IR 05000440/1990010
| ML20044B006 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 07/09/1990 |
| From: | Dan Barss, Foster J, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20044B005 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-440-90-10, NUDOCS 9007170167 | |
| Download: ML20044B006 (23) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
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L Report No. 50-440/90010(DRSS)
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-Docket No..50-440 Licen:;e No. NPF-58 Licensee: Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.
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Post Office Box 5000 Cleveland, OH 44101 F[
Facility Name:. Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 i
l Inspection At:
Perry Site, Perry, Ohio
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Inspection Conducted: June 19-22, 1990
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Inspectors:
.. Foster Team Leader Date /
DM bd
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- D; Barss
Date Accompanying Personnel:
'R Marabito.
T. Colburn
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G. O'Dwyer'
G. Bethke J. Mumper b
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Approved By-1111am Snell, Chief 7/e7 f/)
' Radiological Controls and Da /'
Emergency Preparedness Section
'h-Inspection Summary
' Inspection on June 19-22, 1990 (Report No. 50-440/90010(DRSS))
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 annual emergency preparedness exercise involving a review of the exercise scenario (IP 82302), observations by seven NRC representatives of key functions, activities, and locations during the exercise (IP 82301), and follow-up on i
licensee actions on previously. identified items (IP 92701).
Results: No violations, deficiencies or deviations were identified. The licensee demonstrated an excellent response to a hypothetical scenario involving multiple equipment failures and a large radiological release.
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DETAILS
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NRC Observers and Areas Observed
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-J. Foster,.Siinulator Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC),
Operations Support Center (OSC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
J.. Mumper, Simulator Control Room, TSC, OSC, EOF T. Colburn, TSC G. Bethke, Simulator Control Room, EOF D. Barss, OSC, Field Monitoring Teams p
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G. O'Dwyer, EOF-
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R. Marabito,: Joint Public Information Center
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Persons Contacted-
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Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company M. Lyster, Vice President, Nuclear - Perry D, Takacs, Manager - Quality Control J. Waldron, Principal-Engineer E. Riley, Director - Nuclear Quality Assurance S. Kensicki, Director - Nuclear Engineering R. Stratman, General Manager
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R. Newkirk, Manager - Licensing & Compliance i
W. Kanda,. Manager - Instrumentation & Control R. Bowers, Manager - Radiation Protection E. Root, Manager - Performance Engineering D. Hulbert,' Compensation Analyst
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D. Cobb,_ Superintendent - Plant Operations
.J. Anderson, On-site Emergency Planni_ng Coordinator F. Stead, Director.- Nuclear Support M. Roseum, Supervisor - Emergency Planning D. Igyarto, Manager _ Training Section
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R. Farrell, Director - Services ~ Department
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R. Vondrasek, Manager - Emergency Planning 4'
J. Bahleda, Lead Quality Engineer The above and other individuals attended the NRC Exercise Exit Interview
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held on June 21, 1990.
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The-inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during the course--
of the inspection.
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Licensee Action on previously Identified Item (IP 92701)
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(Closed) Open Item No. 440/89025-01:- This item relates to the reliability of the Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system utilized for the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
During this exercise, the EOF HVAC system was operated for an extended time in the emergency recirculation mode, and functioned properly, maintaining facility temperatures within acceptable limits.
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.The manipulations required to place'the system in the '.' recirculated -
filtered" mode were observed, with no problems noted. The system was.
then walked down to verify that all components were operating as-described.
Previously identified problems from-the emergency response facility =
appraisal report were verified as ha'ving been corrected.
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Holes in the air handling unit ductwork on the roof of the building have been plugged or sealed, b.
The economizer air-inlet dampers (F-44 and F-11), which had failed to completely shut during a previous inspection were verified 100%
shut.
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Damper F-5 (roughing and HEPA filter train bypass), which had prev.iously failed to shut completely, was verified 100% shut, d.
Dampers which previously required the' use of a l' dder and removal a
of ceiling tiles to manually operate have been automated.
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The building doors were inspected and the EOF envelope verified-at a neutral pressure with the system in emergency recirculation mode.
Subsequent to the exercise, the inspector discussed plans for E0F HVAC modifications intended to increase the capacity of the system (partially to support upgrades to-the unit simulator) and increace the overall long-term reliability of the system. These plans included review of intervals for repetitive maintenance tasks, review of methods used to-assign corrective work order priorities, and assuring that repetitive maintenance tasks are not routinely deferred. Licensee personnel also
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indicated that'the EOF and Technical Support-Center HVAC systems would be placed in their emergency recirculation mode for long periods during future annual exercises, to verify continued system adequacy. These actions adequately address the previous concerns relative to system function and reliability. This item is closed.
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. General An announced, daytime exercise of the perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Emergency Plan was conducted at the Perry-Nuclear Power Plant site on June 20,1990. This exercise tested the licensee's and offsite agencies'
emergency support organizations' capabilities to respond to a simulated accident scenario resulting in a major release of radioactive effluent.
This was a " partial" exercise.
