IR 05000445/1986032

Insp Repts 50-445/86-32 & 50-446/86-26 on 861201-31.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Electrical Penetration Assemblies,Unit 2 Hot Shutdown Panel & Shutdown Transfer Panel

ML20206A166
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	03/31/1987
From:	Barnes I, Phillips H, Spessard R, Wagner P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205T709	List: IR 05000445/1986032 ML20205T705
References
50-445-86-32, 50-446-86-26, NUDOCS 8704070436
Download: ML20206A166 (14)

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APPENDIX CONSTRUCTION INSPECTION REPORT U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COP 94ISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-445/86-32 Permits: CPPR-126 50-446/86-26 CPPR-127 Dockets: 50-445 Category: A2 50-446 Construction Permit Expiration Dates:

Unit 1: August 1, 1988 Unit 2: August 1, 1987 Applicant: Texas Utilities Electric Company Skyway Tower 400 North Olive Street Lock Box 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 Facility Name: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), Units 1 & 2 Inspection At: Glen Rose, Texas Inspection Conducted: December 1-31, 1986 Inspectors: .

Ab H. S. Philli'ps, SenioF Resident Reactor 3[3/[77 Date Inspector, Region IV (paragraphs 2, 3, 4.a-b, 7, 8 and 9)

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P. C. Wagner, Reachor Inspector, Region IV 3l2 7/87 Date CPSES Group (paragraphs 3, 4.c, 5, and 6)

Reviewed By:

R. L. Spessa(p!, Deputy Director, Division of Date Inspection Programs, Office of Inspection and Enforcement 8704070436 870402 PDR ADOCK 05000445 O PDR

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Approved: 8% 3/3///7 I. Barnes, Chief, Region IV CPSES Group Date Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted December 1-31, 1986 (Report 50-445/86-32; 50-446/86-26)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced and unannounced inspections of Unit 1 and Unit 2 electrical penetration assemblies, Unit 2 Hot Shutdown Panel and Shutdown Transfer Panel, Unit 2 general plant inspections, applicant actions on previous inspection findings, Unit 1 construction deficiency reporting, Unit 1 structural steel welding, and storage of Unit 2 reactor vessel and internal Results: Within the seven areas inspected, no violations or deviations were ,

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l DETAILS Persons Contacted Texas Utilities Generating Company TUGCo R. P. Baker, Regulatory Compliance Manager

• J. L. Barker, Engineering Assurance Manager

• C. T. Brandt, Quality Engineering Supervisor

• W. G. Counsil, Executive Vice President

• P. E. Halstead, Site Quality Control (QC) Manager

• J. Krechting, Director of Engineering

• D. McAfee, Quality Assurance (QA) Manager

• L. D. Nace, Vice President P. Passalugo, Equipment Qualification Supervisor

• D. M. Reynerson, Project Manager, Unit-2 J. Streeter, Director of QA

• T. G. Tyler, CPPT Program Director J. Waters, Regulatory Compliance Engineer

• D. R. Woodlan, Licensing Supervisor Southern Technical Service (STS)

• T. Heatherly, Regulatory Compliance Engineer Ebasco C. Krisher, Supervisor, Civil and' Receiving Inspection J. Matthews, Equipment Qualification Site Support' Supervisor Brown & Root (B&R)

D. Sampson, Lead Receiving Inspector, Brown & ' Root (B&R)

The NRC inspectors also interviewed other applicant and contractor employees during this inspection perio * Denotes personnel present at the January 13, 1987, exit intervie . Plant Status, Unit 2 The NRC inspector discussed the status of work with TUGCo managemen December 1986 project status reports were also-reviewed. B&R Construction has turned over approximately 62 percent of the subsystems to TUGCo

! Startup and overall construction is about 83 percent complet . General Plant Inspections, Unit 2 At various times during the inspection period,.the NRC inspectors conducted general inspections of the Units 1 and 2 reactor, safeguards, l

