IR 05000387/1992014
| ML17157B846 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 06/09/1992 |
| From: | Bhatia R, Chandhary S, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17157B845 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-92-14, 50-388-92-14, NUDOCS 9206240130 | |
| Download: ML17157B846 (13) | |
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
REPORT NO.
2-14 2-14 DOCKET NO.
K=K
%=385 LICENSE NO.
FACILITY NAME'NSPECTION AT'g'F-14
+'F-22 d
h n
team El tric rwi k PA and Allent wn Penn.
lvani INSPECTION DATES:
'arch
2 thr u h A ril
2 INSPECTORS:
R. Bhatia, Reactor Engineer, Electrical Section, EB, DRS Date S. K. Cha,
.
eactor Engineer, Systems Section, EB, DRS Date APPROVED BY:
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W. H. Ruland, Acting Chief, Electrical Section, EB, DRS ate d~ld:
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'g f modifications, onsite and corporate engineering organization and communication/interface, quality assurance, training, management support and staffing, and licensee actions to. resolve identified weakness in the engineering and technical support program.
~Re >i~i: There appears to be a strong management emphasis on enhancement of engineering capability, communications, technical support to the plants and a general improvement of engineering effectiveness in design and plant support activities.
9206240130 920609
.
PDR ADOCK 05000387
There is adequate administrative and technical control over design changelmodiTication activities.
A sample of six modifications reviewed indicated very good technical work and package assembly.
The new organization may further improve the modification process.
Communication and interface of engineering with other functional groups appear effec'tive.
Training schedule is being developed for approval.
The engineering functions have been reorganized recently (November 1991) and appear to be well thought out and capable of improving engineering and technical support effectiveness.
Strong management support and involvement are evident.
Engineering review committee (ERC) charter willprovide global oversight on the engineering activities.
There has been a concerted effort to reduce engineering open items (including electrical and environmental qualification items), and good success has been achieved.
This effort is continuing and appears effective.
Prioritization of work appears reasonable.
There appears to be a marked improvement in the quality and timeliness in engineering support to plant operating issues and safety assessment.
No violations or deviations were identifie '3 1.0 SCOPE OF THE INSPECTION The purpose of the inspection was to determine the effectiveness of the licensee's engineering organization to provide engineering and technical support and guidance to the Susquehanna Units 1 and 2 to assure safety.
The scope included:
the review of design, design changes and modifications in accordance with plant procedures, the requirements and commitments specified in the facilities Technical Specifications (TS), NRC rules and regulations, safety analysis report and quality assurance (QA) program; the licensee's organization structure and adequacy of staffing in the engineering area; communication/interface between corporate and site organizations; management support; workload and backlog; plant outage activities; assessment of weaknesses identified in the previous engineering and technical support portion of the systematic assessment of licensee performance (SALP) report; QA audits; capability of the engineering staff to resolve technical issues; and technical training.
1.1 Administrative Controls for Design Changes and Modifications The inspectors reviewed administrative procedures and engineering procedures to determine whether the engineering activities were specified and controlled by approved procedures.
The.
procedures reviewed included plant modifications, design change initiation, design input, design verification, safety evaluations, design document changes, configuration management, station operations review committee (SORC) reviews, and the modification/simple design change program.
The review indicated that the licensee's procedures provided adequate administrative guidelines and controls to ensure that design, design changes and modifications performed do not involve an unreviewed safety question.
Appropriate requirements and guidelines are provided for the 10 CFR 50.59 screening review and safety evaluations, design input, design calculations and design verifications.
The inspectors noted that the licensee was implementing a procedure update program.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee had established adequate measures to ensure that plant design changes, modifications and engineering activities are prescribed and controlled by appropriate procedures.
1.2 Organization and Staffing The inspectors reviewed the licensee's organization and staffing levels to ascertain the level to which they contributed to the technical support and engineering oversight of the plant operations.
The licensee's system engineering group provides the day to day engineering and technical support to the plant.
Long term engineering for modifications, design changes, and other safety improvements are carried out by the headquarters design engineering group mainly based in Allentown, with an onsite group at the plan The recent reorganization (November 1991) of the engineering group and functions appeared to be well thought out and capable of improving engineering and technical support functions.
Engineering functions (including system engineers) have been grouped under one manager, who is a member of the "Strategic Management Team," reporting directly to the vice
.
president, nuclear operations.
This direct reporting has provided a better communication to upper management, and apparently a higher visibilityfor engineering concerns and problems.
Strong management support and involvement was evident thro'ughout the engineering organization.