State of Ohio personnel participated to a.
limited extent.
Personnel from Lake, Geauga, and Ashtabula counties fully participated in the exercise.
Attachment 1 to this report describes the Scope and Objectives of the exercise. Attachment 2 describes the 1990 exercise scenario.
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9.A 5.
General' Observations
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Procedures
. This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Apr,endix E requirements, using the Perry. Nuclear' Power Plant, o
Emorgency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures,
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Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timely.
If the i
scenario events had been real, the actions'taken by the licensee
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.would have been sufficient to mitigate the accident and permit State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health.and safety.
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Observers
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The licensee's controllers / evaluators monitored and critiqued this exercise along with seven.NRC observers. Activities by State and local authorities were observed by a team of over fifteen Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) evaluators.
FEMA'will-be issuing:
a separate report.
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Exercise Critique
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The licensee's controllers / evaluators held critiques in each facility-(with participants)'immediately following the exercise.
Lead controllers held a joint critique the day following the exercise to discuss the observed strengths and weaknesses for each facility and the overall exercise. A final licensee critique was held with the
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licensee and NRC representatives on: June 21, 1990, the day after the
exercise. The NRC discussed observed strengths and weaknesses,.
' developed independently by the NRC evaluation team, during the Exit i
Interview. A public critique, conducted by representatives of. FEMA p
and the-NRC, was held on June 22,.1990.
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Specific Observations (IP 82301)
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. Control Room (CR)
The Control Room Shift Supervisor (initial Emergency Coordinator) was responsible for declaring the " Unusual Event" and " Alert" emergency classifications.
He accurately made these classifications in a timely fashion af ter verifying all. requirements and indications in l'
the associated Emergency Action Levels (EAL).
Following classification, L
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notification forms were properly completed and communicated to offsite authorities (including the NRC) within 15 minutes.
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The Shif t Supervisor judiciously opted to activate the Operational
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Support Center and Technical Support Center at the Unusual Event level (following the seismic event) to facilitate a more rapid
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follow-up on plant walkdowns.
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The Control Room shift performed in an exemplary manner during their l
thorough investigation of the cause for the low main-condenser vacuum.
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The Control Room shif t continued to "back-up" the TSC with respect to event classification following turnover of Emergency Director Responsibilities (e.g., the 0935 prompting of the TSC concerning the " Alert"'EAL for 1000 times normal radiation levels for more.
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than thirty minutes).
The Control. Room " Controller Group" was extremely knowledgeable and
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well coordinated.
Noteworthy activities included the provision of J
"back board" radiological data, and the smooth recovery from the-I simulator problem which reduced reactor power to zero versus the j
desired ?0 percent power.
The single negative comment concerning performance by the Control Room sh'ft is that. following the reactor power spike at approximately 1258. hours, they didn't appear to be cognizant of the severe radiation and contamination conditions within containment, or the magnitude of the reltase via the Unit 2 vent. This observation was supported 1,
by seversi discussions and decisions such as:
(1) discussions at
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approximately 1415 hours0.0164 days <br />0.393 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.384075e-4 months <br /> regarding preparing to pump down the-
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suppression pool to the radwaste system, and (2) selecting the operation of the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system as a means of
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obtaining a representative reactor coolant sample (without apparent concern for circulating the highly active reactor coolant through
the RWCU pumps outside of containment).
The remaining Control Room comments have to do with procedures.
Response.to the scenario presented was hindered by the lack of pre-approved procedures for the following:
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(1) No procedure exists for an alternate means of injecting boron
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in the event of a failure of the Standby Liquid Control (SLC)
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system.
Such a procedure could consider cases where-containment
'is inaccessible and where a loss-of-coolant (isolation) signal is present. A recommendation for development of such procedures was-made in the NRC 1989 annual exercise evaluation-report. A
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discussion with licensee representatives indicated that options
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for such alternate boron injection pathways had been. evaluated I
and a preferred (low pressure) method selected. However, the a
method, although publicized, has not been proceduralized.
(2) Predetermined methods of obtaining a post-accident sampling
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system sample should be developed. Methods may include running
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recirculation pumps, RWCU pumps, or insuring natural circulation-
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mixing.
Discussion with licensee personnel indicated that a May 19, 1987 memorandum addressed this issue, in response.to a
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previous NRC annual exercise evaluation.
The memorandum states
that adequate (representative) reactor liquid sampling can be accomplished as samples are obtained through "the jet pump calibration lines which have reactor water continually circulated through the lines". "Therefore, a representative sample is maintained in the event recirculation pumps are not running".
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Based upon the above findings,Jthis portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
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Technical Support Center (TSC)
The TSC was activated in a organized and efficient manner. At 0803 hours0.00929 days <br />0.223 hours <br />0.00133 weeks <br />3.055415e-4 months <br /> an Unusual Event was declared and the OSC and TSC were' directed to activate.
Within one minute, the first of the support personnel for the TSC began arriving.
