IR 05000387/1987022
| ML17146B129 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 01/21/1988 |
| From: | Blough A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17146B128 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-87-22, 50-388-87-20, IEB-87-002, IEB-87-2, NUDOCS 8802040217 | |
| Download: ML17146B129 (19) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMNISSION
REGION I
Report Nos.
50-387/87-22 50-388/87-20 Docket Nos.
50-387 50-388 License Nos.
NPF-14 NPF-22 Licensee:
Penns lvania Power and Li ht Com an 2 North Ninth Street Allentown Penns lvani a 18101 Facility Name:
Sus uehanna Steam Electric Station Inspection At:
Salem Townshi Penns lvania Inspection Conducted:
November
1987 - Januar
1988 Inspectors:
J.
R. Stair, Resident Inspector F. J.
Crescenzo, Resident Inspector (Shoreham)
T.
B. Powell, Resident Inspector (Watts Bar)
C.
Z. Gordon, Emergency Preparedness Specialist Approved By:
A.
R. Blough, ie
, Reactor Projects Section No.
3B, DRP Ins ection Summar Date Areas Ins ected:
Routine resident inspection of plant operations, physical security, plant events, previous inspection findings, surveillance, mainten-ance, and open item followup.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8802040217 880126 PDR ADOCK 05000387
TABLE OF CONTENTS
~Pa e
1.0 Followup on Previous Inspection Findings
.
2.0 Routine Periodic Inspections
.
2. 1 Operational Safety Verification 2.2 Station Tours
~
~
~
~
3.0 Summary of Facility Activities
.
3. 1 Unit
Summary 3.2 Unit 2 Summary 3.3 Condenser Tube Leaks and Manway Gasket Failure 4 '
Licensee Reports
.
4. 1 In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reports 4.2 Onsite Followup of Licensee Event Reports 4.3 Review of Periodic and Special Reports
~
5.0 Surveillance and Maintenance Activities 5. 1 Monthly Surveillance Observations 5.2 Monthly Maintenance Observations 6.0 Susquehanna Unit 1 Restart Inspection.
7.0 Warehouse Storage.
8 '
NRC Compliance Bulletin No. 87-02.
9.0 Exit Meeting
.
15
17
. DETAILS 1.0 Followu'n Previous Ins ection Findin s
1.1 Closed Unresolved Item 387/86-10-01 388/86-10-01:
Ful 1 Descri tion of Meteorolo ical Pro ram is Needed Includin Details on Additional Information That Ma Be Re uested From the Local National Weather Service NWS The inspector reviewed Section 7. 11. 1, page 7.2 of revision 10 to the SSES Emergency Plan, dated December 1986 and determined that appro-priate changes have been made to include an adequate description of the Meteorological Monitoring Program.
1.2 Closed Unresolved Item 387/86-10-03 388/86-10-03
- Cablin Phone and Power Cords in the TSC are Subject to Mechanical Dama e
Ourin Movement of Personnel or E ui ment The inspector toured the TSC'and inspected power cables and equipment wiring and noted that elbow connectors were installed on th'e Unit Monitor Display Console and that instrument cables running the length of the TSC were coupled in PVC pipe.
Based on these findings, the inspector determined
- the licensee's corrective actions to, be acceptable.
1.3 Closed Unresolved Item 387/86-10-04 388/86-10-04
- Emer enc Procedures Should Address An Serious De radation of Emer enc Res onse Facilities The licensee conducted a
review and assessment of power supplies necessary to support response activities in the TSC and EOF.
As a
result of this review, the licensee made changes in the dose assess-ment system's (STREAM) adapter and power cord (twist-lock plug)
and provided an uninterruptable power supply to the Apple computer.
The inspector verified the licensee's corrective actions and 'found them to be acceptable.
1.4 Closed Unresolved Item 387/86-10-06 388/86-10-06
- Clarification is Needed of How PP&L En ineerin Personnel S ecif Com ression Limit Ran es for Plant Com uter Data The inspector met with licensee representatives responsible for main-taining and implementing data acquisition, processor and storage systems and determined that the criteria used to determine both sensor compression limits and historical compression limits for each system were adequately describe.5 Closed Unresolved Item 387/86-10-09 388/86-10-09
Diverse 0 erations Su ort Center OSC Assembl Areas Need to be Addressed in The'mer enc Plan and Procedures The inspector reviewed Section 8.1.2, page 8. 1 to revision 10 of the SSES Emergency Plan and EP-IP-007
"Personnel Assembly and Accounta-bility and Site Evacuation" dated December 1986, and toured assembly areas in the IKC shop, maintenance shop, electrical shop, and Health Physics Office as described in the procedures.