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auxiliary, electrical / control, and diesel generator buildings. Selected rooms in these buildings were inspected to observe current work activities or major safety related equipment which was stored in place. The storage conditions inside these buildings and the storage area for steel supports located just outside Unit 2 were also inspecte With respect to electrical inspections, the NRC inspector verified that proper electrical separation between safety-related trains and/or nonsafety-related trains was maintained and that electrical cable in process wie stored in accordance with procedural requirements. The NRC inspector also verified that. electrical equipment and instrumentation was properly protected from the painting activities being conducted in the Unit 2 reactor-buildin The following specific observations were discussed with applicant personnel: Heat tracing electrical wire on a 1-inch containment post accident atmosphere sampling line was loose and the covering tape had bean pulled back to reveal adhesive remaining on the pipe. The pipe was located in Room 88 of the Unit 1 safeguards building. The NRC inspector was informed that Work Request 21453 had been written to correct the installation. Applicant personnel provided the NRC inspector information that the heat tracing had been committed to in response to the NRC action plan on page II.B-16 of Amendment 40 to the FSA This is an open item pending inspection of the completed rework. (445/8632-0-01) The jumper wire from nonsafety-related fuse blocks JAA to JAB in the Unit 2 remote shutdown panel had the terminal lug at each end bent approximately 90 . The startup engineer was informed of this problem and will ensure proper corrective action is take Three red electrical cables (red indicates Protective Channel I) were observed to be improperly trained in vertical cable tray-T24KCDM90 in the Unit 2 cable spreading room. The cable tray designation (K)

indicated that the cables were nonsafety related but only one of the red cables had the appropriate black (black is nonsafety) field color coding bands applied. The NRC inspector was informed by applicant personnel that these three cables were being used as a nonsafety-related, temporary modification for testing purposes and would be removed following the completion of the test. The NRC inspector then verified that the three red cables were BIW Optical I Cables which were routed to panel CP-ECPRCR-27. Inspection of the I inside of this panel showed that the cables were not connected, but I tagged to be for Temporary Modification 2225- No violations or deviations were identifie l l

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4. Applicant Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Open Item (446/8601-02): Corrective action of audit deficiency (No.1) of TUGCo Audit Report TCP-51 was not verifie This item was upgraded to a violation in a subsequent NRC Inspection Report (50-445/86-08; 50-446/86-06). (Closed) Unresolved Item (446/8604-04): Bingham-Willamette pump impeller cracks and deviation from designed rotating wear ring diametrical clearances. The NRC inspector found that the cracking-had been under evaluation and reported in several interim reports (SDAP,86-11). The diametrical ring was evaluated but was not reporte (Closed) Unresolved Item (446/8617-08): Disagreement between drawings and physical electrical; terminations. The NRC findings that the plant drawings did not agree with the physical term * nations in the Unit 2 remote shutdown panel and shutdown transfer panel were listed in a previous NRC Inspection Report (50-445/86-20; 50-446/86-17). The NRC inspector reviewed additional construction work documents which were provided by the applicant during this report period. All but 12 of the above 30 findings related to construction / modification work that was still in progress. The remaining 12 items have had 4 nonconformance reports (NCRs) written to ensure proper corrective action. The involved NCRs and the related findings are as follows:

. NCR E86-202171 (1) Incorrectly labeled conductor--2 instance (2) Loose terminal lug connecting scre (3) Bent terminal lu . NCR E86-202267 (1) Incorrectly labeled conducto (2) Physically landed conductor different than shown on the drawin . NCR E86-202397 (1 Two jumpers not installed but indicated on the drawin (2 Jumper installed but not shown on the drawin (3 Conductor connected but shown as a spare on the drawin . NCR E86-202398 l (1) Two, 6 conductor cables not installed but shown on the drawin (2) Jumper installed that is not shown on the drawin . .