By 0808 hours0.00935 days <br />0.224 hours <br />0.00134 weeks <br />3.07444e-4 months <br />, the first set of plant readings had been taken from the' Emergency Response Information l i.
System (ERIS) computer terminals-and logged on the plant status board.
Facility activation began so rapidly-that controllers had not been able to provide TSC personnel with the initial conditions of equipment out of service.
Therefore the Standby Liquid Control (SLC)
pump was initially logged "of f" instead of out-of-service (005).
This was quickly corrected.
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The Operations. Manager in the TSC exhibited excellent command and t
control throughout the exercise. He took charge immediately to reduce noise levels in the TSC by having the plant page circuit turned down.
He frequently worked with his various coordinators to ensure communications were precise, information was understood, and i. hat they verified that the Control, Room was informed of pertinent information.
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When told'of the " grid emergency" the operations manager announced in the TSC that " power was at a premium".
It wasn't clear that all TSC personnel understood that the loss of the unit would introduce serious grid instability-and possible complete loss of power.
By 0837 the TSC was reported as activated, and all status boards had been updated at least once by that time.
By 0857 hours0.00992 days <br />0.238 hours <br />0.00142 weeks <br />3.260885e-4 months <br />, security
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personnel had collected identification badges and issued dosimetry, per procedure.
Status boards were updated frequently (every 15-20 minutes) and were generally correct. However, because information was being taken from two ERIS terminals, if information was incorrect on ERIS or was not on ERIS, the data was often incorrect for at least a short period of time.
Examples of this included the SLC "B" pump status, SLC "A" pump status, Division 1, 2, and 3 emergency diesel generator status.
Team accountability and direction were generally very good. However, a number of times the status board was'" swamped". This was primarily because of the large number of teams (44 for the entire exercise),
and because teams were not being removed from the status board promptly after completion of their missions.
Status and priority updates were frequent and well performed.
Prior to each update the Operations Manager announced the forthcoming briefing, giving support personnel time to organize their thoughts.
This greatly improved briefing ef ficiency and enhanced overall communication. Briefings to TSC and OSC personnel (the public i
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' address system covers' both ' areas) were concise, to the point,:and wel1~ organized.
Priority determinations were well done throughout.
the' exercise, focusing correctly on the major problem areas. TSC
_j decorum was excellent; very businesslike but relaxed.
The status of the-injured / contaminated man was not forgotten, although for some time it was not clear whether he had been released from the hospital or not. At one point it was announced that he had been-released'from the hospital, and thirty minutes later it was announced that he was being held for further observation.
The events surrounding the loss of coolant (LOCA) accident came as
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somewhat offa surprise, and it took se.'eral minutes for TSC personnel l
to fully understand the revised plant' status. The Standby Liquid j
Control. train "A" pump was returned to service shortly af ter the SLC
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"B" pump.had been started. Because of the confusion surrounding the loss of coolant accident, this apparently-went unnoticed for some
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time.
TSC personnel attempted to assess how much boron had been injected-into the reactor by the time the SLC pumps tripped due to low levels
in the SLC storage tank. They-also explored options available for refilling the SLC storage tanks should it.be determined that
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additional boron injection was warranted.
In general, repair efforts to return equipment to service went very well, Good communication and inventiveness were demonstrated including devising an " alternate" SLC injection pathway.
The Recovery discussions went very well.
The initial analysis of Recovery needs contained most of the-necessary elements.
There was a lively discussion during the Recovery meeting which added several.
more key elements to the list included with the draft Recovery plan.
It was noted that the Recovery discussion did not address the need to determine-the effects, if any, of the seismic event on the spent fuel pool and any stored ~ fuel. The integrity of the fuel pool would have been important for fuel and control rod storage when defueling efforts began.
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was acceptable, f
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Operational Support Center (OSC)
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L The OSC is an excellent, dedicated facility. The facility has been improved over the years, with the latest improvements consisting of a
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carpeted floor and sound absorbant materials on the upper walls.
L The facility was quickly activated and was declared operational at i
0819 hours0.00948 days <br />0.228 hours <br />0.00135 weeks <br />3.116295e-4 months <br />.
Status boards were generally very well maintained.
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l An excellent status board system provides quick information as to task priorities (established by the Control Room and TSC), available L'
workforce by discipline, team tracking, and radiation dose tracking.
L A list of chronological events was also maintained, l-
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Habitability of the facility was verified by Health Physics (HP)
personnel;; a Continuous-Air Monitor was_ in operation in the general-area,. surveys.were performed, and players were routinely requested to check their self-reading dosimeters..
' The. Health Physics Manager, OSC Manager and Bargaining Unit Boss =
. (BUB) worked together well. Team briefings / debriefings and team
- tracking were conducted per established procedures.
As previously noted,- the public address system provides for_ plant status briefings _in the TSC to be broadcast to the OSC, keeping OSC personnel aware of plant status and ongoing activities.
A large-number of teams were dispatched during the exercise, indicating
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that this. portion 'of the licensee's program was considerably challenged.
during the exercise. A total of forty-four teams were recorded, although some teams were not actually dispatched when the Shift Supervisor halted access-te several buildings due to (scenario) high radiation levels.
