IR 05000413/2009004
| ML093020724 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/2009 |
| From: | Bartley J NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB1 |
| To: | Morris J Duke Energy Carolinas |
| References | |
| IR-09-004, IR-09-501 | |
| Download: ML093020724 (24) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ber 29, 2009
SUBJECT:
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000413/2009004, 05000414/2009004 AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INSPECTION REPORT 05000413/2009501, 05000414/2009501
Dear Mr. Morris:
On September 30, 2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on October 6, 2009, with Mr. George Hamrick and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. No findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Jonathan H. Bartley, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414, 72-45 License Nos.: NPF-35, NPF-52
Enclosure:
Integrated Inspection Report 05000413/2009003, 05000414/2009004 and Emergency Preparedness Inspection Report 05000413/2009501, 05000414/2009501 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414, 72-45 License Nos.: NPF-35, NPF-52 Report Nos.: 05000413/2009004, 05000414/2009004 05000413/2009501, 05000414/2009501 Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: York, SC 29745 Dates: July 1, 2009, through September 30, 2009 Inspectors: A. Hutto, Senior Resident Inspector A. Sabisch, Senior Resident Inspector R. Cureton, Resident Inspector L. Miller, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Sections 1EP and 4OA1)
Approved by: Jonathan H. Bartley, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000413/2009004, 05000414/2009004, 05000413/2009501, and 05000414/2009501; 7/1/2009 - 9/30/2009; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2;
Routine Integrated Report The report covered a three month period of inspection by three resident inspectors and an emergency preparedness inspector. No findings of significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent Rated Thermal Power for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at or near 100 percent Rated Thermal Power for the entire inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial Walkdowns: The inspectors performed three partial system walkdowns during the activities listed below to assess the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety-related equipment was inoperable. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures and walked down system components, selected breakers, valves, and support equipment to determine if they were in the correct position to support system operation. The inspectors reviewed protected equipment sheets, maintenance plans, and system drawings to determine if the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Protection of 2A train equipment during the period the 2B train of component cooling (KC) was removed from service for cleaning of the 2B KC heat exchanger and maintenance activities on the 2B1/2B2 KC pumps and 2B residual heat removal (ND) pump
- 1B emergency diesel generator (EDG) while protected for A train maintenance
- A train of controlled area chilled water (YC) while the B train was removed from service due to a controller modification Complete System Walkdown: The inspectors conducted one detailed walkdown/review of the Unit 2 Containment Valve Water Injection System. The inspectors used licensee procedures and licensing and design documents to verify that the system (i.e., pump, valve, and electrical) alignment was correct; valves and pumps did not exhibit leakage that would impact their function; major portions of the system and components were correctly labeled; hangers and supports were correctly installed and functional; and essential support systems were operational. In addition, pending design and equipment issues were reviewed to determine if the identified deficiencies significantly impacted the systems functions. Items included in this review were: the operator workaround list, the temporary modification list, and outstanding maintenance work requests/work orders. A review of open Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs) was also performed to verify that the licensee had appropriately characterized and prioritized safety-related equipment problems for resolution in the corrective action program. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Fire Protection Walkdowns: The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the five plant areas listed below to assess the licensees control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures. The inspectors observed the fire protection suppression and detection equipment to determine whether any conditions or deficiencies existed which could impair the operability of that equipment. The inspectors selected the areas based on a review of the licensees safe shutdown analysis probabilistic risk assessment and sensitivity studies for fire-related core damage accident sequences. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 2 Mechanical Penetration Room, 543' elevation
- Unit 1 Mechanical Penetration Room, 577' elevation
- Unit 2 spent fuel pool and truck bay area
- Unit 1 Main Transformer Area
- Unit 1 A EDG room and sequencer hallway
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors entered two conduit manholes (nuclear service water (RN) Conduit CMH-11B and CMH-18B) to verify that the cables were not submerged, that the cables were not damaged or degraded, and that the sump pumps were functioning properly.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
Annual Review: The inspectors reviewed the performance of the Unit 2 A Containment Spray (NS) Heat Exchanger heat capacity test and evaluated the test data for acceptable performance. The inspectors reviewed the system configuration associated with the test, heat load requirements, the methodology used in calculating heat exchanger performance, and the method for tracking the status of tube plugging activities via the data logger and computer processing equipment. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed Simulator Exercise S-28 to assess the performance of licensed operators during a license operator requalification simulator training session. The exercise included a steam generator tube leak followed by a steam generator tube rupture complicated by a steam generator power operated relief valve failing to close.
