IR 05000498/2017003
| ML17311A653 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 11/02/2017 |
| From: | Nick Taylor NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-B |
| To: | Gerry Powell South Texas |
| Nick Taylor | |
| References | |
| IR 2017003 | |
| Download: ML17311A653 (31) | |
Text
ber 2, 2017
SUBJECT:
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2017003 AND 05000499/2017003
Dear Mr. Powell:
On September 30, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, facility. On October 5, 2017, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Nicholas H. Taylor, Branch Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-498 and 50-499 License Nos.: NPF-76 and NPF-80 Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000498/2017003 and 05000499/2017003 w/ Attachments:
1. Supplemental Information 2. Request for Information
ML17311A653 SUNSI Review: ADAMS: Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Keyword:
By:DLP/dll Yes No Publicly Available Sensitive NRC-002 OFFICE SRI:DRP/B RI:DRP/B C:DRS/EB1 C:DRS/EB2 C:DRS/OB C:DRS/PSB2 NAME ASanchez NHernandez TFarnholtz GWerner VGaddy HGepford SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
DATE 10/24/2017 10/24/2017 10/23/2017 10/18/2017 10/19/17 10/18/2017 OFFICE C:DRS/IPAT SPE:DRP/B BC:DRP/B NAME THipschman DProulx NTaylor SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
DATE 10/17/17 10/31/17 11/2/17
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket: 05000498; 05000499 License: NPF-76; NPF-80 Report: 05000498/2017003; 05000499/2017003 Licensee: STP Nuclear Operating Company Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth Wadsworth, Texas 77483 Dates: July 1 through September 30, 2017 Inspectors: A. Sanchez, Senior Resident Inspector N. Hernandez, Resident Inspector R. Azua, Senior Reactor Inspector H. Freeman, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Josey, Senior Resident Inspector J. Melfi, Project Engineer J. Rollins, Senior Physical Security Inspector Approved Nicholas H. Taylor By: Chief, Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000498/2017003, 05000499/2017003; 07/01/2017 - 09/30/2017; South Texas Project
Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2; Integrated Inspection Report The inspection activities described in this report were performed between July 1 and September 30, 2017, by the resident inspectors at the South Texas Project and inspectors from the NRCs Region IV office. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (i.e., Green, greater than Green, White, Yellow, or Red), determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, dated April 29, 2015. Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014. Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, dated July 2016.
No findings were identified.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 and Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and remained there for the entire inspection period.
On August 25, 2017, Hurricane Harvey, a category four hurricane, made landfall in Rockport, Texas, approximately 100 miles west of the site. Both units maintained full power operations through the storm. The NRC Region IV office dispatched four inspectors to the South Texas Project to oversee licensee response and actions to the storm, and were physically sequestered inside the protected area from August 25 through September 2, 2017.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
On August 10, 2017, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations readiness for impending adverse weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed plant design features, the licensees procedures to respond to high winds due to a tornado spotted on the owner controlled area, and the licensees implementation of these procedures. The inspectors evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and indications for those systems required to control the plant.
On August 25, 2017, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations readiness for impending adverse weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed plant design features, the licensees procedures to respond to high winds, tropical storms, and hurricanes (Harvey), and the licensees implementation of these procedures. The inspectors evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and indications for those systems required to control the plant.
These activities constituted two samples of readiness for impending adverse weather conditions, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial Walk-Down
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial system walk-downs of the following risk-significant systems:
- July 20, 2017, Unit 1, train B essential cooling water while train A essential cooling water was out of service for emergent maintenance
- July 24, 2017, Unit 1, train A essential cooling water while train B essential cooling water was out of service for planned maintenance
- August 8, 2017, Unit 1, train C emergency diesel generator while the train D turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was out of service for planned maintenance
- August 14, 2017, Unit 1, train C essential cooling water systems while train A essential cooling water system was out of service for planned maintenance
- August 31, 2017, Unit 1 and Unit 2, main cooling reservoir following Hurricane Harvey The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the systems and trains were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.
These activities constituted five partial system walk-down samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Complete Walk-Down
a. Inspection Scope
On July 27, 2017, the inspectors performed a complete system walk-down inspection of the Unit 2, train A auxiliary feedwater system. The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and system design information to determine the correct auxiliary feedwater system lineup for the existing plant configuration. The inspectors also reviewed outstanding work orders, open condition reports, in-process design changes, temporary modifications, and other open items tracked by the licensees operations and engineering departments. The inspectors then visually verified that the system was correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.