The " Exposure Tracking Board" in the OSC was not initially utilized as intended. The board is meant to-track each individual's exposure and remaining available exposure before exposure limits are met.'
However, the exposure section was either blank or listed the total overall OSC player exposure. The total available exposure section of the board was "N/A".
Following evaluation that this aspect needed more training, players were advised of the correct usage of the board, and the board was properly utilized for the remainder of the exercise.
At one-point, Control Room personnel attempted to direct personnel to take actions in the plant without coordination with the OSC. This was detected and halted._ Once the OSC is activated, all in plant activities should be coordinated through the OSC to preclude either duplication of. efforts or loss of coordination.
e Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
d.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
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The EOF was activated at 1108 hours0.0128 days <br />0.308 hours <br />0.00183 weeks <br />4.21594e-4 months <br />.
Excellent command and control of the overall licensee response to the accident was demonstrated by the Emergency Coordinator (EC).
He actively " looked ahead" to possible problem areas.
Frequent updates on plant status and ongoing activities / discussions were provided to the EOF staff by the EC.
Classification of the General Emergency was rapidly accomplished.
The initial notification form, containing the default Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) of sneltering was quickly completed and given to corr.iunicators for transmission to State and local county
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personnel. While the form was'being completed,' dose assessment-
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personnel had been performing a dose projection based on current yg y
information, and provided the completed projection and PAR for evacuation just after-the initial notification forms had been given
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i to communicators. An excellent decision was made to halt transmission =
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- of the initial notification, and alter the PAR to that of evacuation, based on current dose projections..This action precluded having te-e
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transmit the initial notification and PAR to offsite authorities,
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perhaps having them begin the sheltering notification process, and then advise them that the PAR had been updated to require evacuation.
This would have been potentially confusing and could have delayed evacuation efforts.
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Briefings were provided to State and county personnel at the EOF.
Dose projections and control of. radiation monitoring teams were well i
done. At the conclusion of the exercise, dose projection personnel i
attempted to calculate the total exposure an individual might have accumulated at the site boundary during the course of the release.
Personnel were not familiar with the computerized method of
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accomplishing-this calculation and performed a manual calculation.
Training on the computer option and modification of the computer
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program to prompt actions needed to facilitate this option would enhance this task.
However, this calculation has no effect on 1m protective action recommendations or emergency classifications.
, 4 Near the termination of the exercise. simulated failures of. one channel of a vent radiation monitor and of the ERIS system itself occurred. EOF personnel handled both of these failures very well, even to considerations as to whether the radiation monitor readings could possibly be valid (with two other channels having failed low).
,The ERIS failure was handled with considerable aplomb, with personnel-
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requesting that the system be vestarted, and obtaining reactor F
information via telephone to the Control Room until the system was restored.
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-There was considerable discussion as to the need to refill the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) tanks with boron solution, so that additional boron-could be injected if necessary.
Refilling of the tanks would require bypassing a containment isolation signal P
generated as a result of the loss of coolant action.
Procedures,
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as written, did not allow bypassing of this signal to refill the
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SLC tanks.
Licensee personnel discussed the option of intentionally violating their procedure under the auspices of 10 CFR 50.54(x) and p!;
50.54(y), which provide that, in an emergency, a licensee can take f
any action required to protect the health and safety of the public, with the approval of a senior licensed facility operator.
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%h Discussion then centered around whether the NRC would concur in such
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action. A controller playing the part of the NRC then concurred with
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the proposed action.
It should be made clear that actions under the auspices of 50.54(x) are clearly a licensee responsibility; no members of the NRC are licensed to operate the facility. On the
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other hand,'if requested to provide a view as to the advisability of-anLaction,.or concur.in the action, it.is anticipated that the NRC.
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would respond to a-licensee, within a relatively short period of M
time, using staff reactor engineering expertise.
Beginning shortly before, and continuing after termination of'the exercise, licensee personnel demonstrated the capability to develop a comprehensive plan for the Recovery phase which would follow any j
large reactor accident.
The draft Recovery plan was developed per procedure, and addressed the majority of concerns which would be
expected. The plan did not address the impact of the expected NRC
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response and accident investigation actions, or the probable impact-of investigations undertaken by other groups, and these should be
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factored into any major reactor accident Recovery plan.
During the activation of the EOF, the setup of the portal monitor for
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monitoring personnel entering the facility was observed.
No procedural
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guidance was followed by the technician. A.needed electrical extension
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cord was not available and one had to be located.
No source check or
response check was completed to ensure the portal monitor was functional and capable of detecting contamination levels necessary to-maintain
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appropriate facility habitability. This was considered-as an Open Item (No. 440/900010-01),
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l With the exception of the above Open' Item, this portion of the licensee's program was~ acceptable.
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Field Monitoring Teams Personnel for two Radiation Monitoring Teams (RMT),were identified
snd~ instructed to report to the Emergency Operation Facility Decon
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Room (EOF-D) and begin making preparations to conduct field monitoring
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activities. No initial briefing was provided to them at this time.