The inspection focused on high-risk operator actions performed during implementation of the abnormal and emergency operating procedures, and the incorporation of lessons-learned from previous plant and industry events. The classification and declaration of the Emergency Plan by the Shift Technical Advisor and Operations Shift Manager was also observed during the scenario. The post-scenario critique conducted by the training instructor and the crew was observed. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the two activities listed below for items such as:
- (1) appropriate work practices;
- (2) identifying and addressing common cause failures;
- (3) scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the Maintenance Rule;
- (4) characterizing reliability issues for performance;
- (5) trending key parameters for condition monitoring; (6)charging unavailability for performance;
- (7) classification and reclassification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2); and
- (8) appropriateness of performance criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2)and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified as (a)(1). For each item selected, the inspectors performed a detailed review of the problem history and surrounding circumstances, evaluated the extent of condition reviews as required, and reviewed the generic implications of the equipment and/or work practice problem. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 2 Component Cooling Maintenance
- Maintenance activities on the Control Room Air Handling Unit following an emergent repair to the inboard fan
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following six activities to determine if the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors reviewed the risk assessment to determine that the plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the use of the licensees risk assessment tool and risk categories in accordance with Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 415, Operational Risk Management (Modes 1-3), to verify there was appropriate guidance to comply with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Review of planned work activities for Work Week 29
- Transformer SATA critical lift
- Review of Critical Activity Plan associated with the cleaning of the 2B KC heat exchanger and maintenance activities on the 2B1/2B2 KC pumps and 2B EDG engine cooling water (KD) pump which placed Unit 2 in an Orange risk condition
- Review and walk down of Protected Equipment following emergent work on the B YC Chiller during an A train work week
- Review Complex plans for RN to KD Modification Dig #6
- Review of Complex Activity Plan associated with the Standby Shutdown Facility Load Bank (Isochronous) Test
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the five operability evaluations listed below to determine if Technical Specification (TS) operability was properly justified and the subject components and systems remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations to verify that they were made as specified by NSD 203, Operability. The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to determine that the systems and components remained available to perform their intended function.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- PIP C-09-4202, Potential Auxiliary Feedwater Condensate Storage Tank Vortexing and Air Entrainment at Maximum Flow Conditions
- PIPs C-09-4874, C-09-4881, Increased 1A Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Leakoff
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following temporary plant modification to verify the adequacy of the modification package, and to evaluate the modification for adverse affects on system availability, reliability and functional capability. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- CD 101717 - Revise the high temperature alarm set point for Reactor Coolant Pump 1A Seal Water Temperature
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the four post-maintenance tests listed below to determine if procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the licensees test procedures to determine if the procedures adequately tested the safety function(s) that may have been affected by the maintenance activities, that the acceptance criteria in the procedures were consistent with information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that the procedures had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessed the tests and/or reviewed the test data to determine if test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety function(s). Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- PT/1/A/4200/007 B, Centrifugal Charging Pump 1B Test, following routine preventive maintenance activity
- OP/2/A/6400/005, Component Cooling System, Enclosure 4.4, Operation of Additional KC Pumps / Parallel Operation, performed as a functional test of the 2B1 and 2B2 KC pumps following planned maintenance work
- PT/1/A/4450/005 A, Containment Air Return Fan 1A And Hydrogen Skimmer Fan 1A Performance Test, Enclosure 13.1, HSF-1A and ARF-1A Test With Correct Fan Speed and Motor Currents, performed as a functional test of the Unit 1A Hydrogen Skimmer Fan following planned work
- PT/1/A/4350/002 A, Diesel Generator Operability Test, performed following planned work on the 1A Diesel Generator
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
For the seven tests listed below, the inspectors witnessed testing and/or reviewed the test data to determine if the SSCs involved in these tests satisfied the requirements described in the TS, the UFSAR, and applicable licensee procedures, and that the tests demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety functions.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Surveillance Tests
