IR 05000387/1987004
| ML20205F176 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 03/10/1987 |
| From: | Eapen P, Oliveira W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205F155 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-87-04, 50-387-87-4, 50-388-87-04, 50-388-87-4, NUDOCS 8703310103 | |
| Download: ML20205F176 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report Nos.
50-387/87-04 50-388/87-04 Docket Nos.
50-387 50-388 License Nos.
NPF-14 NPF-22 Licensee:
Pennsylvania Power & Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101 Facility Name:
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Inspection At:
Berwick, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted:
February 9-13, 1987
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h//7 Inspector:
W. Oliveira, R_eactor Engineer date Approved by:
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Dr. P. K. Eapen,IChief, Quality Assurance dat#
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Section, Operations Branch, DRS, RI Inspection Summary _:
Routine unannounced inspection on February 9-13, 1987 (Report Nos. 50-387/87-04 and 50-388/87-04)
Areas Inspected: Nonlicensed Staff Training.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted
- R. Byram, Superintendent of Plant
- D. Heffelfinger, Coordinating Engineer, Nuclear Quality Assurance
- W. Lowthert, Manager of Nuclear Training
- D. McGann, Compliance Engineer
- L. O'Neil, Supervisor of Maintenance R. Peal, Senior Engineer Operations
- R. Prego, Operations Quality Assurance Supervisor
- K. Rodsh, Supervisor, Nuclear Instruction D. Sadvary, Compliance Evaluator
- J. White, Supervisor, Nuclear Training United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- L. Plisco, Senior Resident Inspector
- J. Stair, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those who attended the exit meeting on February 13, 1987.
2.0 Nonlicensed Training 2.1 Requirement 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion II requires in part that a licensee's Quality Assurance (QA) program shall provide for indoctrination and training of personnel performing activities affecting quality as necessary to assure that suitable proficiency is achieved and maintained.
2.2 Details of the Review The effectiveness of the implementation of the licensee's nonlicensed staff training program was assessed by reviewing the following activities in operations, maintenance, instrument and control (I&C),
engineering, and quality assurance (QA) areas.
Shift turnovers for nuclear plant operators (NP0s) and auxiliary
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system operators (A50s).
NP0s activities including conducting reactor building rounds,
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venting the chill water expansion tank, placing tne in line filter in service during the Reactor Water Cleanup effort in accordance with Procedure No. OP-161-001, and starting and loading the "D" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG).
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AS0s conducting circulating water pump house rounds and red
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tagging the Fire Protection System (Permit No. 1-87-222).
Mechanics repairing a drain connection to the Fire Protection
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System valve 022-430 in accordance with work authorization (WA)
No. S73317.
Electricians performing a weekly surveillance of the 24 VDC
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Batteries in accordance with Procedure No. SM-175-001.
Supervisor of Operations On-the-Job (0JT) Agenda 87-04 meeting.
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I&C technicians performing: 18 month surveillance authorization
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(SA) of Strong Seismic Instrument in accordance with surveil-lance instruction (SI) Procedure No. SI-099-301; 18 month SA of
"0" emergency diesel lubrication oil pressure in accordance with Procedure No. SI-024-304.
Engineering activities such as Significant Operating Occurrence
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Reports (S00Rs) and Plant Modification Records (PMRs).
" Lessons learned" factored into the training program.
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QA audit reports and one QA engineer conducting a surveillance
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of the air roll cycle of the "E" EDG.
Training records of personnel interviewed and observed.
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Lesson plans.
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For each of the job functions identified in paragraph 2.1, the inspector reviewed the established training programs, imphmenting procedures, qualification, and experience of personnel, qualification and training of instructors, quality of 0JT, and the effectiveness of training as evidenced in daily activities.
The activities were conducted in accordance with the procedures by personnel knowledge-able in the requirements of the procedures and technical specifica-tions.
The comments and evaluations from the trainees, line supervisors, and instructors were also reviewed to establish how this feedback was factored into future training.
Management and QA involvement in the training area was assessed for effectiveness.
