IR 05000454/1982010
| ML20058C514 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1982 |
| From: | Forney W, Hayes D, Ramsey C, Ulie J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058C456 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-454-82-10, 50-455-82-07, 50-455-82-7, NUDOCS 8207260369 | |
| Download: ML20058C514 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0 Fit!ISSION
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REGION III
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Report No. 50-454/82-10(DPRP); 50-455/82-07(DPRP)
l Docket No. 50-454; 50-455 License No. CPPR-130; CPPR-131
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Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Byron Station, Units 1 and 2
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Inspection At:
Byron Station, Byron, IL i
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Inspection Conducted: ?!ay 1 - June 18, 1982 Inspectors:
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M C. Rams'ey
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kWus/ nb W
hf/h9 Approved By:
. W. Ilayes, C
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Reactor Projects
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Inspection Summary
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Inspection on ?!ay 1 - June 18, 1982 (Report No. 50-454/82-10(DPRP);
50-455/82-07(DPRP)
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Areas Inspected: Routine safety inspection to review preoperational test acti-i
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vities, IE Circulars, Fire Protection, Quality Assurance Procedure Control, Construction Deficiency Reporting, and other construction activities. The in-spection involved a total of 173 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors
including twenty inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: Of the six areas inspected no items of noncompliance were identified
in five areas. One item of noncompliance was identified in the other area.
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7260369 820708 o
ADOCK 05000454 i
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j DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted i
Commonwealth Edison Company j
- V.
I. Schlosser, Project Manager
- G.
Sorensen, Project Construction Superintendent
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- R. Tuotken, Assistant Project Superintendent, PCD
- R.
B. Klingler, Quality Control Supervisor
- J.
Binder, Lead Electrical Engineer, PCD
- C. Tomashek, Lead Startup Engineer l
- M. Stanish, Construction Quality Assurance Manager
- R. Querio, Station Superintendent i
- R. Ward, Station Assistant Superintendent for Administration & Support R. Pleniewicz, Station Assistant Superintendent for Operations
L. Sues, Station Assistant Superintendent for Maintenance i
- F. Willich, Station Quality Assurance
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- D.
St.
Clair, Technical Staff Supervisor
- A.
A. Jaras, Project 0.A.D. Supervisor
F. A. Hornbeak, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor, Startup
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- A. C. Chomacke, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor i
T. E. Didier, Quality Control Supervisor J. R. VanLaere, Rad Chem
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- P.
Nodzenski, Quality Assurance
- T.
P. Joyce, Operating Engineer
- W. Burkamper, QA Supervisor
- Denotes personnel at exit interview.
2.
Preoperational Test Program
a.
The inspector observed portions of the performance test of Emergency Diesel IB Preoperational Test 2.22.10.
The inspector observed brief-
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ings, conduct of the test, observation of precautions, calibration and placement of test instrumentation, documentation of results and unusual events / deficiencies.
The inspector observed during the performance of testing that data was being improperly recorded and signed for, that operators were j
inattentive to test operations, that Test Change Requests (TCR's)
were not properly entered and that test parameters were exceeded
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many times.
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The inspector observed portions of the Safety Injection System to Preoperational Test Procedure 2.73.10 and noted that the Test En-
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gineer directed installation of electrical jumpers without properly accomplishing the preceeding step.
This item appears to be contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B and Commonwealth Edison Topical-Report CE-1-A, Revision 20 as described in the Appendix of the report transmittal letter
(50-454/82-10-01).
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b.
The inspector observed portions of the performance of Diesel Fuel Oil System Testing Preoperational Test Procedure 2.24.10.
The inspector observed establishment of prerequisite and plant condi-tions and reviewed the procedure to determine if TCR's were being properly entered.
No items of noncompliance were noted.
3.
Inspection and Enforcement Circulars IEC 80-12
" Valve-Shaft-to-Actuator Key May Fall Out of Place When Mounted Below Horizontal Axis."
The licensee's review indicates that the only safety related air operated valves with stems located below the horizontal axis are the main steam power operated relief valves. The design of the valves are such that they are not susceptable to the failure mode identified in the circular. This circular is closed.
IEC 80-17
" Fuel Pin Damage Due to Water Jet From Baffle Plate Corner".
The Licensee's review indicates that the Byron reactors are an "Up Flow" design as opposed to the "Down Flow" design identified in the circular.