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However,.later the teams checked in by phone from the EOF-D to the TSC an.: were, at that time,.provided a good briefing on the existing plant situation and current as well.as forecast methorological j
conditions. A third RMT was assigned, as procedurally required, when the Site Area Emergency was declared.
- Throughout the remainder of the exercise, RMTs were frequently c
provided with status updates on both plant conditions and
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meteorological information.
Several plant news releases were
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also read over the 2-way radio to the RMTs.
The field monitoring kits were obtained and inventoried in preparation to begin monitoring activities. This is a procedurally required step.
Since the-kits are provided with tamper proof seals, i
the necessity of performing a detailed inventory should not have-been required. One kit was found to have an insufficient number of disposable gloves, and additional supplies were procured from E
the EOF-D room.
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Radiological monitoring equipment was inspected and source checked to
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a calculated value to-insure proper operability. ' Air samplers were-t tested to insure a;5 standard cubic-foot per minute. flow rate could be obtained. However, this test was performed without a filter being s
installed on the air sampler..Although no problem was noted in field'
operation of the sampler, the flow rate check should have been
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conducted with a test filter installed.
Vehicle inspections were conducted to insure lights and radio were
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operable and sufficient fuel supply ins available (the procedure needs to be revised to account'for the new radios currently in'use),
i While attempting to conduct the radio test, and several times during
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the exercise, the TSC would not respond-to radio calls initiated by
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the RMTs. Apparently the TSC radio was frequently left unmonitored i
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during portions'of-the exercise.
This radio should be monitored constantly while the TSC is still responsible for directing the RMTs.
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Prior to the (scenario) release, RMTs were directed to traverse the
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downwind sectors and look for possible impediments caused by the earlier earthquake which could hinder anticipated field monitoring activities as-well as evacuation routes.
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RMTs were observed to keep good logs and records of monitoring
activities.
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RMTs were observed to traverse downwind sectors and properly follow procedural guidance to identify scenaric plume boundaries and center
line. Teams were directed to return to the plume centerline area and-obtain air samples for analysis.
The teams were well positioned and travertes of the plume were timed to bisect the plume as it passed throtgh each area.
'ir samples were taken in general compliance with established
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procedure. One air sample was,taken with the sampler sitting on the vehicles' roof. This height was in excess of the procedurally
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specified-four foot height, but would have still been a valid,
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representative sample.
Contamination control was adequate to insure that the air sample would not have been cross contaminated. However, the technician did not wear gloves while obtaining the air sample.
The sample canister and filter were kept inside a plastic bag and were not touched directly. The technician did handle the air sampler without wearing
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gloves-and would have contaminated himself.
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The air sample canisters.have been removed from the initially supplied protective cans, and placed in plastic bags.
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and handling practices may damage the fragile particulate filters lo supplied with the air sample canister.
This storage practice should be reevaluated.
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. Environmental. sampling of grass and surface' water.was observed.
Both samples.were obtained following established procedural: guidance and utilizing good contamination control practices.
Sample labels were properly prepared and af fixed to' each sample container.. Samples were properly surveyed and delivered to the EOF-D-in preparation for shipment offsite for analysis by a contractor laboratory.
It was noted that the only protective clothing supplied with the-field monitoring' kits was disposable gloves.
Full sets of personal anti-contamination clothing should be available for use by the'RMTs.
Additionally, respiratory protection equipment was not available as i
part of the RMT supplies.
During exercise activities, RMT members wondered if they should.
consider using potassium iodide (KI) due to the high dose rate they'
were. observing from the plume.
Later in the day when the RMTs returned to the EOF-D, they were informed that their exposure times in the plume had been tracked and exposure due to iodine had been:
calculated to be less than 25 Rem, and therefore issuance of KI was not deemed necessary.
RMT personnel promptly reported results of field monitoring activities to the EOF utilizing good, formal radio protocol. With the exception of the previously noted problem of the TSC radio being unmonitored, radio communications with field teams were excellent, tMonitoring results were clearly communicated and " repeat backs" and clarification was provided as necessary.
-Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:
full sets of personal anti-contamination clothing: and respiratory protection equipment for use by the RMTs.
Emphasize the'need to monitor,the TSC radio constantly while the TSC is responsible:for directing the RMTs.
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Joint public Information Center (JPIC)
The JPIC was activated in a timely manner. The first press briefing was held approximately one hour af ter the declaration of the Site Area Emergency.
Information flow from the licensee to the JPIC staff was timely and factual.
The licensee, in some cases, disseminated information to media representatives in advance of a written press release.
This was considered a good practice, and which is favorable to maintaining the flow of information concerning an ongoing accident.
Press briefings were held about every hour, and of ten lasted 30-45 minutes.
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'a The technical spokesperson'was articulate, knowledgeable and-responsive to.a group:of aggressive media representatives (in~some cases, licensee personnel simulating media representatives).
