IR 05000440/1989023
| ML19325E208 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 10/24/1989 |
| From: | Ring M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19325E205 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-440-89-23, IEIN-88-046, IEIN-88-051, IEIN-88-055, IEIN-88-067, IEIN-88-097, NUDOCS 8911020229 | |
| Download: ML19325E208 (17) | |
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REGION III
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i de . Report No. 50-440/89023(DRP) Docket No. 50-440 License No NPF-58-j "' Licensee: Lleveland Electric Illuminating Company ' Fost Office Box 5000 y f.
' Cl eveland., 0;t 44101 . ' . Facility hue: Perry Nuelerr power Plant, Unit 1 q , , 1.
Inspection Ai.: Perry Site,' Perry, Ohio l
Inspection Conducted: August 11 through October 11, 1989 l I , ' L Inspectors: P. L. Hiland j ' G. F. O'Dwyer l.' 1 Approved By: M.' A. Ring, Chie / /*[Z-L Reactor Pro.iects Section 3B U Date ] ' , i ' j; .I_nspection Summary L Inspection on August 11 through October 11, 1989 (Report No. 50-440/89023(DRP)) .
L Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by resident inspectors .
of licensee action on previous inspection items; NRC Information Notice followup; i ' L radwaste storage; Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) walkdown; surveillance ' observation; maintenance observation; operational safety verification; and ! onsite followup of events.
'. Results: Of the eight areas inspected, one violation was identified in the ~ area of onsite followup of events. That violation was due to a failure to ) o I L' properly perform a surveillance instruction which resulted in Division 1 ECCS components being declared inoperable (Paragraph 9.b.(4)). The violation was , , L significant-in that the procedural steps performed required independent L verification. -In addition, one Open Item was identified in the area of onsite
L followup of events. That open item concerned the licensee's root cause g, i [ determination of a failed directional control valve in the hydraulic power unit for the A recirculation system flow control valva that caused a power ' ,
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excursion above 100 percent (Paragraph 9.b.(2)). All of the above items were receiving management attentien.
, 8911020229 891025 PDR ADOCK 05000440 a.
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- Details i 1.
Persons Contacted L a.
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) " r A. Kaplan, Vice President, Nuclear Group > L M. Lyster, General Manager, Perry Plant Operations Department l .(PP00)
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- S. Kensicki, Director, Perry Plant Technical Department (
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' R. Stratman, Director, Nuclear Engineering Department (NED) J
- P. Bordley, Reactor Engineer, PPTD W, Coleman, Manager, Operations Quality Section, Nuclear Quality
, Assurance Department (NQAD) [
- G. Dunn, Compliance Engineer, Nuclear Support Department (NSD)
- M. Gmyrek, Manager, Operations Section, PPOD
- V. Higaki, Manager, Outage Planning Section, PPOD
- W. Kanda, Manager, Instrumentation and Control Section, PPTD
- R. Newkirk,' Manager, Licensing and Compliance Section, NSD K. Pech, Manager, Technical Section PPTD
' D. Takacs, Manager, Mechanical Maintenance Quality Section, NQAD
- L. Teichman, Supervisor, Preventive Maintenance and Welding Unit, PPOD i
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V. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- P. H11and, Senior Resident inspector, RIII
- G. O'Dwyer, Resident Inspector, RIII
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting held on October 11, 1989.
( 2.
Licensee Action en Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702) , a.
(Closed) Violation (440/87003-03(DRp)): Lack of Written Safety l Evaluation.
The subject icem was initially identified as a violation for which the licensee had taken adequate corrective action (ref. IR 50-440/87003,
Paragraph 4.c)); therefore, a written response was not required. Based on the corrective action taken as documented in the referenced ( ' inspection report, this item is closed.
b.
[ Closed) Violation (440/87004-01(DRP): Failure to take timely and effective corrective action.
, Following surveillance test failures on the Division 1 and'2 emergency l diesel gent:rators in February 1987, the inspectors determined that the licensee had failed to implement timely corrective action to known equipment deficiencies that directly contributed to the February test , failures.
The licensee responded to the subject violation in l l
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m '. '. . . . [ letter PY-CEI/NRR-0650L, dated May 20, 1987, in a timely manner.
This item was previously reviewed in inspection report 50-440/88003, L Paragraph 2.b.
At the time of that review this item remained open " pending completion of corrective action as stated in a January 27, 1988, revised response to the violation.