The inspector deter-mined that assembly areas had been properly designated and appro-priately referenced in the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Imple-menting Procedures.
Closed Unresol ved Item 387/86-10-10.
388/86-10-10:
Provide a
S ecific Proceduralized Plan for Performin Fre uent Radiolo ical Surve s of Assembl Areas to Ensure Habitabi lit 1.7 The licensee revised procedures EP-IP-007 and EP-IP-016 to address radiological concerns of assembly areas during emergencies.
Procedure EP-IP-007 was revised to identify the Radiation Protection Coordina-tor (RPC)
as the individual who is responsible for providing health physics support during accountability and evacuations.
Procedure EO-IP-016 "In-Plant Team Management" includes instructions given by the RPC to in-plant teams regarding ALARA considerations, survey instrumentation, and other equipment of necessary availability at the health physics control point to ensure radiation safety for the assigned task.
This arrangement would appear to preclude teams traveling between the OSC and TSC and still allow tasks to be per-formed efficiently.
Attachment H to EP-IP-007, Section H.l.2 directs the RPC to consider alternate assembly areas if radiation levels in primary areas exceed 5.0 mR/hr.
The inspector verified the licen-see's corrective actions and found them to be acceptable.
Closed Unresolved Item 387/86-10-11.
388/86-10-11:
Provide Dosimeters to All Personnel in the Assembl Areas and Routinel Have the Individuals Read Their. Dosimeters The inspector reviewed a recently instituted station policy change, Section 6.4. l.e to Procedure AD-00-705, "Access Control And-Radiation Work Permit System,"
Revision 9,. dated September 17, 1987 and deter-mined that all personnel are assigned dosimetry and are required to wear self-reading dosimeters (SRD)
in controlled zones.
Department supervisors are responsible for ensuring distribution of SRD's to personnel.
-Attachment E to Procedure EP-.IP-016,
"In-Plant (INDIA)
Team Management,"
provides a
log to evaluate and track personnel exposure of in-plant team members.
Based on the station policy revision, the inspector considers this item close.8 Closed Unresolved Item 387/86-10-12 388/86-10-12: Protective Su lies Clothin
Res irator Protection Should be Stored in the Assembl Areas to Assure OSC Staff Ade uatel Protected The inspector toured the TSC and 18C Shop and determined that dedi-cated protective clothing and respiratory protection equipment were available in storage cabinets, however, licensee personnel stated that the philosophy to dispatch in-plant teams is to send teams directly from assembly areas rather than from the TSC or IKC Shop staging areas.
The inspector verified that the control room and health physics control point will have equipment and supplies available for emergency use and considers this acceptable.
1.9 Closed Unresolved Item 387/86-10-13 388/86-10-13:
Emer enc Plan Should Be Chan ed to Correctl Reflect the Location of E ui ment and Su lies Available for Use Durin an Emer enc
'he inspector reviewed page 8. 1. 1 of the Emergency Plan and noted that the December 1986 rev'ision identifies the Control Room and health physics control point as the locations where equipment and supplies will be available for emergency use.
The inspector deter-mined that this revision is acceptable and considers this item closed.
Closed Unresolved Item 387/86-10-14. 388/86-10-14:
Licensee Needs to Formalize Staffin Standards for The 0 eration Su ort Center The inspector reviewed Table 6. 1 to the Emergency Plan and determined that offgoing shift personnel are identified as the first group of, personnel that would remain if needed for repair and corrective actions during emergencies.
Table 6.2 describes personnel available to satisfy the 30 - 60 minute augmentation criteria. If additional personnel would be needed, an additional number of electricians, mechanics, and I&C technicians would be retained during normal working hours.
The inspector considers the inclusion of Tables 6. 1 and 6.2 an acceptable method of formalizing the licensee's staffing standards and considers this item closed.
1.11 Closed Unresolved Item 387/86-10-15 388/86-10-15:
Corr ect Tem orar Electrical and Phone Wirin and Cablin in the EOF The inspector toured the Radiological and Environmental Monitoring Room (REM),
the Recovery Manager's (RM) Office, and other areas of the EOF and determined that new cabling was installed in the REM room providing a
neater appearance to cord runs.
Extension cords were eliminated during the installation of new circuitry in the EOF dis-play area, and power cords were rearranged in the RM Office so that cords are no longer exposed.
