IR 05000518/1979013
| ML19208B612 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hartsville  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1979 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Swan W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19208B607 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-518-79-13, 50-519-79-13, 50-520-79-13, 50-521-79-13, NUDOCS 7909210069 | |
| Download: ML19208B612 (9) | |
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UNITED STATES E\\,,,, g ',,n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 M ARIETT A sT., N.W., sulTE 3100
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Report Nos. 50-518/79-13, 50-519/79-13, 50-520/79-13 and 50-521/79-13 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Tower II
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Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility Name:
Hartsville Nuclear Plants A&B Docket Nos. 50-518, 50-519, 50-520 and 50-521 License Nos. CPPR-150, CPPR-151, CPPR-152 and CPPR-153 Inspection at Hartsville Site near Hartsville, Tennessee
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Inspector:
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W. B. Swan Date Signed 7he Approved by:
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F. S. Cantrell, Acting Sect. ion Chief, RC&ES Branch Date Signed SUMMARY Inspected on June 19-22, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine unannounced inspection involved 32 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of concrete, spray ponds, containments, steel structures and supports, project status, planning pertaining to shutdown of plant B construction and warehousing.
Results Of the areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted License Employees
- R. T. Hathcote, Project Manager
- H. S. Sheppard, Assistant Construction Engineer, QC for STRIDE
- G. A. Gonsalves, QA Supervisor
- A. G. Debbage, QA Audit Supervisor
- W. 1. Quinn, Construction Engineer, BOP
- W. R. Brown, Construction Engineer, STRIDE
- W. O. Brown, Asst. Construction Engineer, Engineering Services
- B. E. Huffaker, Civil / Materials QC Supervisor, B0P G. England, DCU Supervisor, Second Shif t R. C. Nixon, Document Control Supervisor J. T. Dorman, Assistant Construction Engineer, Second Shift R. L. Long, Materials Engineer M. H. McGrory, Technical Services Supervisor J. Carroll, Assistant Construction Superintendent, STRIDE
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 22, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph I above, in the areas of concrete, spray ponds, warehousing audit, containments, steel structures and supports, project status; and planning for shutdown of Plant B construction and the resultant reorganization of site personnel.
No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified. Licensee representatives expressed no dissent with the findings detailed.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Independent Inspection Effort a.
A followup inspection was made of foundation treatment and concrete work for pumphouses for the four spray ponds. The erosion gullies in the Carters formation beneath and south of pond B-2 were being cleared and filled with crushed rock and fill concrete.
b.
The inspector made a general tour of site construction accompanied by a civil engineer of the site QA unit.
Status of construction and supporting activities were observed.
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A review was made of the QA unit's status report on 50.55(e) items, 10 c.
CFR 50 Part 21 items, and IE Bulletins and Circulars.
d.
The inspector accompanied a QA Unit Audit team on an audit of ware-housing in the
"C" storage area. The audit was performed in accordance with established procedures.
Questionable conditions noted by the inspector were independently inspected and noted by the auditors.
e.
The rate of delivery of materials and equipment for both Plants A&B has overwhelmed the capacity of QC to perform timely detailed receiving inspection.
This situation had been discussed with the inspector during inspection 79-11. The inspector discussed the current situation and the licensee's proposals to accelerate receiving inspections. The materials and equipment meanwhile have been provided acceptable interim storage, f.
Reorganization of site personnel to accomodate retrenchment due to curtailment of construction of Plant B was partly accomplished doing this inspection. Job assignments for 141 administrative and technical staff persons were changed effective Monday, June 25, 1979. Basically the changes involved the setting up of three groups: the STRIDE group concerned with power block facilities and pertinent nuclear safety critical support facilities, the balance of plant (B0P) group, and a group providing services to these two principal groups.
Two full shif ts will be manned by construction, engineering, QC and support services personnel.
A necessary reduction in craft and labor personnel (estimated from 900 to 1200 persons) will be accomplished principally by attriticn.
g.