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(3) Two conductors installed that are not shown on the drawin In addition, the NRC inspector's review also disclosed that the panels were not final QC accepted because the final QC walkdown had not been conducte No violations or deviations were identifie . Hot Shutdown Panel and Shutdown Transfer Panel Records Review The NRC inspector's review of certain documentation pertaining to the Unit 2 hot shutdown panel, CP2-ECPRLV-01, and the Unit 2 shutdown transfer panel, CP2-ECPRLV-15, was ccmpleted during this inspection period. The objective of these documentation reviews was to ascertain if procurement requirements; such as, qualification tests (seismic, environmental, etc.), functional tests, and other quality tests (material, physical, and chemical) had been successfully completed, or if such requirements would be satisfied by documented schedules. The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) was reviewed to verify that these panels were described as electrical components that must operate in a harsh environment (e.g., high radiation, temperature, loss of coolant,pressure, steam linehumidity) break, etc.during)and

. Additionalafter an accident (e.g.,

documentation was reviewed to verify that records were'available to demonstrate that environmental and/or seismic testing had been satisfactorily completed as required by the FSAR and the equipment specificatio Qualification documents were reviewed to substantiate that the panels were qualified to applicable standards and to the appropriate environment, and that where accomplished by type testing, that the test environment met or exceeded all of the service conditions postulated to occur during the installed life of the equipmen .

These documents were reviewed for acceptability in accordance with I the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.123, "QA Requirements for i Control of Procurement of Items and Services for Nuclear Power Plants" (ANSI N45.2.13). The NRC inspector noted that the FSAR required the hot shutdown panel and the shutdown transfer panel to remain functional during an accident event, and for a minimum period of 1 year following the accident. The FSAR Volume V, Table 5-1, Sheet 8, Amendment 57, dated December 20, 1985, specified required environmental parameter l These were compared to Specification 2323-MS-605, Revision 2, dated September 23, 1983, and found to be consisten The purchase order (P0 CP-605) covering these panels was awarded to  ;

Reliance Electric Company (REC) with Supplements 32, 34, 38, 40, 44, and 51. The NRC inspector verified that the P0 documentation

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accurately reflected the specification environmental parameters, which were verified to meet or exceed the FSAR commitments, i

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The equipment qualification documentation reviewed by the NRC

inspector included TNE-DC-15.1, "CPSES IEEE 323-1974 Equipment

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Qualification Documentation Review Form," which indicated that the

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required environmental test parameters were verified. However,

! form THE-DC-15.1 did not -list certain items that had been identified

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as having been subjected to seismic qualification testing per TUGCo ,

letter TSG-4333 dated' March 8, 1984. Further NRC inspector review of

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the EQ program showed full environmental qualification is only;

required for safety-related panel components; other components need

, only meet the seismic qualification requirements to ensure panel i integrity during a seismic event. The items not listed on the above t

form were determined to be categorized as nonsafety related.

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The NRC inspector also noted that Form THE-DC-15.1 showed a GE 472 l- transducer was demonstrated for a 0.53-year life and qualified for a j 10-year life, and that RIS transducers models CCC-1B and.VCC-1B were l demonstrated for 1 year and qualified for 10 ' years; however, Module "CS" was demonstrated for 1.3 years and qualified for-

, 40 years. Since it was not apparent that the difference in equipment

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(e.g., transducers vs. modules) would account for the wide difference in life qualification, the NRC inspector requested additional explanations from the applicant. Applicant personnel provided a

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document which listed numerous components which had the qualified life established by separate means. The columns on form THE-DC-1 actually indicated the time following an accident that the component must remain operable and the qualified life of that componen ,

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l The NRC inspector determined that the applicant was required to l 1 establish a replacement schedule for all items / components qualified for a period less than the required life of 40 years in accordance

with 10 CFR Part 50.49(e)(5). The procedural requireroents and

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establishment of such a component replacement schedule is an open-item pending further NRC inspection (446/8626-0-01).

