IR 05000373/2002301
| ML021370683 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 05/17/2002 |
| From: | Dave Hills Division of Reactor Safety III |
| To: | Skolds J Exelon Generation Co |
| References | |
| IR-02-301 | |
| Download: ML021370683 (16) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 INITIAL LICENSE EXAMINATION REPORT 50-373/02-301(DRS);
50-374/02-301(DRS)
Dear Mr. Skolds:
On April 19, 2002, the NRC completed initial operator licensing examinations at your LaSalle Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report presents the results of the examination.
NRC examiners administered the operating test during the weeks of April 8 and 15, 2002, and the written examination on April 19, 2002. Six reactor operator and eleven senior reactor operator applicants were administered license examinations. The results of the examinations were finalized on May 13, 2002. All applicants passed all sections of their respective examinations and were issued appropriate operator licenses.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document control system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADQAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this examination.
Sincerely,
/RA/
David E. Hills, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374 License Nos. NPF-11; NPF-18
Enclosures:
1. Operator Licensing Examination Report 50-373/02-301(DRS); 50-374/02-301(DRS)
2. Simulation Facility Report 3. Written Examination Review 4. Written Examinations and Answer Keys (RO & SRO)
See Attached Distribution
REGION III==
Docket Nos: 50-373; 50-374 License Nos: NPF-11; NPF-18 Report No: 50-373/02-301(DRS); 50-374/02-301(DRS)
Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC Facility: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: 2601 N. 21st Road Marseilles, IL 61341 Dates: April 8 through April 19, 2002 Examiners: M. Bielby, Chief Examiner D. McNeil, Examiner R. Morris, Examiner R. Walton, Examiner in Certification Observer: N. Valos, Examiner in Training Approved by: David E. Hills, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ER 05000373-02-301(DRS), 05000374-02-301(DRS), on 04/08-19/2002, Exelon Generation Company, LLC, LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2. Initial License Examination Report.
The announced operator licensing initial examination was conducted by regional examiners in accordance with the guidance of NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Revision 8, Supplement 1.
Examination Summary
- Six reactor operator and eleven senior reactor operator applicants were administered license examinations for initial operator licensing. All applicants passed all sections of their respective examinations and were issued appropriate operator licenses (Section 4OA5.1).
Report Details 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA5 Other
.1 Initial Licensing Examinations a. Examination Scope The NRC examiners conducted announced operator licensing initial examinations during the weeks of April 8 and April 15, 2002. The NRC staff used the guidance established in NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Revision 8, Supplement 1, to prepare the examination outline and to develop the written examination and operating test. The NRC examiners administered the operating test during the weeks of April 8 and April 15, 2002, and the written examination on April 19, 2002. Six reactor operator and eleven senior reactor operator applicants were examined.
b. Findings Written Examination The NRC developed the written examination. The licensee reviewed the written examination for technical accuracy from March 26 through 31, 2002, after the operating examination validation week. Examination changes, agreed upon between the NRC and the licensee, were incorporated into the written examination in accordance with the guidelines provided in NUREG-1021.
The NRC examiners administered the written examination in accordance with NUREG-1021. The NRC examiners and licensee independently graded the written examination and concluded that all seventeen applicants passed. The licensee submitted four post written examination comments. The specific NRC review and resolution of those comments are included in Enclosure 3 to this report and were incorporated into the final grading of the written examination.
Operating Test The NRC developed the operating test. The licensee reviewed the operating examination for technical accuracy from March 18 through 22, 2002, during the operating examination validation week. Examination changes, agreed upon between the NRC and the licensee, were incorporated into the operating test according to NUREG-1021. No post operating examination comments were submitted by the licensee.
Examination Results Six reactor operator applicants and eleven senior reactor operator applicants were administered written examinations and operating tests for initial operator licensing. All seventeen applicants passed all sections of their respective examinations and were issued appropriate operator licenses.
.2 Examination Security a. Inspection Scope The examiners reviewed and observed the licensees implementation of examination security requirements during the examination preparation and administration.
b. Findings During validation of the initial operator license operating examination, the licensee identified one instance of an examination security implementation deficiency that negatively impacted the integrity of the NRC examination. Title 10 CFR 55.49 states, in part, "Applicants, licensees, and facility licensees shall not engage in any activity that compromises the integrity of any application, test, or examination required by this part."