2.3 Observation of Work Activities The inspector witnessed the following work activities identified in paragraph 2.1 as detailed below:
In one of the shif t turnover meetings attended by the inspector, the Shift Supervisor advised the operators to carry an alarming dosimeter
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when entering a radiation area regardless of the expected duration of stay.
This was to address the concerns of S00R 1-87-032 which was written when an operator entered an area and received 100 mR within 5 minutes as he tagged out a component.
The Shift Supervisor also reminded the operators to secure all the approval signatures before a system or equipment can be released to the Maintenance or I&C Departments.
This was to address the concerns resulting from a recent instance in which an assistant shift supervisor did not know that a system was tagged out for repair as his approval signature was not requested prior to the release.
A S00R was written because this action was not in compliance with AU-QA-103, Permit and Tagging.
The inspector attended a Supervisor of Operations OJT Agenda 87-04 meeting on February 13, 1987.
The supervisors reviewed six S00Rs, three shutdowns, and four other plant situations.
The inspector noted that 0JT training mentioned in many of the S00Rs as part of the corrective action was completed adequately.
This observation confirmed what the nonlicensed staff personnel had said regarding their OJT Agenda training as being beneficial.
Maintenance and I&C Departments hold monthly meetings while Operations meetings are held weekly.
The inspector observed an STA preparing S00R 2-87-021 regarding the operation of the Rod Position Indication System. The event happened at 1356 en February 10, 1987.
The Operations Department personnel took the action required by technical specification paragraph 3.1.3.7 when they lost position indication for 65 rods.
Action ircluded selecting eight rods and inserting them one notch.
Rod motion, however, was inhibited.
Concurrently I&C technicians were invest-igating the problem.
They determined the cause was the failure of the probe multiplexer card when the relay room overheated.
The problem was corrected by fixing the room temperature controls and replacing the multiplexer card.
The inspector walked down PMRs 85-8005, 86-30068 and 86-9055 with their respective cognizant engineers.
The PMRs were processed in accordance with AD-QA-410, Revision 6, Plant Modification Record.
In each case, the engineer determined that the PMR affected training.
PMR 86-30068's new Spray Pond Riser Level Indicator requires the operator to take two actions vice one for the old level indicator.
PMR 86-9055 will require changes to the checklists, the local leak rate test procedures, and training.
During the permit and tagging of the Fire Protection System, the AS0s, with prior approval of the shift supervisor, had to use a
" cheater" for additional leverage to turn the hand wheel and close valve 022-077.
The lead ASO immediately tagged the valve with a deficiency tag and a WA was prepared. The ASO also logged the event in the ASO Auxiliary Lo.
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2.4 Training Policy and Progress
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On May 23, 1985, the licensee became the first in the United States
'to receive full INPO accreditation.
They have recently begun the self-analysis necessary for the two year report to the INP0 Accrediting Board, which is due May 23, 1987.
The Manager of Nuclear Training reports directly to the Vice President of Nuclear Operations, and is responsible for nonlicensed training.
The key procedures for the Nonlicensed Training Program include:
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Nuclear Department Instruction (NDI)
-QA-4.1.2, Revision 3,
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Training Responsibilities.
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Nuclear Training Procedure (NTP) -QA-32.1, Revision 1, Non-
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licensed Operator Training and Certification Program.
NTP-QA-43.1, Revision 2, Instrument & Control Training and
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Qualification Program.
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NTP-QA-44.1, Revision 1, Electrical Ma'.ntenance Training and
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Qualification Program.
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NTP-QA-45.1, Revision 2, Mechanical Maintenance Training and
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Qualification.
The licensee is actively involved in the training areas.
He has developed and implementated certification programs for the Superin-tendent of the Plant, the Assistant Superintend'ent, the Technical Supervisor and ' selected senior plant personnel.
He also has implemented the certification program for nonlicensed operators, I&C technicians, ele,ctricians and mechanics.
Rotation Training program is also being implemented. (The Manager of Nuclear Tra'ining was assigned to the. Maintenance Department for six months). I&C has a similar. program called enhancement training where technicfare aie cross trained with other crews.
The Maintenance Department is developing its own enhancement program.
' The licensee required the Nuclear Training to review the Probabil-
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istic Risk Assessment effort.
