IR 05000528/1983011
| ML20024F667 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 04/20/1983 |
| From: | Dangelo A, Narbut P, Thomas Young NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024F662 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-83-11, 50-529-83-08, 50-529-83-8, 50-530-83-06, 50-530-83-6, IEB-79-24, IEB-80-05, IEB-80-11, IEB-80-5, NUDOCS 8309090562 | |
| Download: ML20024F667 (14) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOM
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REGION V
Report Nos.
50-528/83-11 50-529/83-08
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50-530/83-06
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v Docket Nos.
50-528, 50-529, 50-530 License Nos. CPPK-141, 142, 143
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Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Company
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P. O. Box 21666
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Phoenix, Arizona 85036 x
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. Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2 and 3 '[,
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sInspection at:
Palo Verde Construction Site, Wintersburg, Arizona
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i Inspection conducted:
March 28 - April 1, 1983
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Inspectors:
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P. P. Narbut, Reactor Inspector Date Signed N
<pl bb A. J. D' Angelo, Reactob-inspector Date $igned 2e
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Approvedbyh.Yo
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Reac Projects Section No.2 Summary:
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Inspection during the period of March 28 - April 1, 1983
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' $ Areas Inspected: Routine,' unannounced inspection by regional based
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inspectors of activities associated with licensee action on previous
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.~ inspection findings, safety-related concrete placement, backfill and soil
. compaction, equipment storage and maintenance, and IE Bulletins and
? 5 Circulars. The inspectors also examined an allegation regarding the f
spraying'of water on carbon steel piping welds and examined the
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' containment purge' isolation valve installation. The results of an NRR f
evaluation of an allegation on volcanic activity were discussed. The
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. inspection. involved'66 inspection-hours on site and five inspection houys
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in office by two NRC inspectors.
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RestiltsB No items of noncompliance er deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons-Contacted
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Arizona Public Service Company (APS)~
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- E. E. Van Brunt,'Jr., Vice President, Nuclear Projects Management
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- J. A. Roedel, Corporate Quality Assurance (QA) Manager
- B. S. Kap}lan, Quality Systems Supervisor
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P. J. Moo e, QA' Engineer c
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K. Anderson,.tts Engineer and APS Level III NDE Examiner
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- A. Carter lRosiers,NuclearProjects S. Frost, Siuclear moperations Support b.
Cechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
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R. M. Grant, Project Quality Centrol (QC) Supervisor
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- D. R. Hawkinson, Project QA Supervisor M. A. Rosen, QC Engineer W. A. Miller, Psoject Field Engineer S. M. Nickell,s9roject Superintendent M. Martel, Assistaat, Lead Welding Field Engineer A
L. Afek, Lead Discipline Field Engineer (Mechanical)
I. W. Williams,~ Maintenance Field Engineer g
- K. Wadel, Warehouse Maintenance M.' Alexander, Lsad Discipline Field Engineer (Electrical)
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In addition, various other crafts, QC, and engineering personnel were contacted.
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' * Denotes those attending exit meeting on March 31, 1983
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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(0 pen) Follow-up Item (50-528/81-02/04) Maintenance Program Requirements
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The follow-up item dealt with actions resulting from a review of
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V equipment storage and maintenance. The specific items to be reviewed included the licensee's method of assuring that all permanent plant equipment is included in the maintenance program and assuring the specific maintenance requirements are properly t
performed and documented for these permanent plant items.
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The inspector examined Procedure WPP/QCI 28.0, Revision 11, through
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PCN No. 31, dated September 10, 1982, " Maintenance of Materials and
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Equipment," for conformance to ANS?. N45.2.2 and to determine the licensee's revised method of controlling maintenance of plant equipment.
The inspector interviewed the Lead Discipline Field Engineer (mechanical), the liaintenance Field Engineer, a warehouse
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maintenance engineer, the Quality Control Supervisor, and the responsible APS QA engineer to determine what changes in the control of maintenance activities had taken place as a result of the follow-up item.
The inspector randomly selected three safety-related hardware items; one in Warehouse C, and two installed in Unit 2.