The inspector is satisfied that the licensee's corrective actions are adequate and considers this item close.12 Closed Unresolved Item 387/87-08-01 388/87-08-01:
Res onse Time for Au mentation b
Cor orate Staff Was Not Ade uatel Demonstrated For Exercise Held Durin Off-Hours 3:30
.m. - 11:00
.m.
On September 3,
1987, the licensee conducted an unannounced drill to test notification, emergency response facility activation, and response by key members of the emergency response organization.
Re-view of the licensee's documentation and critique results indicate that facility activation was adequate and that corporate staffing of the EOF was timely.
Based upon this review, the inspector considers this item closed.
1.13 0 en Unresolved Item 387/87-08-08 388/87-08-08
Followin Declaration of an Emer enc Condition Official Notifications Were Made B
The Licensee Via Tele hone to the State.
During the emergency exercise there appeared to be certain inconsis-tencies with regard to roles of each respective response organiza-tions'embers.
The licensee has taken steps to enhance the rela-tionship with the State by meeting with Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection officials on September 15, 1987 to discuss specific response actions, responsibilities, and interfaces expected during emergencies.
The inspector indicated that adequacy of correc-tive action in this area will be carefully evaluated during the next full-participation exercise.
1.14 Closed Ins ector Followu Item 388/86-19-04
- Metal Shavin s in the RHR S stem During Inspection 388/86-19, the licensee identified metal shavings in the RHR system.
The cause was determined to be from drilling holes in piping to add modifications.
To correct this problem the licensee has issued procedure IE-OOO-M03, Rev.
0, "Drill Through and/or Cut of Pipe Wall for the Addition'of Branch Connections".
The inspector reviewed this procedure and did not identify any deficiencies.
1.15 0 en Ins ector Followu Item 387/85-12-03
- Reins ection of 125VDC Panels Bent Lu s During Inspection 387/85-12, broken terminal lugs in 125VDC panels had caused an automatic start of the 'C'iesel Generator.
Noncon-formance Report (NCR) 85-0025 was issued and dispositioned to perform inspections of terminal lugs in panels 1D614, 1D624, 1D634, 1D644, 2D614, 2D634, and 2D644.
The inspector reviewed the Work Authoriza-tions (WAs) documenting the inspections and necessary repairs.
It appears an adequate inspection and repair program has been accom-plished.
A review of procedures indicates that no inspection at the conclusion of work for possible damage to equipment in the area of work is performed.
This item remains open until the licensee includes actions to prevent recurrence, such as inspection of areas surrounding the work for damag.0 Routine Periodic Ins ections 2.1 0 erational Safet Verification The inspector toured the control room daily to verify proper manning, access control, adherence to approved procedures, and compliance with LCOs.
The inspector reviewed shift supervisor, plant control operator and nuclear plant operator logs covering the inspection period.
Sampling reviews were made of tagging requests, night orders, the by-pass log, Significant Operating Occurrence Reports (SOORS),
and gA nonconformance reports.
The inspector observed several shift turn-overs during the period and routinely attended work planning meetings'n addition, the inspector conducted midnight shift inspections on December 31, 1987 and weekend/holiday coverage on December 20, 1987.
Instrumentation and recorder traces were observed and the status of
'ontrol room annunciators was reviewed.
Nuclear Instrument panels and other reactor protection'ystems were examined.
Effluent monitors were reviewed for indications of releases.
Panel indications for onsite/offsite emergency power sources were examined for automatic operability.
During entry to and egress from the protected area, the inspector observed access control, security boundary integrity, search activities, escorting and badging, and availability of radiation monitoring equipment.
2.2 Station Tours The inspector toured accessible areas of the plant including the con-trol room, relay rooms, switchgear rooms, cable spreading rooms, penetration areas, reactor and turbine buildings, diesel generator buildings, ESSW pumphouse, the security control center, and the plant perimeter.
During these tours, observations were made relative to equipment condition, fire hazards, fire protection, adherence to pro-cedures, radiological controls and conditions, housekeeping, secur-ity, tagging of equipment, ongoing maintenance and surveillance and availability of redundant equipment.
On December 23, the inspector observed one individual violate secur-ity procedures at the South Gate House exit turnstile.
The badge reader had taken his badge, but had not unlocked the turnstile.
Instead of reporting this discrepancy to security, the individual doubled up in the turnstile (tailgating) with the next person exiting the plant.
