IR 05000387/1987008
| ML17146A828 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 05/29/1987 |
| From: | Craig Gordon, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17146A827 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-87-08, 50-387-87-8, 50-388-87-08, 50-388-87-8, NUDOCS 8706100337 | |
| Download: ML17146A828 (8) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-387/87-08 50-388/87"08 Docket No.
50-387 50-388 License No.
NPF-14 NPF-22 Pr i ority Category C
Licensee:
Penns lvania Power and Li ht Com an 2 North Ninth Street Allentown Penns 1 vania 18101 Facility Name:
Sus uehanna Steam Electric Station Inspection At:
Berwick Penns lvania Inspection Conducted:
A ril 29-30 1987 Inspectors:
Craig
. Gordon, Regional Team Leader iS l9xa date NRC Team Members:
C. Amato, Emergency Preparedness Section, RI E. Podolak, DEPER, AEOD J. Stair, Resident Inspector G. Stoetzel, Battelle, PNL T
Tuccinardi, Emergency Preparedness Section, RI Approved by:
PJ'7 W.
Laz u, Chief, at Emergenc reparednessSection I
Ins ection Summar
Ins ection on A ri 1 29-30 1987 Re ort No. 50-387/87-08
~/
observation =of the licensee's full-participation annual emergency preparedness exercise conducted on April 29-30, 1987.
The inspection was performed by a team of six NRC Region I, NRC Headquarters, and NRC contractor personnel.
Results:
No violations were identified.
The licensee's response actions for this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
870b100337 870b04 PDR ADOCK 05000387
DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted The following licensee arid state representatives attended the exit meeting held on April 30, 1987:
Boughman, G. W., Nuclear Operations Support Coordinator Byram, R. G., Superintendent of Plant Cantone, S. H., Manager Nuclear Support Cardinkle, D. J.,
Supv.
Eng.,
NPE IKC Castellana, D., Asst. to Personnel
& Admin. Supversior Craven, A. W., Public Information Director Gandenberger, D. J.,
Senior Results Engineer Hagan, D. L.,
Rad Group Supervisor Jensen, R. T., Senior Project Engineer Keiser, H. W., Vice President, Nuclear Operation Lex, J. H., Nuclear Generating Supervisor Maingi, S.P.,
Nuclear Engineer, Pennsylvania BRP Malek, F. G., Security Training Supervisor Minneman, J.
M., Senior Project Engineer O'eil, L. D., Supervising Engineer Peal, R. M., Senior Engineer, Operations Prego, R. J.,
gA Supervisor-Operations Rochester, M., Health Physicist Roszkowski, C. J.,
Senior Nuclear Emergency Planner Schwarz, R. A., Senior Project Engineer Shank, K. E., Environmental and Chemistry Group Supervisor Stotler, R.L., Supervisor of Security Taylor, P. E.,
Lead Shift Technical Advisor Wehry, R. G., Nuclear Safety Assessment Group Widner, T. E., Health Physicist Wike, C. A., Nuclear Emergency Planning Supervisor Woodeshick, H. D., Special Assistant to the President 2.0 Emer enc Exercise The Susquehanna full-participation exercise was conducted on April 29-30, 1987, from 3:30 p.m. until 11: 15 p.m.
a.
Pre-Exercise Activities The exercise objectives, submitted to NRC Region I on February 2,
1987, were reviewed and, following revision dated March 12, 1987, determined to adequately test the licensee's Emergency Plan.
On March 6, 1987, the licensee submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evaluation.
Region I representatives had
telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario.
As a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario and supporting data provided by the licensee.
At that time it appeared the revised scenario would provide for the adequate testing of major portions of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP)
and also provide the opportunity for licensee personnel to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in need-of corrective action.
NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on April 29, 1987, and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the scenario.
Suggested NRC changes to the scenario were made by the licensee in the areas of technical support, offsite release data, and the medical drill.
In addition, missing informa-tion was provided.
These changes were also discussed during the briefing.