In' the future, briefings should include a more detailed explanation of technical data, components and systems and a greater reliance on visual aids (which were available on stage but seldom utilized). An example of.this was the lack of a description of the normal function of the' Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System (AEGTS), and the indication that someone would be available between briefings should anyone want.
to discuss-the system's functions.
An inaccurate press release by the Lake County Board of Commissioners
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concerning the cause of the Alert declaration was eventually corrected.
O This press release represented one of the few factual: errors disseminated to the public during the exercise,
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Rumor control, media monitoring and JPIC security were adequately performed.
It was observed that several items were covered in written press
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releases, but not discussed during press briefings until related questions from the " media" surfaced.
A' minor portion of one press release regarding the Site Area Emergency
declaration was mildly confusing. The release indicated that the Site Area Emergency (SAE) was the "second highest" of-four emergency classifications.
It is possible that this could be interpreted to mean that the SAE was the second in a sequence of four classification-
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levels.
Based-upon the above findings, this portion of-the-licensee's program I!
was acceptable, a
7.
Exercise Objectives' and Scenario Review (IP-82302]
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The licensee submitted the exercise-and scope and objectives and a draft
scenario package for review by the NRC within-the established.timeframes.
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Scenario review did not indicate any significant problems, and the licensee adequately responded to the single question raised during scenario review j
(regarding the magnitude of.the off-site release). The scenario package
was adequate in scope and content to ensure-ease of use and contained
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enough information'so that licensee controllers could control the exercise.
Backup information was available in the event that the plant simulator,
.o utilized to " drive" the exercise, failed.
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The licensee's scenario was considered very challenging, including.
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multiple equipment failures, a number of mini-scenarios, a fire,
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y injured / contaminated man, a post-accident sample, and assembly /
accountability. Virtually all portions of the licensee's emergency plan were exercised. Simulation of player actions was minimized.
A control cell simulated the NRC Headquarters Duty officer, and required players to maintain continuous communications with the NRC.
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The multiple equipment failures were technically challenging.
An unusually large number of in plant teams were utilized in this exercise.
The degree of challenge in an exercise scenario is considered when assessing observed exercise weaknesses.
The exercise scenario addressed a previous NRC concern regarding the adequacy of the EOF HVAC system by requiring the system to be placed in the emergency recirculation mode to demonstrate its capacity to maintain habitability in the facility for an extended length of time.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
8.
Exercise Control Overall, exercise control was considered excellent.
Individuals controlling the plant simulator performed very well, correcting a problem with the simulation of reactor power level during the exercise.
There were adequate controllers to control the exercise, and they were knowledgeable regarding their tasks. One individual was observed asking a controller for the current reactor power level; the controller properly replied that the player should obtain this information himself.
No instances of Controller prompting were observed.
Based upon the above finaings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
9.
Licensee Critiques The licensee held facility critiques, a Controller exercise critique, and a critique where the conclusions of the Controller / Evaluators were presented and discussed with the players.
NRC personnel attended these critiques, and determined that significant NRC identified exercise deficiencies had also been identified by licensee personnel.
In addition, licensee controller / evaluators also identified a large number of minor problems experienced during the exercise.
The licensee demonstrated an excellent capability of self-identifying exercise problems.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
10.
Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee which will be reviewed further by the inspector and which involves some actions on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An Open Item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 6.d of this report.
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11. Exit Interview'(IP 30703)
The inspectors held an exit interview the day after the exercise on
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June 21, 1990, with the representatives _ denoted in Section 2.
The NRC Team Leader discussed the scope and findings of the inspection.
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The evaluation team leader indicated that the licensee had demonstrated an excellent response to a challenging and complicated hypothetical scenario involving multiple equipment failures,-fire, contaminated / injured
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man, and a large radiological release..
The licensee was also asked if. any of the'information discussed during
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the exit interview was proprietary, The licensee responded that none of the information was proprietary.
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Attachments:
1.
Perry Nuclear Power Plant ~
1990 Exercise Scope and Objectives 2.
Perry Nuclear Power Plant 1990 Exercise Scenario Outline
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'1.0-SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES'
The scope of the exercise is defined in Section 1.1.
The exercise objectives are provided as separate sections, divided into the objectives for the Perry Plant (Section 1.2)'and those of;the state and each county
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1.1 SCOPE
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The 1990 Er.ergency Preparedness Exercise, to be conducted on June 20, 1990, vill-simulate accident events culminating in~a radiological accident with resultant off-site releases from the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP), located in North Perry Village, Lake County,;0hio. The exercise vill involve events that test the effectiveness of the PNPP-Emergency Preparedness Program and the integrated capabilities of the emergency organizations of the State of Ohio, and'the Counties of Lake, Geauga, and Ashtabula. The Exercise vill include the mobilization of
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state and local resources necessary to demonstrate their objectives to
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the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
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1.2 ON-SITE OBJECTIVES The major objective of the exercise is to demonstrate the response capabilities of the PNPP Emergency Response Organization outside of g
normal working hours. Within this overall objective, _ individual vi objectives are specified as follows:
N ITEM NO.