The inspector reported this infraction to plant security, who issued Security Incident Report 87-12-42.
The inspector dis-cussed with the licensee his concern that the attitude of the
individuals involved in this incident not be allowed to continue or to possibly carry over to other security barriers/doors.
The super-visor of plant security acknowledged the inspector's concerns and stated that appropriate corrective measures would be instituted.
This appeases to be an isolated occurrence and of minimal technical significance since it involved only the plant exit, however, this area will be monitored by the resident inspector to ensure that it is, in fact, an isolated case.
3.0 Summar of Facilit Activities 3.1 Unit
Summar The unit ended it's third refueling outage when condition
was entered on November 20.
Power ascension and testing proceeded smoothly with the unit reaching 100% power on December 3. Full power operation continued until December
when a
reduction to 60%
power was taken in order to plug condenser tubes in both the 'A'nd
'B'aterboxes.
The unit returned to 100%
power until December
when it was shutdown following a sharp increase in reactor vessel conduc-tivity.
All four condenser waterboxes were then inspected and approximately
condenser tubes were plugged.
During power ascen-sion on December. 23, the unit was manually scrammed following a
waterbox manway gasket failure which flooded the condenser bay area (see Detail 3.3).
Power ascension recommenced following repairs and processing of the spilled water.
Specific events which occurred during the period are discussed in the following paragraphs.
At 3:ll p
.m.
on November 18, during performance of the EOC/RPT Logic Test, a technician mistakenly lifted the internal wiring leads in-stead of the field wiring leads to 1C663A/TBA32-7.
This caused the turbine stop valves to open when the main turbine was reset which defeated the main condenser low vacuum bypass and actuated a
Hain Steam Isolation Signal.
Since Unit 1 was in Cold'hutdown with the MSIVs closed, no valve movement occurred.
The improper lifted lead was reconnected, the proper lead removed,
'and the logic test reper-formed.
At 11:05 a.m.
on November 22, the
'A'mergency Diesel Generator automatically started with no initiation signal present.
The diesel generator reached normal speed and voltage with no apparent malfunc-tion.
The diesel generator to ESS Bus supply breaker did not close and normal power to the ESS Buses was unaffected.
The licensee took local control of the diesel and shut it down, then declared the diesel inoperable.
Investigation by Instrument and Control Tech-nicians determined that a
LOCA Start Logic Relay had failed and caused the automatic start.
The relay was replaced and the diesel returned to service.
(See Detail 4.2. 1).
At 7:00 p.m.
on November 29, during performance of the quarterly Calibration of the Main Steam Tunnel Temperature Channels, the Instrument and Control Technicians accidentally connected the thermo-couple calibrator to the HPCI Emergency Area Cooler module resulting in a., closure of the HPCI steam supply inboard isolation valve ( 1F002).
The thermocouple calibrator was removed, the isolation signal to HPCI reset and 1F002 reopened.
Duration of the event was approximately one minute.
Based on his review of these events, the inspector concluded that the licensee responded to the above events by implementing appropriate immediate corrective action and restoring safety systems in a timely manner.
Safety systems functioned as designed for the initiating signal(s)
and reporting requirements of
CFR 50.72 were met.
Licensee Event Reports (LERs), detailing the licensee's evaluation of root causes and long-term corrective actions are required for these events.
These reports are routinely reviewed by the inspector.
3.2 Unit 2 Summar K
Unit 2 operated at or near full power for most of the inspection period.
Scheduled power reductions were conducted throughout the per-iod for control rod pattern adjustments, surveillance testing and scheduled maintenance.
Specific events which occurred during the period are discussed in the following paragraph.
At ll:20 a.m.
on December 3, while several maintenance personnel. were cleaning and inspecting Motor Control Center Terminals in MCC 28112, Breaker 104, a trip of the 'C'eactor Feedwater Pump occurred.
The plant responded as designed and an automatic runback to 45 percent recirculation pump speed based on an individual feedwater flow of <
20 percent and vessel level of < 30inches, occurred with a corres-ponding reduction in power level to 68 percent.
Investigation by the licensee determined that the feedwater pump trip occurred as a result of closure of the Feedwater Pump Turbine Exhaust Valve (HV-22731C).
HV-22731C apparently closed when the auxiliary contactor mechanism, which is located in the Motor Control Center Breaker, was bumped by one of the maintenance personnel.
This would makeup the seal-in circuit in the valve closure logic until HV-22731C stopped closing due to reaching the required torque switch setting.
