IR 05000440/1985075
| ML20138L356 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 12/13/1985 |
| From: | Patterson J, Matthew Smith, Williamsen N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138L292 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-440-85-75, 50-440185-75, 50-441-85-25, NUDOCS 8512190242 | |
| Download: ML20138L356 (26) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. ,. . . , U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
r Rept,rt Nos. 50-440/85075(DRSS); 50-441/85025(DRSS) -Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441 License Nos. CPPR-148; CPPR-149 ' Licensee: ~ Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Post Office Box 5000 Cleveland, Ohio 44101 Facility'Name: Perry Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At: Perry Site, Perry, Ohio . Inspection Conducted: November 19-21, 1985 hG J Inspector: J.
. Patterson [ //f/[[[ Team Leader Date ' $ l 2llplfy
. R. Williamsen . . Date /)][Sinith 4/HIff UEG M. J Date - R. T.
ogan, E B />//MM Date ' Approved By: M. P.
hillips,' Chief / /M8f Emergency Preparedness Section Date Inspection Summary-Inspection on November 19-21, 1985 (Report Nos. 50-440/85075(DRSS); 50-441/85025(DRSS)) . Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant emergency preparedness exercise involving observations by eight NRC' representatives of key-functions and locations during the exercise. The , inspection involved 188 inspector-hours onsite by four NRC inspectors and-four consultants.
.Results: No. violations, deficiencies, or deviations were idt.ntified.
I512190242 851213 ' " PDR ADOCK 05000440 0-pg
". m . . DETAILS 1; Persons' Contacted _ NRC Observer's and Areas Observed G.: Bryan,; Control Room (Simulator) C. Haughney,. Technical Support Center (TSC) J. Davis, Operations Support Center _(OSC) R. Hogan, Medical Drill and Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) T. Essig, TSC and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) N. Williamsen, Offs.ite Radiation Monitoring Teams M.' Smith, E0F, Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) J. Patterson, TSC, OSC and EOF Cleveland Electric--Illuminating Company
- M. Edelman, Vice. President, Nuclear Group A. Kaplan, Vice President,-Nuclear Operation Division D. Hulbert, Emergency Planning Coordinator.
J. Anderson, Emergency Planning Assistant W.;Coleman' General Superintendent, Community Relations , _ R.- Smith, Offsite. Emergency Planner ' R. Farrell, Manager, Perry Project Services M. Lyster, Manager, Perry Plant Operations D. Takacs, General. Superintendent, Maintenance R. Tadych, General Superintendent, Operations L Vanderhorst, Plant Health Physicist J. Jasiel, Quality Engineering,. Lead - T. Mahon, General Supervisor, Site Protection 'K. Novak, Security Training Coordinator C. Dixon, General Supervisor, Community Affairs T. Boyer, Shift Supervisor J..Goecker, Maintenance Supervisor T. Corbett, Training Department, Responsible Instructor F.'Whitaker, Health Physics Supervisor: W. King, Public Information _ W. Kanda, Plant Technical Engineer F. Stead,. Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department '*Did not' attend the exit interview on November 21, 1985.
- 2.
General ' An exercise of the applicant's Perry Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan . was conducted at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) on November 20, 1985, testing the response of the applicant to a hypothetical accident 1 scenario resulting in a major release of radioactive effluent.
Attachment 1 describes the Scope and Objectives of the exercise and Attachment 2 describes the exercise scenario.
This was a utility-only exercise.
_.
,_ .. . -. __ __
- w
_ , _ > . , , , 3.t ' General Observations-a.
Procedures.
EThis-exercise was conducted in accordance with 10.CFR.Part 50, ' Appendix E, requirements using the PNPP Emergency, Plan and the.
PNPP_ Emergency. Plan: Implementing Instructions.
~ b."- Coordination - -The applicant's response was coordinated, orderly and timely.
If- ~ the events.had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to itake appropriate actions.
c.' Observers Applicant'.s observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with eight NRC observers.
d.
. Exercise Critiques- . The applicant-he'1d a critique 0.1 November-21,'1985,.the day after the exercise. The NRC critique was held immediately after the. applicant's critique.
Personnel who attended are listed in Sectio'n 1.
The NRC discussed the' observed strengths and weaknesses during the exit interview.
~ ' - 4.
~ Licensee Actions on a Previously-Identified Open Item Related to Emergency Preparedness .(Closed) Open Item No.. 440/80-15; 441/80-15-88. This item relates to ian NRC bulletin issued June.18, 1980'regarding a possible loss of the emergency notification system (ENS telephone) with a loss of offsite power.. The inspector interviewed a member of the applicant's emergency. planning ~ staff and the applicant's Responsible Design Engineer, Nuclear _ Design and Analysis Section.- The AT&T. equipment package including'the ENS.line_was powered by an' independent uninterruptible power source.
~ This' item is considered closed.
- 5.
Specific Observations - a.
Control Room Because of potential interference with Unit 1 pre-testing activities, the PNPP simulator, on the first floor of the PNPP Training and-Education Center, was used throughout-the exercise.
The Notice of Unusual Event (NUE) and the Alert declaration were both properly classified by the Control Room based on the appropriate Emergency-Action Level-(EAL)-for each event.