Contrary to this, while securing the plant specific simulation facility (simulator) from examination security isolation, the licensee identified that the Digital Feedwater System Operator Station computer had retained alarm and event logs and trend data from the previous day. The validated operating examination material from the previous day consisted of one scenario which was replaced. This was considered a violation of 10 CFR 55.49 because the computer data and logs could have provided unauthorized information concerning the examination scenario to the applicants who were subsequently in the simulator preparing to take their examination. This compromise of examination integrity was considered a minor violation, because the licensee identified that the computer had retained scenario data, immediately notified the NRC examiners, and assisted in replacing the operating examination scenario before the examination was administered. A Condition Report, AR/CR No. 00100016, was written for this event and entered into the licensees corrective actions program. This event constitutes a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the Enforcement Policy.
In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, minor violations are not normally documented in inspection reports; however, the operator licensing initial examination was conducted in accordance with the guidance of NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Revision 8, Supplement 1. Examiner Standards, ES-501, Section E.3.a, requires documentation of examination security issues and incidents.
4OA6 Meetings Exit Meeting The chief examiner presented the examination teams preliminary observations and findings to Mr. Barnes and other members of the licensee management on April 19, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the observations and findings presented. No proprietary information was identified during the examination nor during the exit meeting.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee G. Barnes, Site Vice President K. Bartes, Nuclear Oversight Manager D. Czufin, Engineering Director S. DuPont, Regulatory Assurance D. Enright, Operations Manager M. Entwistle, Operations Training S. Factora, Chemistry G. Graff, Senior Operations Supervisor S. Landahl, Assistant Plant Manager B. McConnaughay, Work Management S. Russell, MWOROG Exam Coordinator M. Schiavoni, Plant Manager J. Yesinowski, IDNS M. Zickefoose, Operations Training Instructor NRC E. Duncan, LaSalle Senior Resident Inspector M. Bielby, Chief Examiner ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED Opened None Closed None Discussed None
LIST OF ACRONYMS AEER Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room ADAMS Agency-Wide Document Access and Management System ADS Automatic Depressurization System CFR Code of Federal Regulations Delta-T Delta Temperature dP Delta Pressure DRS Division of Reactor Safety ECCS Emergency Core Cooling Systems LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LPCS Low Pressure Core Spray NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PARS Publicly Available Records PSIG Pounds Per Square Inch RA Required Actions RB Reactor Building RO Reactor Operator RP Radiation Protection RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel RWCU Reactor Water Cleanup SBO Station Blackout SRO Senior Reactor Operator TS Technical Specifications
Enclosure 2 SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT Facility Licensee: LaSalle Station Facility Docket No.: 50-273; 50-274 Operating Tests Administered: April 8 - 18, 2002 The following documents observations made by the NRC examination team during the initial operator license examination. These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of non-compliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b). These observations do not affect NRC certification or approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information which may be used in future evaluations. No licensee action is required in response to these observations.
During the conduct of the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were observed:
ITEM DESCRIPTION An abandoned spare annunciator spuriously alarmed and saturated the Blank Annunciator Sequence Of Events Recorder (SWR 3423).
Auxiliary Power Ammeters indicated inaccurately when associated bus was unloaded ammeter (Minor Maintenance Request No. 1824).
Enclosure 3 Written Examination Review Written Examination Question SRO 86:
The applicant was given a handout of Technical Specifications and asked to determine the applicable Technical Specification Required Action (RA) for a surveillance test that identified a setpoint of 480 psig for one LPCS (Low Pressure Core Spray) low pressure injection permissive pressure switch (1E21-N413). The question stated that Unit 1 was operating at 100% power with no equipment abnormalities noted.
Comment: The correct answer per the Answer Key was C. The stem of the question was looking at a failure of the LPCS Low Pressure Injection Line pressure switch. Per Technical Specification Table 3.3.5.1, Table 3.3.5.1-1 (Page 3.3.5.1-8), this is Function 1.g. Looking at the applicability of Required Action D.2, there is a NOTE that states: Only applicable for Functions 1.d and 2.d. Therefore answer C is not correct, as it contains Required Action (RA) D.2, which does not apply to Function 1.g. The reason for distractor B not being correct is that it states Technical Specification 3.3.5.1 RA D.1 and D.3 only. This is not correct, as Technical Specification 3.5.1 RA A.1 also applies. Allowing B to stand as a correct answer would be negative training since it would essentially be stating that actions for an inoperable ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) pump would not be required.