The items were:
Circuit Breaker 3E PBB SO4, MRR 108048, Serial No. 269A7316-008 (GE Magna Blast breaker type AM416 250 9H)
Control Element Drive Mechanism, CEDM 9630330, Tag 2M SFE X01
Limitorque Valve Operator for Safety Injection Valve 2JSIA-UV-644 The items were field-inspected and the vendor technical manuals were researched to determine if special storage or maintenance requirements applied. The maintenarce cards for the items were also examined.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
The following was determined:
All permanent plant hardware items were listed and reviewed for
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maintenance requirements and a maintenance card prepared.
Those items that do not require maintenance are listed as "no maintenance required."
- The Lead Discipline Field Engineers are required to review the applicable vendor technical manuals for revisions to maintenance requirements every six months.
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The Maintenance Field Engineer is responsible for tracking and resolving maintenance activities in all three units plus the receiving warehouses. These duties had previously been divided
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arcong several people.
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New plant equipment, in receiving, is listed daily. The daily
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list is provided to the Maintenance Field Engineer (MFE) so equipment can be erstered into the maintenance system.
- Battery maintenance and equipment lubrication activities are
witnessed, each time, by the HFE. Other maintenance activities are periodically witnessed.
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This system is utilized until the hardware item is turned over to the APS Startup Group.
Startup maintenance and Operations
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maintenance were not examined by the inspectors.
the construction maintenance program in March 1981, August 1981, and December 1982.
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The conduct of the construction plant equipment maintenance program appeared adequately controlled and monitored. Ilowever, the inspectors observed two aspects which appeared to be weaknesses.
(1) Specific visual inspections are not always detailed when specified on maintenance action cards. The inspectors observed that most maintenance action cards detailed the visual maintenance action required.
In several cases, however, the coding category "X02-07" or "X03-Ob" was given without further detail. These codes refer to a shopping list of possible visual inspections (e.g., " space heaters energized" or " rust preservative on machined surfaces") given in WPP/QCI 28.0, Appendix II, page 4.
In most cases, the specific visual inspections required were printed out on the card.
In some cases this was not done; only the code was gi7en. The MTE stated that the mechanics were familiar with the actions required. The inspectors' field sampling did not identify hardware discrepancies. This matter was discussed with licensee management at the exit interview.
(2) The discipline engineers initiate changes to the maintenance requirement by verbally instructing the maintenance program computer operators. On March 24, 1983, the operators had removed the requirement (from the computerized maintenance program) to maintain space heaters energized on Class 1E switchgear based on verbal instructions from the electrical discipline field engineer and a copy of a nonconformance report which applied only to non-Class IE switchgear. This matter was discussed with licensee management at the exit interview.
This item remains open pending resolution of paragraphs 2.a. (1)
and (2) above.
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(Closed) Follow-up item (50-528/83-02/02) Allegation Regarding Siting Concerns The allegation dealt with concerns regarding the siting of the Palo Verde units near evidence of previous volcanic activity. The inspector referred the allegation to the Geosciences Branch, Division of Engineering, NRR.
The Geosciences Branch performed an evaluation (forwarded by Vollmer to Crews, memorandum dated March 21, 1983) which concluded; with due consideration of the items identified in the allegation, that there is no identifiable basis for assuming that a potential exists for volcanic activity in the site area, and that volcanism, consequently, presents no hazard to the Palo Verde units.
This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-528/83-08/ F, Stress Relief Temperature of a Reactor Coolant Pump Support Cast ng Appears Low
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The item concerned the stress relief heat treatment of a reactor coolant pump support casting which was certified by the manufacturer as being done at 1076 to 1094 F, whereas the ASME Code requires stress relief heat treatment at 1100 to 1250 F for the material
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' ASTM-A-148 (currently classified as an ASME P-4 material).
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The licensee representative noted that the component support certification lists ASME Code Case 1644-5 as an applied code case.
