IR 05000409/1982003
| ML20054D099 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/07/1982 |
| From: | Branch M, Spessard R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054D093 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-409-82-03, 50-409-82-3, NUDOCS 8204220339 | |
| Download: ML20054D099 (4) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-409/82-03(DPRP)
Docket No. 50-409 License No. DPR-45 Licensee: Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue - South La Crosse, WI 54601 Facility Name: La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Enforcement Conference At: Region III Office, Glen Ellyn, IL Enforcement Conference Conducted:
February 11, 1982
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4lq/8+m Report Prepared By:
M. W. Branch 7! &
Approved By:
P pess Dr t Division of Project and
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i Resident Programs Enforcement Conference Summary Enforcement Conference on February 11, 1982 (Report No. 50-409/82-03)(DPRP))
Areas Discussed:
(1) Potential NRC action relative to the March 16, 1981, event involving operation on the main steam bypass valve at power.
(2) Potent-ial NRC action relative to the December 23-24, 1981, event involving loss of offsite power and unintentional cooldown of a recirculation loop.
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(3) Licensee corrective actions related to items (1) and (2).
(4) NRC con-cerns about the present staffing of the Health Physics Department and how the present attrition rate may affect the future staffing of that department.
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8204220339 820408 PDR ADOCK 05000409 G
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DETAILS 1.
Attendance Dairyland Power Cooperative (DPC)
J. Taylor, Assistant General Manager for Power R. Shimshak, Plant Superintendent J. Parkyn, Assistant Plant Superintendent L. Goodman, Operations Engineer S. Rafferty, Reactor Engineer G. Boyd, Operations Supervisor L. Kelley, Assistant Operations Supervisor S. Hiestand, Legal Advisor to DPC T. Kettler, Consultant to DPC (NES)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission J. Keppler, Regional Administrator, Region III A. Davis, Regional Deputy Administrator, Region III R. Spessard, Director, Division of Project and Resident Programs J. Streeter, Chief, Projects Branch 2 D. Hunter, Section Chief, Project Section 2B M. Branch, Resident Inspector W. Forney, Senior Resident Inspector, Byron Station L. McGregor, Senior Resident Inspector, Braidwood Station W. Schultz, Enforcement Coordinator j
R. Dudley, Licensing Project Manager (NRR)
R. Caruso, Licensing Project Manager (NRR)
2.
Opening Remarks Mr. Keppler opened the conference stating that the primary purpose of the conference was to discuss NRC concerns about the March 16, 1981, event involving operation at 85% power on the main steam bypass valve, to discuss potential escalated enforcement action related to the event, and to give the licensee the opportunity to explain how the corrective actions described in the licensee's response to the containment sensing line proposed civil penalty apply to the March 16, 1981 event.
Mr. Keppler also stated that NRC concerns related to the December 23-24, 1981, event involving loss of offsite power and unintentional cooldown of one of the two recirculation loops would be discussed along with potential escalated enforcement action related to that event.
Mr. Taylor responded that the present regulatory pressure being exerted on the nuclear industry is a primary cause for the amount of attrition that has plagued the industry. He also stated that INPO had indicated that LACBWR was the cleanest / neatest plant in the country and was being managed and operated by very knowledgeable and competent personnel, whereas he feels that the NRC does not share that opinion.
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3.
Discussion Concerning the March 16, 1981, Event Involving Operation on the Main Steam Bypass Valve at Power Mr. Branch described the March 16, 1981, event and the subsequent issuance of an Operations Memorandum revision that allowed similar operation. He stated that the NRC concerns with this event were:
(1) The lack of a docketed safety evaluation for the type of operation the plant staff chose to utilize to recover from the transient; (2)
The Power Range Nuclear Instruments were not capable of performing their Technical Specification function of accurately indicating true core power during this mode of operation; (3) The issuance of a Operations Memorandum to deviate from the normal and abnormal opera-tions procedures which circumvents the review process required by 10 CFR 50.59 and Technical Specifications; and (4) The apparent lack of operator awareness that a sizeable reactor power increase would not be accompanied by a corresponding response by the instrumentation used to normally detect such a power increase.