!- Specification 2323-MS-605, Revision 2, dated September 23, 1983,

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required the hot shutdown panel and the shutdown transfer panel be

seismically qualified in accordance with-IEEE 344-1975 by analysis

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and/or testing. The NRC inspector verified that the P0 documentation a accurately reflected this requirement, and that REC Report 46623-1, i

transmitted by letter dated April 14, 1983, indicated four methods of

) seismic qualification: (1) seismic simulation testing; (2) seismic j analysis; (3) tuned seismic analysis with modal testing; and j (4) similarity. The above specification further required that the testing consist of random multi-frequency and multi-axis excitation,

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that components remain functional during and after the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), and that relay contact bouncing not cause

! electrical contact closure or interruption for more than two_ l milliseconds. The NRC inspector verified that the following Gibbs & l Hill (G8H) approved procedures were used during testing / qualificatio !

of the panels: (1) REC /WYLE Low Impedance = Test Plan 400701-MT-1; j (2) REC Tuning Analysis Procedure G&H 65, Revision 1; (3) Seismic .

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Test Procedure for Various Components Mounted in a Seismic Test Frame 541/1167WB, Revision 1; and (4) Welding Qualification Plan for CPSES Control Boards WQP-0404-A, Revision 2. The NRC inspector reviewed the test procedures and methods used by REC /WYLE and determined that they were in accordance with the specification, IEEE i

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and P0 requirements.

i NRC inspector review of the P0 files available at the CPSES site disclosed that the Unit 2 hot shutdown panel was originally received on-site on December 1, 1980. However, by June 1981, design changes had been promulgated which incorporated equipment qualification and fire protection requirements. Design Change i Authorization (DCA) 10.413, dated June 11, 1981, required the

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incorporation of a shutdown transfer panel in partial solution to the fire protection requirements. This DCA was revised through Revision 4 dated September 15, 1983; the revisions incorporated minor l

changes involving switch numbers and tag number On August 17, 1981, DCA 10,824 was issued to address fire protection modifications to the hot shutdown panel; P0 Supplement 34 covered th proposed work which was to be done in the field in accordance with REC service bulletins. However, the applicant decided that the modifications would be more extensive than originally planned and the panel was shipped back to REC on October 1, 1981. On November 12, 1981, Revision 1 of this DCA added a 5-foot long section to the panel

to satisfy fire protection and human factors engineering (HFE)

requirements, P0 Supplement 38. Revision 2 of the DCA dated

January 16, 1982, added manual loading stations for cold shutdow Revision 3 dated February 26, 1982, changed the tag numbers of the panels from Unit 2 to Unit 1, and vice versa; this work was ,

authorized by P0 Supplement 51. The qualification requirements were  !

as originally specified, except that a low impedance test was also required to be submitted via REC Report AAl-150. The Unit 2 hot shutdown panel was received back from REC on September 18, 1984, as

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indicated on receiving inspection report (RIR) 24896. The P0 activity appeared to the NRC inspector to properly incorporate specification requirements, including all applicable DCA The NRC inspector observed that the original hot shutdown panel configuration (without the 5 foot addition) was seismically analyzed by modeling, coupled with a low impedance test. The mathematical model used the computer program Stardyne, and concluded that the panel structure was acceptable since all margins of safety were

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greater than zero for the conditions analyzed. Report REC LV-01,

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AAI-106, " Seismic Analysis," was transmitted by letter GTN 54799 ,

dated August 14, 1981. WYLE Test Report 44153-5 covered the low l impedance test which determined natural frequencies and mode shape !

i Since the lowest natural frequency of the structure, including i front-to-back, side-to-side and vertical, was over 33 Hz, the

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structure was considered to be rigid and the base response spectrum j was used for any location on the structure.

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An REC letter dated April 14, 1983, transmitted Report 46623-1 which documented the results of the testing performed on the modified panel. This test was to evaluate the "as-built" weld anomalies that were present in some panels supplied by REC and discussed in IE Information Notice 82-34. The report also contained information pertaining to the natural resonances of the panel tested. WYLE Report 47207-1 dated April 10, 1984, was transmitted by

' letter TSG-4869 dated May 3, 1984, and addressed the seismic

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siwulation test program for various panel components utilizing a seismic test frame. (Report AAI-150 was the basis for the Seismic Certificate of Compliance addressed by REC letter dated August 21, 1984.)