Code Case 1644-5 lists ASTM-A-148 as an additional allowable material for ccmponent supports. Code Case 1644-5 did not assign ASTM-148.to a P group number. This was done later; in a revision of the code case (1644-6). Since, at the time, the material was not assigned as P-4 material, the requirements of Table NF-4622.1 for P-4 material did not apply. Alternately, paragraph NF 2121 requires that materials for component supports shall meet the requirements of the material specification. Material specification ASTM-A-148 is not specific as to stress relieving temperature and only requires heating to a " suitable temperature."
The temperature utilized to stress relieve the casting weld repairs appears to be suitable given the small differences between the temperature used and the current requirement and the longer than required time utilized.
This item is considered closed.
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(0 pen) Unresolved item (50-530/83-03/02) Use of Water Spray on Welds This item was originally noted by the inspector on stainless steel welds and was the subject of an allegation on both carbon and stainless steel welds.
The inspector addressed the stainless steel weld aspect in Inspector Report No. 50-528/83-02.
During this inspection the inspector addressed carbon steel welds.
The inspector randomly interviewed 15 welders at work in the field.
The welders were interviewed in the Unit 3 containmeat the Unit 3 Auxiliary Building and the pipe fabrication shop. The welders interviewed had been on site as welders from one week to six years, the average being three and a half years. None of the welders interviewed stated that they had ever sprayed water on carbon steel welds.
They stated that spraying was done on small bore stainless steel to
" draw it up" or align the pipe by selective cooling. None felt it was needed on large bore pipe or structure because the heat sink was more than sufficient.
Two of the welders stated that they had seen other welders spray carbon steel, in the past, on the site.
They both stated that it i
occurred several years ago.
One stated that he had observed it in
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the pipe fabrication shop, and one stated that he saw it in one of the units. Neither could identify whether the pipe was quality class or not.
Both stated that they were talking about relatively isolated incidents.
At the exit interview, the inspector discussed his findings with licensee management. Licensee management committed to perform a study which would identify the welded carbon steel material used in safety-related applications and have them evaluated metalurgically for the possible effects of water spray.
The item remains open pending the results of that study and the procedure change discussed in Inspection Report No. 50-528/83-08.
3.
Review of IE Circulars The inspectors examined licensee action on applicable IE Circulars for a portion of the year 1980 and all of 1981. The closure status and any applicable comments are provided below:
(Open) Circular 80-14, Radioactive Contamination of Plant
Demineralixed Water System and Resultant Internal Contamination of Personnel Bechtel Letter BANPP-E 64373, MOC 126 552, of October 2, 1980, and the APS Action Report Sheet for this circular were reviewed against the circular's recommended actions. The pathway study was performed and additional check valves were added. The licensee identified certain actions yet to be performed:
Review of procedures for adequate administrative controls to prevent cross contamination.
Posting of warning rigns at demineralized water sources.
This circular remains open pending completion of those actions.
,Open) Circular 80-16, Operation Deficiencies in Rosemount Model 510DU (
Trip Units and Model 1152 Pressure Transmitters
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This' circular remains open pending licensee action on the matter.
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(Closed) Circular 80-17, Fuel Pin Damage Due to Water.Tet from
Baffle Plate Corner
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- Tbe inspectors reviewed Combustion Engineering (CE) Letter V-CE-11635 of December 23, 1980. The letter states that the CE design has no unwelded scams in the flow baffles and, therefore, the circular is not applicable.
(Closed) Circular 80-22, Confirmation of Employee Qualifications
The circular recommends that licensees review employment procedures to assure the professional qualifications of employees are
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confirined. The inspectors reviewed Letter ANPP 16578 - JMA/NEM of
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October 20, 1980, which forwards the circular to CE and Bechtel for review. The inspectors reviewed APS Procedure 711-02 of July 30, 1978, " Pre-employment Reference Verification," and noted an operations QA audit finding based on an audit of personal files done against the circular requirements and FSAR commitments. The circular is considered closed based on the action taken by the licensee.