One result of this review was the development of Black Out Training for licensed and nonlicensed operators.
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Management reportir.g and analysis of reportable events is performed in accordance with Procedure No. AD-QA-424, Revision 6, Significant Operating Occurrence Reports (S00Rs).
The S00Rs may result in
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issuance of License Event Reports (LERs) and inputs to the INPC Human Performance Evaluation System (HPES) as well as the licessee's
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internal information system.
The inspectors reviewed and discussed the disposition of 20 selected S00Rs and observed S00R 2-87-021 being prepared.
The results indicated that the S00Rs are processed in a timely manner.
S00R 2-87-021 was processed including resolution, within a hour of the event (loss of CRD position indication).
The selected (personnel error) S00Rs adequately addressed training.
In 15 cases, the training was covered in the OJT Agenda meetings. In one case, the S00R is to be incorporated in "the fuel handling training prior to next refueling and inspection outage." The balance of the 500Rs listed counselling, instructing or advising the individual (s) as corrective action.
The nonlicensed training staff of ten instructors, supervisors and management adequately administer the training program and instruct a student body of 350 nonlicensed operators, craft, technical and supervisory personnel. The inspector reviewed with the instructors the development, preparation and conduct of the courses in accordance with the NTPs and INPO guidelines to assess the effective-ness of programs implememtation.
A lesson plan for the Standby Liquid Control course SY015-A-6 was reviewed.
The inspector also reviewed a revision of the lesson plan for the Standby Gas Treatment System SY015-13. Another instructor discussed the development of a new course for the newly acquired CRD Handling System. The inspector also reviewed changes to ME 095, Basic Electricity, Revision 1, that was sent to the Maintenance Department for review and comment.
The training records of the instructors and the personnel involved in this inspection were reviwed.
These records are in compliance with FSAR Chapter 13.2, ANSI N45.2.6 and INP0 guidelines.
The records are automated (computerized), current, complete and readily accessible. Hard copies were maintained for the information that had not been automated.
The Training Department is increasing its nonlicensed training staff to meet the management's objectives, e.g., Certification, Rotation, and the Enhancement Programs. Plans include an additional instructor in Maintenance training and one in Engineering Management training.
The nonlicensed training and qualification effectiveness was measured primarily through the 500R program and secondarily through the PMR, Nonlicensed Training and QA audit programs.
The inspector reviewed 20 selected (personnel error) S00Rs.
None of the S00Rs reviewed indicated that the occurrence was caused by deficient training. The PMRs discussed in paragraph 2.3 also did not indicate any deficien-cies in training as a cause of any problem discussed in the PMRs.
The inspector, however, did note that the instructors were not observing the student's performance during plant visits.
This item will be reviewed during future NRC inspection _. _ _ _.
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2.5 QA/QC Interface With Nonlicensed Training The inspector reviewed QA audit reports (85-048 85-096,85-108 and 86-047.
The audits85-048 and 86-047 reviewed personnel and qualification training.85-108 installed plant instruments calibration and 85-096 regarding 0JT program activities.
Audit
,85-096 was requested by the Manager of Nuclear Training. The audits, while thorough, dealt mainly with compliance requirements, i.e.,
documentation.
The audit team consisted of corporate auditors supported by site auditors.
The corrective action responses were timely except for audit finding 85-047-02 related to periodic instructor appraisals. This item will be reviewed during future NRC in'spections.
The inspector accompanied a QA engineer, who was conducting a quality
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surveillance. The surveillance was for the air rolling of the "E" emergency diesel generator.
The QA engineer was thorough in his surveillance inspection and knowledgeable of the requirements.
2.6 Conclusion
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No violations were identified. The licensee's non-licensed training j
program is implemented in accordance with NRC requirements and
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licensee commitments.
3.0 Management Meetings Licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of the inspection at the entrance interview on February 9,1987. The findings of the inspection were discussed with the licensee representatives during the course of the inspection and presented to licensee management at the February 13, 1987, exit interview (see paragraph 1 for attendees).
At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspectors.
The licensee indicated that no proprietary i
information was involved within the scope of this inspection, t
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