These activities constituted one complete system walk-down sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
.1 Quarterly Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on five plant areas important to safety:
- July 17, 2017, make-up demineralizer building, Fire Area 99, Fire Zone Z920
- July 20, 2017, Unit 2, auxiliary feedwater pump rooms, trains A, B, C, and D; Fire Areas 48, 49, 50, and 51, Fire Zones Z400, Z401, Z402, and Z403
- July 21, 2017, Unit 2, electrical auxiliary building, train B 125 Vdc battery room, Fire Area 02, Fire Zone Z002
- July 24, 2017, Unit 1, electrical auxiliary building motor generator room, Fire Area 04, Fire Zone Z054
- July 25, 2017, Unit 2, turbine generator building, 13.8 kV switchgear room and cable vault, Fire Area 90, Fire Zone Z710 For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensees fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.
These activities constituted five quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Annual Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
On August 21, 2017, the inspectors completed their annual evaluation of the licensees fire brigade performance. This evaluation included observation of two fire drills:
- July 12, 2017, unannounced drill, fire in the Unit 1, train A cable spreading room coupled with a personnel injury
- August 2, 2017, announced drill, fire in the Unit 2, train B emergency diesel generator control panel due to the A phase overcurrent breaker overheating During these drills, the inspectors evaluated the capability of the fire brigade members, the leadership ability of the brigade leader, the brigades use of turnout gear and fire-fighting equipment, and the effectiveness of the fire brigades team operation. The inspectors also reviewed whether the licensees fire brigade met NRC requirements for training, dedicated size and membership, and equipment.
These activities constituted one annual inspection sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
On August 1, 2017, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations ability to mitigate flooding due to internal causes. After reviewing the licensees flooding analysis, the inspectors choose two plant areas containing risk-significant structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that were susceptible to flooding:
- Unit 1, auxiliary feedwater pump rooms
- Unit 2, auxiliary feedwater pump rooms The inspectors reviewed plant design features and licensee procedures for coping with internal flooding. The inspectors walked down the selected areas to inspect the design features, including the material condition of seals, drains, and flood barriers. The inspectors evaluated whether operator actions credited for flood mitigation could be successfully accomplished.
In addition, on September 28, 2017, the inspectors completed an inspection of underground vaults susceptible to flooding, to observe their condition following Hurricane Harvey. The inspectors selected seven underground vaults that contained risk-significant or multiple-train cables whose failure could disable risk-significant equipment:
- Unit 1, train A, A0XYAB KEM53
- Unit 1, train B, B0XYAB KEM52
- Unit 1, train C, C0XYAB KEM52
- Unit 1, train C, C0XYAB KEM51
- Unit 2, train B, B0XYAB KEM55
- Unit 2, train B, B0XYAB KEM56
- Unit 2, auxiliary feedwater storage tank valve pit The inspectors observed the material condition of the cables and splices contained in the underground vaults and looked for evidence of cable degradation due to water intrusion. The inspectors verified that the cables and vaults met design requirements.
These activities constituted completion of one flood protection measures sample and one bunker/manhole sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
On September 21, 2017, the inspectors completed an inspection of the readiness and availability of risk-significant heat exchangers. The inspectors observed performance tests for the Unit 1, trains A, B, and C component cooling water heat exchangers and reviewed the data from a performance test for these heat exchangers. Additionally, the inspectors walked down the Unit 1 component cooling water heat exchangers to observe its performance and material condition, and verified that they were correctly categorized under the Maintenance Rule and was receiving the required maintenance.
These activities constituted completion of one heat sink performance annual review sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.07.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
.1 Review of Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
On July 19, 2017, the inspectors observed simulator training for an operating crew. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators critique of their performance.
These activities constituted completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Review of Licensed Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
On August 9, 2017, the inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the plants main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened risk due to maintenance on the letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature controller, CC-TV-4494, which required manual control of letdown temperature.
In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators adherence to plant procedures, including the conduct of operations procedure and other operations department policies.
These activities constituted completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed two instances of degraded performance or condition of safety-significant SSCs:
- August 17, 2017, Unit 1 and Unit 2, auxiliary feedwater systems
- August 28, 2017, Unit 2, pressurizer pressure backup heater breaker for group 2A following a failure to open The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensees corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensees work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensees characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.
These activities constituted completion of two maintenance effectiveness samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed two risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to elevated risk:
- August 7, 2017, Unit 1, planned maintenance on auxiliary feedwater pump 14 to lubricate, clean, and inspect the terry turbine and auxiliary feedwater regulating valve
- September 17, 2017, Unit 2, planned maintenance work week in which the emergency transformer was out of service from Hurricane Harvey The inspectors verified that these risk assessments were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensees risk assessments and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessments.