- IP/1/A/3145/001 B, Containment Pressure Control System Train B Channel Operational Test (1CPCC2)
- IP/1/A/3200/001 A, Solid State Protection System Train A Periodic Testing
- IP/1/A/3150/004 B, Unit 1 Train B Containment Valve Injection Water System, 11.1.5 1NWLT5030 Calibration
- PT/1/A/4200/009 A, Auxiliary Safeguards Test Cabinet Periodic Test, Enclosure 13.12 Safety injection (K609) Train B
- OP/1/A/6200/032, Primary Sampling Using a Rheodyne Model 7010 Valve
- PT/1/A/4150/001 D, Reactor Coolant System Leakage Calculation In-Service Tests
- Unit 2 B Containment Spray Pump inservice light water pump test
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP2 Alert and Notification System Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector evaluated the adequacy of licensee=s methods for testing the alert and notification system in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 02, Alert and Notification System Evaluation. The applicable planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and its related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D requirements were used as reference criteria. The criteria contained in NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, was also used as a reference. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the alert and notification system on a biennial basis.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP3 Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the licensee=s ERO augmentation staffing requirements and process for notifying the ERO to ensure the readiness of key staff for responding to an event and timely facility activation. The qualification records of key position ERO personnel were reviewed to ensure all ERO qualifications were current. A sample of problems identified from augmentation drills or system tests performed since the last inspection were reviewed to assess the effectiveness of corrective actions.
The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, 03, Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System.
The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and its related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements were used as reference criteria. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the ERO staffing and augmentation system on a biennial basis.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
Since the last NRC inspection of this program area, revision 09-1 of the Catawba Nuclear Station Emergency Plan was implemented based on the licensees determination, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), that the changes resulted in no decrease in the effectiveness of the Plan, and that the revised Plan continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR 50. The inspector conducted a sampling review of the Plan changes and implementing procedure changes made between August 1, 2008, and June 30, 2009, to evaluate for potential decreases in effectiveness of the Plan. However, this review does not constitute formal NRC approval of the changes. Therefore, these changes remain subject to future NRC inspection in their entirety.
The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, 04, Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes. The applicable planning standard (PS), 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and its related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements were used as reference criteria. Documents reviewed are listed in the
. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the emergency action level and emergency plan changes on an annual basis.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the corrective actions identified through the Emergency Preparedness program to determine the significance of the issues and to determine if repeat problems were occurring. The facility=s self-assessments and audits were reviewed to assess the licensee=s ability to be self-critical, thus avoiding complacency and degradation of their emergency preparedness program. In addition, the inspector reviewed licensee self-assessments and audits to assess the completeness and effectiveness of all emergency preparedness related corrective actions.
The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, 05, Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses. The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and its related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements were used as reference criteria. Documents reviewed are listed in the
. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the correction of emergency preparedness weaknesses on a biennial basis.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensees emergency planning performance during a drill conducted on September 17, 2009. The inspectors reviewed licensee activities that occurred in the Simulator and the Technical Support Center during a simulated event. The inspectors assessment focused on the timeliness and accuracy of the event classification, notification of offsite agencies and the overall response of the personnel involved in the drill from an operations and emergency planning perspective.
The performance of the Emergency Response Organization was evaluated against applicable licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique for the drill to evaluate the licensee's self-assessment process for identifying potential deficiencies relating to failures in classification and notification.