Notification to State, Counties,; .and the NRC-were made in a timely manner for each of these levels of emergency. The U.S. Coast Guard was notified of the NUE and the '
. . . - . .. . . . ' < }g -. ,. ' &. ' ,
i - ' ' , . -- , Alert'before.the-NRC was notified.. Emergency ~ Plan Instruction, EPI-B1,; Revision'4, Section'5.2.2l lists the U.S.. Coast Guard as-t . _the first Federal agency to be contacted after the State of Ohio ~and the three Counties.
However, Section 5.2.3 of this procedure directed the Emergency. Coordinator (EC) to have the communicator . contact;the-NRC immediately after the State and Counties.
Procedure LEPI-B1 should be; consistent in the order of contacts outside the-plant-in the: event'of an emergency.
The ShiftiTechnical' Advisor (STA)' performe'd his-function ~well, and - his actions integrated well with the control room staff. The Control - Room. staff was well trained and demonstrated coordination in their . efforts to' mitigate the effects of.'the. accident.
~ Immediately after the Plant'Public Announcing-System (PPAS) ' fannounced the Alert, the Control Room received a telephone call from the 0SC Coordinator asking the Shift Supervisor..(SS) whether r _ sthe OSC'and TSC should be-activated.
The SS is responsible for ~~^ - ' ensuring that an! announcement regarding TSC.and OSC activation . -is made; however,~no such announcement was made1according to other NRC observers.
Shift of command and control, from the SS as initial EC to the Operations Manager as the new EC in the TSC, was made by-a telephone. call abo't 0923.
u Good communications were' maintained with the three other ERFs ' throughout the exercise..The' Control Room team functioned well, _ -was_ coordinated in effort, and responded appropriately to- ' operational-and safety systems failure'except for those' listed above.
'
Based on the abov'e findings,.the following' items should be considered for improvement: . I ~*. The Shift Supervisor in the Control Room, upon . declaration of the Alert, should follow Section 5.1.3
- of EPI-A7,"and make the appropr.iate announcements activating the TSC and OSC, or-this section should
- - be' eliminated as a redundant measure.
,
- -
Procedure EPI-B1 should be clarified and revised so .that each section is consistent regarding immediate . . notifications.
U
- b.
Technical Support Center (TSC) - Emergency assigned personnel began arriving shortly after 0857 _
- when the Alert was announced on the PPAS.
At'0926 the TSC was officially activated by the Emergency Coordinator, 29_ minutes' ' .after the Alert declaration.
The TSC Operations Manager conducted ' - a transfer (by telephone) of command and control with the SS in the; Control: Room at approximately 0923.
However, no formal announcement of this was heard in either the TSC or Control Room.
. w ~ - -4 v.
,e ,-r .r --, ,---,a ,- r-n~+ >-o'-- ae ~y- ,-N,- , ,n ,+w-- .- -w n w enw -~w.- -v~- --.-v------w - -. - .
- . , - ., . . The TSC Operations Manager did not announce over the Plant Public Announcing System (PPAS) that the TSC was activated as required by. EPI-A6, Section 5.1.3.
Orderly, professional and intense-participation by the TSC staff was demonstrated.throughout the exercise.' The Emergency Coordinator gave thorough and frequent briefings to his support manager and all the TSC staff.
Use of
E the adjacent auxiliary TSC room for offsite communications, as well as for reviewing plant and engineering systems drawings proved very useful, particularly for engineering troubleshooting of operational problems encountered in the emergency.
A good example of anticipating possible adverse consequences of future actions was demonstrated by a decision to shift to shutdown cooling.
A shift rotation scheme was coordinated with counterparts ~ in the EOF.
Recovery planning was thorough, well organized and involved all appropriate emergency organizations managers.
The noise level in.the main TSC room was high and the room seemed congested with emergency personnel most of the day; however, this may be difficult to alleviate because of the size of the room.
Continuous broadcast of several plant radio channels was distracting ~ as well as adding to the noise level. One suggestion would be to move the Information Liaison Representative to the adjacent TSC room.
Habitability surveys were conducted two to three times; however, the results of these surveys were never reported to any of the TSC managers.
The TSC area.is connected with an operational area radiation monitor with alarm indicator, which may have limited the EC's concern over the habitability monitoring.
In general, the TSC status boards were highly readable and well used.
A section on the status board should be designed to display the status of the electrical distribution-system.
The changing steam. tunnel temperatures should have been logged and trended on the TSC status boards.
The Site Area Emergency (SAE) was properly declared and the announcement was made on the PPAS, accompanied by a plant emergency alarm as required by EPI-A4.
Announcement was made by the EC that the EOF had been activated, and that he had been relieved of his EC duties at 1125.
A TSC participant was observed at 1146 handing out plant data scenario forms to cognizant TSC personnel rather than waiting for a controller.
This added to the artificiality of the controllers periodic distribution of plant data sheets due to ERIS being inoperative.
Prior to the General Emergency, the Radiation Protection Coordinator announced preparation to obtain a reactor coolant sample, a normal requirement ' following reactor shutdown.
Initial dose assessment calculations were made in the TSC and completed in a timely manner.
The first dispatch of offsite radiation monitoring team was made a few minutes after-the SAE
__.
,_ _ . _, _._ . , _ .
. .. . . - - ~ ~. - -. ,. - . g \\
^ ~ .m .. . . . E -~was declared. 1 Subsequent transfer of authority for these teams ' <Y from the TSC to the EOF was properly completed in_ anl orderly manner p' _
- by the Radiation Protection Coordinator to his counterpart of the'
, ' EOF,- - . . Based on the above findings, the following item should be considered
,
- for improvement.
i*. 'For activation.of.the TSC,:procedureLEPI-A6, Section 5.1.3,
should be followed.in its entirety including an announcement on the PPAS that-the TSC is activated,'or else this section - _ .of:the procedure should be eliminated.