(Closed) Circular 80-23, Potential Defects in Beloit Power Systems
Emergency Generators The inspector examined the APS document "In-house Review of NRC I&E Documents," dated November 5,1980, which concluded APS does not have Beloit Power Systems generators. This circular is considered closed.
(Closed) Circular 81-01, Design Problems Involving Indication
Pushbutton Switches Manufactured by Honeywell Incorporated The circular described a situation where relamping Series 2 pushbutton switches manufactured by the Microswitch Division of Honeywell may cause short circuits and component actuation.
Bechtel Letter B/ANPP-E-76443, MOC 157259, of July 1981 states that
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a supplier survey shows PVNGS does not use Series 2 switches.
The inspector noted that the licensee identified in APS Letter ANPP-18580-JMA/NEM of August 5,1981, that PVNGS uses Master
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Specialties pushbutton switches, similar to Honeywells, and further identified that inadvertant switch actuation had oteurred during relamping. Bechtel Letter B/ANPP-E-86230, MOC 190132, of March 16, 1982, stated that Master Switch pushbutton switches are not a problem when the company's relamping procedure is used. A copy of Master Specialties Company letter to Comsip Inc., dated January 26, 1982, was included which contained the relamping procedure.
The construction aspects of this circular are considered closed.
(Closed) Circular 81-05, Self Aligning Rod End Bushings for Pipe
Supports The circular addressed the subject raised by Bechtel notifications of generic deficiencies in pipe support bushings. The licensee had reported these conditions as 10 CFR 50.55(e) reports, i.e.,
notifications on August 28, 1980 (DER 80-23), and November 20, 1980
~ (DER 80-36). These 50.55(e) reports were examined and closed in Inspection Reports 50-528/82-03 and 82-08, respectively. This circular'is therefore considered closed.
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(Closed) Circular 81-06, Potential Deficiency Affecting Certain
Foxboro 10 to 50ma Transmitters
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Bechtel Letter B-ANPP-E-87474, MOC 194261, of April 12, 1982, states
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a ' review of Palo Verde purchase orders shows the items were not
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supplied to'PVNGS. ' This circular is considered closed.
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' (Closed)' Circular 81-08, Foundation Materials
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The circular dealt with insufficient compaction of foundation and
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regarding action taken for this circular. This circular is aconsidered closed, however, based on the inspection reported in
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paragraph.5 of.this report.
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'- (Closed) 3 Circular 81-09, Containment Effluent Water That Bypasses
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'The circular requires a review for unmonitored, unisolable water effluents to the environment that are not automatically isolated on i~
high containment pressure.
The APS review form for this circular, dated October 15, 1981,
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states that there is no discharge of cooling water in the
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containment to the environment, that a closed loop cooling system both inside and outside the containment is used in all potentially j
radioactive-heat exchangers. This circular is closed based on the licensee's review.
't (Closed) Circular 81-13, Torque Switch Electrical Bypass Circuit
for Safeguard Service Valve Motors The inspector examined an APS Circular Review Form, dated September 25, 1981, which stated a review of design criteria and
wiring elementary diagrams _for limitorque valve actuators was done and that this design is notfincorporated at Palo Verde. The
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ir.spector reviewed the FSAR and contacted the NRR reviewer; no
commitment to bypass torque switches was identified. This circular b
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'(Open) Circular 81-14, Main Steam Isolation Valve Failures to_Close
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This circular remains open pending completion of licensee actions.
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Review-of IE Bulletins
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'Bulletin 79-24, Protection of Safety-Related Piping Systems from Freezing
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The bulletin addresses freeze protection of safety-related piping
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y, Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC) Letter Number B/ANPP-E-59379, dated
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May 27, 1980, discusses PVNGS safety-related process, instrument-and z
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sampling lines-located outdoors which may be subject to freezing
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conditions. The subject lines are associated with the following
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tanks:
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Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWT)
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Condensate Storage Tank (CST)
The RWT cnd associated piping were designed to maintain a minimum temperature of 60 F.
The redundant heat tracing systems are comprised of two heater elements, two Resistance Temperature Devices (RTDs), two controllers, and power sources. Sensor location was determined, by analysis, for the lowest line temperature and other parameters such as flow conditions and ambient temperature.