The establishment of the Engineering Review Committee (ERC) was an indication of management emphasis on improving the engineering support functions and early identification of engineering concerns.
The ERC charter should provide a global oversight on the engineering and technical support activities.
From a review of the organization chart and assigned personnel to the budgeted position, the level of staffing appeared adequate.
The unitized engineering organization directed by respective managers established by the licensee provided adequate support for the station.
The site engineering group with modification/design authority stationed at the plant provides adequate representation of the corporate engineering group to expedite the engineering and technical support for the stations.
1.3 Technical Training The licensee has established a broad-based technical training program for the engineering staff.
The areas included are nuclear reactor systems, safety evaluation, process controls, codes, standards, QA fundamentals and other specialized training.
The implementation of the training started on January 1992.
A continuing training program for corporate engineers is being determined by the engineering training advisory committee.
However, the plant staff was already receiving the required training.
An engineering training matrix has been developed, based on the required, needed and wanted training input from supervisors.
The responsibility for scheduling and completing required training rests with the functional group supervisor.
Furthermore, the licensee has established an engineering qualification program based on job assignments.
The plan is generated by engineering supervision and validated by job incumbents detailing tasks, courses and procedures in which the engineer must demonstrate knowledge and ability. The existing qualification program willenable the managers to assign tasks to the proper engineering staff.
Based on discussions with corporate and site personnel, the inspectors found them to be technically competent and very familiar with the areas of their responsibility.
The training and qualification program developed to address training needs of the engineering/technical staff seems to be comprehensive and designed to enhance the knowledge and skills of nuclear
'ngineering personne.4 Engineering Backlog and Prioritization The inspectors reviewed the licensee's efforts to reduce the backlog of engineering items, especially with regard to the resolution and disposition of nonconformances (NCRs) and deficiencies (Significant Operating Occurrence Report, SOORs).
The licensee had initiated an extensive review and resolution effort for these deficiencies by establishing a "Deficiency Management Task Force" in the middle of 1990.
The senior management accepted the task force's recommendations.
These included the "cycle closure" concept, and the centralizing of tracking and reporting.
The above actions and a concerted-emphasis on timely resolutions and corrective actions has reduced the backlog in the NCRs and SOORs system.
In 1991, the outstanding deficiencies were reduced from a peak of 810 during the Unit 2 outage to 54/ at the end of the year.
The licensee is currently evaluating the experience gained in this area for further improvement in the program.
In the area of prioritization of engineering action items, the licensee is developing criteria to
. be applied in setting the priority of engineering items.
The basic system proposed is a set of test statements to describe the consequences of a one year deferral of an activity or project.
The greater the consequences of deferral, the higher the priority. The test statements are intended to use common language to describe both quantitative (economic) and qualitative, consequences of deferral of work in four broad categories of work; 1) Nuclear Safety Risk Reduction, 2) Regulatory/Legal/Public Relations, 3) Economic, and 4) Employee Conditions, Industrial/Radiological Safety.
Five priority levels (00,[highest priority], 10, 20, 30 and 40 Dowest priority]) are assigned resulting in a four-by-five matrix.
Sub-categories are proposed in several of the broad work categories for greater definition.
1.5 Communication/Interfaces An effective interface between the station and engineering personnel exists at Susquehanna
and 2.
This was evidenced by the staffing of site and system engineering groups for each plant to support the engineering/technical needs of the plant.
Effective interface between operations, maintenance and engineering was established by the participation of representatives from site engineering, corporate and system engineers at the daily meetings.
To improve communications between the engineering staff at Allentown and other organizations at the plant site, the licensee had-established a daily plant status meeting, and an afternoon meeting to discuss action items and subsequent telephone calls needed to resolve issues.
The active participation of management representatives from different organizations at these meetings complimented the effective communication.
Furthermore, the nuclear generation/engineering interface meetings are held as needed, and plant manager and engineering manager meetings are held biweekly to resolve and prioritize engineering work activitie ~
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The licensee initiative to improve communications, timeliness and quality of engineering was evidenced by the following actions:
a.
Performance measurement system was established in 1991 to monitor engineering performance, meeting schedules, monitoring backlog and amount of rework.
b.
Accountability meetings to emphasize lessons learned.
c.
Increased engineering involvement in planning of outage activities.
d.
Implemented simple design change process to expedite engineering support for the station and the design authority delegated to site engineering group for minor modifications.
e.
Interface meetings such as planning meeting, engineering/plant manager's meetings and daily morning meetings to discuss the engineering activities.