. During this report period, the inspector reviewed the status of the , licensee's corrective action to this item.
Licensee letter
PY-CEI/NRR-1041L dated July 19, 1989, provided current status information, Modifications to the Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator .' (DG) building. ventilation systems were completed during the firct ' refueling outage; however, due to vibration in the Division 2
ventilation fan impeller, additional rework was necessary.
In the i.
interim. the Division 2 room air supply fans were to be operated as necessary. The licensee further stated that the replacement ' ' Division 2 fan would be installed within 90 days following receipt.
s ' Based on the completion of the design modification for Division 1 { l and 2 Diesel Building ventilation systems as stated in the. licensee's
July 19 letter, the inspectors considered corrective actions for the-subject violation to be completed.
The rework / replacement of the Division 2-exhaust ventilation fan impeller within 90 days following receipt of the replacement fan appeared reasonable and would allow
for rework within the licensee's routine 13 week maintenance schedule.
This item is closed, c.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (440/88003-07(DRP)): Reporting of Unplanned Engineered Safety Feature Actuation.
In January 1988, the licensee experienced an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation which was reported to the NRC
Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System as required i by 10 CFR 50.72.
However, the subsequent Licensee Event Report (LER) 88-005-00 was submitted by the licensee as a " voluntary c " report" since the licensee considered the specific ESF actuation to be part of a propicnned event. As delineated in inspection report- , ' 50-440/88003, Paragraph 9, the inspecters were concerned that the licensee was not fully aware of the reporting requirements for ESF actuations and this item remained open pending the inspectors review of the licensee's handling of future ESF actuations.
During the most recent Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP-9), the inspectors reviewed fifty LERs that were issued by the licensee between May 1, 1988 and May 30, 1989.
In addition, since , May 30, the inspectors have reviewed all reportable or potentially ' , reportable events as documented in previous routine inspection reports. During those reviews, the inspectors noted that all ESF actuations were properly reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73.
Based on the above reviews, the licensee demonstrated a clear understanding of the reporting requirements for " unplanned" ESF actuatiors. This item is closed.
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(Closed) Violation (440/88009-01(DRP)): Failure to recognize Control Complex Chiller inoperability and enter appropriate Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), In June 1988, the "A" Control Compler. Chiller was discovered to be low on refrigerant and its outlet temperature was indicating 72 cegrees F.
Therefore, the "A" Control Complex Chiller was not capable of performing its intended support function. Upon reviewing , the work request that identified the Chiller problem, the on-duty , Unit Supervisor failed to initiate the appropriate tracking forms and entry into the applicable LCO.
The licensee responded to the subject violation in letter PY-CEI/NRR-0901L in a timely manner. That initial response requested that.the NRC withdraw the violation. By letter. dated October 25, 1988, Region III informed the licensee that there was no basis for the requested retraction of the violation.
The licensee supplemented their initial response to this violation + in' letter-PY-CEI/NRR-0937L.
Corrective action to the violation included training.of licensed operators as to the importance of reviewing all available indicators when system operability was in question. Based on the actions taken by the licensee as discussed above, the inspectors considered the corrective action to be completed. This item is closed.
e.
(Closed) Violation (440/88012-02(DRP)): Overtime Guidelines Exceeded Without An Approved Deviation Request.
The licensee responded to the subject violation via letter PY-CEI/NRR-0926L, dated October 19, 1988. That response stated that appropriate supervisors had been reminded of their responsibility to implement the requirements of the governing administrative procedures used to control unit staff overtime. The licensee considered that correct've dction adequate to prevent recurrence of the subject violation.
However, as documented in the Diagnostic Evaluation Team Report for Perry Nuclear Power Plant dated May 1989, Section 3.2.2, the licensee's stated corrective action was ineffective to prevent recurrence of the violation.
Violation 50-440/89022-03 was issued on September 11, 1989, for the licensee's failure to take adequate corrective action to prevent recurrence of this violation.
Based on the issuance of violation 50-440/89022-03, this item is closed and further followup of the licensee's corrective action will be documented against Violation 50-440/89022-03.
f.
(Closed) Perry Unit 2 Open Items (59): Administrative Closure of All Open Items Assigned Docket Tracking Number 50-441.
In order to more accurately track the status of Open Items that were being actively workec on, NRC Region III Management directed that the 59 Perry Unit 2 Open Items as of Auoust 18, 1989, be ' 4... .,w.,, 1 .,r ~.~. ,.,.m.,n, sy my, y.497, w.~ 7, . .-,s ,.,. - m,,, .., . s t,, . v.,, ,,, .. .,, ,-3..