The licensee responded to each of the four concerns that were expressed by Mr. Branch as follows:
(1) Mr. Shimshak indicated that the plant did not and does not feel that the operation on March 16 involved operation of the plant outside of an analyzed safety area (Mr. Kettler indicated that the event was not unlike the Turbine Trip without Scram event that was analyzed by Allis-Chalmers in the Safeguards Report); (2) Mr. Taylor indicated that the plant realizes they have a problem with nuclear instru-mentation and that the 1982 budget contains funds for upgrading this equipment; (3) Mr. Shimshak indicated that the plant is reviewing all Operations Memoranda and will ensure no operation that requires an approved procedure is accomplished with an Operations Memorandum. He also indicated that the licensee feels that the issuance of Revision 1 to Operations Memorandum 86 to allow plant operation on the Main Steam Bypass Valve was proper and that an approved procedure was not necessary; and (4) Mr. Boyd indicated that lack of operator awareness was not a valid concern and he felt that the operating crew on shift on March 16, 1981, was fully aware of what t:'s hcppening as far as the core power increase, but the crew may nr. L ce ceen aware of the magnitude of the power increase.
Mr. Branch asked how ths
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>se action specified in the licensee's response to the containmeat sensing line proposed civil penalty would preclude the recurrence of an event such as the March 16, 1981, event and the subsequent issuance of the revised Operations Memorandum DPC-86 without a 10 CFR 50.59 review?
Mr. Taylor indicated that he felt the necessity to follow procedures for 50.59 reviews had been clearly emphasized to all plant personnel.
He indicated that adherence to those procedures would preclude recurrence of an evsat such as the March 16, 1981, event and related operations memorandum issuance.
In addition, Mr. Taylor and staff members stated that should an event develop similar to the March 16, 1981, event, the immediate operator response would be to scram the plant.
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4.
Discussion Concerning the December 23-24, 1981, Reactor Scram With a Loss of Offsite Power Followed by an Unintentional Cooldown of the No. 1B Forced Recirculation Loop Mr. Branch described the December 23-24, 19J1, event. He stated that there were two separate failures to follow procedures that lead to the excessive cooldown of the 1B Forced Recirculation loop.
Mr. Branch indicated that the primary NRC concerns with this event was that it was another example of failure to follow plant procedures and indicates that the corrective action specified in the licensee's response to the containment sensing line proposed civil penalty was not completely effective.
Mr. Branch also indicated that, through discussion with control room operators, it appears that the control room command functions were not under the absolute control of the shift supervisor as required by Technical Specifications.
Mr. Shimshak agreed that the event of unintentional cooldown of the No. 1B Forced Recirculation Loop was caused by a failure of plant personnel to follow procedures. He also indicated that he believed the contol room command functions were always under the absolute control of the shift supervisor but that he would review the matter and would present'his findings to the NRC.
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Discussion Concerning the Staffing of the Health Physics Department Mr. Branch discussed the potential problems relative to the present and expected staffing of the Health Physics (HP) Department. He indicated that, with the overtime restriction and Emergency Plan requirements to augment a shift in the event of an emergency, the present staff size may become inadequate during the upcoming outage or in the event of sickness or additional attrition.
Mr. Shimshak indicated that tha plant shares the NRC's concerns and has initiated a recruitment program and have hired three HP trainees that will be fully qualified in six months to a year. He also indicated that the plant would contract HP personnel if necessary.
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Closing The Enforcement Conference was closed by Mr. Streeter who stated that Region III personnel would evaluate the licensee positions and that he would inform Mr. Taylor of the results. He also stated that a future meeting would be conducted to discuss the interface between the licensee and Region III.
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