The CSI is not heat traced because of the volume of water stored.
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Associated lines are heat traced to prevent freezing.
Heat, tracing consists of a single heater element fed from one power source. Two ambient thermostats sense low temperature and energize all heaters.
Additional thermostats sense line temperature. These line
thermostats have two level controls; one level will energize all
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heaters of the panel if the ambient thermostats fail and the other level gives a low temperature alarm.
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The freeze protection of the safety-related tanks are also discussed in the PVNGS FSAR Section 2.4.7.
The FSAR provides the following rationale for not providing freeze protection for the CST. Outdoor safety-related facilities are protected from subfreezing temperatures. Pipes are installed underground. The mass of water in the essential spray pound and safety-related tanks will not
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freeze because subfreezing temperatures have too short a duration.
Based on the statements contained in the BPC letter and FSAR, freeze t.
protection of safety-related systems located outdoors has been adequately addressed and this bulletin is considered closed.
Bulletin 80-05, Vacuum Conditions Resulting in Damage to Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS) Holdup Tanks The bulletin addresses vacuum breaker protection of tanks containing radioactive material.
Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC) Letter Number B/ANPP-E-58428, dated May 1, 1980, discusses PVNGS tanks which could be subject to a vacuum. The Chemical Volume Control System Holdup Tank (CVCSHT) is provided with vent piping to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWT)
vent header, which is connected into the Fuel Building normal exhaust duct. There are no valves in the vent system. The total discharge flow from both the CVCSHT and RWT is 21580 gpm, which would induce a 22-inches of water vacuum in addition to the vacuum of three-inches of water present in the Fuel Building normal exhaust duct. Thus, the total vacuum in both the CVCSHT and RWT can be 25-inches of water. The CVCSHT and RWT are designed for 41.4-inches of water vacuum. The above system is described by drawings in the PVNGS FSAR (Figures 9.3-13 and 9.4-9).
The liquid radwaste system holdup tanks are provided with vents connected to the Radwaste Building normal exhaust duct. There are no valves in the vent system. The holdup tanks total discharge flow
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rate of 130 gpm would induce a 1.2-inches of water vacuum in addition to the Radwaste Building exhaust duct vacuum of four-inches of water. The total calculated vacuum in the holdup tank would therefore be 5.2-inches of water. The holdup tanks are designed for a 14.0-inches of wate'. vacuum. The above system is described by drawings in the PVNGS FSAR (Figures 11.2-2 and 9.4-5).
Based on the statements contained in the BPC letter and FSAR, vacuum conditions resulting in damage to tanks containing radioactive material has been adequately addressed and this bulletin is considered closed.
Bulletin 80-11, Masonry Block Wall Design
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This bulletin addresses the design adequacy of masonry blocks walls when subjected to additional loads imposed by piping and equipment supported by the block wall.
IE Bulletin 80-11 is applicable to all power reactor facilities with an operating licensee. Since PVNGS does not have their operating licensee at this time, no response is required of the licensee. However, NRC has requested all construction permit holders to respond to a information request made by the NRC dated April 21, 1980, titled "Information Request on Category I Masonry Walls Employed by Plants Under CP and OL Review."
The licensee responded to NRC via letter dated August 25, 1980, Letter Number ANPP-16223-JMA/KWG. This bulletin is considered closed on the basis that it is not applicable to construction sites and the fact that the subject has been addressed by another vehicle (discussed above).
5.
Foundation and Backfill The inspector examined the procedures used for backfilling to determine that appropriate earth work construction controls were in place for safety-related earth work. The examination consisted of a review of the Palo Verde FSAR, the technical specification for structural backfill, and the applicable quality and work procedures a.
Requirement for Structural Backfill The requirements for the structural earth work to be performed are
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contained in the facility FSAR Section 2.5.4 and Technical Specification 13-CM-300, titled " Excavation aad Backfill." The first issue of the specification was dated May 21, 1976.