The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and indicated in the scenario that lead referees would intercede in the exercise activities to prevent scenario deviations or disruption of normal plant operations.
The exercise scenario included the following events:
medical response and transportation to hospital of contaminated/
injured individuals Extraction Steam Line Break Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)
Above core plate instrument line break Offsite release of radioactivity to the environment Declaration of unusual event, alert, site area emergency, and general emergency classifications The above events caused the activation of the licensee's onsite emergency response facilities.
Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities.
The following activities were observed:
2.
3.
4.
Detection, classification, and assessment of the scenario events; Direction and coordination of the emergency response; Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies; Communications/information flow, and record keeping;
5.
Assessment and Projection of radiological dose and consideration of protective actions; 6.
Provisions for in-plant radiation protection; 7.
Performance of offsite and in-plant radiological surveys; 8.
Maintenance of site security and access control; 9.
Performance of technical support; 10.
Performance of repair and corrective actions; ll.
Performance of first aid and rescue; 12.
Assembly and accountability of personnel; and 13.
Provisions for communicating information to the public.
3.0 Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activations of the emergency response facilities, and use of the facilities were gener'ally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures.
The team also noted the following actions of the licensee's emergency response organization that were indicative of their ability to cope with abnormal plan conditions:
Good preplanning was demonstrated by TSC staff in considering a
mockup on Unit 2 to minimize radiation exposure and ensure timely implementation of the emergency procedure to repair the Unit
feedwater tank.
Emergency response personnel were knowledgeable in their assignments and demonstrated adequate use of the emergency procedures, and, in general, demonstrated they were competent in performing assigned functions.
Dose calculations were performed continuously and based upon plant conditions while updates on radiological conditions were discussed with State representatives at regular intervals.
Communications between the site and offsite field teams were clear and detailed; when equipment or instruments became inoperable, teams were able to obtain reliable backup equipment.
Personnel involved in drawing, transporting, and analyzing the PASS sample demonstrated effective teamwork and good familiarity with sampling and processing procedures, Classification of each emergency condition was based upon appropriate emergency action levels, were promptly made, and exhibited conservatis The NRC identified the following areas which could have degraded the licensee's response to an actual event and need to be evaluated by the licensee for corrective action.
These are classified as inspector follow-up items (other comments and recommendations were also made to the licensee during the exit meeting).
The licensee conducted an adequate
" self-critique of the exercise which also identified some of these areas:
Despite the exercise being held during off-hour s '(3:30 p.m.-
ll:00 p.m.) response time for augmentation by corporate staff was not adequately demonstrated.
Personnel were prepositioned onsite instead of traveling from the corporate office after notification.
(50-387/87-08"01; 50-388/87-08-01).
Staging the Control Room portion of the exercise outside the Control Room detracted from realism and hindered initial response actions of the shift staff with regard to recognition of degrading plant functions, communications, and notifications (50-387/87-08-02; 50-388/87-08-02).
Although site personnel were required to report to their designated
'assembly areas, accountability and identification of missing individuals within the protected area was simulated (50-387/87-08-03; 50-388/87-08-03).
During ENS communication, the notification form of procedure IP-2, Attachment 1 does not provide all information which the NRC head-quarters duty officer requi res regarding plant system status (50-387/87-08-04; 50-387/87-08"04).
During Alert classification, the Emergency Director in the TSC appeared overburdened with directing and coordinating the response in addition to maintaining onsite responsibility to mitigate the accident.
At this time the EOF was adequately staffed and functional so that offsite response could be carried out, but official EOF activation could not occur since a recovery manager (corporate individual) was not present.
(50-387/87-08-05; 50-388/87-08-05).
The licensee stated that earlier turnover from the TSC to the EOF would be considered.,
Regular EOF briefings were not conducted between the Recovery Manager, key EOF staff, and State representatives to discuss protective action recommendations (PAR), plant status, and prognosis of the emergency.
As a result, a consensus on the PAR was not reached between the licensee and Pennsylvania (50-387/87-08-06; 50-388/87-08-06).