During the review of the above documentation, the NRC inspector noted that to assess the structural adequacy of the as-built welds, the panel was attached to a " shaker" table (Report 46623-1). However, in addition to testing the adequacy of the welds, resonance search testing and random, triaxial, multi-frequency testing were conducte During this testing, natural frequencies of 12 Hz side-to-side,10 Hz front-to-back and 30 Hz vertically, were identifie (Since these i frequencies were below 33 Hz, the panel structure would be considered i

to be dynamic, not rigid, as originally determined.) The WYLE letter 4 of April 11, 1983, discussed these findings and stated, in part,

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. . . the resonant frequency of the specimen may be higher than the ,

system frequency . . . ." The WYLE report further stated: l l

(1) The test specimen did not correspond to the panel as installed )

in the field. The post-HFE panel had a light box and had been lengthened by 60 inches. Resonance search runs will therefore not yield the same results obtained by means of analysis and verified by a low impedance tes '

(2) The bolted side panel arrangement did not provide the stiffness of the original welded side sheet er the "X" frames used in the post-HFE structur (3) Some cantilevering was present over the shaker tabl (4) The height of the panel was increase (5) The doors were not tightly restraine (6) Modal testing provided frequency and mode shape data that can be relied on, whereas a shaker table resonance search under the above suspect test conditions canno Specification 2323-MS-605 required all non-metallic components to

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have self-extinguishing characteristics in accordance with ASTM D635 and IEEE 420, paragraph 4.3.1; however, the NRC inspector could not

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locate evidentiary documentation during this report period. This is an open item pending clarification by the applicant (446/8626-0-02).

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' Specification 2323-MS-605 also required all panel wire and cable to

- be in accordance with IEEE 323 and 383. The NRC inspector review of

Appendix F, in Volume 2 of the Equipment Qualification Package,

verified the qualification of the electrical wire and cable to these i requirement The NRC inspector also noted the following:

(1) Review of Specification 2323-MS-605 showed that TUGCo was to i generate a DCA to explain the nonexistence of Appendixes 8 and 9 in accordance with a commitment made in letter GTN-69881. The i

NRC inspector brought this item to the attention of applicant 4

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i personnel as an out-of-scope observation (which is obviously not 1 important to safety) and was informed that G&H would write a DCA I - to delete these unused appendix numbers from the documents.

l (2) Supplement 67 of P0 CP-605 authorized REC to provide reactor

vessel level indicators in accordance with DCA 16,392. REC was i to provide a certificate of compliance for the indicators-however, REC disclaimed responsibility for the IEEE '

l qualification of the light emitting diodes (LEDs) provided by i

TUGCo. The NRC inspector could not determine, during the report period, the need for or the availability of qualifications for

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the LEDs. This is an open item pending clarification by the '

j applicant (446/8626-0-03).

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Electrical Penetration Assemblies

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electricalpenetrationassemblies(EPAs)inbothUnit1andUnit2. The

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originally installed Bunker-Ramo Corporation (BRC) EPAs would be replaced j in response to problems identified by NRC Inspection Report 50-445/86-04; 1 50-446/86-03. The program consists of replacing the feedthrough modules -l

!' in the header plates attached to the containment liner flanges; the l feedthrough modules are referred to as the EPAs in the following '

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! The NRC inspector reviewed Specification 2323-ES-12A, " Electrical

] Penetration Assemblies and Accessories," dated February 5, 1982, to identify the conditions the newly purchased Conax replacement EPAs ,

.j were required to meet. The DCAs applicable to this specification f included DCA 21,979. Revision 3 dated October 6, 1986, to

DCA 21,979, superseded the previous revisions and incorporated the

requirements of Corrective Action Report (CAR) 055 related to tr replacement of the BRC with Conax EPA The NRC inspector determined that the specification incorporated all

, of the necessary provisions to ensure compliance with applicable

regulatory requirements and FSAR consnitments.