Westinghouse evaluation of the Up Flow design indicates that fuel rod damage attributed to baffle jetting is effectively eliminated utilizing this design. This circular is closed.
IEC 80-22
" Confirmation of Employee Qualifications". The Li-censee's review indicates receipt and review of the subject circular. The resultc of the review indicated that the Licensee determined weaknesses in some areas and that action was initiated to resolve the weaknesses.
This circular is closed.
IEC 80-23
" Potential Defects in Beloit Power System Emergency Generators". The Licensee's review indicates that Emergency Diesel Generators at Byron are not supplied by the manufacturer referenced in the circular, there-fore no further action is required. This circular is closed.
The inspector also reviewed Circulars 80-18, 80-21, 81-05, 81-07, 81-08, 81-11, 81-12, 81-13, 81-14, which could not be closed at this time.
4.
Nonroutine Reporting Program 10 CFR 50.55(e), Construction Deficiency Reporting - The inspector reviewed reports 79-02, 79-04, 80-02, 81-01, 81-02, 81-03, 81-04, 82-01 which could not be closed at this time.
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5.
Fire Prevention Protection a.
The inspector audited classroom and practical training of the Annual Fire Brigade Training. The classroom training cor.sisted of a one-half hour lecture on fighting class A, B, C and D fires using CO2, dry chemical and light foam extinguishing agents.
The practical training consisted of trainees participating in extinguishing Class A and B fires in a mockup area simulating potential fires that might arise during operation of the plant.
No items of noncompliance were noted.
b.
The inspectors noted the following conditions which do not appear to be consistant with National Fire Protection standards:
(1) Automatic or administrative controls were not provided on:
(a) The main isolation valve on the ring header from the main motor-driven vertical shaft turbine pump for the fire protection water supply system in the pump house.
(b) The main isolation valve on the ring header from the back up diesel pump for the fire protection system in the pump house.
It is noted that isolation (shut off)
of one or both of these valves could render any water supplied protection system at the site inoperative.
(c) The loop sectional isolation valves on ring header (6)
located in the turbine building.
It is noted that isolation of one of these valves may not render a particular water supplied fire protection system in-operative, however, isolation of a sequence of these valves could render a particular water supplied fire
' protection system inoperative.
(2) Fire Doors (a) The integrity of most fire doors throughout the site have been violated by the use of unapproved hardware and penetrations of doors (holes drilled, missing door frames and approved assemblies, installation of security devices and use of unapproved nuts, bolts, door hangers and/or hinges).
In addition, swinging fire doors should be installed so as to open inward toward the hazard being protected, except in areas where life safety considera-tions require doors to open in the direction of egress (stairways, hallways, places of public assembly, etc.).
All fire doors installed at the site open outward (away from the hazard) negating the use of the door stop in fire door assemblies and relying on the single door latching mechanism as the means of holding fire doors in the closed position in a fire situation.
In most cases, these door latching mechanisms were found missing
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from fire doors, or where installed, their purpose was defeated by use of heavy masking tape to hold them in j
the "in" position to keep them from automatically seating l
in the latch holder upon closure of the door.
In such cases, increases in pressure from the hazard side of the door, due to fire and heated air, will force the door open and spread fire, smoke, or hot gasses into adjacent areas.
I (b) The dual bullet proof security / fire doors on the auxillary control equipment room do not appear to be approved fire doors. One double door did not have an approved fire rating and two double doors had a single Underwriters Laboratory label indicating that these doors and their assemblies were dually rated for bullet proof (high power rifle) security and 3-hour fire resistance.
Mr. Ben Zemmer of Underwriters
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Laboratories indicated that U.L. have not rated a
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combination bullet proof and fire resistive door as a single door.
If such a door was listed by U.L.,
it would bear two labels attesting to the fire resis-
tive rating and security classification of the protec-tion afforded. The manufacturer of these doors is listed in the Underwriters Laboratory Building Materials Directory as a manufacturer of a special purpose type -
fire door which is a heavy steel faced swinging fire door and frame assembly. The manufacturer is also listed in the U.L. Automctive Burglary Protection
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Mechanical Equipment Directory as a manufacturer of bullet resisting enclosures / doors to provide protection from attack against small arms, high power small arms, super power small arms, or high power rifle weapons.