During the inspection, the U. S. Senate acted to double TVA's bonding capacity to thirty billion dollars. The site manager said this action was not expected to affect the delay in construction of Plant B since the curtailment had been based on lower projection of power needs in the late 1980's.
h.
In the Plant A document Control room, the inspector was given a demon-stration of the newly installed Management Engineering Data Systems (MEDS) equipment for retrieval of microfilmed records and site repro-duction.
The QC records, construction drawings and other documents are microfilmed at Knoxville and stored in tape cassettes. Af ter a particular document is identified on the MEDS display screen, it is reproduced. Reproductions made during the inspection were true and legible.
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6.
New Licensee Identified Items (50.55(e))
Prior to the inspection the licensee identified two of the following under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e) and one at the end of the inspection exit interview:
(0 pen) 50-519/79-13-01 Wrong Concrete Mix in Pour BIR-2B a.
At the exit interview licensee representatives revealed that 3,000 psi concrete had been placed by mistake in the B-1 containment shield wall instead of the specified 4,000 psi mix. The 28 day cylinder tests indicated that 90 day cylinders could show that the concrete had attained the required 4,000 psi strength. The matter has been referred by TVA to the STRIDE architect-engineer, C. F. Braun Co., for evaluation.
b.
(0 pen) 50-518/79-13-02 Weld Repair on Vent Wall Plate Weld Preparation TVA found slag inclusions in a buttered weld preparation repair made by the supplier, Lakeside Bridge and Steel Company (Lakeside).
The weld preparation repair had been made by Lakeside to correct the angle of the weld preparation.
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The repair was undocumented and did not receive the radiographic examination required by the General Electric procurement c9ecifica-tions. TVA is to take corrective action and has been au-
.ized by Lakeside to backcharge the costs.
(0 pen) 50-518, 519, 520, 521/79-12-05 Reactor Pedestal Cracking c.
On May 26, 1979 the inspector was notified that cracking had been discovered along a horizontal inside buttered weld preparation on the A-1 RPV pedestal.
The licensee gave notice on June 6, 1979, that General Electric Company had determined that unauthorized and undocu-mented weld preparation repairs to the RPV pedestal plates were made by the supplier. These repairs required documentation and radiographic examination under terms of the procurement specification; and the item is reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e). This item will be held open pending corrective action and issuance of a final report by the licensee.
7.
Status of Previous Licensee Identified 50.55(e) Items a.
(Closed) Item 50-520/79-10-01 Failure to Follow Cadweld Procedures On April 20, 1979, the licensee reported that a basemat Cadweld had been replaced by the Cadweld crew using an unauthorized procedure. QC investigation revealed additional instances in the A-2 basement and one defective weld in the B-2 basement.
On June 29-30, 1979, the inspector observed the installation of 120 replacement Cadwells and the testing of Cadwell specimens.
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The licensee's report "Hartsville Nuclear Plant Unit A2 - Unacceptable Basement Cadwelds - Report No. 1 (Final) -NCR HNP-A-039" dated May 22, 1979, has been received and judged to be adequate.
b.
(Closed) Item 518, 519, 520, 521/78-16-06 Moisture Content Outside Acceptable Limits for Spray Pond Fill The licensee's final report on this matter was transmitted by letter dated June 1,1979. It was entitled:
HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANT, ALL UNITS SPRAY POND CENTRAL AND SUPPORT EARTHFILL MOISTURE CONTENT OUTSIDE OF LIMITS 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) REPORT NO. 2 (FINAL)
NCR-HNP-B11 AND NRC-HNP-B12 The extensive retesting and evaluation of previously placed fill resulted in the conclusion that no corrective action was required.
To avoid repetition of conditions leading to NCR's B11 and B12, the CONST QCI Manual is being revised where not previously indicated to include the type of test to be conducted, frequency of inspection and acceptance criteria as required by the Hartsville Construction Specifi-cation N6C-875, " Earth and Rock Foundation and Fills." The CONST QA staff will continue to update the QCI Manual as necessary to reflect construction specification revisions. Site QC inspectors will then be retrained to the revised QCI's to extablish their cognizance of appli-cable requirements including proper recording of test data.