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L Author's Name: Shafer", I
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Document Comnents: ! memo to all drp sri's and ri's , . t.
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. administrative 1y closed. The 59 Unit 2 open items will be reopened ' g should construction be resumed on the unit.
All 59 Unit 2 Open L items are considered a single Open Item (441/89002-01) pending L resumption of Unit 2 construction.
Reference: RIII memorandum for ' file from R. C. Knop, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3, dated ' August 18, 1989.
' 441/79015-CC 441/83007-BB. 441/84039-EE 441/85013-HH 441/80001-BB 441/83008-EE 441/84041-EE 441/85014-EE
441/80009-CC 441/83011-EE 441/84043-EE 441/85014-HH 441/80012-CC 441/83016-EE 441/84046-EE' 441/85022-HH 441/80014-BB 441/84001-PP 441/84047-EE 441/86002-EE' 441/80015-CC 441/84002-PP 441/85001-PP 441/86002-HH 441/80015-EE 441/84003-BB 441/85002-PP 441/86002-PP 441/81002-PP 441/84003-PP 441/85003-HH 441/86003-BB 441/81003-PP 441/84006-EE 441/85003-PP 441/86003-EE-441/81006-EE 441/84007-01-441/85004-PP-441/86003-PP 441/82005-EE 441/84010-EE 441/85005-PP 441/86004-EE-441/82005-PP 441/84023-HH 441/85006-HH 441/86004-PP 441/82019-EE 441/84025-01 441/85007-HH 441/86005-PP 441/83003-PP 441/84026-EE 441/85012-EE 441/86006-PP 441/84033-EE 441/85013-EE 441/87001-01 No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
NRC Information Notice Fellowup (92701) During the report period, the inspectors performed a review of licensee actions related to selected Information Notices issued by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulatiot.
The review included verification that each Lr information notice was reviewed for applicability; the informatior notices received proper distribt: tion to appropriate personnel; and if l applicable, the scheduling of appropriate corrective action was , completed, a.
(Closed) Information Notice No. 88-46 (440/88046-IN): LICENSEE REPORT OF DEFECTIVE REFURBISHED CIRCUIT BREAKERS.
The subject Information Notice (IN) dated July 8, 1988, was received ! by the licensee on July 10, 1988. The licensee's Reliability and Design Assurance Section distributed the information notice to the licensee's Electrical Design Section (EDS), Procurement and Administrative Quality Section (PAQS), Engineering Project Support , l' Section (EPSS), and Perry Services Department (PSD). The inspectors L noted that the required reviews were completed and approved l September 27, 1988. Based on the review performed, the licensee l cont.luded that electrical equipment was not procured from the l vendors listed in IN 88-46.
The inspectors considered the licensee ' l review of IN 88-46 to be adequate. This item is closed.
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(Closedj Information Notice No. 88-51 (440/88051-IN): FAILURES OF l MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES.
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' The subject Information Notice (IN) dated July 21, 1988, was received by the licensee on August 3, 1988. The licensee's Reliability and Design Assurance Section distributed the information to the licensee's Plant Technical Department (PPTD), Mechanical , Design Section (MDS), and Plant Operations Department (PP00).
In.
1' addition to the review performed of IN 88-51, the licensee performed
~ a review of General Electric Service Information Letter (SIL)-477 ' .. which discussed the same issue as IN 88-51.
The licensee's review ' ' of'SIL-477 was completed and approved on August 8, 1989, and addressed both the recommendations of SIL-477 and'IN 88-51.
In response to this information notice, the licensee revised their General Maintenance Instructions (GMIs), Surveillance Instructions (SVIs), and Alarm Response Instructions (ARIs) to assure adequate testing and control of maintenance on the main steam isolation valves. GMI-0096 was revised (February 28,1989) to assure n.
verification of full stem movement following maintenance.
= Surveillance Instructions SVI-B21-T2200/T2201 were initiated in April 1989 to measure back leakage past the MSIV air accumulator i ' . check valves. ARI-H13-P870-2 was revised to direct plant operators to i declare inboard MSIVs inoperable if. air header pressure dropped below ' 90 psig.
L In addition to the above, the inspectors noted that the licensee had performed extensive MSIV troubleshooting following failures to l' ' " slow-close." The results of that troubleshooting effort were i ' delineated in licensee letter PY-CEI/01E-0355L datea August 10, 1989.