, s c.
_ Operations Support Center (OSC) an'd Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) , ' The OSC was activated in approximately 30 minutes in a systematic-land professional manner.' Air habitability checks were started early.
! with a constant air monitor just.outside the OSC office. A status board with five separate headings for the various support and repair ~ teams, cincluding Health Physics and Chemistry, was used throughout.the , '~ exercise. 'This was well maintained'and proved useful throughout the ! . exercise.
The : status board.11 sting' chronological: events 'was often >
- behind time.
Status reports by'the TSC's EC were _ heard clearly over the PPAS 'As. requested by the-OSC Coordinator, briefings were held by, the Team Leader of each in plant. team before the_ team was dispatched.
As reported in Section 4.b, there was-some initial confusion over-
- the~ activation of the OSC since no PPAS announcement was made.
. -Personnel correctly pursued activating the OSC because the' Alert was previously declared which automatically triggered the activation process..The' personnel pagers for some technical response personnel ~. failed; however, they-responded because they heard the Alert announcement.
' -
- Information from teams sent out to perform repair tasks or radiation
- surveys'was not recorded in the chronological event log. -The OSC .Coorldinator'and the Health Physics Supervisor received most of the=
communications and recorded the information on note pads.
The NRC .' observer recommended a full time communicator to permit the OSC , Coordinator.and the Health Physics Supervisor to be available for- - emergency evaluation'decisionmaking and monitoring of the OSC teams.
A maintenance team was sent to check the area where the water deluge valve had accidentally opened, which put the ventilation system out
_ tof service.
This team appeared undecided as to what action to take o~~ after they arrived at the scene.
The lack of concise instructions in a briefing on what was to be done appeared to be the cause.
Some , - teams were observed not~axiting properly through the control point.
~
One team.did not sign the Radiation Work Permit-(RWP).
While i observing an air. sample being counted in the Health Physics Counting Room, cross-contamination of the air samples was observed. Two
_ persons with. beards were dispatched when a request was made for a team to make a containment entry.
The OSC Coordinator should have yf requested two others, clean shaven, since the two with beards would not_ qualify for_ wearing full face respirators.
t
,., . . .. -., ~.,. _ _ _..___......_.__.-_______.__.._;
.
- v ;...
. . A PASS-sample was requested by the TSC about 1235.
The team was dispatched without delay after a briefing, and was fully outfitted in anti-contamination clothing before departing to the PASS panel.
The team' worked diligently and with some difficulty did obtain a reactor coolant sample.
One problem with the PASS was in the ~' collection of excess liquid, that overflowed the sample bottle into the shielded container. -The sample was not labeled as delivered to the laboratory. The NRC observer concluded that a remote handitng tool should be used to transfer the sample vials from the sample cabinet to the shielded container for further transport.
Besides better handling, greater distance from the sample would limit personnel exposure.
Results on the PASS sample were reported - about 1537, or-3 hours after the initial request; however, the results were available about 1430.
In conclusion, OSC supervision and key support staff performed well; however, there were several examples.of' poor techniques and actions taken by the emergency response teams, which indicated reinforced training in-these areas is needed.
Based on.the above_ findings, the following items should be considered.for improvement: A full time Communicator should be assigned to the OSC -* to relieve the OSC Coordinator and his. support managers from answering the more routine messages.
-The log keeper should base his input on current, accurate
information as it flows in and out of the OSC and not on brief status board postings.
Emergency health physics practices should be improved.
- d.
Medical Drill The medical drill was initiated when a Radwaste Operator was severely cut.on his right arm while loading the Radwaste Trash Compactor. A First Aid Team arrived promptly after being called by another Radwaste Operator. The activities were all initiated quickly and correctly including the assistance by a Security representative. The injured and contaminated man, after initial evaluation, was sent in an ambulance to the Lake County Memorial Hospital East.
The SS correctly classified this event as an NUE. The ambulance arrived and ambulance personnel quickly obtained their dosimetry plus guidance from Security with a negligible loss of time.
A HP Technician accompanied the injured person in the ambulance.
The hospital personnel were not informed that the injured man was contaminated also until notified by ambulance radio enroute to the hospital.
Proper radiation protection procedures were followed in removing the patient from the ambulance and securing him on a cart in the emergency room decontamination facility. Additional health physics support arrived at the hospital . shortly after the ambulance arrived.
Contamination control was good, with the only instance of personnel contamination occurring when
- ...
'
- , . ' . , . , J 'an.X ray: Technician'used poor handling _ techniques'which were not ' ' _ , . intercepted by.the HP. technician. This X-ray Technician also went . in and-out of the room without being' monitored.
- e.
Eneroency Operations' Facility (EOF)- , - . The-EOF was activated within one hour following the declaration of the. Site. Area Emergency.
Transfer of command and control from the TSC wasfobjectiveland' orderly.
Plant status briefings by the Emergency Coordinator were thorough and timely.' Direction and control of the.
- ~ emergency response activities were handled well from the E0F.
~The General. Emergency classification was timely and.the-notificatio'ns to offsite authorities'were completed within 15 minutes.