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j b. The NRC inspector reviewed P0 13340 through Supplement 4, and P0 1540

through Supplement 16. The NRC inspector verified that P013340 dated May 7, 1986, incorporated the requirements described in 4 DCA 21,979; Supplement I clarified that the EPAs were to be manufactured in strict compliance with Specification 2323-ES-12A as l

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amended by the DCAs attached thereto; Supplement 2 included quantity and price information; Supplement 3 revised the pigtail length for selected EPAs; and Supplement 4 revised the required quantity of some types of EPAs. (Approximately eight of the original Conax EPAs will l also be replaced.)

The original PO for Conax EPAs (1540, dated April 14,1982) was also

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reviewed. Supplements 1 through 14 pertained to the original order; i Supplement 15 dated September 16, 1986, pertained to connectors for

the Conax EPAs; and Supplement 16 dated November 25, 1986, pertained j to the return of removed EPAs to Conax for the salvage of usable

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part l J Based on the above reviews, the NRC inspector determined that the

] appropriate requirements had been incorporated into the P0s.

I c. The NRC inspector next reviewed two Receiving Inspection Reports i

(RIRs) for the newly ordered EPAs. Review of RIR-28106 showed that

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58 EPAs were received on October 16,.1986. The NRC inspector

{ verified that the required receiving checklists, QA Release,

] certificate of conformance/ compliance, and testing data sheets were

appropriately completed. The RIR file also contained a copy of the

! applicant Release for Shipment Trip Report which included a final

. inspection QA checklist and shop inspection checklist for these 58 j EPAs. No problems were identified with this fil j

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! Review of RIR 28161 dated October 17, 1986, disclosed the same

! documents as discussed above, all of which appeared to be acceptable.

l The NRC inspector did note, however, a problem with the number of

< EPAs associated with this file. RIR 28161 and all of the other I '

documents, except the Material Receiving Record (MRR) indicated that 62 EPAs were involved; however, the sumation of the various types of

, EPAs listed on MRR-173916 disclosed a total of 63 EPAs.- The NRC j inspector compared the RIR and MRR listings and discovered that three j type 69c/#16D-TP(23) EPAs were listed on the RIR while four of this i type were indicated on the MRR. When the NRC inspector questioned 1 applicant personnel about this inconsistency, he was informed that

! the MRR had been identified as being in error and was provided the i corrected MRR which was in the process of being issued to revie l The revised MRR resolved the NRC inspector questio d. The NRC inspector performed an inspection of the EPAs in storage .

awaiting installation. Those EPAs covered by RIR 28106 were in

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level B storage in Warehouse C; those covered by RIR 28161 were in

Level A storage (more restrictive than Level B) in Warehouse B. The j Conax Installation and Maintenance Manual for EPAs dated June 19 j

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1-1986, required ANSI' N45.2.2, Level- B storage for. the EPAs in their wooden shipping crates. These crates were approximately

l' x 3' x 40'. The NRC inspector was informed that the applicant had f

wanted to store all of the EPAs in Level A storage but, because of j size and space limitations, this was not practica The NRC inspector observed that the EPAs stored in Warehouse B had l

been removed from the wooden crates and were stored up to four high in their individual cardboard containers. The individual container were removed from the crates for EPA testing (electrical continuity, insulation resistance and sealing surface smoothness) prior to release for installation. The NRC inspector reviewed NCR E86-104725 which was dispositioned on October 28, 1986, indicating that Conax

! had approved this type of storage provided the cardboard containers

were stacked no more than six high; review of Conax telex dated -

October 27, 1986, verified the acceptability of this dispositio The NRC inspector also witnessed the preparation for the testing of

electrical continuity of one EPA and determined that adequate care j was being exercised to preclude damage and that the requirements of

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the appropriate procedures were implemented.