The inspectors also observed portions of three emergent work activities that had the potential to affect the functional capability of mitigating systems:
- July 19, 2017, Unit 1, emergent maintenance for a ground on train A essential cooling water pump discharge valve 0121
- July 24 through August 20, 2017, Unit 2, emergent maintenance to rebuild centrifugal charging pump 2B due to high pump vibrations
- August 18, 2017, Unit 2, emergent maintenance on train B, qualified display processing system to repair a failed self-health card, which required entry into the licensees Configuration Risk Management Program The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected SSCs.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensees action for implementing the Configuration Risk Management Program for determining and implementing the risk-informed allowed outage time for the emergent maintenance to repair the qualified display processing system, in Unit 2, on August 18, 2017.
These activities constituted completion of five maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed eight operability determinations that the licensee performed for degraded or nonconforming SSCs:
- July 26, 2017, operability determination of Unit 1 solid state protection system following failure of one of two 15 Vdc power supplies in logic cabinet R
- August 8, 2017, operability determination of the Unit 1 reactor coolant leak detection system following the containment normal sump discharge flow totalizer meter giving a false indication of a rising level in the sump
- September 1, 2017, operability determination of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergency diesel generator flood panels that exhibited leakage during heavy rains associated with Hurricane Harvey
- September 15, 2017, operability determination of the Unit 2, train B reactor containment fan cooler (21B) due to a failure of the backdraft damper failing to close
- September 19, 2017, operability determination of Unit 2, train D 125 volt Class 1E battery due to corrosion identified on 16 cells
- September 20, 2017, operability determination of the Unit 1, train B reactor containment fan cooler (12B) due to a failure of the backdraft damper to fully close
- September 20, 2017, operability determination of Unit 2, train B qualified display processing system cabinet due to a broken door handle following maintenance
- September 27, 2017, operability determination of Unit 2, train C degraded automatic recirculation valve flange due to corrosion The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensees evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable, the inspectors verified that the licensees compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability of the degraded SSC.
These activities constituted completion of eight operability review samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed eight post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk-significant SSCs:
- July 27, 2017, Unit 2, pressurizer heater backup group 2A supply breaker following breaker replacement
- August 7, 2017, Unit 1, main generator circuit breaker following solenoid and air regulating valve replacement
- August 8, 2017, Unit 1, train D auxiliary feedwater pump following preventative maintenance
- August 8, 2017, Unit 1, steam generator 1D power operated relief valve following preventative maintenance
- August 20, 2017, Unit 2, centrifugal charging pump 2B following corrective maintenance to replace the pump rotating element
- August 21, 2017, Unit 2, train B qualified display processing system following replacement of the communications board
- September 1, 2017, Unit 1, train A low head safety injection following corrective maintenance to replace a failed breaker
- September 9, 2017, Unit 2, train C auxiliary feedwater pump following corrective maintenance to replace a failed 3A auxiliary relay The inspectors reviewed licensing- and design-basis documents for the SSCs and the maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures. The inspectors observed the performance of the post-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected SSCs.
These activities constituted completion of eight post-maintenance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed five risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their safety functions:
In-service tests:
- July 20, 2017, Unit 2, train D turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump
- August 10, 2017, Unit 1, train D turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump Other surveillance tests:
- July 26, 2017, Unit 1, train B emergency diesel generator surveillance test
- August 1, 2017, Unit 2, train B emergency diesel generator surveillance test
- September 8, 2017, Unit 2, train B reactor containment fan cooler backdraft damper test The inspectors verified that these tests met technical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the test satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing.
These activities constituted completion of five surveillance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1 Safety System Functional Failures (MS05)
a. Inspection Scope
For the period of April 2016 through May 2017, the inspectors reviewed licensee event reports, maintenance rule evaluations, and other records that could indicate whether safety system functional failures had occurred. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, and NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines: 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73, Revision 3, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
These activities constituted verification of the safety system functional failures performance indicator for Unit 1 only, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Mitigating Systems Performance Index: High Pressure Injection Systems (MS07)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees mitigating system performance index data for the period of July 2016 through June 2017 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.
These activities constituted verification of the mitigating system performance index for high pressure injection systems for Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Mitigating Systems Performance Index: Heat Removal Systems (MS08)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees mitigating system performance index data for the period of July 2016 through June 2017 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.
These activities constituted verification of the mitigating system performance index for heat removal systems for Unit 2 only, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity (BI01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees reactor coolant system chemistry sample analyses for the period of April 2016 through May 2017 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.
These activities constituted verification of the reactor coolant system specific activity performance indicator for Unit 1 only, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.5 Reactor Coolant System Identified Leakage (BI02)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees records of reactor coolant system identified leakage for the period of April 2016 through May 2017 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.