All' press releases were' reviewed and approved by the Emergency Coordinator . ' prior to their. release.
Simulation of EOF placement.on an . . . independent ~HVAC system was demonstrated.
Access control to the EOF was very good.and included issuance of badges and dosimetry.
TLDs and instructions regarding their use were issued to all s - personnel. ;The access control individuals at the EOF entrance reminded. personnel in the EOF to check.their dosimeters routinely.
All. items coming into the~ EOF were checked for potential contamination.
Status boards were effectively used throughout the exercise.
. Protective actions recommended by the state were also displayed on the status. boards.
~ Strong leadership was demonstrated in the EOF.
The EC effectively made efforts to be continually apprised of what was-happening at the staff level.in the EOF.
Three communicators were utililed full time to contact _offsite agencies;and the NRC, keeping them apprised ~of ^
- changing data cn reactor parameters as well as protective' action
'~ = recommendations (PARS);and changes in emergency-classifications.
~
- Their' proximity to the EC's-desk at times interfered with his
. -discussions-and group announcements, since all three were often talking 'at th'e:same time. A partial partition asLa sound barrier could help alleviate this conditionc ~ . Good communication with the TSC was maintained throughout the E0F's activation. The Plant Operations. Advisor kept in contact with his counterparts in the TSC and received and gave information and advice where applicable to the Emergency Coordinator.
Initial dose assessment calculations began about 1118.
Forecast data from the Weather Service Information was used'as input for ' meteorology information. Meteorology data were updated every-15 minutes.
Dose calculations were used in conjunction with release ? duration and evacuation time estimates to produce realistic
- . protective action recommendations (PARS). These calculations did,
..however, emphasize the importance of defining the release duration as soon as possible, rather than rely on default values.
Although .the State and Counties were not officially participating,'a State
, _ -. - , ~..
' n . of Ohio representative was actively taking part in receiving ' 'information and counseling with the EC on PARS, offsite sampling, Eand other areas'of joint: interest. Also, one of the three counties , -had:a representative at their Emergency. Control: Center (ECC) as. a communicator. A separate map, divided geographically into sectors , m' representing the areas included in the.three counties within the 10 mile EPZ, was used to convert the sectors.of the plant's EPZ map ' into meaningful. areas that the county could relate-to in.its PAR.
Before any recommendation was made which included EPZ 1etter.
sectors, a close eneck was made superimposing the sector areas'over.
< .the geographical areas designated by numbers.
The EOF staff performed this conversion to county areas each time, and no' errors ' '
- were noted by the NRC. observers.
. , . . The length of time from collection of. airborne radioactive samples . - . T Juntil results were,available for inclusion in the PARS seemed excessive,. req'uiring up to one. hour.
This time span was due to the length of. time required for field teams to collect, count, and report-v the results in counts per minute.and to the E0F dose assessment staff having' difficulty in getting the computer program to work A ' smoothly. -Another example.of delayed analytical results was the'_.
' Turbine Building Heater Bay Vent sample which was collected at 1245 . 'and analyzed at 1300.
However,-results.were not available at the-EOF'until:approximately 1600, too' late to be helpful.
The Offsite Radiation Advisor did an excellent job in coordinating . the operations.of.the offsite' radiation monitoring teams, interpreting ' radiological ~ data and dose assessment values, communicating his- ' -evaluat. ions.to the EC, and being totally involved in the decision-making taking place in the' EOF.
Communications were well maintained- ~with the'three offsite. teams from the EOF.
Frequent briefings on
plant. status lplus reminders to check dosimeters periodically were < -noted.
Logistics, administration, communications.from and to the EOF, and-responsibility for planning and executing a shift ~ change for support . . personnel in the ERFs were well directed under guidance of the EOF n . Manager.- The relief. shift rostar change was well discussed, acted , >- , . . upon, and coordinated with'the new EC whoitook' charge'of the emergency L from the EOFJat.about 1400.
This second EC decided to delay a routine press release for'about 30 minutes while considering downgrading from a General: Emergency to the: Alert. level.
u . Good discussions'and caucuses took place:before and after the - , ' . announcement at 1450 to downgrade to'the-Alert level.
These
- discussions included a summary of current plant condition ~s, release w
- paths, condition of the previously open RHR valve (now closed), l current and-projected dose assessments,Jand meteorological forecast
- data.
A later caucusfaddressed reentry / recovery and included display-of. an organization chart for the recovery group as well. as a listing of outside-support and advisory groups that would be available.
Plans 2-l' ' .
, - ,. -._ - _ . - ,- .. .. . . - .. .. .-
e . . ~
l were later'made to meet at 1700 at Lake _ County with representatives of the three Counties and the State to plan re-entry sampling programs and other mutually related concerns.
Significant releases of radioactive material were still occurring.in the-environment, and projected doses were near or above protective action guides (PAGs) values due to'this residual radioactive material when the decision to downgrade was made.
The NRC observers had some concern that the downgrade to_ Alert was somewhat premature and instead " a-recovery" mode should have been entered rather than a downgrade.
The Offsite Radiation Advisor maintained that iff samples of soil and vegetation were taken by the offsite radiation monitoring teams, it would be 24 hours before the sample results could be obtained from an offsite contractor laboratory.
The offsite teams as dispatched ~ were not equipped for soil and vegetation sampling.
Basad on the above findings, the following item should be considered for improvement: Better coordination and execution of all phases of radiological
sampling and reporting of values should be practiced, so that results can be obtained in a more timely manner.
f.
Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) ' The JPIC demonstrated timely activation.
Frequent, thorough briefings were held throughout the time JPIC was activated. Good coordination with State representatives was demonstrated.
Communications were maintained with State and local Emergency Operating Centers (E0Cs) through a five-way dedicated telephone.
Personnel dosimetry was distributed and checked at regular intervals.
Timely approval of press releases at all levels of emergency activities was aptly demonstrated.- Utility personnel _were responsive to all inquiries from the press and from several Kent State journalism students who served as inquiring newspersons.
Procedures for re-entry and recovery were well organized and demonstrated by JPIC personnel.
Also, the final de-escalation , announcement without a change in PARS was well addressed and ' projected to non-utility personnel.
Only one incident marred the performance of the JPIC. The JPIC General Supervisor and the-Technical Liaison representative were having difficulties in understanding the EAL for the Alert classification.
A Public Affairs Representatives had asked for the proper EAL for the Alert somewhat earlier. The JPIC Controller got a copy of the EPIs and told the participants to use the EALs as listed in the EPIs to clarify the classification.
This was construed as prompting.- L
. -,.., _ _, _.. - -c- -.
- z,.
- _. 2
. . . I I . g.' Offsite Monitorind Teams ~ , Assembly, activation, and check-out of monitoring and sampling - equipment were well done at the teams' assembly point in the EOF.
. Teams Number 1 and;2 completed their check-out of eq'uipment in.
. - 20 minutes and-22 minutes, respectively, from the time they entered the EOF.
Their vehicles were four-wheel drive capable, with two-way radios and an electrical receptacle for the 12-volt powered air samplers.
' The TSC, and subsequently the EOF, did a good-job of. directing the radiation monitoring teams (RMTs).
Maps were used effectively.
Directions were clear and the teams followed them accurately. The transfer of control ~of the RMTs from the TSC to the E0F was_ clear and unambiguous.
, -The RMTs were informed of plant emergency conditions by their EOF ' Communicator who read the approved press releases over the-radio.
All communications began and ended with the phrase, "This is a ' dri l l_. During the exercise, Team No. 3 hit a " dead spot" where 'they-could hear the transmissions from the.TSC, EOF, and the.other-teams, but-Team No.~3 could not be. heard. As.soon as they realized this problem, they properly drove to a pry phone which was listed on.their procedure and drove.to a' higher elevation to make the stelephone: call.
, The teams ~ were _well trained and did their plume-traversing very well.
> .Open window /close window reaSu 1s were taken.
Air sampling was '
- performed expeditiously, and % teams were careful in the handling 1of the air-sampling; silver zealite cartridge to avoid cross-contamination.
< , ALARA considerations were generally followed.
, Team No. 3 was ordered back to'the EOF while the exercise was still . in progress.
They properly followed the procedures and carefully ? frisked their vehicle, paying particular attention to tires, radiator, and air-filter.
. 6.
. Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview on November 21, 1985, with the representatives denoted in Section 1. -The NRC Team Leader discussed the . scope and findings of the-inspection.- The applicant was also asked if-any of.the information discussed during the exit was proprietary. The
- applicant responded that none of the information was proprietary.
,
- Attachments: -1.
' Perry Exercise Scope and Objectives
- 2. ; Perry Exercise Scenario Outline
_
.
e
- eo
,.-
.-- - -g J , mm-
m..e .4 m4...m uaa e Ame s4-e%M,__Aed -- e a.A&a_.E.a44 Js, eus, zL A-h2e_ .wh6 --a ' . .. - I o a
g l l i O '
, ! ! I - i
y -. t , ! . I SECTION 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
- O
> - ? . i '
e i r h ' .
- o
. I r $
. -w g yr fw .r--w- - --~-r ywn.eww--o,,y-we.--- yw9 9g.
g99,wymy_ . . we am w, me+-e-ec-wW
- , .. . .- . ~ -- ...... , '1.0 SCOPE'AND OBJECTIVES ' . I'.1 S_coE* The 1985 Emergency Preparedness Exercise, to be conducted on
- November 20,1985, will simulate accident events culminating in a
- radiological accident with resultant off-site relea'ses from 'tle '*'-~ Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP), located in North Perry Village, Lake County, Ohio. The Exercise will involve events that test the effectiveness o.f the PNPP Emergency Preparedness Program only.
Successful demonstration of the emergency response capabilities of , the State of Ohio, and the Counties of Lake, Geauga, and Ashtabula was accomplished in the November 28, 1984,. Emergency Preparedness Exercise and will not be demonstrated in this exercise.
c 1.2 Objectives The major objective of the exercise is to de'monstrate the response capabilities of the PNPP Emergency Response Organization. Within this overall objective',-numerous individual objectives are specified as follows: . . - 1.2.1 Demonstrate the, ability to nobilize, staff and activate x- ' Emergency Response Facilities promptly.
' ' 1.2.2 Demonstrate the ability to ftilly staff facilities and to maintain staffing on an around the clock basis through the - use of relief shift rosters (limited shift changes may occur to allow-for operational restrictions).
1.2.3 Demonstrate the ability to make decisions and to coordi- ', nate emergency. activities.
~1.2.4 Demonstrate tF.e adequacy of facilities and displays to - i support emergency operations.
'1.2.5 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appro-priate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
1.2.6 Demonstrate the ability to mobilize and deploy Radiation Monitoring Teams.
. 1.2.7 Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels..