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The specification contains the following soil test standards to be
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-implemented in the procedures.
.(1) ASTM D422-63(1972) -
Particle Size Analysis of Soils (2) ASTM D1556-64 (1974)-
Test for Density of Soil in Place by the Sand-Cone Method a
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(3) ASTM D1557-70
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Tests for Moisture Density Relations of Soils and Soil-Aggregate Mixtures Using 10 pound (4.5 Kg) Rammer and 18-inch (457-mm) Drop (4) ASTM D2216-71
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Laboratory Determination of Moisture
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Content of Soil Specification 13-CM-300 contains the requirements for structural backfill. To determine the suitable materials and construction practices to be reficcted in Specification 13-CM-300, Specification 13-CM-301, titled " Test fills for Category I Structural Backfills,"
was prepared by the Engineer. This specification was first issued on January 18, 1977. The specification sets forth the requirements to determire suitable construction practices to be used for backfill, that is, the type of equipment to be used for backfill, the number of passes by the compaction equipment, the moisture content of soil to achieva the require bearing strength, and the
' maximum lift thickness to obtain the required compaction for Category I structural backfills.
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The specifications were found to be in compliance with the facility FSAR.
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Procedure Review Procedure WPP/QCI 57.0, titled " Placing and Compaction of Earthwork (Backfill), Revision 14, was reviewed to ensure that all applicable requirements of Specification 13-CM-300 are contained within the procedure. The procedure was first issued June 18, 1976.
The procedure requires that the quality control engineer verify the following:
~(1) Gradation and moisture are within specification limits.
(2) Backfill area is cleaned, scarified and compacted in accordance with the specification.
(3) Earth work testing is provided when required by specification.
Results of the quality control engineer's inspection are documented on Form WPP/QCI 57.0, titled " Construction Inspection Planning for Placement of Backfill."
Procedure WPP/QCI 57.1,_ titled " Quality Control Inspection and Documentation for Test Fills for Category I Structural Backfills,"
Revision 1, was reviewed to ensure that all applicable requirements of Specification 13-CM-301 are contained within the procedure. The procedure was issued June 18, 1976.
The inspector determined that both procedures implemented the
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applicable specification requirements.
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Recorda Reviews
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The quality inspection records for certain backfill operations were
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examined for compliance with Procedure WPP/QCI 57.0.
Specifically
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at the Unit 3 Spray. Pond Number 2 location, were examined:
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24" Pipe West of Density Tunnel, April 29, 1982 E1. 85'-6"
n 24" Piping East of Spray Pond No.2, May 1, 1982 El. 91'-11 1/4"
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24" SP Lines East of Spray Pond, June 22, 1982
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. El. 92'-5 3/8" 24"~SP Lines East Side Spray Pond, June 24, 1982
' El. 92'-5 3/8" Spray Pond East Pipe Density Tunnel June 25, 1982 El. 95'-5 3/3" 24" SP Line East of Spray Pond, June 29, 1982 El. 92'-5 3/8" 24" SP Line East of Spray Pond, July 8, 1982 El. 92'-5 3/8" 24" SP Line East Side Spray Pond,'
July 9, 1982 El. 92'-5 3/8" 24" SP Line East Side Spray Pond, July 9, 1982 El. 92'-5 3/8" s
~ 24" Piping East Side' Spray Pond, August 13, 1982 El. 92'-5 3/8"
. A11' quality inspection records examined were found to be incompliance with Procedure WPP/QCI 57.0.
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6.
Safety-Related Concrete Placement
'The inspectors reviewed'the procedures, work activities, and preplacement and postplacement' records for the PVNGS Unit 3 Spray Pond Placement 3Y111A.
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Requirements for Concrete Placement
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U The PVNGS FSAR and Specification 13-CM-365, titled " Installation.
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Specification ~for Forming, Placing'and Curing of Concrete," were C -'
'e, cc. reviewed for the requirements imposed on the work activity. The
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following requirements were imposed:
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'(1) Regulatory Guide 1.55 - Concrete Placement in Categroy I Structures.
p (2) ANSI N45.2.5 - Supplementary Quality Assurance Requirements for Installation, Inspection, and Testing of Structural Concrete and Structural Steel During the Construction Phase of Nuclear
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Power Plants.