-OBJECTIVE
Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and to maintain staffing around the clock.
i LIMITING ~ CONDITION:
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The ability to maintain around the clock staffing of the Technical. Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) vill be demonstrated by means of the development of staffing / shift rosters.
Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
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-!iilil!! L M h-ITEM NO.
OBJECTIVE-i
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Demonstrate ability'to communicate with all appropriate
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locations, organizations, and field personnel.
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Demonstrate: ability to' mobilize and deploy field p
monitoring' teams in a timely fashion.
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Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for
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y determining ambient. radiation levels.
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Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for.
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ny measurement of airborne radioiodine concentrations as lov
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k as 1.0E-7 uCi/cc in the presence of, noble gases.
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Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via
plume exposure,' based on plant and field data, and to
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determine-appropriate' protective measures, based on PAGs, L
.available shelter, evacuation time estimates, and other relevant-factors.
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10 Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via ingestion pathway exposure, based'on field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAGs-l and other relevant factors.
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LIMITING CONDITION:
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Actual collection and analysis of environmental L
L samples (i.e., soil, vegetation, water,:etc.) vill
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not be demonstrated. Analysis results will be
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provided by the Exercise Controller for the
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g determination of protective action recommendations.
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Demonstrate. ability to notify off-site officials and.
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Demonstrate ability to periodically update off-site y
officials and agencies of the status of the emergency
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based on data available at the PNPP.
13 Demonstrate ability to notify emergency-support pools
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Demonstrate ability to notify on-site personnel using
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Demonstrate ability to effectively assess incident y
conditions and classify the incident correctly.
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OBJECTIVE:
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Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources m
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necessary to manage an accountability of all or part of ty.'
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site personneli
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LIMITING CONDITION:
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n..[1 Personnel accountability vill only be demo!.e?stM
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the Unit 1 Protected Area and EOF pcrtion Of the
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hj Training and Education Center (TEC).
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Demonstrate the organizational ability and resoun cv
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of site. personnel.
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LIMITING CONDITION:-
~ Protected Area personnel vill be evacuated to the
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L-adjacant parking areas during the performance of i
personnel. accountability.
- 18-Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources l
necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, such as L
inclement-vesther or traffic obstructions.
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Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources q)
necessary to control access to the site, i
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LIMITING CONDITION:
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PNPP Security personnel vill establish traffic control points at key intersections on-site. PNPP
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vill also simulate requesting traffic. control (
-assistance from the Lake County Sheriff Department.
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'20 Demonstrate ability'to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.
Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.
Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rutuor control in a coordinated fashion.
Demonstrate adequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals.
Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals.
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LITEMI i
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OBJECTIVE
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.26 Demonstrate adequacy of on-site first aid:
i facilities / equipment and procedures for handling (.
contaminated individuals.
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127a Demonstrate' ability to identify need for, request, and oDtain Federal assistance.
' LIMITING CONDITION:
Exercise participants vill demonstrate the ability to identify the need for Federal assistance and vill-j reviev vith a-Controller how such assistance vould be l
requested. No Federal agencies vill actually be
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c'ontacted for assistance by the PNPP during the.
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exercise.
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~28 Demonstrate ability to estimate total population exposure.
Demonstrate adequacy of in-plant post accident sampling
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techniques and_ analysis.
1.3 0FF-SITE OBJECTIVES.
,The Jof f-site agencies' objectives are found as follows:
l Agency Attachment
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State of Ohio
Ashtabula County
Geauga Courti
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. Lake Cour';r
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.o The off-site exercise objectives are written in reference to the 36 FEMA
. Example Exercise Objectives.. Thus, for example, State of Ohio Exercise Objective No.1 discusses how the State of Ohio vill meet FEMA Objective
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'No.11.
The state and counties' objectives correspond by number' to the L
FEMA Example Objectives.
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Attachment 2
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1990 EVALUATED EXERCISE
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PERRY NUCLEAR POVER PLANT e
e 6.2.1 ON-SITE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Approximate Key Time Events
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0730 Initial conditions are established. Commence Exercise.
0745 A Seismic Event occurs. The Seismic Honitoring Panel indicates two amber lights. Grid frequency slows down temporarily. The operators implement ONI-D51.
0750 SOC notifies the cont'al Aoom that a Grid Emergency has been declared. The earthquake caused several Eastlake plant relay trips, resulting in the station's going off-line.) Perry is requested to remain on-line.
0800 An UNUSUAL EVENT is declared (EPI-A1, Section L.I.la, " Natural phenomenon being experienced beyond normally observed levels").
0820 A fire occurs in the AEGTS A system. AEGTS fan (H15 0001A) motor catches fire. The fire ignites charcoal dust, rags and other (
materials in the area from the recent charcoal changeout.
Off-site fire fighting assistence is requested.
0825 An injury occurs at the fire scene. The victim is potentially contaminated and injured, requiring off-site hospitalization.