.. . 1.2.8 Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radioiodine concentrations as low as 10E-7 uCi/cc in the presence of noble gases.
l 1.2.9 Demonstrate the ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PNPP - protective action guidelines, available shelter, evac-untion time estimates, and other appropriate factors.
, ) ' . . .
. . .. . . ~ 1.2.10 Demonstrate the' ability to notify off-site officials and agencies within 15 minutes of.an emergency.
1.2.11.
Demonstrate the ability to periodically update off-site officials and agencies of the status of the emergency - based on data available at PNPP.
- 1.2.12.
Demonstrate the ability to notify emergency support pools as appropriate (i.e., INPO, ANI, etc.). 1.2.13 Demonstrate the ability to notify.on-site personnel using plant alarms and public address systems.
1. 2.1'4 Demonstrate the ability to effectively assess incident c conditions and to properly classify.the incident.
, 1.2.15 Demonstrate the organizational ability'and resources , - necessary to control access to the site.
1. 2.~ 16 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency workers exposure.
1.2.17.
~ - ' Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner.
1.2.18- ' Demonstrate 1the ability to provide advance coordination of information released to the public.
1.2.19 Demonstrate,the ability to establish and operate rumor control.in a coordinated fashion.
-1.2.20 Demonstrate the adequacy of. ambulance facilities and procedures for handling a contaminated, injured indivi-dual.
. 1.2.21 Demonstrate the adequacy of hospital facilities and . . procedures for handling a contaminated,- injured indivi-dual.
. - t 1.2.22 Demonstrate the adequacy of on-site first aid facilities, equipment, and procedures for handling a contaminated, injured individual.
1.2.23 Demonstrate the ability to determine and implement appro-priate measures for controlled re-entry and recovery.
- , , w
e
.
. w -. ., r ' g % 4.
i
7.'O.
EXERCISE SCENARIO ' . . k
. Contents Of This Section- , ' Section 7.1 Initial Conditions i <
- .Section 7.2 - Sequence of Events Section 7.3' Narrative Summary of Exercise Scenario'
! n' . h
. , Y . , a L w
P ID: - > b t
. /s- .
- w' N t'% v r-nsaw w awe -e eus-w n wymn-g*w,ewww-%yw,-g---p
. _ - --._... - -.. . -..-..- - -.. _ -. .. ~ . -. -. - - - - - _. -. - _. . _ _. ... . . . . ,:.
. .
t
,. ,
, , p
l l
.
I < 7.1 Initial Conditions j l . . i , ,
. T .-
l l f t
t i.
<
e . . , I e e g-o us+.arw --wi%,, ...eew-
...-e-w,.-.. . -.. -w.,.~ ,we,.y..,,,,- ,,- e - w ww m,w e .,7vw.
. .-my , w-.,,w-w-+w-ww-
m- . .
. . - - PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT = 1985 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE INITIAL CONDITIONS l '. Unit 1" reactor is operating at 100% power. The unit has been operating continuously for the last 315 days.
It has had a capacity factor of 95% since the last refueling outage 15 months ago.
2.
The diesel driven fire service-pump (P54-C001) is out of service due to a scheduled maintenance overhaul. The pump and diesel are expected to be ready for testing at 1600 tomorrow.
- 3.
RHR pump E12-C001B remains out of service due to seized pump bearings.
The pump is expected to the back in service within 2 days.
4.. The motor driven reactor feed pump (N27-C004) is out of service due to the A.C. Auxiliary lube oil pump having failed. The lube oil pump is disassembled and is expected to be back in service within 48 hours.
- 5.
Surveillance test SVI-R43-T1319 " Diesel Generator Slow Start and . Load-Division 1" must be accomplished today to meet the 31 day limiting condition for operation. Diesel generator 1R43-C001A problems prevented this test.from being done earlier; those problems (specifically the air - start distributor) have been corrected.
,_s - 6.
All other systems are operable.
- 7.
New fuel receipt is scheduled to begin at approximately 2200 tonight.
8.
Unit 2 remains under construction; no significant activities are scheduled for today.
9.
Current weather conditions are as follows: Wind Speed: 6 miles per hour (measured on the 10 meter level) Wind Direction: 90* Temperature: 40*F , Today's - forecast calls for sunny and clear weather. Winds will be out of ' the North Northeast at 5-10 miles per hour for most of the day. Today's high temperature is expected to be 50*F.
. V .
, . __ - _. -. __.. - _ .- ..-. .... -. -... _ _.. - _. -.. -. -.... _. - -. - - ..i ! I-
>, . '
,
i l i
I >
f
I t t . t s
, i ! e, . t . , I ! I 7.2 Sequence of Events ' ' ,. L i F k t i F , , l ! , .l
o F I
,,,.. .. _,. _.,,... - __ _ ____,_,..--m.___,___.
mm .,_, _. _ _.... -w,,.y ..,yy,_., , _ _,., y._m,%. _.- -.. - -., -. -.,.., - - - -.,,
Vy ' L f i ~ . . , r v ): p( PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1985 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE l SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Approximate Time Key Event 0800 Initial conditions are established. Commence Exercise.
0805 Two radwaste operators are loading the radwaste trash compactor with low-level dry waste. One operator severly.
cuts his right forearm. He.is bleeding profusely. The i other radwaste operator witnesses the accident and calls for first. aid assistance.