These products, however, are separate doors with individual listings by Underwriters Laboratories.
To attest to the fire resistance capability of these doors, the licensee should provide sufficient test data to support the fire resistance rating indicated on the U.L. label affixed to these doors.
(3) Electrical lighting fixtures in Diesel Generator oil storage
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rooms A & B were equipped with ordinary light fixtures.
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Such areas for bulk storage of combustible liquids could produce, in a fire situation, combustible vapors requiring the installation of Class I, Division 2, electrical wiring, according to the National Electrical Code. The requirements for electrical wiring and equipment for this type of bulk
storage of combustible liquids are not specific; however, if the #1 and #2 fuel oil mixture (50,000 gallons) stored in the indoor tanks was exposed to the heat produced by the
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fire, the liquid would produce flammable heat vapors that would be released into the room by pressure relief devices e
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and come in contact with the ordinary electrical fixtures installed. With sufficient concentration of the vapors in the presence of such an ignition source, the fire could be enriched, or an explosion could result.
In view of this, consideration should be given to venting pressure relief devices on these tanks directly to atmosphere and installing Class I, Division II cicctrical. wiring and fixtures in those areas in accordance with the National Electrical Code.
(4) Evaluation of the adequacy of fire protection systems design, calculations and working plans detailing the basic design of the systems installed were not available to compare with test data and system configurations.
This item,is considered unresolved item 454/82-10-02; 455/82-07-01.
e 6.
Final Setting of Unit 1 Steam Generators
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l The inspector noted during review of plans, inspection process sheets and installation procedures that it did not appear that proper quality control records existed to verify correct final setting of all four Unit 1 Steam generators. The inspector noted inconsistancies in in-l spector documentation what appeared to be missing inspector certifica-l tion, discrepencies between procedural requirements and plan require-ments for torquing of fasteners.
The inspector has requested additional information and clarification by the Licensee.
This item is considered unresolved item 454/82-10-03; 455/82-07-02.
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Installation of Shock Arrestors The inspector observed a Pacific Scientific Shock Arrestor, plant identification M-1MS 05003-S, being brought into the Unit I contain-ment for installation. The inspector noted that the bushing was damaged and should not be installed. The inspector notified CECO Construction QA and PCD personnel. The shock arrestor was apparently damaged while in storage in the 426' level. The inspector was told by CECO QA personnel that an inspection of the remaining shock arrestors in storage in the 426' level would he conducted to determine if any other shock arrestors have been damagcd and the results of the in-spection would be provided to the inspector.
This item is considered unresolved item 45A/82-10-04; 455/82-07-03.
8.
Review of QA Procedures The inspector noted while reviewing QA Procedures on file in the Central i
Files that the QA Topical Report CE-1-A did not have the latest two j
revisions (19 and 20) inserted in the report and that QA Manual #157 l
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did not have pages 1 and 2 of Section 18.1, contained two page 5 and page 5 and 6 were out of order.
The Assistant Plant Superintendent for Administration was notified and committed to instituting more positive control of procedural changes and issuance of documents that are not complete and do not
.contain the latest revisions.
This item is considered open inspection item 454/82-10-05; 455/82-07-04.
9.
Care and Preservation of Safety Related Components The inspector noted on June 2, 1982, that a portion of reactor coolant piping under preoperation test control had surface damage which appeared to be hammer marks. CECO QA/ Construction personnel were notified who then notified the Hunter Corporation QA supervisor.
j Review of Hunter Corporation procedure S.I.P. 4.201, Revision 4 of
January 19, 1982, indicates a formalized program of inspecting exists that would have required another system inspection prior to installa-l tion of insulating material. The inspector noted the procedure requires
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the inspection "just prior to heat insulation...." During discussion with CECO and Hunter Corporation personnel the inspector determined that a definition of "just prior to" does not exist and in actual practice the time between inspection and insulation may be weeks.
The inspector notes that extended time periods increases the potential
for damaging pipes and subsequent installation of insulation without
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identification and correction of the damaged area. The inspector has requested the Licensee determine a reasonable time period for definition of "just prior to."
This item is considered unresolved inspection item 454/82-10-06;
455/82-07-05.
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10.
Exit Interview The inspector met with Licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) at the conclusion of the inspection on June 18, 1982. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The Licensee acknowledged the findings reported herein.
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