Based on the above, the inspectors determined that the licensee had adequately reviewed IN 88-51.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) Information Notice No. 88-55(440/88055-IjN: POTENTIAL l PROBLEMS CAUSED BY SINGLE FAILURE OF AN ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE , SWING BUS.
' L The subject Information Notice (IN) dated August 3, 1988, was l received by the licensee on August 11, 1988. The licensee's i Reliability and Design Assurance Section distributed this L information notice to the licensee's Electrical Design Section (EDS) l and Mechanical Design Section (MDS) for review.
The results of l those reviews concluded that IN 88-55 was not applicable to the L Perry plant since the class IE electrical distribution system was l divided into three independent divisions.
Each electrical division l was provided with its own standby generator and its own 125 VDC , power supply.
No provisions existed to automatically or manually transfer the AC or DC loads of one division to either of the other divisions.
Based on the above, the inspectors concluded that the l licensee had adequately reviewed IN 88-55.
This item is closed.
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[ Closed] Information Notice No. 88-67 (440/88067-IN): PWR AUXILIARY FElDWATER PUMP TURBINE OVERSPEED TRIP FAILURE.
, ! The subject Information Notice (IN) dated August 22, 1988, was received by the licensee on September 8,1988.
The licensee's '
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m . _ .. - . - . c Reliability and Design Assurance Section distributed this information notice to the licensee's Mechanical Design Section (MDS) for review.
That review concluded that no additional action was E required since the recommendations contained in IN 88-67 had been previously initiated in eiiponse to General Electric Service Information Letter (SII b.53.
Specifically, overspeed testing of the Reactor Core Isoladun Cooling turbine (Terry Turbine) was .
E required to be performed at each refueling outage.
In addition, ' visual inspection of the tappet ball and emergency trip weight was g' required to be perfonned prior to and after the overspeed testing, i Based on the above, the inspectors concluded that the licensee had adequately reviewed IN 88-67.
This item is closed.
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(Closed)InformationNotice 88-97 (440/88003-PP): POTENTIALLY SUBSTANDARD VALVE REPLACEMENT-PARTS.
The subject Information Notice (IN) dated December 16, 1988, was received by'the licensee on December 27, 1988. The licensee's a Procurement and Administrative Quality Section (PAQS) reviewed the.
~ subject IN and the associated 10 CFR Part 21 report which had been submitted to the NRC by Consumers Power Company.
, The licensee's review concluded that none of the companies identified by IN 88-97 were used as suppliers.
However, Masoneilan . valves were furnished for use in non-safety service and instrument
air systems.
Spare parts had been procured from Masoneilan or from suppliers not listed in IN 88-97.
The licensee further identified that 17 original valo manufacturers were currently listed on their approved supplier's list and were the single source of replacement parts.
Two additional valve manufacturers were identified where replacement parts were ordered from sub-vendors but shipped from the original valve manufacturer.
,, t Based on the above, the inspectors concluded that the licensee had
adequately reviewed the subject IN. The licensee's approved
suppliers list contained spare part procurement from the original equipment manufacturer for safety-related valves. This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
, 4.
Radwaste Storage - Regional Request (92701) During the report period, the inspectors conducted an extensive tour of radioactive waste storage areas at the Perry plant. Of particular interest were areas in the radwaste building where the majority of onsite storage was performed.
Following a sub-basement contamination event at Nine Mile Point Unit 1, NRC Region III management directed the inspectors to verify by direct field observation that a similar condition ' did not exist at Perry.
The inspectors toured all elevations of the radwaste building including " basement" areas.
All radioactive waste was i
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undetected flooding, The stored spent-resin waste material was located at the radwaste , y building' grade elevation and contained in approved storage liner:,. In
addition, the inspectors toured designated storage areas outside of the radwaste building where contaminated equipment and tools were stored in dry containers. Based on the direct field observations, the inspectors concluded that radioactive waste material was being properly stored in , , p appropriate storage locations.
No violations or deviations were identified.
j 5.
Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Walkdown (71710) g , L During this inspection period, the inspectors performed a detailed ' walkdown of the accessible portions of the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)
System.
The system walkdown was conducted using Valve Lineup Instruction (VLI)-E21, Revision 4; the System Operating Instruction (501)-E21, Revision 5, and the controlled Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P& ids) for the LPCS System.