0830 An ALERT is declared (EPI-A1, Section F.II.1, " Fire potentially affecting safety systems"). The TSC and OSC are directed to be activated.
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0845 condenser vacuum s:erts to decrease due to air inleakage through the troughs. Offgas flov increases from 45 scfm to 90 scfm.
Alarms occur at 70 sefs.
0855 The Ofigas (N64) trouble atarm flashes on P680.
"PREFLTR LINE DRN LOOP SEAL ?IVEL LOV" is lighted on P845. Operators are dispatched to fill the treugh.
In accordance with ARI-H13-P845-F8, Valve N64-F360 should be shut.
N64-F360 does not shut due to the Barton level switch being out of calibration. Any actions to close N6*-F369 fail. Upon closing
N64-F054 per procedures, N64-F054 indicates mid-positioni it is stuck open.
0900 Turbine Pover Complex Floor Drain area radiation monitors alarm; offgas building vent radiation monitors alarm.
High airborne activities (particulate and iodine) are indicated all over the area.
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1990 EVALUATED EXERCISE
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i PERRY NUCLEAR POVER PLANT l
6.2.1 ON-SITE SEQUENCE OF EVFKTS l
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Approximate Key Time Events i
0907 An Operator (PPO) attempts to fill loop seal by opening N64-F042 no flow is observed.
0908 The PPO visually checks Pll-F623 in overhead piping it appears to be closed.
0911 The PPO uses a lift to elevate himself to open Pll-F623.
He is unable to open the valve.
0930 Another ALERT should be declared [ EPI-Al, Section E.II.1, "High rad levels / airborne contamination (1000 times normal for more than 30 minutes).)
0935 Valve Pll-F623 is finally opened. The loop seals can be filled; radiation levels start to decrease.
Plant technicians exiting the area are found to be contaminated.
0945 condenser vacuum has been slowly decreasing. At this time, it is at
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4".
Per ONI-N62, the operators should reduce power such that vacuum goes belov 4".
1013 At 40% power, the condenser vacuum quickly decreases to 8".
At this point the turbine trips and the reactor scrams. Only a few control rods insert. Reactor power is between 20-35%. Reactor pressure is being controlled by the bypass valves.
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1015 When the turbine trips, two SRV's stick open.
Pool temperature increases quickly; suppression pool cooling is placed in service.
Condenser vacuum goes tc 6".
1022'
Operators should determine to initiate Standby Liquid Control (SLC).
When initiated, SLC does not inject due to Pump A (C41-C001A)
tripping on overcurrent. Subsequent investigation shows that the SLC pump breaker (EFlA08-D) has failed.
1023 One SRV shuts: the other SRV remains open. NOTE:
If Seppression Pool Temperature exceeds 100'F or if the reactor begins to depressurize, the SRV shuts.
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1990 EVALUATED EXERCISE
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PERRY NUCLEAR POVER PLANT
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i Approximate Key
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Time Events 1030 A SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared [ EPI-A1, Section D.III.1,
" Transient requiring operation of shutdovn system with failure to
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scram (ATVS)). The E0F and JPIC are directed to be activated.
F Operators are able~to insert only one control rod at a time.
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Rea.'. tor vater level is being controlled by feedvatet. Condenser
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vacuum stabilizes at approximately 4".
p 1100 As operators insert one control rod at a time, a Rod Control &
Information System (RC&lS) problem occurs. This problems halts rod insertion power is between 10-20%.
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1145 Site Protection Section is notified of an employee attempt to bring l
contraband into the protected area.
1250 Both SLC systems are returned to service.
Both SLC systems are (..
initiated and inject to the vessel.
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1253 At 4% power, a major failure of an SRV necurs. Reactor vater level decreases but is recovered by lov pressure ECCS systems. The injection of cold vater causes a pover spike.
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As a result of the transient, the backup hydrogen purge system does not isolate; valves M51-F090 (inside containment) and M51-F110 (outside containment) fail open. A release path to the environment exists (RPV through SRV to dryvell to M51 backup hydrogen purge to
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AEGTS B to Unit 2 Vent). A release to the environment is undervay.
1300 A GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared (EPI-Al, Attachment 3, " Loss of two fission product barriers with a potential loss of the third barrier"). Protective actions recommendations are made.
1305 RC&IS is restored. Control rods can not be inserted until the CRD Pump Bus is restored from its trip on the LOCA signal.
1310 The CRD Pump is restored. Operators are able to insert only one Control Rod at a time. Some rods remain stuck out due to the loss
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of core geometry.
1400 The outer Hydrogen purge valve (M51-F110) is shut; the release is terminated.
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6.2.1 ON-SITE SEQUFRCE OF EVEttS Approximate Key
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Time Events 1430 The plume off-site begins to dissipate.
- One channel'of the offgas vent radiation monitor 1D17-K836 fails
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upscale. Plant I&C technicians respond.
1500 Condition exist such that Recovery plans and actions may be discussed and implemented.
1515 A failure of the ERIS system, occurs.
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1600 The exercise is terminated.
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