0813-The first' aid team and health physics support arrive at l the scene. The victim is still bleeding. An offsite }_ ambulance is requested.
., 0815 The Shift Supervisor ' declares an Unusual Event (EPI-A1, -Section N.I.1, " Transportation of-contaminated, injured individuals from the site to offsite hospital.") m - - 0835 The offsite ambulance arrives at the Primary Access , _, Control Point (Security) Gate.
,
-0850 Safety Relief Valve (SRV) B21-F051D inadvertently opens !. -due to a' spurious energizing of the "A" Solenoid. Efforts ! to close the valve ~' fail. The suppression pool temperature ~ [ 'begins to increase.
0853 'As the Emergency Service Water (ESW) System is placed in service, ESW pump P45-C001A fails to start. An operator is sent to investigate.
0855 The victim is loaded into the ambulance.
. '0900 The ambulance leaves the site.
. The operator reports that the pump appears fine.
SRV B21-F051D closes.
. , The Shift Supervisor declares an Alert (EPI-A1, p Section D.II.lc, " Loss of functions needed for Plant Cold f Shutdown"; in this case: Loss of A ESW loop and B RHR L loop.)
' The TSC and OSC are activated.
l . g !. . !
. . . ' {} ' - _
. .
PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PIANT 1985 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SEQUENCE OF EVTNTS Approximate Time Key Event 0930 The TSC and OSC should be declared operable. Efforts should concentrate on tracing the ESW electrical fault and then repairing the fault.
0945 An accidental actuation of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation Deluge System occurs. The ventilation system is rendered out of service.
1000 The ESV electrical fault is located and repaired. The operators implement PEI-2.
1005 The turbine expansion joint on the high pressure condenser fails. A rapid loss of condenser vacuum occurs.
1007 The turbine trips, the feedwater pumps trip and the Main Steam Isolation Valves close. The reactor scrams.
1009 Reactor Water Level is dropping rapidly, HPCS and RCIC lh inject at Level 2.
1015 Reactor level, pressure and power are now under control.
The operators maintain the reactor in hot standby, pending further information.
1020 Steam tunnel high temperature and high differential temperature annunciators alarm. Outboard RCIC steam
isolation valve E51-F064 is leaking into the steam tunnel.
All indications from E51-F064 are lost on panel P601.
Inboard RCIC steam isolation valve E51-F063 remains open and will not close.
1025 High pressure condenser seal trough data indicate that there has been a failure of the turbine expansion joint.
The operators implement 10I-6, and place the steam condensing mode of RHR into service.
. O L
, ,. - . . [v} : PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT , 1985 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 1 Approximate Time Key Event-1030' The Operations Manager declares a Site' Area Emergency (EPI-A1, Section C.III.1, "Steamline break outside containment without isolation")'. The EOF and JPIC are activated.
The reactor is being cooled down by RHR steam condensing mode.
1130 - The EOF should be operable by now. Survey results of.the - steam tunnel show expected levels of radiation.
1200: ' Cooldown continues.
. 1215 The reactor is cooled to approximately 125 psig and 350*F.
The operators begin to place.the reactor in shutdown
cooling mode.. Inboard RHR isolation valve E12-F009 is ( s) ~ opened. A shear in the 20 inch pipe between outboard isolation valve E12-F008 and containment occurs. Reactor water is released into the steam tunnel.
1216 Reactor water level is decreasing rapidly. HPCS initiates at reactor water level 2.
1217 At:1evel 1, LPCS and LPCI-C inject cold water on the fuel-causing fuel clad damage due to thermal shock.
1220 Leaking reactor water inventory is being made up by all available ECCS systems.
1230 The Emergency Coordinator declares a General Emergency (EPI-A1, Attachment 3,' Condition 1: " Loss of two fission product barriers with a potential loss of third barrier.") . Turbine Building / Heater Bay vent monitors detect increasing levels of radiation. Fission product gases.
released by clad damage are channeled out of severed RHR pipe.into the steam tunnel. From there the gases flow up through the Turbine Building and out the T3/HB vent.
(_ .
e
. . . PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PIANT O 1985 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS ' Approximate Time Key Event 1245 Maintenance efforts focus on closing E12-F009. Upon investigation, an electrical fault has occurred in the motor control cabinet for E12-F009. When the MCC is repaired, E12-F009 can be closed (later at 1315). How-ever, the General Emergency will remain, now due to projected / actual radiation readings.
1300 Radiation Monitoring Teams continue to report readings.
1315 Maintenance reports that E12-F009 can be closed.
1400 TB/HB vent monitors show decreased levels of radiation.
1430 TB/HB vent monitors show normal levels.
1500 Weather conditions begin to change. Offsite radiation levels are decreasing as wind speed changes disperse the plume.
1530 Offsite radiation levels return to background. The General Emergency is downgraded. Re-entry and recovery operations commence.
1600 The exercise is terminated.
. DW247D/F/6/rmk i
. .
3 . I ! l 7.3 Narrative Sununary of The Exercisa Scenario . I k . t i . r a "' . . k _.. ~#
"""9"+- -y-. ,.., _
, c.
- . . ) 7.3 ' Narrative Summary of the Exercise Scenario The Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, has been operating continuously for the last 315 days. The unit has had a capacity factor of approxi-mately 95% since the last refueling outage 15 months ago. Currently the unit is operating at about 100% power. Some equipment problems are ongoing but have been addressed through surveillance and maintenance actions. The first new fuel shipment for the upcoming rr. fuelling outage is scheduled to be delivered at 2200.