During the system walkdown, the inspectors directly observed equipment conditions to verify that hangers and supports were installed properly; c appropriate;1evels of clearliness were being maintained; piping insulation, heaters, and air circulation systems were installed and operational; valves in the system were installed in accordance with applicable P& ids and did not exhibit gross packing leakage, bent stems, missing handwheels, or improper labeling; and, that major system components were properly labeled and exhibited no leakage.
The inspectors verified that instrumentation associated with the system was properly installed, functioning, and that significant process parameter values were consistent with normal expected values.
By direct visual observation or observation of remote position indication, the inspectors verified that valves in the system flow path were in the correct positions as required by the various modes of operation that were required; power was available to the valves; valves required to be locked [ in position were locked; and, that pipe caos and blank flanges were installed as required.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726) For the below listed surveillance activities the inspectors verified one or more of the following: testing was performed in accordance with procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for operation were met; removal and restoration of the affected components were properly accomplished; test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; and that any deficiencies
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appropriate management personnel, s Surveillance Test No.
Activity SVI-E22-T1200, Revision 2 High Pressure Core Spray Pump Discharge Pressure - High Channel Functional for IE22-N651 , No violations or deviations were ic'entified.
7.
Monthly Maintenance Observatie:i (62703) i Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components l p listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted ' in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
, The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were - inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations ware ' performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls l ' were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority was assigned to safety related equipment m:intenance which may affect system performance.
, 'The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed: Repetitive Task, R85-002917, which was the calibration of Control Complex Chillers i Ammeters and Work Order 89-6896, Revision 1, which was the replacement o of a worn inflatable seal on the inner door of the lower containment airlock.
Following completion of the above mentioned maintenance, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned te service properly.
' No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Operationel Safety Verif dcation (71707) a.
Ueneral The inspectors observed cor. trol room operations, reviewed applicable
logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators during l this inspection period.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tag-out records and verified . L
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,. *. i .. i L tracking of Limiting Conditions for Operation associated with ' affected components. Tours of the intermediate, auxiliary, reactor, and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment - , conditions including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations, and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for certain pieces of. equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that . ! the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with L the station security plan.
, The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that . facility operations were in conformance with the requirements , i established'under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures, b.
Details 1.
On August 17, 1989; at about 3:30 p.m. the inspectors noted ) white (informational) tags on switches on control room' panels for the following motor operated valves: shutdown cooling outboard isolation, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Loop "A" heat - exchanger outlet, RHR loop B heat exchangers steam shutoff, and RHR loop B to containment shu off. The white tags indicated that the first three valves were manually seated and that the - last valve was out-of service. Operations personnel informed the inspectors that before attempting to operate the valves, i they had to manually unseat the valves to avoid damaging the ' ., operators. 'On the control switch on the control room panel for the Division 2 Emergency Service Water (ESW) Pump a white tag indicated that operators were to maintain the pump running until the ESW loop B keep fill pressure indicator was checked by , Instrumentation and Calibration (I&C) personnel. There were no
white tags on the control switches for these valves or' tHs pump on the Division 1 or 01 vision 2 Remote Shutdown Panelt (LP) or the breaker panels for any of the aforementioned Division 2 equipment. Operators evacuating in an emergency from the conb ' room to the Remote Shutdown Panel would have had to remember.*. cn switches were tagged and wnat the tags had indicated in order to determine which of their equipment was still operable.
The inspectors brought this situation to the attention of the plant manager, the operations manager and the senior operations coordinator who agreed that the control of the Remote Shutdown .. " Panels needed to be improved and committed to changing the ' tagging procedures.
On October 6, 1989, the senior operations coordinator informed the inspectors that a Temporary Change ' Notice (TCN) to Perry Administrative Procedure (PAP)-1401, " Safety Tagging," would provide instructions for hanging white tags on switches on the Remote Shutdown Panel to provide i
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Since L revtsien 4 of PAP-1401 was issued on October 2, the licensee . ,
did not attempt to revise it while it was in the final review
and training cycle. On October 7, 1989, the inspector noted ! s that satisf actory white tags were hung on the Division' 1 RSP
i for the shutdown cooling suction outboard isolation valve and , at tne breaker for the RHR B heat exchangers steam shutoff i p ' valve. There werc no longer white tags in the Control Room on , the switches fer the outlet valve for the RHL A heat exchangers ' or the shutoff valve for RHR B containment spray. However on l October 7, there was still no white tag on the Division 2 RSP
l switch for ESW Pump B, even though the tag in the control room i i still indicated that the pump should be kept running because l l its discharge valve leaked, i 2.