The logic cir-cuit to the reactor feedwater pump trips the pump when its respective turbine exhaust valve starts to close.
Cleaning of the MCCs was immediately stopped and the workers instructed on the event.
Power ascension commenced at 3:30 p.m.
and 100 percent full power achieved at 1:00 on December 4.
All preventative maintenance on MCCs is presently on hold while the licensee reviews the PM process.
The inspector discussed the event with operations personnel, STA, and reviewed GETARs traces of the event to assure that systems functioned appropriately and that no safety limits were exceede.3 Condenser Tube Leaks and Manwa Gasket Failure On December 11, the licensee isolated the 'B'irculating Water System water box on the main condenser.
to plug condenser tubes.
On December. 18, following an increase in reactor vessel and condensate demineralizer influent conductivity power was decreased to 60 percent to check for condenser tube leaks.
Due to trouble with closing the outlet valve 'to the 'C'ater box the licensee decided to shutdown the unit.
With the unit taken off line, the licensee was able to inspect all four waterboxes at once and to in'spect and repair the
'C'utlet valve.
A total of 80 tubes were found to have indications that required plugging.
There were 60 tubes in the 'C'ater box in a centralized area surrounding one completely severed tube -and two other tubes which contained pinhole leaks and
tubes with minor indications in the other three waterboxes.
The licensee believes that increased vibration in the condenser with a water box isolated and operation during cold weather was the cause of condenser tube leaks.
The licensee plans to implement an interim operating procedure (OP),
pending further evaluation of the cause of the "leaks. This interim OP reduces reactor power and takes one circulation water pump off-line when a water box has to be isolated in order to reduce vibration through the condenser tubes.
At 2:40 p.m.
on December 23, with the reactor at ll percent power, during power ascension following condenser tube plugging, a
manway gasket on the 'C'ater box failed, flooding the condensate bay area, with approximately 220,000 gallons of circulating water system water.
The licensee was unable to close the water box outlet valve com-pletely, preventing isolation of the leak.
The licensee therefore shutdown the reactor by placing the reactor mode switch in Shutdown at 3:52 p.m.
Additionally, all but one circulating water:
pump was tripped and flow reduced to minimum in an effort to limit leakage.
The Technical Support Center (TSC)
was manned as a
precautionary measure in order to draw upon the licensee's appropriate technical resources and as a central point in. which to direct and coordinate the activities necessary to isolate the leak and prepare for pro-cessing of the spilled water through the radioactive waste treatment system.
The licensee made the required 4-hour ENS call to NRC He'adquarters at 5:30 p.m.,
based on manual actuation of the RPS.
With approximately
inches of water in the condenser bay area on the 656-foot foot elevation of the turbine building, measures were taken to limit leakage past the bay area doors and to transfer approximately 40,000 gallons of water to the Condensate Storage Tank berm to await processing.
Following manual isolation of the water box, the manway gasket was replaced and all four outlet valves inspected.
Maintenance was performed on the 'C'utlet valve to assure that it was capable of fully closing electrically.
Processing of all the spilled water was completed by December
and the unit placed in startup at 10:46 a.m.
on December 2 The inspector witnessed shutdown of the reactor and the operators'ttempts to isolate the 'C'ater box.
In addition, the inspector observed manning of the TSC and direction by licensee management to terminate the event and make preparations for processing the spilled water.
The operators handling the event exhibited 'good overall know-ledge of the unit's systems and procedures, in that the problem and necessary mitigating actions were quickly identified and implemented in exemplary fashion.
The inspector discussed potential radiological problems and equipment impacts with the licensee and determined that the licensee had taken action to address these conditions.
The inspector found the licensee's actions appropriate for the situation involved.
The event itself, however, appears to have been caused by improper installation of the gasket following work on balance of plant equipment (i.e.,
condenser tubes).
The licensee is considering a
new type of gasket that will be easier to install in the particular applications 4.0 Licensee Re orts 4. 1 In-Office Review of Licensee Event Re orts The inspector reviewed LERs submitted to the NRC:RI office to verify that details of the event were clearly reported, including the accur-acy of description of the cause and adequacy of corrective action.
The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were involved, and whether the event warranted onsite followup.
The following LERs were reviewed:
Unit
- 87-030 Damaged Wire Results in Blown Fuse and Inadvertent Engi-neered Safeguard Feature Actuation
"'87-031 Unancitipated ESF Actuation Due to Installation of Jumper in Wrong Panel
"87-032 Emergency Diesel Generator
'A'nplanned Automatic Start 87-033 Entry Into LCO 3.0.3 -
CREOASS Boundary Door Repair
" Further discussed in Detail 4.2.