Weather conditions are typical autumn weather for northeast Ohio with the forecast calling for a high of 50*F and winds out of the east-northeast at 5 to-10 miles per hour.
At 8:05 a.m., a radwaste operator severely cuts his right forearm while loading the radwaste trash compactor with low level dry waste. Another radwaste operator witnesses the accident and calls for help. The First ' Aid team and health physics support arrive to assist. A survey shows that the operator is also contaminated. An offsite ambulance is requested.
At 8:15 a.m., the Shift Supervisor declares an UNUSUAL EVENT (EPI-A1, Section N.I.1, " Transportation of contaminated, injured individuals from the site to offsite hospital.") Lake County Memorial Hospital East is notified to prepare for the receipt [_] _ of a contaminated, injured person. The ambulance leaves the site at A/ .approximately 9:00 a.m.
At 8:50 a.m., Safety Relief Valve (SRV) B21-F051D inadvertently opens due to a spurious energizing of the "A" Solenoid. Efforts to close the valve fail. The suppression pool temperature begins to increase.
-As the Emergency Service Water (ESW) System is placed in service for the suppression pool cooling function of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Sys-tem, ESW Pump P45-C001A fails to start. An operator is sent to investi-The 'perator reports that the pump appears fine.
gate.
o Even though at 9:00 a.m. SRV B21-F051D closes, the Shift Supervisor . declares an ALERT (EPI-A1, Section D.II.lc, " Loss of functions needed for Plant Cold Shutdown;" in this case: Loss of A ESW loop and B RHR loop.)
- Notifications are made and the Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center are activated. Plant assessment activities begin in order oto troubleshoot the ESW system.
At '9:45 a.m., a truck backs into a wall mounted solenoid, causing an accidental actuation of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation Deluge System to occur. The ventilation system is rendered out of service.
' -At 10:00 a.m., the ESW system electrical fault is located and repaired.
Downgrade discussions may commence.
p D247D1/C/2/rmk x) _.
__
. . . , At 10:05 a.m., the turbine expansion joint on the high pressure condenser begins to tear. At 10:07 a.m., the joint fails, causing a loss of con-denser vacuum. The main turbine trips, the feedwater pumps trip, the reactor scrams, and the Main Steam Isolation Valves close. All* systems work, and by 10:15 a.m., the unit is under operator control. The opera-tors should maintain the reactor in hot standby pending further Laforma-tion.
At 10:20 a.m., steam tunnel high temperature and high differential temperature annunciators alarm. Outboard RCIC Steam Isolation Valve E51-F064 is leaking into the steam tunnel. All indications from E51-F064 are lost on Panel P601.
Inboard RCIC Steam Isolation Valve E51-F063 remains open and will not close. The operators cannot isolate the steam leak and proceed to bring the unit to cold shutdown.
At 10:30 a.m., the Operations Manager declares a SITE AREA EMERGENCY (EPI-A1, Section C.III.1, "Steamline break outside containment without isolation"). The Emergency Operations Facility and the Joint Public Information Center are activated.
The reactor is being cooled down by RHR steam condensing mode.
At 12:15 p.m., the reactor is cooled to approximately 125 psig and 350*F.
The operators begin to place the reactor in shutdown cooling mode.
Inboard RHR Isolation Valve E12-F009 is opened. A shear in the 20 inch pipe between Outboard Isolation Valve E12-F008 and containment occurs.
Reactor water is released into the steam tunnel. Reactor water level decreases rapidly. HPCS initiates at Reactor Water Level 2.
At Level 1, LPCS and LPCI-C inject cold water on the fuel causing fuel clad damage due to thermal shock. Reactor Water Level is restored as leaking reactor water inventory is being made up by all available ECCS systems.
By 12:30 p.m., the Emergency Coordinator declares a GENERAL EMERGENCY (EPI-A1, Attachment 3, Condition 1: " Loss of two fission product barriers with a potential loss of third barrier.") Turbine Building / Heater Bay vent monitors detect increasing levels of radiation. Fission product gases released by clad damage are channeled out of severed RHR pipe into the steam tunnel. From there the gases flow up through the Turbine Building and out the TB/HB vent.
Maintenance efforts focus on closing E12-F009. Upon investigation, an electrical fault has occurred in the motor control cabinet for E12-F009.
When the MCC is repaired, E12-F009 can be closed (later at 1:15 p.m.). However, the General Emergency will remain, now due to projected / actual radiation readings. Radiation Monitoring Teams continue to report readings.
D247D1/C/3/rmk b
y < .c.
, a .. -h At 1:15 p.m., E12-F009 is closed, and at 2:00 p.m., the TB/HB vent moni- -Q tors show decreasing levels of radiation.' RMTs continue to track the ~
~
- plume. By 2:30 p.m., the' TB/HB vent monitors show normal levels of radiation.
- Weather conditions begin to change at 3:00 p.m. such that the radioactive plume disperses by 3:30 p.m.
Re-entry and Recovery operations should commence by then.
After appropriate re-entry and recovery actions have been accomplished, the Exercise'will be terminated at 4:00 p.m.
, r.
~ v t 't J l i l ^b. U D247D1/C/4/rmk .. ,_ _ _, . - . .. . _.
.. _. _ _ -,. _ }}