NRC Resolution: The LaSalle Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.5.1, Table 3.3.5.1-1, listed the LPCS Low Pressure Injection Line pressure switch (1E21-N413)
under Function 1.g. Both Answer C and distractor D referenced Required Action (RA) D.2. However, RA D.2 contained a NOTE that stated: Only applicable for Functions 1.d and 2.d. As a result, both answer C and distractor D were incorrect. The complete correct answer should have been, TS 3.3.5.1, RA D.1, D.3, AND TS 3.5.1, RA A.1. As stated, both distractors A (TS 3.5.1, RA A.1 only) and B (TS 3.3.5.1, RA D.1 AND D.3 only) were also incorrect answers. This question was deleted from the exam based on no correct answer.
Written Examination Question RO 36 and SRO 11:
The question stated that a LOCA (Loss of Coolant Accident) had occurred in the drywell concurrent with a release of radioactivity which caused the Reactor Building (RB) ventilation to isolate. Specific plant conditions were listed and the question asked what bypasses must be made to restart RB ventilation in accordance with LGA-002.
Comment: Per the Answer Key, answer A is correct. Facility representatives believe that distractor C is also correct. LGA-VR-01 contains a note at the top of Page 7 of 27 that states: Since an isolation signal from either Unit will isolate both Unit 1 and Unit 2 VR systems (with the exception of tunnel dP), it may be necessary to defeat the Group 1 isolation signals for both Units. Since the question is not written to be unit-specific, if the event occurred on Unit 1 with the Unit 2 MSIVs (Main Steam Isolation Valves)
open, bypassing the Unit 2 Main Steam Line Delta-T trips would be a
correct action for the startup of the Unit 2 Reactor Building Ventilation System.
NRC Resolution: Distractor C (Main steam line delta T, High drywell pressure, and Low RPV water level only) was initially validated as incorrect by licensee operators and training representatives regardless of a specific unit.
However, the scenario postulated by the licensee and the note at the top of LGA-VR-01 Page 7 of 27 could necessitate the additional bypass of Main Steam Line delta-T (temperature) Group 1 isolation signal in order to restart the unit RB Ventilation. As a result, both A and C were correct answers.
Written Examination Question RO 84 and SRO 59:
The question required the applicant to identify an activity that would require notification of Radiation Protection (RP) due to changing radiation levels.
Comment: Per the Answer Key, answer A is correct. Facility representatives believe that distractor C is also correct. LOP-RT-02, Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU) Startup And Pump Transfer, Prerequisite B.8, states: Radiation Protection notified of pending startup of RWCU to evaluate for additional surveys in affected areas. Since procedural guidance is provided to notify RP, answer C is also correct.
NRC Resolution: Distractor C (swapping RWCU pumps) was initially validated as incorrect by licensee operators and training representatives based on the shielded location of the RWCU system. However, based on the new reference, LOP-RT-02, Prerequisite B.8, identified by the licensee, both answers A and C were correct.
Written Examination Question SRO 79:
The question stated that a Station Blackout (SBO) had occurred, Div 1 and 2 Emergency Diesel Generators had failed to start, and System Relief Valves had been initially used for reactor pressure control. The applicant was asked to identify the means available for pressure control three hours after the SBO occurred.
Comment: Per the Answer Key, answer A is correct. Facility representatives believe that distractor C is also correct. The use of the ADS (Automatic Depressurization System) Division 1 Keylock switches in the AEER (Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room) will work to carryout pressure control three hours after a SBO and would be available regardless of the procedure used. LGA-004 is a pressure control procedure. By performing an RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) Blowdown, pressure is being manually lowered (i.e. controlled).
NRC Resolution: Based on discussions with the licensee training department, the licensees comment was changed to reflect that the licensee considered distractor B, vice C, and A were correct.
Distractor B (ADS valves using Div 1 keylock switches in AEER IAW LGA-004 RPV Blowdown) was initially validated as incorrect by licensee operators and training representatives based on the unavailability of compressed air during a SBO condition. However, sufficient conditions were not given in the question stem to exclude the LGA-004 procedure because it can be entered from LGA-001, RPV Control. As a result, both A and B were correct answers.
Enclosure 4 WRITTEN EXAMINATIONS AND ANSWER KEYS (RO/SRO)
RO Initial Examination ADAMS Accession # ML021350615 SRO Initial Examination ADAMS Accession # ML021350642