IR 05000454/1979008
| ML19247B077 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 05/25/1979 |
| From: | Knop R, Konklin J, Livermore H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19247B071 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-454-79-08, 50-454-79-8, 50-455-79-08, 50-455-79-8, NUDOCS 7908070159 | |
| Download: ML19247B077 (5) | |
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U.S.. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMEh7
REGION III
Report No. 50-454/79-08; 50-455/79-08 Docket No. 50-454; 50-455 License No. CPPR-130; CPPR-131 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Byron Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Byron Site, Byron, Illinois Inspection Conducted:
May 8-9, 1979 Inspectors:
J. E. Konklin
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Approved By:
R. C. Knop, Chief 5[7>[9
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Projects Section Inspection Summary Inspection on May 8-9, 1979 (Report No. 50-454/79-08; 50-455/79-08)
Areas Inspected:
Cagoing plant construction activities and storage of components and materials (Units 1 and 2); licensee followup on Part 21 report relating to defective limitorque valve actuators (Units 1 and 2).
This inspection involved a total of 30 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
One item of noncompliance was identified (infraction -
failure to maintain adequate cleanliness and protection of components and equipment, six examples - Paragraphs 2 and 3).
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees
- G. Sorensen, Project Superintendent
- J. T. McIntire, QA Supervisor
- R. Tuetkin, Lead Mechanical Engineer
- J. J. Mihovilovich, Lead Structural Engineer
- G. E. Smith, Lead Electrical Engineer
- J.
T. Porter, QA Mechanical Coordinator
- R. A. Westbery, QA Engineer
- R. B. Klingler, QA Engineer S. Forsha, QA Structural Coordinator Hunter Corporation K. Berta, Warehousing Supervisor Delta-Delta Midstates C. Zavada, QA/QC Manager Westinghouse R. Schulz, Site Manager The inspectors also contacted other licensee and contractor personnel, including craftsmen, QA/QC, technical and engineering staff members.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
Functional or Program Areas Inspected 1.
Ongoing Plant Construction and Storage Activities An extensive site tour was conducted to monitor the progress of site construction activities and the storage of safety-related components and materials.
The areas inspected included the Unit 1 and 2 reactor containments, the fuel handling building, the auxiliary building, the river screen house, the safety-related piping and reinforcing steel storage yards, outdoor storage of the Unit 2 reactor vessel, and warehouse storage of the Unit 1 main coolant pump motors and Unit 1 and 2 reactor vessel heads.
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2.
Unit 1 Reactor Vessel and Inte aals On May 8, 1979, while inspecting the Unit I reactor vessel, which is set in place, and the Unit I reactor internals, which are stored separately from the reactor vessel in Containment No. 1, the inspectors observed the following conditions:
a.
The end caps on fourteen instrumentation thimbles on the Unit I reactor vessel bottom head were found to be torn open, thereby exposing the interiors of the thimbles; on two of the thimbles the weld preps at the ends of the nozzles were completely exposed.
b.
A coating of an oily substance, having the consistency of light machine oil was observed on the bottom and one side
(approximately 30 to 40 of the circumference) of the reactor vessel exterior, extending upward between the reactor vessel and the surrounding reflective insulation; droplets of the oil had formed on the exterior of the bottom head.
c.
Although a protective tent had been set up around the reactor internals, quantities of oily dirt, dirty rags, and other debris were observed on the lower core support plate, the flow mixer plate, the lower thimble guide tube support plate, aad the thimble guide tubes.
The inspectors notified the licensee that the above conditions are considered to be in noncompliance with Criterion XIII of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Chapter 17 of the Byron PSAR, and Regulatory Guide 1.38/ ANSI N45.2.2 which is committed to in CECO Topical Report No. CE-1-A.
(454/79-08-01; 455/79-08-01)
With regard to the oily substance on the reactor vessel exterior, the licensee stated that it appeared that this was oil from the hydraulic equipment which had been used to set the vessel in place in mid-1978. However, the inspector reinspected the bottom head the following day (May 9) and observed that the quantity of oil present appeared to have increased from the previous day.
The inspector expressed a particular concern over the possible effect of the oily substance and its con-taminants on the reflective insulation and on the instrument thimbles at the points of penetration of the bottom head.
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3.
Unit _1 Reactor Coolant System Piping and Components The inspectors also observed work activities and equipment status relative to the installation of Unit 1 primary coolant system Components and made the following observations:
a.
A number of main coolant piping nozzles on reactor coolant loops No. I and No. 3 were open, with the weld prep areas unprotected from possible damage from nearby construction activities. The piping contractors' area foreman ver:fied that there was no work in progress (such as purges or preparation for radiography) which required these nozzles to be open at the time of this inspection. The specific nozzles of concern were pointed out to the licensee by the inspectors. Examples included an 8-inch port in the loop No. 3 hot leg between the steam generator and the stop valve, the loop No. 3 cold leg between the pump and stop valve, and an opening in the loop No. 3 27-inch return line with a construction catwalk passing between the two unprotected weld prep lips.
Similar openings with exposed weld preps were observed in loop No.
1.
b.
In reactor coolant loop No. 1, the main coolant pump volute was found to be open, and 17 of the 24 motor-to-volute threaded bolt holes were uncovered and unprotected from possible damage.
The area foreman also verified in this case that there was no work in progress which required the volute or the bolt holes to be uncovered at the time of this inspection c.
Steam generator manway hatches on reactor coolant loops No. I and No. 3 were open to the atmosphtre, although there was no work in progress (as again verified by the area foreman) which required the manway hatches to be open.
The inspectors notified the licensee that the above conditions constituted three additional examples of noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIII, and that these wruld be included in the item of noncompliance noted above.
4.
Unit 1 Upper Core Support Barrel On the inner surface of the Unit I upger core support barrel, 5 feet above the baffle plate at the 90 azimuth, the inspectors observed a surface pit approximately 1/4 inch in diameter and A25 23%
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A 1/32 inch deep with a sharp edge. Discrepancy reports supplied to the licensee with the core barrel do not record this surface pit.
The inspector discussed the surface pit with the licensee and the Westinghouse Site Manager, and reviewed applicable Westinghouse Drawing 1095E44, Revision 10, Sheet 1 of 5.
Drawing 1095E44 indicates a 250 rms finish on the surface in question.
The licensee stated that the surface pit will be evaluated to determine whether grinding or repair is required.
The inspector stated that this will be made an unresolved item, for review during a future inspection.
(454/79-08-02; 455/79-08-02)
5.
Limitorque Valve Actuators, Report per 10 CFR 21 A report per 10 CFR 21 was made to the NRC by Jamesbury Corporation, on October 16, 1978, regarding specific limitorque valve actuators at four plants, including Byron, which do not meet the applicable seismic loading requirements. During a previous Region III inspection at the CECO corpotete offices (50-45/' 8-11; 50-455/78-11), identifi.ation and implementation of required corrective actions by CZ", was discussed. During this inspection, the inspector determined that corrective actions are underway but are not yet completed.
The inspector questioned whether an evaluation of the valve actuator deficiencies had been made by CECO with regard to reportability per 10 CFR 50.55(e). The on site licensee per-sonnel were unable to obtain verification of such an evaluation in the time avialable. The inspector stated that this will be made an unresolved item pending review during an upcoming inspection at the CECO corporate offices.
(454/79-08-03; 455/79-08-03).
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to determine whether they are acceptable items or items of noncompliance. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 4 and 5.
I :it Interview las inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) at the conclusion of the inspection on May 9, 1979. The inspectors summarized tbt purpose and findings of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings reported herein.
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