- Previously discussed in Inspection Report 50-387/87-18; 50-388/87-17
87-035 Procedural Inadequacy Results in an Inadvertent Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Actuation
"*87-036 Assignment of SRO With Inactive License Status Results in Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications Unit 2
"*87-012 Auxiliary Boiler Arc-Over Causes Primary Containment Isola-tion Valve Closure The inspector found the above reports acceptable.
- Previously discussed in Inspection Report 50-387/87-18; 50-388/87-17 4.2 Onsite Followu of L'icensee Event Re orts For those LERs selected for onsite followup (denoted. by asterisks in Detail 4. 1),
the inspector verified that the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 had been met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken, that the event was adequately reviewed by the licensee, and that
,continued operations of the facility was conducted in accordance with Technical Specification limits.
The following find-ings relate to the LERs reviewed on site:
4.2. 1 LER 87-032 Emer enc Diesel Generator 'A'n lanned Automatic Start At 11:05 a.m.
on November 22, 1987, an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation occurred when the 'A'iesel Generator automatically started.
Both units were in Condi-tion 1 with Unit 1 at 90 percent power during power ascen-sion following its third refueling outage and Unit 2 at 100 percent power'.
No testing of the diesel generators or the start logic was being performed at the time and the cause of start was determined by the licensee to be the failure of a coil in a relay (relay 4LOCAl) of the engine elec-tricall control circuit.
The coil was
"burned out" and
"open".
The licensee manually shut down the diesel gener-ator after assuring that no actual Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP) signal was present.
The relay was subsequently replaced, and tested and the diesel generator returned to standby statu A review of unplanned diesel generator automatic starts identified one previous occurrence in August 1986 in which a similar relay (4LOCA2) in the 'A'iesel generator elec-trical control circuit "burned out".
The licensee believes this not to be an excessive failure rate and therefore does not intend to replace these relays with another type.
This is the first LER the licensee has submitted on unplanned emergency diesel generator starts.
Previously none were submitted because the SSES FSAR does not list the standby power as an ESF System, but as an ESF Auxiliary Support System.
The decision was made to commence submitting LERs on emergency diesel generator unplanned starts following discussions with the resident inspector.
The inspector determined that the licensee's corrective action's and review of the event were adequate and that technical specification limits were met.
4.3 Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee were reviewed by the inspector.
The reports were reviewed to deter-mine that they included the required information; that test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; that planned corrective action was adequate for resolution of identified problems; and whether any information in the report should be classified as an abnormal occurrence.
The following report was reviewed:
Monthly Operating Report
-
November, 1987, dated December 15, 1987.
The above report was found acceptable.
5.0 Surveillance and Maintenance Activities 5. 1 Surveillance Observations The inspector observed the performance of surveillance tests to determine that:
the surveillance test procedure conformed to Tech-nical Specification requirements; administrative approvals and tag-outs were obtained before initiating the test; testing was accom-plished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved sur-veillance procedure; test instrumentation was calibrated; limiting
conditions for operations were met; test data was accurate and com-plete; removal and restoration of the affected components was properly accomplished; test results met Technical Specification and procedural requirements; deficiencies noted were reviewed and appro-priately resolved; and the surveillance was completed at the required frequency.
These observations included:
S0-156-007, Control Rod Coupling Check, performed on November 23, 1987.
SI-156-203, Channel Functional Test of Scram Discharge Volume High Mater Level Channels LSH-C12-N013E and G,
performed on December 18, 1987.
SI-158-202, monthly Functional Test of Scram Discharge Volume High Water Level Channel LSH-C12-N013A, B,
C, and D, performed on December 18, 1987.
S0-252-002, Quarterly HPCI Flow Verification, performed on December 22, 1987.
SI-261-105, Honthly Functional Test of Reactor Mater Cleanup System, performed on December 31, 1987.
SI-262-206, Functional Test of Reactor Mater Cleanup System Area Differential Pressure Test, performed on December 31, 1987.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
5.2 Maintenance Observation The inspector observed portions of selected maintenance activities to determine that the work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, Technical Specifications, and industry codes or standards.
