IR 05000410/1980002
| ML17053B762 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/09/1980 |
| From: | Cerne A, Mcbrearty R, Mcgaughy R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17053B761 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-410-80-02, 50-410-80-2, NUDOCS 8007210209 | |
| Download: ML17053B762 (18) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OfFICE OF INSPECTION ANO ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-41 0/80-02 Docket No.
License. No.
CPPR-112 Prior ity Licensee:
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard, Hest Category Syracuse, New York 13202 faci 1 ity Name Nine Mi 1 e Point Nucl ear Station, Unit 2 Inspection at:
Scriba, New York E
Inspection conducted:
March 19-21 and'pri'1 10-11, 1'98Q Inspectors:
A.
C. Cerne, Reactor Inspector R. A. McBrearty, Reac or Inspector G. A. Walton, Reactor Inspector Approved by:
y R
H MeGaughy, C
, Construction Projects Section,,
RC&ES Branch 3:o ~
date signed
+ gy ate signed
+'zm ~o date signed date signed Ins ection Summar
Inspection on March 19-21, 1980 an A ril 10-11, 1980
'e ort No. 50-410/80-02 Areas Ins ected:
Routine, unannounced ins ection b
re ional based p
y g
inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings, RPV and internals storage, biological shield wall status, and plant inspection tours.
NRC witness of the re-examination of a flued head penetration using the UT method had been previously coordinated and did take place on March 20,. 1980.
The inspection commenced at 6:00 p.m.
on March 19, 1980, outside the normal dayshift working hours at the site and involved 40 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC regional based inspectors.
Resul ts:
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Region I form 12 (Rev. April 77)
800>aZO QdP>
1.
Persons Contacted DETAILS Nia ara Mohawk Power Cor oration'MPC)
- E. F. Crispell, Senior Associate Construction Engineer
- S.
E.
Czuba, gA Engineer
- J. L. Dillon, Senior Site gA Representative (Acting)
P. Francisco, Nuclear Engineer R. A. Norman, gA Projects Group Leader (Acting)
- R. L. Patch, gA Technician Stone and'Webster En ineerin
'Cor oration'M).
T. Britt, Senior Electrical gA Engi'neer J.
P. Cardelli, Materials Manager
- J.
E. Evans, Advisory Operations Engineer
- W. E. Franczek, Containment and Shield Project Manager.
- B. F. Gallagher, Senior Resident Engtneer
- C. E.
Gay, Superintendent, Field gC
- R. D. Jones',
Si'te Engineering Offi'ce V. Langley, Level
UT Techni'ctan (Boston)
- M. G. Pace, Assistant Project gA Manager
- J.
E. Rogers, Chief Office Engi'neer
- L. E. Shea, Head, Site Engineering Offtce
- denotes those present at the exit interview on March 21, 1980
- denotes those present at the exit interview on April ll, 1980 2.
Plant Tours The inspector observed work activities in-progress, completed work and plant status in several areas of the plant during general inspection of the plant.
The inspector examined work for any obvious=defects or noncompliance with regulatory requtrements or license conditions.
Particular note was taken of presence of quality control inspectors and quality control evi'dence such as inspection records, material identification, nonconforming material identification, housekeeping and equipment preservation, and quality inspection personnel as such personnel were available i'n the work area Specifically the inspector checked weld rod controls for welding being accomplished on the containment liner upper cone, certain reactor pedestal embeds, and the biological shield wall.
He interviewed a Field Engineer concerning the status of shield wall weld repairs and discussed weld material requisition procedures with the SSM rod room controller during the evening shift.
The condition and temporary storage of various stainless and carbon steel pipe spool pieces throughout the Reactor Building was noted and discussed with the licensee.
The inspector examined certain completed stainless steel pipe welds, discussed pipe hanger material utilization, and reviewed specification requirements for high-strength structural steel bolt connections, as such were determined to warrant further evaluation during the course of the inspection.
The existence and adequacy of a blast monitor program for the review of the lake tunnel blasting effects was also verified.
The, inspector evaluated specific actions initiated by the licensee to clarify the adequacy of present conditions and completed work for certain of the above items and he has no further questions on those issues.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s
'I (Closed)
Unresolved Item (79-02-03):
Specification for control of electrodes.
The inspector reviewed a letter from SAW dated February 4,
1980 which documented satisfactory results of adsorption tests on E8018-Cl electrodes by Chemetron Corporation.
These tests determined the amount of moisture adsorbed after exposure of the electrodes for ten hours at 90 F, and up to 97 + 2X relative humidity.
Data representing those periods of time at Nine Mile Point 2 where temperature/humidity exceeded the test conditions were also listed.
Of the ten applicable dates, the maximum exposure time to these extreme conditions was determined to be three hours.
The inspector noted that a
S&W engineering review of the above data and conditions indicated no evidence that unsatisfactory welds had resulted.
