IR 05000387/1995099
| ML17158A907 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 09/20/1995 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17158A906 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-95-99, 50-388-95-99, NUDOCS 9509260016 | |
| Download: ML17158A907 (10) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE
SALP REPORT - SUSQUEHANNA STEAN ELECTRIC STATION 50-387'388/95-99 I.
BACKGROUND The SALP Board convened on August 21, 1995, to assess the nuclear safety performance of the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES),
Units 1 and 2, for the period February 27, 1994 to August 5, 1995.
The Board was conducted pursuant to NRC Management Directive (HD) 8.6 (see NRC Administrative Letter 93-20).
Board members were:
Wayne D. Lanning (Board Chairman),
Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, NRC Region I (RI);
A. Randolph Blough, (Acting) Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety, NRC RI; Charles W. Hehl, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, NRC RI; and, John F. Stolz, Director, Project Directorate I-2, NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
The Board developed this assessment for the approval of the Region I Administrator.
The performance ratings and the functional areas used below are described in NRC HD 8.6,
"Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)."
II.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - OPERATIONS During the previous SALP period, operations was rated Category 2.
The operations staff's superior performance contributed to the safe operation of the plant during normal operations and in response to plant challenges.
Operator training was improved.
However, longstanding staff performance problems were identified involving refueling activities and control of equipment status.
During this period, operations management provided extensive oversight and strong involvement in daily and preplanned operational activities fostering a
strong operational safety philosophy.
In response to weaknesses identified during the previous SALP, management oversight of refueling outage preparations and activities was significantly strengthened.
The corrective actions ensured that fuel handling and other outage activities were performed in an excellent manner.
The corrective actions implemented prior to the Unit 1 refueling outage resulted in improved equipment status control.
The power uprate testing for both units was completed in a controlled and safe manner.
Operator performance in the control room continued to be a strength as evidenced by their actions in response to routine and transient operational occurrences.
Operators were well trained, demonstrated a high degree of professionalism, and maintained a strong nuclear safety-conscious approach toward plant operations.
However, there were several minor events caused by operator errors throughout the period which indicated the need for improvement in communications and self-checking.
Ear ly in the period, inadequate corrective actions were identified involving repetitive problems with blocked open fire doors and several examples where the operating shift did not 950'P2600i6 950920 PDR ADOCK 05000387
establish the required fire watches after recurring failures of the fire protection system.
These problems were effectively resolved later in the pel 1 od.
Plant startup and shutdown activities were well planned and controlled.
The two refueling outages completed during this assessment period were accomplished with improved risk management and without significant events.
In addition, the licensee's Independent Safety Evaluation Services provided significant oversight of control room activities during the first week of the outage.
The licensee significantly enhanced its self assessment function during this period.
A new organization was established to better focus and consolidate assessment functions.
In addition, the use of Event Review Teams continue to be a positive licensee initiative.
The results were generally comprehensive and provided detailed assessments of root and contributing causes with appropriate corrective actions.
In summary, operators continued to demonstrate strong, safe performance during normal operations and in response to plant challenges.
Operations management provided extensive oversight and involvement in operational evolutions.
Fuel handling and other outage activities were improved and event free.
Some minor personnel performance weaknesses were noted during the period relative to communications and self-checking.
Operations was rated Category l.
III.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS MAINTENANCE During the previous SALP period, maintenance was rated Category 1.
The safety system reliability and availability were excellent, and material condition of the plant was exceptionally good.
The surveillance program was effective and well managed as evidenced by no inadvertent automatic scrams and few errors.
Ther e were a few isolated instances where the maintenance and surveillance activities were indicative of poor maintenance planning, inadequate communication, ineffective material control, and failure to adhere to procedures.
During the current SALP period, the site management team continued to demonstrate a strong commitment to support the maintenance and surveillance program.
Although there are a large number of open work authorizations (WA),
the backlog is effectively managed, and the WA process was effective in identifying and resolving deficiencies in the plant.
Corrective maintenance is prioritized based on safety significance and its impact on power generation.
Appropriate prioritization of, work is reflected in the material condition of the plant, which continued to be exceptionally good.
Safety system availability and reliability continued to be excellent.
Maintenance staff's skill, experience, and knowledge continued to be very good.
