constant recorded on the blowdown record (after the senior operators falsification)
and the constant that had been entered into the computer (according to computer printouts).
The Shift Manager directed the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) to investigate the issue. The CRS contacted the senior operator, who immediately admitted that he had falsified the blowdown record to cover up his original error in choosing the blowdown constant. The senior operator provided a written statement describing the events leading to his falsification of the blowdown record. On November 14, 2006, the senior operator submitted his letter of resignation to APS acknowledging his error in judgment in falsifying the blowdown record.
During the interview with OI, the senior operator admitted to falsifying the blowdown record. He also admitted that falsifying the blowdown record was wrong, and that it was an intentional act to cover up his initial error of determining the incorrect blowdown constant. Based on the information from the OI investigation, the NRC is concerned that the senior operator may have deliberately falsified blowdown records while on watch as a reactor operator on November 8, 2006.
-1- Enclosure 1