The following items were considered during this review:
Limiting Conditions for Operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and gC hold points were estab-lished where required; functional testing was performed prior to declaring the particular component operable; activities were accom-plished by qualified personnel; radiological controls were imple-mented; fire protection controls were implemented; and the equipment was verified to be properly returned to servic These observations included:
WA 578477, Replacement of Data Storage Card to Rod Position Indicating System, performed on November 23, 1987.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
6.0 Sus uehanna Unit 1 Restart Ins ectio'n The Susquehanna Steam Electric Station resident inspector, with the assis-tance of the resident inspector from the Shoreham Nuclear Station, con-ducted a restart inspection at the end of the Unit 1 Third Refueling Out-age in an effort to determine the readiness of the, unit for its return to operation.
Areas inspected included modifications and.accompanying pro-cedure changes, operator training on modifications, valve and breaker lineups, radiological controls, housekeeping, licensee management evaluation of restart readiness and observing portions of the'tartup.
6. 1 Modifications Four modification packages were reviewed by the inspectors for com-pleteness, timeliness, procedural and drawing revisions, and testing.
The following specific packages were reviewed:
PMR 85-3142 (Installation of FW LLRT Valves)
PMR 86-3010C and PMR 86-3010D (Appendix R
Changes to HVAC Controls)
PMR 85-3097B (Standby Liquid Control. Logic Change).
All were found to be adequately implemented with exception of a
required procedure change for PMR 86-3010C.
This modification was performed to comply with
CFR
Appendix B
Requirements and installed an automatic control circuit, redundant to circuitry in the control room, for HVAC equipment in the EDG enclosures.
In the event of a control room fire which disables the existing HVAC control cir-cuits, the new redundant circuits will continue to function auto-matically thereby allowing continued use of the equipment.
Previous to this installation, during a postulated control room fire and sub-sequent evacuation, the operator was instructed by procedures EO-100-009 and EO-200-009-to disconnect and jumper the HVAC control curcuits from outside the control room to allow local operation.
Since installation of the modification, jumpering of the control circuits is no longer necessary and those procedures should have been changed or deleted.
Contrary to this, the fans were declared oper-able on November 6, 1967 without the procedure changes noted above
being implemented.
Furthermore, the inspector could find no refer-ence to the modification package which would have told a
reviewer that these procedures needed to be changed.
Other applicable 'pro-cedures had been adequately referenced in the package and were changed.
The engineer responsible for the Operations Department review of the modification package to ensure procedural compliance was questioned on this issue.
He was aware of the required proced-ural change, however, he had intended not to make the change until completion of other modifications similar to the one in question.
These other modifications also required changes to the above men-tioned procedures.
He had justified this action by considering the fact that Unit 1 was shutdown and it would have been easier to make one procedural change rather than several.
Licensee management agreed with the inspector that this approach was inappropriate and reinstructed the responsible engineer.
On November 12, 1987 the last modification of this type was completed and the procedures were appropriately changed.
The inspector found the licensee's control of the modification process in this instance to be not in strict com-pliance with station procedure AD-QA-410 (Control of Station Modifi-cations)
which requires all applicable procedures to be changed or noted prior to declaring a
system operable.
All other procodure changes required by the modifications which were reviewed had been completed or were noted in the packages as being in need of change.
The inspector found this issue to be an isolated instance and limited to one individual's misunderstanding of station procedures addressing procedure changes.
6.2
~Trainin The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for modifications training of licensed operators.
The training material developed by the training department was found to be of excellent quality.
De-scriptions of the modifications were clear, complete, and well organ-
'ized.
All of the licensed operators had completed the training except four individuals.
For these individuals, the training depart-ment had set deadlines for completion of the training consistent with Unit 1 startup.
6.3 Startu Pre aration The inspectors found the licensee's preparations for startup to be adequate.
This was evidenced during the startup PORC meeting which took place on November 13, 1987.
During this meeting, senior manage-ment was presented with pertinent, updated information on the resolu-tion of problems or issues noted during the outage.
All major issues appeared to have been adequately resolved or on schedule for resolu-tion prior to the startup.
The inspector again toured the facility.
Housekeeping and material conditions were found to be excellent with exception of several jobs which were still in progress within the Reactor Building.
Documentation of the Class 1 system pressure test was reviewed by the inspector.
No discrepancies were note The inspector verified that the licensee had completed mechanical and electrical system lineups for all ECCS systems, RCIC, ESW, CRDS, RMCS, RSCS, and RPS.
The inspector reviewed all corresponding com-pleted checklists and walked down portions of core spray, HPCI, and RCIC to assure that these systems were lined up appropriately for normal standby operation.