Work evolutions were generally well planned and properly supervised.
Enhanced work planning and preparation for the Unit I 8th refueling outage resulted in improved outage management and its successful completion in less than the
scheduled 45 days.
A new work control center improved the efficiency of work control and reduced administrative distractions for control room operators.
Recent enhancement of the work control process also included the establishment of an Emergent Work Action Crew that was judged to be an excellent initiative in managing the backlog.
Performance of plant maintenance was excellent.
New initiatives, such as underwater installation of main steam line plugs during the Unit I refueling outage, were performed in a deliberate and well controlled manner.
Improved coordination of outage activities and resolution of emerging problems, and excellent supervisory oversight were evident on the refuel floor.
Similarly, on-line maintenance activities were performed very effectively with very good control, coordination and supervisory oversight.
An exception involved the events that occurred during the high pressure coolant injection on-line maintenance activity that resulted from a lapse in planning, coordination, and control of sequential tasks, system configuration and equipment status.
Although good communication, coordination, and procedure compliance were normally observed, occasional lapses in attention to detail involving some examples of nonconformance with procedures, administrative policies, and work practices indicate that additional management attention is warranted.
The surveillance tests were effectively managed in a well run program, and were performed with good command and control of the work and good supervisory oversight.
No inadvertent automatic scrams resulted from the surveillance testing activities.
The in-service testing program was excellent, and the in-service inspection and the motor operated valve programs were effectively implemented.
With the establishment of the Nuclear Assessment Services, new requirements are being established for each functional unit manager to conduct self assessment that are to be planned a year in advance.
Self assessment performed by this group and its predecessor, the Nuclear Safety Assessment Group, contributed to improvements in maintenance effectiveness and the overall safety of the plant.
The new Condition Report process. implemented in March 1995, was an important licensee initiative to improve the effectiveness of the corrective action program.
In summary, the licensee continued to implement a strong, well managed, and effective maintenance program.
New initiatives were undertaken by the licensee for further improvements.
Improved planning,,coordination, and, excellent supervisory oversight contributed to very successful refueling outages.
However, some examples of personnel performance weaknesses indicated further improvements were needed in these areas to sustain the superior performance.
The safety system reliability and availability were excellent, and material condition of the plant was exceptionally good.
The surveillance program was effective and well managed as evidenced by no inadvertent challenges and few errors.
Maintenance was rated Category IV.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - ENGINEERING Engineering was rated Category I in the previous SALP.
The engineering organization demonstrated a strong, conservative safety perspective and interacted effectively in support of the other site organizations.
Management oversight was very evident.
Technical evaluations almost always were technically sound, thorough, and of high quality.
A few potentially avoidable repetitive events were attributed to inadequate attention to performance trending, ineffective corrective action, and untimely engineering assessment.
During this SALP period, excellent management involvement and effective independent oversight were evident.
The design and technical support organizations at the corporate offices and the site exercised effective control of engineering activities.
Appropriate levels of management became involved in emerging safety and programmatic concerns at an early stage, and contributed to timely and comprehensive corrective actions.
When management considered issues to be potentially significant, ample resources were applied to the evaluation and resolution.
Performance expectations were communicated unambiguously in a variety of formats.
Strong independent assessments were provided by the Engineering Review Committee (ERC)
and by Independent Safety Evaluation Services (ISES); these assessments enhanced the quality of engineering work.
Independent audits also were commissioned to review specific program areas.
Communication within the engineering department and with other site organizations was fostered by regularly scheduled system status meetings and reports to management.
A new Condition Report program successfully improved upon past problem-solving issues.
However, databases did not provide a readily retrievable cause/trend information for monitoring corrective action effectiveness.
For the most part, the licensee achieved superior quality of technical work and excellent resolution of safety issues.
Design change packages were thorough, as indicated by the infrequency of any need for field changes during installation.
Further, the modifications were supported by in-depth safety evaluations, and industry experience was used effectively.
The Engineering Deficiency Report program backlog was reduced and,temporary modifications were well controlled.
The licensee's commitment to improved plant safety was evidenced by the implementation of modifications in response to individual plant examination (IPE) insights.