These activities constituted verification of the reactor coolant system leakage performance indicator for Unit 1 only, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Routine Review
a. Inspection Scope
Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensees corrective action program and periodically attended the licensees condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected one issue for an in-depth follow-up:
- On September 28, 2017, the inspectors completed a review of an NRC-identified transient combustible issue in the fuel handling building, associated with the emergency core cooling systems common penetration space. The licensee was previously tracking the transient combustibles in accordance with site Procedure 0PGP03-ZF-0019, Control of Transient Fire Loads and Use of Combustible and Flammable Liquids and Gases, Revision 14, but had not included the material in the appropriate appendix following implementation of 0PGP03-ZF-0019, Control of Transient Fire Loads and Use of Combustible and Flammable Liquids and Gases, Revision 15. The inspectors reviewed the fire hazards analysis and toured other areas of the site to evaluate the extent of condition.
The inspectors assessed the licensees problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews and compensatory actions. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate to correct the condition.
These activities constituted completion of one annual follow-up sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 2016 Problem Identification and Resolution Follow-up Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
From August 7 through 9, 2017, the NRC conducted a follow-up inspection to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensees corrective actions, to address the chilled work environment within the South Texas Project (STP) security department. The chilled work environment was first documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000498/2016009; 05000499/2016009, when inspectors found a significant number of security officers that shared a perception that the raising of nuclear safety or security concerns to their employer, or the NRC, was being suppressed or discouraged.
During this inspection, the NRC interviewed approximately 50 members of the G4S Regulated Security Solutions (RSS) contract security force, including four lieutenants, during focus groups and individual interviews. The inspectors also met with licensee management to discuss the corrective actions that had been taken to address the chilled work environment in the STP security department. Finally, the inspectors met with the STP employee concerns program and G4S Safe to Say personnel in order to assess the effectiveness of these programs, and to identify the volume and types of concerns that were being raised using these avenues.
Since the chilled work environment was identified by the NRC, the licensee had made several personnel changes in security management, at the site, in both the STP organization and the G4S/RSS organization. The licensee trained all security officers regarding expectations for establishing and maintaining a safety conscious work environment, and trained them in the use of the corrective action program software.
Finally, the licensee had made progress in hiring and training new security officers to address security overtime and scheduling issues, and had developed a strategic plan to address the condition of the bullet resistant enclosures and response post facilities at the site. With regard to the bullet resistant enclosures and individual response post facilities, the licensee had already replaced the air conditioners, improved their cleanliness, and replaced the chairs.
Interviews with security officers revealed that the morale within the security organization had improved. The officers were aware of the management changes that had occurred and indicated that the new managers seemed to be interested in correcting adverse working conditions that had existed for some time. However, this was tempered by the fact that they felt it was too soon to conclude whether management was committed to the changes over the long term. All of the officers interviewed indicated a willingness to see if these new STP and G4S/RSS managers would be able to effect change, but were reserving judgement on their effectiveness.
In conclusion, the inspectors noted that the licensee had taken several actions to address the underlying problems that were causing the chilled work environment in the STP security department. The inspectors determined, based upon interviews, that security personnel felt comfortable raising nuclear and non-nuclear safety concerns without the fear of retaliation, and with a greater degree of confidence that their concerns would be addressed. The inspectors concluded that the licensees corrective actions had been effective in addressing the chilled work environment in the security department. However, the inspectors concluded that continued management attention and follow through with the corrective action plan is needed to ensure that the safety conscious work environment in the security department continues to improve.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000498/2016-002-00: Unit 1 Automatic Reactor Trip
and Auxiliary Feedwater System Actuation Following Turbine Trip due to Generator Lockout On May 1, 2016, Unit 1 tripped due to a main generator lockout that ultimately resulted in an automatic turbine trip and an automatic reactor trip. The licensee discovered a deteriorated rubber boot where the main generator phase B enter the isophase bus duct.
This degraded protective boot separated and a piece was hanging down and intermittently contacting the generator bushing causing a resistance path to ground, main generator lockout, and turbine trip. The automatic trip was uncomplicated.
The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2016-6008. As part of their corrective actions, the licensee replaced the boot seals on all three phases from the main generator. The licensee determined that the design of the boot seal was less than adequate and implemented Design Change Package 16-6008 to improve the design. During the following Unit 2 Refueling Outage, fall 2016, the boot seals on all three phases from the main generator were replaced.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee event report and related documents regarding the accuracy of the licensee event report and the appropriateness of corrective actions. The inspectors determined the licensees actions were adequate and appropriate. The licensee event report was reviewed and no findings or violations of NRC requirements were identified. Licensee Event Report 05000498/2016-002-00 is closed.