6.4 Conclusion The inspectors determined that modifications, training, valve and breaker lineups, and procedure changes were adequately accomplished; radiological controls and housekeeping were effectively implemented and in a state as to support unit startup; and that licensee manage-ment evaluation of restart readiness was comprehensive and accurate.
The inspectors, therefore, concluded that the unit was operationally ready for 'restart.
7.0 Warehouse Stora e
The inspector toured the plant warehouse.
The warehouse was being kept in excellent condition.
It was very clean and the equipment'as well organized on pallets.
It was apparent the stored equipment was being maintained in excellent condition.
The inspector noted that a
spare Reactor Recirculation motor (not safety related)
was being stored in the warehouse.
It was determined the only storage maintenance being done was to ensure that the motor's space heaters were energized.
A review of procedure MC-OI-020, Rev.
1, "In-Storage Maintenance Activities", indicated variable speed AC Motors were to have the following maintenance accomplished:
a.
Inspect commutator/slip ring condition and motor shaft rotation every 2 months.
b.
Inspect and rotate in accordance with existing guidelines in the Electrical Maintenance Preventive Maintenance System (PMS).
Insula-tion resistance and oil condition will be checked as part of this routine.
The warehouse had requested the motor to be entered into the PMS program, but PMS had not yet been scheduled for this motor.
A review of the vendor's manual, GEK-33656,
"Recirculation Water Pump Motors",
specified the following storage maintenance which the licensee was not performing:
a.
quarterly room temperature, motor winding temperature, and insulation resistance were not being recorded.
b.
quarterly inspection of the motor for the following were not being performed:
physical damage cleanliness oil leaks and oil level signs of condensation condition of paint, discoloration integrity of coatings integrity of closures c.
annual recoating of motor bearing journals, runners, and other machined parts with rust inhibiting oil was not being performed.
The review of this motor's storage maintenance indicated that, in at least this case, the licensee's storage maintenance program did not take in account the vendor's specified storage maintenance.
The failure to in-clude these vendor's specified maintenance may indicate a weakness in the licensee's storage maintenance program.
The licensee should review its program in this area to ensure. safety-related equipment received in the future receives appropriate storage maintenance.
The inspector discussed this problem with the warehouse supervisor who acknowledged the concern and indicated that he intended to have procedures changed to incorporate vendor's specified storage maintenance.
This item is unresolved pending review of changes to the program (387/87-22-01).
8.0 NRC Com liance Bulletin 87-02: Fastener Testin to'Determine Conformance With A licable Material S ecifications The inspector reviewed the licensee's followup action regarding the NRC Compliance Bulletin 87-02.
Bulletin 87-02 requests that licensees:
1) review their receipt inspec-tion requirements and internal controls for fasteners and 2) independently determine, through testing, whether fasteners (studs, bolts, cap screws, and nuts)
in stores at their facilities meet required mechanical and chemical specification requirements.
On December 17, 1987, the resident inspector accompanied the licensee through the sampling of fasteners required by Bulletin 87-02.
Based on the inspector's observations, the licensee chose an appropriate represen-tative sample based on use of fasteners in the plant.
Ten bolts and ten nuts each of safety related and non-safety related classification were chosen with the resident inspector observing.
Safety related material specifications included in the samples are:
SA193 Gr.B7, SA194 Gr.2H, A307 Gr.A galvanized to A153, A193 Gr.B8, A194 Gr.8, SA194 Gr.7, A354 Gr.BD zinc coaed to B633, A563 Gr.A galvanized to A153, A449 Type 1, A563 Gr.B,
A325 Type 1,
and A194 Gr.2H.
Non-safety related material specifications included are:
SAE J429 Grade 1,
J995 Grade 2,
and J429 Grade 5.
The inspector concurred with the licensee's sampling method for the samples chosen for testing.
The licensee tagged each sample for shipment and, in addition, tagged and removed a
second sample of each to cover the possi-bility of lost or misplaced samples during shipment to end testing at the test laboratory.
Based on this review, the inspector determined that the followup action on this bulletin had been properly disseminated to the appropriate personnel.
Since the licensee's reply is presently in draft format, the inspector will review the final report in a subsequent inspec-tion report to ensure that it contains all pertinent information requested by Bulletin 87-02.
9.D ~Ei<<i On January 8,
1988, the inspector discussed the findings of this inspec-tion with station management.
Based on NRC Region I review of this report and discussions held with licensee representatives, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to
CFR 2.790 restrictions.