After the licensee. learned that the State had made and implemented an independent PAR, overall direction and control of the EOF and the emergency were significantly.reduced while key EOF staff focused on discussing the State's actions (50-387/87-08-07; 50-388/87-08-07).
Following declaration of an emergency condition, official notifica-tions were made, by the licensee via telephone to the State, however, the State representative assumed that notifications would be received directly in the EOF.
The licensee should compare the site Emergency Plan and Pennsylvania Emergency Plan and ensure that both Plans are consistent and that State representatives understand the procedure for official notification of emergencies.
(50-387/87-08-08; 50-388/
87-08-08)
The licensee's protective action recommendations (PAR) are not of sufficient detail to be useful to the state in the event that evacuation of the entire EPZ (as required by the state plan) is undesirable.
For example "Evacuation" was made as, a PAR following the General Emergency.
PARs should be based on EPA Protective Action Guidelines rather than how the state may respond.
The state may always choose to go beyond the licensee's PAR, but at least should be provided an accurate estimate of the actual risk areas prior to taking action.
(50-387/87-08-09; 50-388/87-08-09)
4.0 Licensee Actions on Previousl Identified Items The following items were identified during previous emergency exercises.
Based upon discussions with licensee representatives, examination of procedures and records, and observations made by the NRC team during the exercise, these items were not repeated and are closed:
(Closed)
50-388/86-07-01.
Although the ambulance response to the medical emergency was timely and efficient, the on-the-scene medical treatment of the contaminated injuries was lacking.
The first aid team waited approximately five minutes before attending to the victims.
In addition, it took about 40 minutes for the initial report that the injured persons were contaminated to reach the control room.
This notification appeared to be unnecessarily delayed until a full survey had been completed by health physics.
(Closed) 50-388/86-07-03.
NRC observers in,the control room and TSC felt that the players did not consider the potential of a General Emergency condition when the Site Area Emergency was declared.
(Closed)
50-388/86-07-04.
Although PASS sampling was quite good, the person who was being used to transport the samples from the PASS area to the chemistry lab was not accompanied by a health physics technician nor did he have a survey meter with him.
(Closed)
50-388/86-07-05.
No consideration was given to checking the vehicle used for offsite monitoring for contamination per Procedure EP-IP-014, Revision 4, Personnel and Vehicle Contamination Survey (Closed) 50-388/86-07-06.
It was difficult to determine the ability of the offsite monitoring team to monitor the plume because of indirect prompting by the controller.
(Closed)
50-387/87-08-02; 50-388/87-08-02.
Deficiencies noted in the operational support area.
The previous deficiencies identified in this area are closed since the quality of radio communications between the TSC and the in-plant teams was adequate.
(Closed)
50-387/87-08-03; 50-388/87-08-03 'eficiencies noted in the offsite monitoring area.
The offsite monitoring procedure has been revised so that separate teams are dispatched to monitor the area from the site out to 2 miles and two additional teams from two miles and beyond.
(Closed)
50-387/87-08-04; 50-388/87-08-04).
EOF and Technical Support Center status board not maintained.
Status boards were observed to be up-to-date and provided adequate information for EOF personnel to obtain technical data and radiological data.
5 '
Licensee Criti ue J
The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on April 30, 1987 during which the licensee discussed observations of the exercise.
The critique was adequate in that licensee participants highlighted both areas for improvement (which the licensee indicated would be evaluated and appropriate actions taken)
and areas in which improvements have been made.
Specific improvement areas which were identified by the licensee related to coordination with State representatives in the EOF, contamination assessment in medical treatment of the injured individuals, and open/
closed window readings not taken by offsite monitoring teams.
6.0 Exit Meetin and NRC Criti ue Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee and State representatives listed in Section 1 of this report.
The team'eader summarized the observations made during the exercise..
The licensee was informed that previously identified items were adequately addressed and that no violations were observed.
Although there were areas identified for corrective action and some items unresolved, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner that would provide adequate protective measures for the health and safety of the publi ~