He has no further questions or concerns regarding the use of the E8018-Cl electrodes during this past period when a ten hour out-of-oven time was permitted.
This item is resolve (Closed)
Unresolved Item (80-01-02):
Packing inspection for Dikkers Relief Valves.
The inspector examined correspondence which directed the visual inspection of the relief valve stems for corrosion every six months.
This correspondence from S&W to ITT Grinnell served to delineate temporary storage instructions for the.Dikkers valves until formal incorporation into the SSW storage and maintenance specification (SM01).
The inspector noted that these instructions specifically referenced the applicable Dikkers'torage document.
This item is resolved.
(Open)
Unresolved Item (79-09-01):
Control of the ITT Grinnell temporary/permanent hanger program.
The inspector reviewed an ITT Grinnell letter dated March 20, 1980 which explains the purpose and intent of the temporary/permanent hanger program.
While an attachment to this letter lists attributes from the Grinnell gA Manual as they apply respectively to temporary, permanent, or temporary/permanent hangers, it is unclear whether this tabulation has been formally documented and approved.
The inspector also questions whether procedural controls have been adequately established to insure compliance with ASME code and quality requirements..
The process of securing approval to already installed modifications differs from one where approval for modifications is requested in advance of work.
Both the inspection program and design control measures should account for these differences.
Pending establishment or further evidence of documented procedural controls over utilization of this temporary/permanent hanger program, this item remains unresolved.
(Closed)
Noncompliance (79-02-02):
Nondestructive Examination of Flued Head Welds.
The NRC requested, by letter dated October 24, 1979, the licensee perform additional ultrasonic examinations of a piping penetration flued head to outer sleeve weld.
The purpose of this additional examination was to have the licensee demonstrate the feasibility of performing the ultrasonic test in lieu of the code required radiographic examinations.
The re-examination was performed by Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation on flued head penetration Z-19. It was the Stone and Webster's position that ultrasonic examinations, when performed correctly would detect any unacceptable defects.
It was the posi tion of the NRC that these type welds, with a backup bar, might not show code rejectable defect The examination was performed on March 20, 1979 by a Level III ultrasonic inspector from the Stone and Webster home office.
The examination was performed in accordance with guality Assurance Directive gAD-9.54 Revision 0, dated November 1, 1976.
The re-examination was witnessed by an NRC inspector.
The weld test results from the ultrasonic examination and from previous radiographic results were correlated to determine the effectiveness of the examina tions.
Ultrasoni c Radio ra hic 1 3/4" length 8 6" from 0" - Reject 1 1/8" length
2 1/2" from 0"
- Reject 1" length 9 10 1/4" from 0"- Reject
'1/2 " length 8 7 1'/4" from 0"
- Reject 3/4" length 8 13 1/2" from 0"
- Slag - Accept 1 3/4" length 8 65 3/4" from 0"-
Reject Numerous other areas of small amplitude - slag - acceptable 1/2" length 9 8 3/4" from 0"
- Reject
- 5/8" length 9 10" from 0"
- Reject 3/4" length 8 16" from 0"-
Reject 1 1/8" length 8 20 1/2" from 0"
- Reject 3/8" length 9 23 3/4" from 0"
- Reject 3/4" length 8 24 1/4" from 0"
- Reject 3/4" length 9 36 3/4" from 0"
- Reject 1/2" length 8 38 5/8" from 0"
- Reject
- Indicates confirmed by the ultrasonic tes The data shown above failed to confirm Stone and Webster's position that an ultrasonic examination in lieu of radiography would'etect all respectable defects. 't remains the NRC position that radiography is the correct method of examination on these welds.
This item is resolved with reaffirmation of the position stated above and based upon the fact that the licensee has re-examined. by radiography all flued head penetration welds.
The radiographic examination disclosed 10 rejectable welds of 17 which were previously accepted by ultrasonic examinations.
Repairs of these areas are completed except weld Z-19 which the licensee is in the process of repairing.
This item is resolved.
(Open)
Unresolved Item (79-07-04):
Radiography of Dikkers Relief Valves.
This inspection was performed by request of NRC: Region IV Vendor Inspection Branch.
An inspection conducted by a Region IV inspector on May 21-23, 1979 at G. Dikkers and-Co.
N.V. in Hengelo, the Netherlands disclosed deficiencies in radiographs of GE safety relief valves.
The deficiency was related to radiographic film density.
The inspector selectively reviewed radiographic film for two valves to ascertain the film quality, including densities.
This review was made comparing the film quality to the applicable ASME BRPV,Section III 1974 Edition requirements.
The following discrepancies were.noted:
Valve No.
3300-3225-01 RW 441 Body and Cover Station 3-4-5 Density 0.4 single 1.72 double Requirement:
Single min. density 1.5 Double min. density 2.0 Station 5-6 Density of weld 0.79 Density of penetrameter 1.92 Film density not within the -155 from weld to penetrameter Requirement:
Film density within the area of interest must be within -15 to +30 percent of the film density at the penetrameter.