The inspectors reviewed the completed critique developed by the licensee documenting the overall performance of the Emergency Response Organization.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee data to confirm the accuracy of reported performance indicator (PI) data for the nine indicators during periods listed below. To determine the accuracy of the report PI elements, the reviewed data was assessed against PI definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 5. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
- Unplanned Scrams, Unit 2
- Unplanned Power Changes, Unit 2
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Reactor Coolant System Activity, Unit 1
- Reactor Coolant System Leakage, Unit 1
- Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Residual Heat Removal, Unit 1
- Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Residual Heat Removal, Unit 2 The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and methods for compiling and reporting the Performance Indicators including the Reactor Oversight Program Mitigating Systems Performance Indicator Basis Document for Catawba. The inspectors reviewed the raw data for the PIs listed above for the period of July 1, 2008, through June 30, 2009. The inspectors also independently screened TS Action Item Logs, selected control room logs, work orders and surveillance procedures, and maintenance rule failure determinations to determine if unavailability/unreliability hours were properly reported. The inspectors compared the licensees raw data against the graphical representations and specific values contained on the NRCs public web page for 2008-2009. The inspectors also reviewed the past history of PIPs for systems affecting the Mitigating Systems Performance Indicators listed above for any that might have affected the reported values. The inspectors reviewed Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, to verify that industry reporting guidelines were applied.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
- Emergency Response Organization Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP)
- Emergency Response Organization Readiness (ERO)
- Alert and Notification System Reliability (ANS)
For the period April 1, 2008, through March 31, 2009, the inspector examined data reported to the NRC, procedural guidance for reporting PI information, and records used by the licensee to identify potential PI occurrences. The inspector verified the accuracy of the DEP through review of a sample of drill and event records. The inspector reviewed selected training records to verify the accuracy of the ERO PI for personnel assigned to key positions in the ERO. The inspector verified the accuracy of the PI for ANS reliability through review of a sample of the licensees records of periodic system tests. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Daily Review
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing copies of PIPs, attending selected daily Site Direction and PIP screening meetings, and accessing the licensees computerized database.
.2 Focused Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of PIP 09-0268, 2A2 KC pump suction was throttled, 2KC7 instead of 2KC9 (discharge) as required by procedure, previously entered into the licensees corrective action program. The sample was within the mitigating systems cornerstone and involved risk significant systems. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed the actions taken to determine if the licensee had adequately addressed the following attributes:
- Complete, accurate and timely identification of the problem
- Evaluation and disposition of operability and reportability issues
- Consideration of previous failures, extent of condition, generic or common cause implications
- Prioritization and resolution of the issue commensurate with safety significance
- Identification of the root cause and contributing causes of the problem
- Identification and implementation of corrective actions commensurate with the safety significance of the issue
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Follow-up
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the entry into AP/1/A/5500/008, Malfunction of Reactor Coolant Pump, due to 1A NCP #2 seal leakage to assess the overall impact on the plant and mitigating actions. As appropriate, the inspectors:
- (1) observed plant parameters and status, including mitigating systems/trains;
- (2) determined alarms/conditions preceding or indicating the event; and
- (3) evaluated performance of licensee actions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.
These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.
These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors' normal plant status reviews and inspection activities.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Radiological Controls
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and observed operations associated with storing spent fuel in the ISFSI in accordance with Inspection Procedure 60855. The inspectors observed selected licensee activities related to the loading of cask numbers 31 and 42 to verify that they performed these activities in a safe manner and in compliance with approved procedures. The inspectors reviewed the cask loading verification video for each of the above casks to verify that the alpha-numeric identification numbers stamped on the loaded fuel assemblies and burnable poison assemblies matched the identification numbers designated in the associated documentation packages. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On October 6, 2009, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr.
George Hamrick, Catawba Station Manager, and other members of licensee management, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that any proprietary information provided or examined during the inspection period had been returned.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- T. Arlow, Emergency Planning Manager
- S. Beagles, Chemistry Manager
- D. Brenton, Operations Superintendent
- W. Byers, Security Manager
- J. Caldwell, Modifications Engineering Manager
- S. Coy, Operations Training Manager
- J. Ferguson, Mechanical, Civil Engineering Manager
- J. Foster, Radiation Protection Manager
- T. Hamilton, Work Control Manager
- G. Hamrick, Station Manager
- R. Hart, Regulatory Compliance Manager
- M. Helton, Radiation Protection
- T. Jenkins, Superintendent of Maintenance
- J. McConnell, Shift Operations Manager
- G. Mitchell, Emergency Planner
- J. Morris, Catawba Site Vice President
- K. Phillips, Safety Assurance Manager
- T. Ray, Engineering Manager
- M. Sawicki, Regulatory Compliance Engineer
- R. Smith, Emergency Planner
- D. Ward, Civil Engineering Supervisor
- R. Weatherford, Training Manager
NRC personnel
- J. Thompson, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
- R. Bernhard, Senior Reactor Analyst, RII