2.0 DESIGN CHANGES AND MODIFICATIONPROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION The selected design changes and modification for Unit 1 and 2 were reviewed to ascertain that they were performed in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications (TS), 10CFR, the Safety Analysis Report, the licensee's Quality Assurance Program and in accordance with the licensee's procedures.
Also, the technical quality of modifications, thoroughness of design analysis, design input, technical review and safety evaluations, management involvement and review and resolution of problems from a safety standpoint were evaluated.
The following modifications and bypass modifications were reviewed in this inspection.*
2.1 Hydrogen-Oxygen (H~-0~) Analyzer Circuit Upgrade Design Change Package (DCP) 92-9001 upgraded the H~-0~ analyzer circuits.
The intent of this modification was to modify the applicable circuits reducing the voltage drop so that the hydrogen oxygen analyzers have sufficient voltage to operate, thus eliminating the'need for an LCO or operator action due to the hydrogen-oxygen analyzers during a degraded grid condition.
Under the present configuration in a degraded grid condition, an alarm would come in at 96.5 percent voltage at the 4.16 kV supply bus and, per the alarm response procedure, operator action would be required.
At present, the operator would transfer the bus to a different power supply.
The inspector reviewed the conceptual engineering package,
-design input, evaluation of the power supply circuits, associated voltage drop calculations and the safety evaluation.
The package reviewed was well thought out and the project and installation teams were very knowledgeable about the related requirements of Technical Specification and the contents of the modification packag.2 Class 1E 4.16 kV Switchgear Computer/Annunciator Signal Isolation This modification resulted from a previous open circuit event when a diesel generator field circuit experienced an inductive surge which migrated through the plant computer causing ground detection alarms on the other diesel generators.
After an initial assessment, the licensee concluded that a potential common failure mode existed related to electrical
'eparation and isolation.
Further review of this assessment and subsequent evaluation of the Westinghouse switchgear mecha'nism operated cell (MOC) switch (welding of contact) was submitted to the NRC through SEA-EE-183, "Evaluation of Unit 1 Computer Class 1E Non Class 1E Interfaces."
As a result of this review FSAR Section 8.1.6;1.q was further enhanced for the existing commitment of electrical isolation of annunciator and computer inputs.
Design Change Package (DCP) 91-3025D rewired the auxiliary switches of the 4.16 kV class 1E breaker for core spray pump 1P206A.
The rewiring separated and isolated the computer input and annunciator circuits from the class 1E core spray control circuits.
The DCP was thorough and adequately reflective of all support documents.
2.3 Replacement of Oversized Unit 1 Class IE 125Vdc Breakers DCP No'. 91-9004A Nonconformance Report (NCR) 88-0523 reported some circuit breakers in the 125V dc class 1E distribution panels (1D614, 1D624, 1D634 and 1D644) to be oversized when considering the ampacity of the connected cables.
Licensee engineering evaluated the potential consequential damage and concluded that plant safety was not adversely impacted by a sustained fault on the circuit. The circuits of redundant safety systems and 125V dc power supplies in this case were adequately separated.
Therefore, any reduction in the margin of plant safety would be limited to one division or channel.
To enhance this condition, the final resolution of this NCR resulted in the replacement of several 125V dc circuit breakers/fuses in the above panels.
Several DCPs were prepared to correct this condition at Unit 1 during this refueling outage.
Design Change Package 91-9004A replaced the existing 20 ampere circuit breaker with a 15 ampere breaker at position 12 in class 1E panel 1D614.
This breaker supplies power to the reactor core isolation cooling control and main steam isolation valve shutoff system indication control circuits.
The review of the conceptual design, safety evaluation, procurement documentation of components, installation details, and test procedures revealed no concern.
The package was well documented per the applicable procedure e 2.4 250 Vdc Fuse Upgrade - Unit 1 DCP 90-3084ME During the EDSFI inspection in 1990, the NRC identified underrated fuses on the 250 Vdc
'ystem.
The EDR No. G00107 was issued by the licensee to assess this condition and to ensure that the underrated fuses in the 250 Vdc system are replaced prior to the startup following the sixth refueling outage of Unit 1.
The licensee is implementing several design change packages to upgrade the 250 Vdc system in this outage.
The inspector reviewed the design modification package No. 90-3084ME to assure that the fuses being replaced in 250 Vdc system are properly procured and qualified for the applicable service in the plant.
This
- modification package replaced the underrated fuses in breaker compartment 091 in dc motor control center 1D254.
This breaker feeds the Division I, high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system equipment.