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v,(3) ACI 304 - Recommended Practice for Measuring, Mixing,
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. Transporting, and Placing Concrete.
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(4) ACI 309 - Recommended Practice for Consolidation of Concrete.
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Specification 13-CM-375, titled " Placing of Reinforcing Steel," was sm
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reviewed to ensure that reinforcing bar spacing tolerances were maintained.
Procedure WPP/QCI 52.0, Revision 12, titled " Concrete Preplacement,"
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and Procedure 53.0, Revision 9, titled " Concrete Placement," were
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examined for conformance to PVNGS FSAR and specification
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. requirements. Both procedures were found to be in compliance with requirements.
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b.
Observation of Work Activities Inspections of Placement 3Y111A was conducted by the inspectors for preplacement cleanliness and proper reinforcement spacing and size.
Concrete placement and consolidation activities and postplacement curing were also observed. Agitator trucks used to transport the concrete from the concrete batch plant to spray pond staging area were examined for internal cleealicess. Agitator truck drums were found to have no debris inside. The truck agitation capacity was checked on several trucks and the truck loadings were found to be satis fa ctory. Slump tests performed at the truck discharge were observed and found to be in compliance with ASTM C143, titled " Slump of Portland Cement Concrete." All activities examined were in accordance with procedures, committed codes and standards, and with the following design drawings for Nuclear Service Spray Pond.
13-C-SPS-375, Revision 7 13-C-SPS-379, Revisiou 8 13-C-SPS-377, Revision 4 13-C-SPS-380, Revision 2
- 13-C-SPS-378, Revision 5 c.
Records Review The concrete preplacement record specified by Procedure WPP/QCI 52.0 for Placement 3Y111A was reviewed and found to be in compliance with the procedure.
7.
Review of Containment Purge Isolation Valves
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During an inspection on February 14-18, 1983 (Inspection Report No. 50-528/83-03), an inspector observed flow arrows on isolation valves to be contrary to the process and instrument drawing (P&ID). The valves in question are the isolation valves for the containment purge system.
The valve tag numbers are as follows:
Inboard Isolation Valvea
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UV3A UV2B UVSA UV4B Outboard Isolation Valves -
UV2A UV3B UV4A UV5B The P&ID for the Containment Purge System (CPP) is shown on Drawing 13-M-CPP-001.
The inspector, during the February inspection, had observed that for each of the four containment penetrations, the inboard containment isolation valve flow arrow (located on the valve body) was pointing in the opposite direction of the outboard isolation valve. The concern was that, if these butterfly valves contained an eccentric disk, the torque characteristics to operate the valve would be different (depending on the flow direction).
During the present inspection, the inspectors examined two of the valves visually and determined that the valves examined had concentric, not eccentric, disks. Further, the inspector reviewed the Pratt (the manufacturer of the valves) instruction manual. The Pratt manual, titled
" Operation - Maintenaice Instruction," submittal number 10407-13-JM-605-161/162-2, states: "In some instances a flow direction is given for valves.
It is characteristic of the offset disc (or eccentric disc) to have a different required operating torque for each of the two flow directions.
If this is the case, our certified Henry Pratt general arrangement drawings will be marked ' Operator suitable for flow in direction as shown only (towards flat side of disc).'
The inspector determined that the applicable Pratt general arrangement u
drawings were:
Pratt drawing C-5768 for valves UV-4A, 4B, 5A, 5B and
,Pratt drawing C-5357 for valves UV-2A, 2B, 3A, 3B Neither drawing contains the above mentioned note regarding flow direction.
Based on the above information the valve's present orientation is in compliance with the valve manufacturer's drawings and instructions.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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8.
Exit Interview On March 31, 1983, the inspectors met with the licensee representatives, identified in paragraph 1, and dicussed the scope of the inspection and findings as discussed in this report.
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