IR 05000409/1982011
| ML20027E531 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/10/1982 |
| From: | Hind J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Linder F DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20027E532 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8211150470 | |
| Download: ML20027E531 (3) | |
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November 10, 1982 Docket No. 50-409 Dairyland Power Cooperative ATTN:
Mr. F. W. Linder General Manager 2615 East Avenue - South La Crosse, WI 54601 Gentlemen:
Thank you for your letter dated October 11, 1982, informing us of the steps you have taken to correct the significant deficiencies we brought to your at-tention in Appendix A of Inspection Report No. 50-409/82-11(DEPOS) forwarded by our letter dated September 15, 1982.
With regard to Items 2e, 4a and 4c, we have specific comments which were transmitted to Mr Paul Shafer of your staff telephonically on October 27, 1982.
Item 2e.
Telephone calls should not be made from the JPIC directly to the Control Room instead of to the E0F.
DPC RESPONSE:
At no time did DPC's public information director make any calls to either the control room or the TSC during the exercise. A clearly delineated and exclusive line of communications with the EOF is the only authorized information channel contained within plans and pro-cedures. To the best of our knowledge, no one else present at the JPIC initiated a call to the control room.
(We would request from the NRC specific information on this observation so that we might contact the originators of any calls to insure that repetition will not occur.)
NRC RESPONSE:
We understand that the State of Wisconsin Representatives, the local Sheriff's Departments Representatives and media personnel called the Control Room directly after the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
was activated. After activation of the EOF, all calls from offsite agencies and personnel should be directed to the EOF. Offsite support agencies and the media should be informed of these changes.
8211150470 821110
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Dairyland Power Cooperative
NOV 10 082 Item 4.
Procedures Habitability surveys for airborne concentrations of radioactivity a.
and radiation background in the TSC and the Control Room should be performed during emergency situations.
DPC RESPONSE:
Habitability surveys for airborne concentrations of radioac-tivity and background radiation levels in the TSC and Control Room will be made as applicable during emergencies. The August 3rd scenario did not involve a radiological release and the available instrumentation and surveys did not indicate a need to perform additional TSC or Control Room habitability t
surveys. A control room ARM with local readout currently
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exists. Dedicated portable radiation monitors are currently located in the TSC. Also, during 1982, radiation monitors which continuously indicate radiation dose rates and airborne radiciodine concentrations will be added to the TSC for use during an emergency. These monitoring systems will include local alarms with trip levels set to provide early warning to TSC personnel of adverse conditions that may affect the habitability of the TSC.
NRC RESPONSE:
Habitability monitoring should be provided to assure radiation exposure to any person working in the TSC would not exceed 5 rem whole body, or its equivalent to any part of the body, for the duration of the accident. The August 3 scenario involved hypothetical Inss of power which would have caused an inter-ruption in obtaining radiological release information from the stack monitors.
In this situation, there could have been major releases of radioactivity from the stack affecting the TSC without the appropriate informrtion to the TSC. Radiological protection and monitoring for occupants of the TSC was not provided. This monitoring must be provided during exercises to assure proper training of TSC personnel and the associated parameters should be incorporated into the scenario content.
c.
Security measures need to be improved for the EOF.
DPC RESPONSE:
Security measures are provided for the Lacrosse Office Building and are adequate. Therefore, no additional security control for the EOF is necessary. During the exercise, an unidentified person
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Dairyland Power Cooperative
NOV 10 882
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entered the EOF area and was immediately challenged by the ECD.
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The individual was identified as an NRC observer who had just arrived at the EOF.
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NRC RESPONSE:
We acknowledge your comments, however, EOF security control
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procedures are required to demonstrate appropriate security
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I measures during emergency situations. Currently, these do not exist.
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We will examine these matters during a subsequent inspection.
l Your cooperation with us is appreciated.
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Sincerely, i
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I J.
. Ilind, irector
'p Division of Emergency Preparedness j
'l and Operational Support
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I cc:
J. Parkyn, Plant Superintendent cc w/1tr dtd 10/11/82:
DMB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS)
Resident Inspector, RIII John J. Duffy, Chief Boiler Section Stanley York, Chairman Public Service Commission
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