The replacement fuses are qualified for 500 Vdc to assure that the fuses are capable of providing overload and fault protection at maximum (approximately 286V) system operating voltage.
The inspector also reviewed the conceptual design, safety evaluation, procurement requirements, technical, specification, test results and certificate of compliance pertaining to this DCP modification.
The documentation was consistent with the applicable procedures and design requirements.
2.5, Diesel Generator B, Overcurrent Alarm Relay Replacement DCP No. 90-3083B, Common to Both Units Each of the 4.16 kV diesel generators is provided with a single phase, induction disk, General Electric (GE) type IAC66B4A inverse overcurrent relay (device type 51) to initiate the near full load alarm.
Licensee engineering discrepancy report (EDR) No. G00157.
documented that the existing overcurrent relay in its current setting or lowest possible tap setting would not reliably pick-up and the time delay function was not repeatable.
This modification replaced the existing relay located in panel OC519B, with a class 1E, single phase, ASEA Brown Boveri (ABB) type ITE-50D definite time overcurrent relay.
The replacement of this relay also needed 125 Vdc power from the existing OC519B panel power supply.
The package adequately covered the design, qualification requirements, seismic aspects, and the additional load requirements on the existing dc power supply.
Additionally, the safety evaluations, installation and test requirements and results were found to be well documente :6 Control Structure ChiHed Water (CSCW)/Flow Switch Electrical Separation Modification DCP No. 90-9040 This modification established the electrical separation between the redundant chilled water
'umps and the opposite loops, low flow auto start switch circuits. In the existing condition, the "A" chilled water pump has an auto start feature from the "B" chilled water loop switch and vice versa.
In the event of an Appendix R fire, a failed component of this cross-tie circuitry could result in. loss of both loops of the control structure heating ventilation and air conditioning system (HVAC).
This modification has separated and fused the leg of the low flow circuits from the opposite loop logic. In this manner, a fire induced short could not propagate between the two loops and make both loops inoperable at the same time, In the worst case condition, a blown fuse in the standby loop auto start logic willbe alarmed in the control room via a newly installed power monitor relay.
The inspector reviewed the conceptual design package, safety evaluation, installation and test results and found that the package was well thought out, and covered all aspects of applicable requirements as per the plant procedures.
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In addition to the above modification, the inspector reviewed a sample of temporary modifications (bypasses)
and found them to be adequately prepared, approved and controlled per procedure AD-QA-484, "Electrical and Mechanical Bypass Control."
CONCLUSIONS There appears to be a strong management emphasis on enhancement of engineering capability, communications, technical support to the plants and a general improvement of engineering effectiveness in design and plant support activities.
There is adequate administrative and technical control over design change/
modification activities.
~
Communication and interface of engineering with other functional groups appears effective.
The engineering functions have been reorganized recently (November 1991).
The change appears to be well thought out and capable of improving engineering and technical support effectiveness.
Strong management support and involvement was evident.
The engineering review committee (ERC) charter should provide global direction for engineering activitie ~
There has been a concerted effort to reduce engineering open items (including electrical and environmental qualification items), and good success has been achieved.
This effort is continuing and appears effective.
Prioritization of work appears reasonable.
There appears to be a marked improvement in the quality and timeliness in engineering support to plant operating issues and safety'assessment.
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Six modifications were reviewed that had been completed with very good technical work and package assembly.
The new organization may further improve the modification process.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.0 EXITINTERVIEW At the conclusion of this inspection on April 4, 1992, the inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Attachment 1 and summarized the scope and results of the inspection at the tim '
ATTA HMENT 1 PERS NS CONTACTED Penn lvania Power and Li ht C m an G. Stanley; Superintendent of Plant J. Raleigh, Project Manager J. O'ullivan, Supervisor - Site Mod'n Group D. McGann, Senior Project Engineer - Compliance R. Stotler, Manager - Nuclear Security S. Kuhn, Supervisor - Elec./I&C Systems R. Wehry, Compliance Engineer R. Peal, Compliance Engineer J. Fritzen, Supervisor - MIG M. Boothby, Manager - Modification Design G. Myers, Manager - Nuclear Regulatory Affairs M. Simpson, Manager - Nuclear Technology R, Saccone, Supervisor - BOP Systems M. Golden, Supervisor - Nuclear Systems Engineer (Prog T. Dalpiaz, Manager - Nuclear Plant Services G. Kucz nski Mana er - Nuclear S stems Engineering g
Nuclear Re ulato ommission
. 4, Test)
G. S. Barber, Senior Resident Inspector D. Mannai, Resident Inspector