In order to prevent mathematical errors in test results on earth fill from going undetected for a long time such that major corrective actions are necessary, the site QC unit will review test documentation in a timely manner to enable errors to be caught before extensive additional work is accomplished and a " checked by" block was added to compaction test forms to record this review.
This report has been reviewed by the inspector and found to be acceptable.
The procedural changes indicated were verified during inspection 79-11.
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(0 pen) Item 518/519/520/521/79-10-02:
Factor of Safety for Actual Design of We'ided' A~nchorages. TVA civil engineering branch review of anchors and platen revealed that if plater acted flexibly, cracking could occur due to stress concentrations in a zone of brittlenest (heat affected zone). This item will remain open pending receipt of the licensee's final report on this matter and until the licensee's corrective actions are reviewed by Region II.
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(0 pen) Unresolved Items 518, 519, 520, 521/79-04-01 Sump Liners - Poor Welds; Inaccuracies in Reporting of Corrective Actions The site QA is instituting a program to implement the instructions in a memorandum f rom Mr. H. H. Mull, Director, Division of Construction dated February 14, 1979 concerning "The Responsibilities And The Accuracy of Reports to NRC Concerning 50.55(e) Items".
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(0 pen) Item 518, 519, 520, 521/79-12-03 Infraction - Weldiug Control Procedures Do Not Clearly Define Requirements f.
(0 pen) Item 518, 519, 520, 521/79-12-01 Deficiency - Outdated QA Program Description Violation of Procedure on g.
(Closed) Item 518/79-12-02 Infraction
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Welding Material Control Welder was removing multiple rods from oven. He was terminated.
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(0 pen) Item 518, 519, 520, 521/79-12-04 Inspector Followup item: QA Training Program for Welders i.
(Closed) Item 518/79-10-03 10 CFR 50.55(e) and/or 10CFR 50 Part 21 Item:
Unauthorized, Undocumented Weld Repairs to RPV Shield Wall Shell Plates Weld Preparation:
By letter dated June 29, 1979, licensee transmitted a report entitled:
HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT Al-BREAKDOWN IN THE QUALITY CONTROL PROGRAM AT INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING WORK ON THE REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL SHIELD WALL REPORT NUMBER 2 (FINAL)
NCR'S HNP-A-037 AND HNP-A-043 REPORTABLE UNDER 10 CFR 50.55(e)
This report states that TVA will correct the deficient weld preparation repairs on Unit A-1 plates and that Industrial Engineering Works has taken shop actions to preclude the same error on the other Hartsville RPV shield walls.
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(Closed) 518, 519, 520, 521/79-13-04 10 CFR 50 Part 21 Item:
Dis-crepant Materials in Welding Elbows:
By letter dated May 25, 1979, the licensee transmitted a report entitled:
HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANTS A AND B PHIPPS BEND NUCLEAR PLANT YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PIANT PIPE ELB0WS MADE OF UNSPECIFIED MATERIAL REPORT NO. 1 (FINAL)
NCR'S HNP-A-047, PBNP-015, AND YCNP-007
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Concerning Hartsville the report states:
"The 45 elbows of heat W6719 shipped to Hartsville excluding those shipped to Yellow Creek were identific.' in the receiving warehouse af ter notification by an April 3, 1979, telecon with Guyoa. These elbows were listed on an OS or D (oser, short, or defective) report, segregated, and shipped back to Tube Turns on April 12, 1979."
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(0 pen) Item 79-01-02 Deviation - Sampling of Pumped Concrete Licensee response letter of March 3, 1979, indicated that immediate corrective action had been taken to comply with ANSI M45.2.5-1974 by sampling at end of pump lines; and states that QCI C-208 would be revised to detail this requirement.
8.
Status of NRC Inspection and Enforcement BulletinsBulletin 79-04 (Closed) - Incorrect Weights for Velan Check Valves:
The enclosure " Response to IE Bulletin 79-04 - Seismic Stress Ar.alysis of Safety Related Piping" attachment to TVA letter dated May 31, 1979, states in part "TVA's review of Hartsville has revealed that three-inch, four-inch, or six-inch diameter Velon Swing check valves have neither been installed nor are scheduled for installation in any seismic Category I piping system."