Valve No.
3300-3325-01 NW 233 Body Station 25-28
2-2T sensitivity not present Requirement:
2-2T hole must be visible on the radiographic film In addition to the items discussed above, the inspector noted the following discrepancies which appears to represent the practice used on all radiographic film:
Film identification and penetrameter located in such a manner as to interfere with the interpretation of the area of interest Location markers not shown on film The radiographic procedure, technique sheets, and valve drawings were not available on-site during the film review and the radiographs could not be evaluated for acceptance/rejection.
This item continues unresolved pending the licensee review and disposition of subject radiographs.
4.
Reactor Pressure Vessel and Closure Head The inspector reviewed documentation, interviewed licensee personnel and observed the reactor pressure vessel and closure head storage areas to ascertain that the applicable storage requirements for the components were being met.
The following were included in the inspector's review:
General Electric Specification No.
22A3126,
"Equipment Storage Requirements" General Electric Specification No.
22A4645, "Site Receiving and Storage of Reactor Pressure Vessel With Shop Installed Internals" GE Field Deviation Disposition Request (FDDR) No. KGl-19 dated 12/5/79 SSW Nonconformance Disposition Request No.
1662, dated ll/12/79 S8W Memorandum dated 1/8/80 from J.
P. Cardelli to B. F. Gallagher The inspector found that the closure head is stored outside on cribbing.
The internal surfaces and the stainless steel surface areas are protected by a coating of Tectyl 506 which is permitted by FDDR KGl-19.
This is in lieu of providing a nitrogen blanket and/or heating of the RPV head internal surface Records indicated that the nitrogen atmosphere required to be maintained inside the reactor vessel during shipment to the site from the fabrication plant was lost sometime during the period from November 5, 1979 to November 6, 1979.
An inspection by the licensee's contractor at the Oswego Port Authority on November 5, 1979 revealed
"that the nitrogen tanks were properly connected to the vessel and contained approximately 50 pounds of pressure.
The low level purge alarm lights were not blinking, indicating that the nitrogen purge pressure was adequate.
Upon arrival at the PASNY Barge Slip on November 6, 1979 it was noted that the low level lights were blinking, indicating low nitrogen pressure.
The pressure gauges indicated zero pressure.
An inspection revealed damage to one vessel nozzle cover.
Subsequently, the nozzle seal was found to be damaged.
Paragraph 4.2.1.2 of Specification 22A4645 requires that the inside of the vessel be inspected for leakage if seal damage is found.
This inspection was not conducted and waiver of this inspection by General Electric Company does not appear to be either adequately substantiated or justified with regard to quality concerns.
The licensee agreed to remove the plug from a 4 inch nozzle to verify the condition of the vessel interior with regard to the presence of moisture.
Subsequently, the inspector was informed by telephone by the licensee representative on April 1, 1980 and on April 3, 1980,that an inspection was made of, the 36 inch diameter N-1 nozzle located directly opposite the nozzle which displayed seal damage.
The nozzle is located at the lowest point of the reactor vessel as stored and would be the collection potnt of moisture if any were present.
The inspector was advised that no indicatton of tnternal water was evident during the inspection and that the inspection details and results would be documented and available for NRC review.
On April 10, 1980 the inspector reviewed the inspection documentation at the site and found that the results provided assurance that water was not present in the reactor vessel.
The inspector stated that he had no further questions concerning this matte Reactor Vessel Internals The inspector examined the storage area for the steam dryer and the shroud head and steam separator.
This was done to ascertain compliance with the applicable requirements of General Electric Specification 22A3126 for Level C storage conditions.
The inspector found that components are stored in unheated, locked buildings and are additionally protected by polyethylene covers.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Biolo ical Shield Mall A potential reportable deficiency under
CFR 50.55(e)
involving the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 biological shield wall was reported to the NRC Region I on May 30, 1979.
The repor ted problem involved defects found in shield wall welds.
The licensee has performed nondestructive examinations of the shield wall welds to determine the extent of'he problem.
The inspector discussed with licensee representatives the status of the shield wall and made an inspection of the wall components which were in various stages of repair.
Licensee representatives stated that an interim report of the shield wall status was in preparation and would be submitted on April 15, 1980 to NRC Region I.
The inspector was.informed that the licensee would be prepared to discuss the shield wall on May 7, 1980 at a meeting requested for this purpose at the NRC Region I office in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.
The inspector stated that he had no further questions concerning the biological shield wall at this time.
Exit Interview At the conclusion of the inspection on March 21, 1980 and on April 11, 1980, a meeting was held at the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 site with representatives of the licensee.
Attendees at these meetings are denoted in paragraph=l.
The inspectors summarized the results of the inspection as described in this report.