On September 28, 1989, at about 8:00 a.m. (EDT), while the plant was at 100 percent power, the licensee identified damage
due to arcing at one of the twn output connectors for the l C phase main power transformer. The licensee evaluated the ' i condition of the lug connections by visual observation, ' thermographic equipment and use of a heat gun.
The decision l was made to remove the main generator from the grid and make
repairs, while keeping the reactor at about 17 percent power.
! At about 6:00 p.m. a controlled reduction in power was commenced with the main generator removed from the grid at . about 9:30 p.m.
Repairs were completed at about 4:30 a.m. on i September 29 and the main generator was synchronized to the grid- ! at 7:45 a.m. with 100 percent power resumed at 3:35 p.m.
! Repairs to the C-phase transformer included replacement of two , power cables to tha transMssion lines.
In addition, the ' connections for the "A" and "B" main transformers were torqued during the repair activities.
No violations or deviations were identified [ 9.
Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Power Reactors (93702) l a.
General i The inspectors performed onsite followup activities for events which
uccurred during the inspection period.
Followup inspection included i one or more of the following: reviews of operating logs, procedures, condition reports; direct observation of licensee ! i.
actions; and interviews of licensee personnel.
For each event, the [ inspectors reviewed one or more of the following: the sequence of ' L actions; the functioning of safety systems required by plant i conditions; licensee actions to verify consistency with plant
procedures and license conditions; and verification of the nature of ., the event. Additionally, in some cases, the inspectors verified that licensee investigation had identified root causes of equipment
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u .. j malfunctions and/or personnel errors and were taking or had taken appropriate corrective actions. Details of the events and licensee corrective actions noted during the inspectors' followup are provided in Paragraph b. below, i
i b.
Details c (1) Uper Containment Pool Level Drop On August 30, 1989, at about 1:30 a.m. EDT, control room j operators discovered the upper containment pool level to be less than the Technical Specification limit of 22'10".
While
investigating a low upper containment pool level alarm, plant operators noted the upper pool level to be 1.5 to 2.0 inches i below the required Technical Specification 11mit. Upon discovery, water inventory to the upper containment pool was i l restored and the level was returned above 22'10".
' The licensee documented this event in Condition Report (CR) , 89-340 to determine the root cause and corrective action to .! prevent recurrence.
The inspectors reviewed that Condition
Report, interviewed plant operations personnel, and performed a
field walkdown of control room instrumentation to verify the licensee's root cause determination.
L As documented in CR 89-340, on August P9, 1989, the control room operators isolated the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup j (FPCC) system at about 3:30 p.m. after maintenance was performed on the upper containment pool flow control valve.
! The system operating instruction ($01-G41-(FPCC)) used to ! isolate the upper containment pool did not provide adequate i instructions to perform the desired isolation in that, while i the ;upply line flow control valve was shut, the return line was not isolated.
That system lineup allowed leakage past the
upper pool " skimmers" to drain the upper pool 1.5 to 2.0 inches through the return line.
The control room operators who i E performed the upper pool isolation lineup were aware of the ! l potential to drain past the leaking " skimmers" and monitored
upper pool level every 30 minutes on the control room panel instrument level meter (accuracy plus or minus 6"). When the , relieving crew assumed the control room duties, the operators noted that a back panel strip chart recorder (accuracy plus or , minus 3") indicated upper pool level was below 22'10".
A plant ' operator went to the upper containment pool elevation and by - ' direct field observation (normal surveillance method) identified the below Technical Specification level, Corrective action to prevent recurrence of this event included revising System 0;:erating Instruction (SOI) G41-FPCC to address the appropriate valve line-up for isolating the upper pool; a
design change was being evaluated to raise the lowest level of l l L
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l [* the upper pool skimmers to a level above design limits; daily i !.. instructions were promulgated to identify upper pool instrument i accuracies; and lessons learned.from this event were to be ! l included in licensed operator requalification training.
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The inspectors concluded that the control room operators on ! t shift at the time the upper containment pool was isolated had - taken action to monitor pool level and most likely would have ' identified a gross level decrease.
However, the relieving crew demonstrated a more aggressive attitude and were not satisfied with monitoring a low accuracy control room instrument meter.
l That aggressiveness led directly to the identification and correction of the upper pool level.