Bulletin 79-09 (closed) Failure of Type AK-2 Circuit Breakers in Safety Related Systems The enclosure to TVA'a letter of June 20, 1979, concerning Bulletin 79-09 states in part:
GE type AK circuits breakers are neither in use nor are
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planned for use in safety-related systems."
(0 pen)Bulletin 79-02 Pipe support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Bolts TVA's letter of July 5,1979, transmitted the results of investigations performed in response to Bulletin 79-02. The transmittal included generic response to the four action items detailed in the bulletin, including details of design analysis, TVA Civil Design Standard DS-C6.1 " Concrete Anchorages", and TVA Construction Specification G-32, Rev 5 Bolt Anchors Set in Hardened Concrete".
This item remains open pending RII review of response and followup inspections.
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Containment (Structural Concrete II) - Observation of Work and Work Activities on Containment Shield Walls of Units A-1 and B-1 The inspector again observed installation of reinforcing steel for the fourth wall ring placement on Unit A-1.
Congestion of vertical #11 bars (reported under QCIR 13817) prevented regular lapping for extension; so the A-E, C. F. Braun Co. had issued an engineering change order to permit mechanical lapping by Cadwelds. The inspector observed installation and inspection of some of these Cadwelds. Crowding of the hooks on horizontal rebars at the equipment hatch (reported by QCIR 13833) prevented effective placement of concrete in the hatch area. The licensee was authorized by the A-E to remove part of the hook on alternate rebars so concrete cover could be obtained without voids.
The inspector also observed the placement of forms for the third wall lift on Unit B-1 containment shield wall. Rebar and other embedments had been installed and the licensee decided to place concrete to protect this steel during the proposed four year curtailment of Plant B construction.
No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.
10.
Containment (Structural Concrete II) - Review of Quality Records for Unit B-1 Shield Wall No additional cylinder breaks had been made since inspection 79-11.
The inspector was told by concrete laboratory personnel that the three day break results for placement BIR-2B had not met the charted strengths for the mix used; therefore the results had been reviewed by specialists of TVA's Singleton laboratories, who felt that results of 28 day tests and 90 day tests would show that the concrete had reached the design strength of 4,000 psi. On July 10 the inspector was told by QA personnel at Knoxville that fully satisfactory results had not been obtained at 28 days; so a decision had been reached by design engineers to skip the 90 day tests, because of the low number of cylinders available for breaking, and that testing would be done at 180 days after placement or about August 5, 1979.
Review of the test results and TVA's engineering evaluation will be made by the NRC inspector as soon as they become available. This will be tracked by Inspector Follow Up Item 519/79-13-01.
The licensee's confidence on the eventual confirmation of the adequacy of the concrete in placement BIR-2B was such that a decision had been reached to place the next ring of wall concrete above it during the week beginning July 8.
Please refer to paragraph 6a for licensee identified 50.55(e) item concerning concrete mix used in placement B1R-2B on May 7,1979.
No item of noncompliance or unreported deviation was identified.
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Containment (Steel Structures and Supports) - Observation of Work cnd Work Activities on Steel Containment Wall and Reactor Pressure Vessel Pedestal for Unit A-1 and the RPV Pedestal for Unit B-2 The inspector observed the installation of lifting attachments and cables on the third containment wall ring on the assembly template preparatory to lif ting of the ring into the shield building.
The inspector observed additional magnetic particle testing along the horizontal weld joining the lower pedestal assembly to the upper.
As reported by Inspection Report 518/79-11, welding has been suspended after finding of cracking on weld preparation repairs mad ' by Lakeside Bridge Steel Company.
The inspector noted that licensee welders were completing welding of the base of the B-1 pedestal to its support ring. Other welding on the pedestal had been halted and a decision reached to store the upper pedestal assembly in the storage yard during the proposed periods of construction of Plant B, rather than store it on top of the lower section in the containment.
No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified during these observa-tions.
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