Corrective actions for weaknesses in the vendor design change review and post-installation test processes were extensive and illustrated the licensee's capacity for critical self-assessment.
The ability to identify subtle, complex, and risk-significant design issues was a strength.
With few exceptions, clearly written, complete, and technically sound license submittals supported timely NRC evaluation and approval.
The licensee completed a good resolution of issues associated with adequacy of spent fuel pool cooling design, operations and testing.
Mechanisms for identification, prioritization, and resolution of design deficiencies and technical problems effectively contributed to maintaining safety system oper ability, although occasional problems were traced to the timeliness of communications between the site and corporate engineering organizations.
Operability determinations occasionally were weak due to lack of formal guidance, technical errors, or communication lapses between site and
corporate engineering.
The licensee recognized this weakness early in the period and used the Continuous Performance Improvement Program to develop enhanced guidance for operability determinations and internal communication.
The licensee maintained or improved many strong program attributes, including the Nuclear Systems Engineering status reports, use of risk assessments to evaluate on-line maintenance, an effective industry experience program, Generic Letter 89-10 on the Motor-Operated Valve Program, and a design basis documentation initiative.
Assurance of quality was confirmed by the positive results of several audits and reinforced programmatically through the activities of the ERC.
Personnel were knowledgeable and well-versed in the requirements of their respective disciplines, as evidenced by the generally excellent quality of technical work.
Regularly scheduled training sessions were excellent in keeping engineering personnel up-to-date on administrative and technical developments.
In summary, superior performance continued in the engineering area.
Engineering management was involved in resolution of design and technical problems early in the corrective action process and provided guidance and recommendations which evidenced a strong safety perspective.
Engineering personnel were well-trained and knowledgeable.
The technical quality of modifications and licensing actions was excellent.
Though occasionally marred by lapses in corporate/site communication, the organization effectively addressed complex and subtle technical deficiencies in a timely manner.
The new Condition Report program improved the performance of technical assessments.
Engineering was rated Category 1.
V.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - PLANT SUPPORT The plant support functional area covers activities related to plant support functions, including radiological controls, emergency preparedness, security, fire protection, and housekeeping controls.
In the previous SALP the plant support functional area was rated as Category 1.
Performance in the radiological controls area continued to improve.
Improvements in Health Physics/worker communications and increased use of shielding contributed to low station doses.
The radiological effluent
monitoring and effluent control programs continued to be effective.
There was continued strong performance in the emergency preparedness area with a number of important improvements implemented in preparation for the Full Field Exercise.
Security program performance continued to be a strength.
Plant housekeeping was excellent.
Fire protection area performance was mixed.
During the current SALP period, the licensee continued to implement a strong radiation protection program.
Management support for ALARA was evidenced by significant efforts to maintain occupational exposures low and involve workers in the ALARA program.
Several ALARA program enhancements were implemented, including real-time dose tracking, proactive reviews of outage work scope
changes by the ALARA committee, use of wet lift equipment for vessel disassembly, and main steam line plug installation.
ALARA radiation exposure goals were well developed and properly used.
Extensive use of shielding was commendable and demonstrated a significant commitment to exposure reduction..
Program changes made in response to the revised
CFR 20 reflected a good safety perspective, and applicable training was of good quality.
The radioactive waste and transportation programs were effectively managed and very good overall performance was achieved.
guality assurance audits and surveillances, and radiation protection program self-assessments were effectively used to improve program performance.
Housekeeping in radiologically controlled ar'eas was generally excellent.
Implementation of the radiological environmental monitoring and effluent control programs continued to be excellent.
Liquid and gaseous effluent releases were well controlled and quantified.
The meteorological monitoring program was effectively implemented.
Audits and surveillances were performance based, and of sufficient scope and depth to effectively evaluate program performance.
The effectiveness of the laboratory gA/gC program was demonstrated by good agreement between split samples analyzed by the licensee and the NRC.
Radiological calibration techniques for radiation monitoring systems were a program strength.
Good emergency preparedness (EP) program performance was noted during drills and exercises.
Senior site management attention and involvement in EP issues were continuing strengths.
Tr'aining program implementation was excellent; the annual training was effective and demonstrated generally good cooperation between the licensee and the offsite organizations.