.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000498/2015-001-00: Unit 1 Manual Reactor Trip
due to Lowering Steam Generator Levels and Valid Auxiliary Feedwater System Actuation Following a Manual Main Turbine Trip On December 21, 2015, while at approximately 48 percent reactor power and ascending following a refueling outage, Unit 1 operators manually tripped the main turbine due to excessive load swings caused by main turbine governor valve 2 oscillations. The steam dump system initially responded correctly prior to the turbine trip, but then the group one steam dumps failed to operate. The steam dump issue led to a main feedwater isolation due to rising steam generator levels. Operators initiated a manual reactor trip due to lowering steam generator levels. The lowering steam generator level in steam generator A was the result of a steam generator blowdown isolation valve that failed to fully isolate in the main feedwater isolation.
The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as Condition Reports 2015-26702, 2015-26719, and 2015-26734. Troubleshooting discovered an intermittent ground on the linear variable differential transmitter (LVDT) caused by a small score in the insulation of the LVDT signal wiring. The spring clips in the group one steam dump positioner became dislodged due to the violent and rapid demands created by the governor valve swings. The steam generator A blowdown valve failed to fully close due to a closing spring issue. All three of these conditions were resolved prior to reactor start-up and include: complete replacement of the degraded LVDT wire for governor valve 2 and inspection and testing of the other wiring in the other throttle and governor valves, reinstallation of the positioner spring clips and tolerances verified in all steam dumps, and the replacement of the degraded spring in the steam generator A blowdown valve.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee event report and related documents regarding the accuracy of the licensee event report and the appropriateness of corrective actions. The inspectors determined the licensees actions were adequate and appropriate. The licensee event report was reviewed and no findings or violations of NRC requirements were identified. Licensee Event Report 05000498/2015-001-00 is closed.
These activities constituted completion of two event follow-up samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71153
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On August 10, 2017, regional inspectors presented the Problem Identification and Resolution Follow-up Inspection results to Mr. D. Koehl, President and Chief Executive Officer, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.
On October 5, 2017, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. G. Powell, Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- D. Abell, Supervisor, Security
- R. Aguilera, Manager, Plant Protection/Emergency Response
- E. Bernard, G4S/RSS Safe 2 Say Representative
- J. Berrio, Manager, Operations, Production Support & Programs
- J. Bodnar, Manager, Security
- C. Bowman, Manager, Nuclear Support
- W. Brost, Engineer III
- A. Capristo, Executive Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer
- R. Cink, Investigator, Employee Concerns Program
- J. Connolly, Site Vice President
- R. Dunn Jr., Manager, Nuclear Fuel and Analysis
- R. Engen, Manager, Design Engineering
- S. Flaherty, Manager, Staff Support and Owner Liaison
- T. Frawley, Manager, Corporate Projects
- C. Gann, Manager, Employee Concerns Program
- R. Gibbs, Manager, Operations Division, Unit Operations
- R. Gonzales, Senior Licensing Engineer
- G. Hildebrandt, Manager, Training
- G. Janak, Operations Training Manager
- B. Jefferson, Director, Operations
- B. Lane, Manager, Operations Division, Integrated Work Management & Outage
- J. Lovejoy, Manager, I&C Maintenance
- E. Matejceck, Manager, Mechanical Maintenance
- R. McNeil, Manager, Maintenance Engineering
- J. Mertink, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
- M. Murray, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- M. Page, General Manager, Engineering
- C. Pence, Manager, Chemistry
- L. Peter, General Manager, Projects
- G. Powell, Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
- D. Rencurrel, Senior Vice President, Operations
- M. Ruvalcaba, Manager, Strategic Projects
- R. Savage, Engineer, Licensing Consult Specialist
- R. Scarborough, Manager, Operations Training Mentor
- M. Schaefer, Plant General Manager
- R. Stastny, Maintenance Manager
- L. Sterling, Supervisor, Licensing
- C. Stone, Manager, Health Physics
- J. Von Suskil, Owner Rep - NRG South Texas LP
- K. Wallis, Manager, Systems/Testing and Programs Engineering
- D. Young, G4S Director
- D. Zink, Supervising Engineering Specialist
Attachment 1
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Closed
Unit 1 Automatic Reactor Trip and Auxiliary Feedwater System
- 05000498/2016-002-00 LER Actuation Following Turbine Trip due to Generator Lockout (4OA3.1)
Manual Reactor Trip due to Lowering Steam Generator Levels
- 05000498/2015-001-00 LER and Valid Auxiliary Feedwater System Actuation Following a Manual Main Turbine Trip (4OA3.2)