' , The licensee initially reported this event to the NRC ! L Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System at '! l' about 5:00 a.m. on August 30, 1989.
The licensee's initial ! report was considered a 4-hour non-emer accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii)gency event in ' c due to loss of a safety , system. However, subsequent to the event, the licensee ! performed an analysis of the actual loss in upper pool level i (2.0") and the required upper pool volume necessary to maintain ! the safety function of the Suppression Pool Makeup System. The I inspectors reviewed licensee calculation G43-5 dated September 27, i 1989, and noted that an adequate volume of water in the t suppression pool was available at the time of this event < occurrence which compensated for the two inch lots of water in the upper containment pool. The inspectors noted that the ? licensee's analysis supported their conclusion that a I safety-system failure had not occurred and their decision not l to submit a Licensee Event Report appeared reasonable.
In
addition, the inspectors noted that the licensee had restored ( the upper pool level to the required 22'10" within the total L ACTION time limit of 16 hours as was required by Technical Specification 3.6.3.4.b.
Based on the inspectors review of i NUREG 1022, Supplement 1, question 2.1, restoration of the upper containment pool level within the ACTION statement time limit prevented violating the plant Technical Specifications.
(2) Thermal Power Excursion Above 100%
On September 13, 1989, while performing maintenance on Reactor l Recire Flow Control Valve-A control circuitry, the licensee i experienced an unexpected power increase above 100%. With the - plant operating at 100% power, both the "A" and "B" Reactor ! Recire Flow Control Valves (FCV) were hydraulically locked to i allow replacement of the "A" FCV's function generator circuit ! card K69]A. Af ter card replacement, subloop-1 of FCV-A's ! associated hydraulic power unit was restarted. Although no l FCV movement was expected, FCV-A drifted open from its originel 56% open position to about 78% open.
This increased total core flow and reactor power.
Plant operators responded immediately
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{ [ .y,6 ; < , n . , . by turning off subloop-1 of FCV-A and inserted control rods to ' ! return power to less than 100%. The total time above 100% power ( was about 2 minutes with a peak of 106.6% reactor power.
j Subsequent licensee investigation into the cause for FCV A to drift open identified a failed (stuck) directional control ! valve (1833F0603A) in the hydraulic power unit skid.
That control valve's solenoid had been replaced just prior to this r ! event af ter a similar FCV drif t at lower power levels had L occurred on August 9, 1989. At the time of that previous f maintenance activity, plant personnel identified varnish on the solenoid plunger as the apparent cause for the earlier failure.
' ' At the conclusion of this report period, the licensee had l replaced the entire directional control valve assembly under work order No. 89005753 dated September 14, 1989.
The root cause of the directional control valve failure was being
,' evaluated by the licensee and was to be reported in the ' required Licensee Event Repnrt (440/89026-00) for this event.
. The licensee reported this event to the NRC Operations Center via the ENS at about 8:30 p.m. EDT on September 13, 1989.
The ' inspectors will review the required Licensee Event Report in a , subsequent Inspection Report.
The determination of ro:t cause '! l' and corrective action for the directional control valve failure c ' is. considered an Open item-(440/89023-01(DRP)) pending the
inspectors review of the licensee's completed evaluation.
(3) High Pressure Core Spray System Inop B On September 14, 1989 at about 4:00 p.m. EDT, the High Pressure a Core Spray (HPCS) system was declared inoperable due to a "HPCS ' ' Leak Detected" alarm. Af ter receiving several spurious alarms from HPCS line break leak detection instrument IE31NU81, plant
operators declared HPCS inoperable and entered the Limiting
Condition for Operations (LCO); however, the HPCS was left in ' its normal standby mode as plant conditions did not validate the leak detection system alarm. The shift supervisor directed troubleshooting of the leak detection alarm circuit to identify l the cause for the spurious alarms. At about 6:00 p.m., while troubleshooting was still in progress, the licensee made a ' 4-hour non-emergency report to the NRC O n rations Center in ! accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii) ior loss of a single i , train safety system.
Following that notification, the licensee confirmed that the leak detection instrument for HPCS had ! ^ failed due to water intrusion at the transmitter.
Since the leak detection instrument was not required to be operable by the plant Technical Specifications as it performed no ! safety-function (i.e. information alarm only), the licensee , declared HPCS operable at about 10:00 p.m. on September 14.
Corrective action for the failed transmitter was delineated in Field Change Request (FCR) No.13152 which was to provide weep ,
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' . l holes in the transmitter's associated terminal box and seal the - l conduit at the terminal end and transmitter end.