The NRC inspector reviewed the following procedures related to the j replacement of the EPAs

i B&R Construction Procedures Number Revision Date Title

EEI-8 6 09/23/86 Class IE and Non-Class j 1E Cable Terminations

l EEI-9 4 10/16/86 Leakage Testing of EPAs

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EEI-12 1 10/10/86 BRC EPA Removal and l Installation i

! EEI-22 1 11/14/86 Installation of Conax

{ EPAs j

TUGCo QC Inspection Procedures

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I QI-QP-11.3-28 31 10/27/86 Class 1E Cable

Terminations QI-QP-11.3-57 1 12/10/86 Inspection of EPA Installation and Testing

These procedures were found to contain adequate technical detail to

! ensure that the applicable requirements, including those contained in j Specification 2323-ES-12A and the QA program were in place. No

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weaknesses or generic problems were identified. Implementation of these procedures will be verified when the replacement activities are observed during future inspection The NRC inspector also reviewed the drawings involved with the replacement (Conax)EPAs. The following drawings were included in this review:

7S66-09010 Project Bill of Materials for Feedthrough/ Adapter Modules for Unit 1, Sheets 1- S66-09011 Project Bill of Materials for Feedthrough/ Adapter Modules for Unit 2, Sheets 1- Feedthrough/ Adapter Module Assembly.

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PL7060-10002 Parts List for Conax Drawing 7060-10002, Sheets 1-4 WL7060-10002 Wiring Legend for Conax Drawing 7060-10002, Sheets 1-4 Feedthrough/ Adapter Module Assembly for Valve Isolation Tan PL7060-10003 Parts List for Conax Drawing 7060-10003, Sheets 1 and 2.

WL7060-10003 Wiring Legend for Conax Drawing 7060-10003, Sheets 1 and 2.

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7566-20001 Feedthrough/ Adapter Module S/A.

l through j 7S66-20013 l

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7566-20015 Feedthrough/ Adapter Module S/ through l 7566-20034 )

The NRC inspector identified no problems or questions from the review of these drawing No violations or deviations were identified.

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7. Construction Deficiency Reporting, Unit 1

4 The NRC inspector reviewed 32 reports submitted by TUGCo during this l inspection period. These reports were variously classified as i nonreportable, interim and reportable.- The submittals reviewed for

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timeliness were within the required reporting perio No violations or deviations were identifie l l

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I Structural Steel Welding, Unit 1 i The NRC inspector visually inspected a tube to plate weld (07-3-65A-91)

i which had been welded with 3/32" weld rod (7018). This item is to b '

installed in Unit 1.. The weld surface was free of defects. The weld rod

! material was stored in heated portable ovens.

i No violations or deviations were identifie . Storage of Reactor Vessel and Internals, Unit 2 i

4 The NRC inspector reviewed B&R Procedure CP-QAP-14.1, Revision 7, and i observed activities in the field. The controls to preclude low melting i alloys and other deleterious materials from entering the area where this

equipment is stored were in effect. The reactor internals.and head had i protective covers and the area cleanliness was acceptabl The NRC inspector noted that access control to this area is governed by an attendant who assures a need to enter. Those entering this area must

wear shoe covers and sign the log to comply with posted requirements. The

I NRC inspector entered and found that two workers did not have shoe covers; however, when this was pointed out, the workers obtained the covers and

put them on before proceeding to the work area. In subsequent discussions j with the attendant, the NRC inspector found that some workers attempt to

violate this work rule. The NRC inspector has no further questions at j this time; however, attention or emphasis may be necessary in this area to

assure continued compliance with the controlling procedure referenced

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! No violations or deviations were identified.

s 10. Exit Interview i

j An exit interview was conducted January 13, 1987, with the applicant's l representatives identified in paragraph 1 of this appendix. During this j

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interview, the NRC inspectors sumarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The applicant acknowledged the findings, i

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}

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