However, recurring problems with coordination of some activities involving other PPEL organizations resulted in EP equipment/facility problems.
Excellent relations with off-site emergency response agencies continued throughout the period.
The licensee continued to implement a very effective, high quality security program.
Hanagement attention and involvement in security matters continued at a high level as evidenced by several equipment upgrades and very effective maintenance support for security equipment.
However, several long standing problems with perimeter assessment aids were not yet resolved.
The licensee continued to implement a good performance-oriented training and qualification
. program as evidenced by extremely knowledgeable individuals effectively carrying out their assigned duties.
The fire protection and prevention program was generally improved.
Increased management oversight of the program was evident.
Excellent administrative and surveillance procedure quality was noted.
Fire protection requirements were effectively integrated into the design change process.
However, repetitive problems with control of fire doors and establishing required fire watches for failures of the Simplex system noted early in the period raised concerns regarding the effectiveness of the corrective action process in this area.
After licensee management attention was focused on these issues, effective corrective actions were implemente The plant support functions effectively contributed to safe plant performance.
Performance in the radiation protection area was excellent.
Steady improvement was noted in exposure reduction.
Outstanding performance in the radiological effluent and environmental monitoring programs was also noted.
There was continued excellent performance in the emergency preparedness area.
Security program performance continued to be a strength, however several longstanding perimeter assessment aid problems went unresolved.
Plant housekeeping was excellent.
A longstanding fire protection issue regarding the timely implementation of compensatory actions for an inoperable fire protection system was finally addressed during this period.
Plant support was rated Category ENCLOSURE 2 SUSQUEHANNA INSPECTION PLAN AUGUST 1995 AUGUST 1996 RI = Regional Initiative TI = Temporary Inspection (Mandated Inspection)
CO = Core Inspection (NRC Program Inspections, excluding Resident Core Activities)
PROCEDURE NO.
CO 83750 (Unit 2)
CO 73753 TI 2515/128 CO 37550 CO 81700 CO 71001 CO 84750 CO 37550 CO 83750 CO 83750 (Unit 1)
CO 86750 TITLE DATE OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURE (OUTAGE RADCON) 10/02/95 INSERV ICE INSPECTION CORE SHROUD INSPECTION 10/16/95 BWR WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION BULLETIN 93-03 10/16/95 ENGINEERING VISIT ¹1 PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM - VISIT ¹1 LICENSED OPERATOR REQUAL IF ICATION PROGRAM EVALUATION RAD WASTE TREATMENT 5 EFFLUENT 5.
ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING ENGINEERING VISIT ¹2 OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURE (RADCON)
(Unit 2)
OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURE (RADCON)
12/01/95 01/22/96 02/12/96 03/04/96 03/06/96 03/20/96 03/26/96 SOLID RAD WASTE MANAGEMENT 5 TRANSPORTATION 07/22/96 OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS CO 37550
'NGINEERING VISIT ¹3 08/05/96
ENCLOSURE 2 SUS(UEHANNA INSPECTION PLAN AUGUST 1995 - AUGUST 1996 RI = Regional Initiative TI Temporary Inspection (Mandated Inspection)
CO = Core Inspection (NRC Program Inspections, excluding Resident Core Activities)
PROCEDURE NO.
CO 83750 (Unit 2)
CO 73753 TI 2515/128 CO 37550 CO 81700 CO 71001 CO 84750 CO 37550 CO 83750 CO 83750 (Unit 1)
CO 86750 CO 37550 TITLE DATE ENGINEERING VISIT ¹1 PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM VISIT ¹1 LICENSED OPERATOR REgUALIFICATION PROGRAM EVALUATION RAD WASTE TREATMENT 5. EFFLUENT &
ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING ENGINEERING VISIT ¹2 OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURE (RADCON)
(Unit 2)
OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURE (RADCON)
SOLID RAD WASTE MANAGEMENT 5. TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS ENGINEERING VISIT ¹3 12/01/95 01/22/96 02/12/96 03/04/96 03/06/96 03/20/96 03/26/96 07/22/96 08/05/96 OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURE (OUTAGE RADCON) 10/02/95 INSERVICE INSPECTION CORE SHROUD INSPECTION 10/16/95 BWR WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION BULLETIN 93-03 10/16/95