, c j Subsequent review for reportability of this event by the i i lictnsee concluded that since HPCS was declared inoperable only ' ! as a conservative measure while troubleshooting the suspected i failed leak detection trtnsmitter, an actual loss of a single ' train safety system had not occurred and a Licensee Event Report was not required. Based on the inspectors review of , i~ licensee action for this event and the fact that HPCS was maintained in its normal standby mode throughout the troubleshooting effort for the leak detection system alarm, the licensee's cot.clusion that a single train safety system failure had not occurred was reasonable.
(4) kss of Division 1 and_3 ECCS and Entry Into Tech. Spec. 3.0.3 , On September 25, 1989, at about 7:00 p.m. EDT, the licensee experienced a loss of control power to the Emergency Service Water (ESW) "A" Discharge Valve IP45F130A. At the time of f event occurrence, the plant was operating at 100% power and the Division 3 emergency core cooling system (i.e. HPCS) was removed from service for preplanned maintenance activities.
With the ESW-A pump discharge valve control power failed, the , licensee declared the affected Division 1 safety related r components inoperable including the Low Pressure Core Spray , (LPCS) system and Low Pressure Coolant Injection-A (RHR-A).
With both Division 1 and 3 emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) inoperable, the Shift Supervisor entered Technical - Specification 3.0.3 which required action to be taken within one hour to place the Plant into an OPERATIONAL CONDITION in which the specification does not apply. Within one hour the Shif t Supervisor discussed plans to prepare for a plant shutdown and, in parallel, actions were started to restore the Division 3 ECCS (HPCS) to service. At about 8:30 p.m. the , Division 3 ECCS was returned to service and Technical i Specification 3.0.3 sas exited.
No actual reduction in power was commenced or rt iuired.
, At about 4:30 a.m. on September 26, 1989, the control power to ESW-A discharge valve was restored and the affected Division 1 , safety-related components were restored to an operable status.
The loss of control power was due to a failed control power , transformer; however, the root cause for the failed control i power transformer was an improperly performed surveillance during which jumpers were installed across the wrong terminal points. While performing Surveillance Instruction l SVI-G43-T1306, " Suppression Pool Makeup Timer Channel-A Functional / Calibration for 3G43-K1," Revision 1 including , TCN-1, plant technicians failed to properly perform steps 5.1.9 i and 5.1.10.
Specifically, the procedural steps required installation of test leads in Control Room Panel P629; however, the leads were installed in Control Room Panel P872.
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' The inspectors review of SVI-G43-T1306 indicated that the procecural steps were clearly written and the actual [[ _ installation of test leads into P629 required independent n verification, Therefore, the error that was made resulted from l two individuals failing to correctly follow surveillance ' procedure instructions and is a Violation (440/89023-02(DRP)) , of Technical $pecification 6.8.1.a which required implementation F of surveillance instructions (ref. Reg. Guide 1.33, Appendix A,
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item Bb).
I (5) Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Due to Containment Vacuum l Breaker Operation ' . On October 6, 1989, the licensee experienced an unexpected actuation of the Containment Vacuum Breakers. At the time of r event occurrence, the licensee was not aware of any changing l atmospheric conditions that would explain the reduced ' containment pressure.
Troubleshooting by the licensee had identified at the close of this report period that the cause of
, i vacuum breaker operation was the normal gravity drain of the ' l upper containment pool to the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup > ' (FPCC) system surge tanks. The licensee concluded that tha ,., l gravity drain vortexing was drawing air from the containment to the FPCC surge tank. At the close of this inspection report period, the licensee was still evaluating system operational ! parameters (e.g. flow rate, surge tank level) that would t [ minimize vacuum breaker operation.
The licensee planned to , submit a Licensee Event Report in accordence with 10 CFR 50.73.
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The inspectors will review that report upon issuance by the ! licensee to assure adequate root cause investigation and timely corrective action.
The results of that review wili be reported in a future inspection report, i L One violation and one open item were identified.
10. Open Inspection Items ! [ Open inspection items are matters which have been discussed with the i licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open !' inspection items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 2.f and 9.b.(2).
10.
Exit Interviews (30703) ! The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 ! throughout the inspection period and on October 13, 1989.
The inspector ! summarized the scope and results of the inspection and dist.ussed the likely I content of the inspection report.
The licensee did not indicate that any , of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in nature.
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