IR 05000373/1978031
| ML19282B317 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/1979 |
| From: | Danielson D, Erb C, Hawkins F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19282B314 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-78-31, 50-374-78-22, NUDOCS 7903130069 | |
| Download: ML19282B317 (11) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGUIATORY C050!ISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-373/78-31; 50-374/78-22 Docket No. 50-373; 50-374 License No. CPPR-99; CPPR-It i Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: La Salle County Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: La Salle Site, Seneca, IL Inspection Conducted: December 6, 12 and 13, 1978 k,.4
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Inspectors:
C. h. Erb
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F.'C.(~awkins I / 2 9 j 7l
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Other Personnel:
Suermann b7/D<- u. 3 h. -
Approved By:
D. H. Danielson, Chief
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Engineering Support Section 2 Inspection Summary Inspection on December 6,12 and 13,1978 (Report No. 50-373/78-31; 50-374/78-22)
Areas Inspected: Observation reactor internals work, Units 1 and 2; quality records Class 1 valves; observation work downcomers - suppression pool; observation work and records post tensioning; closecut three noncompliance items.
The inspection involved a total of 38 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7903130069
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Personnel
- R.
J. Legner, QA Supervisor
- R.
T. Rose, Station Construction, Lead Structural
- E.
R. Wendorf, Station Construction, Field Engineer
- D. J. Skoza, QA Engineer
- B.
L. Wood, QA Engineer
- R.
A. Braun, QA Engineer
- L.
J. Tapella, QA Engineer W. L. Hartig, QA Engineer General Electric Company
- R. E. Spencer, Site Manager General Electric Company - (Installation and Service Engineering)
- W. J. Lowe, QC Supervisor Walsh Construction Company
- M.
R. Daugherty, QA Supervisor Reactor Controls Inc. (RCI)
D. Donath, Assistant QC Supervisor Chicago Bridge and Iron Company (CBI)
G. Jouett, QA Supervisor
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Noncompliance (373/78-09-02; 374/78-08-02) - Failure to control the handling, storage, cleaning and preservation of safety-related material.
The inspector toured the Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Buildings and observed adequate storage of safety-related embedments.
The responsible contractor was instructed by the licensee to be more watchful of such conditions in the future. Cleanliness and maintenance of Unit 2 drywell B-series cad-welds was observed to be acceptable.
Unit 1 drywell concrete has been placed, therefore inspection of Unit I cadwelds was not possible. Walsh Construction Company has instituted a program for B-series cadweld storage surveillance every two weeks. Records of Unit 1 and 2 surveillance were reviewed by the inspector and determined to be acceptable.
(Closed) Noncompliance (374/78-08-05) - Water seepage around the vertical tendon bearing plates No. V19B, V15B, V17B and V32C in the tendon gallery.
The completed concrete chipping and subsequent repair with a quick setting hydraulic cement around the bearing plates in-question was observed. No bearing plate corrosion was evident and the water seepage next to the bearing plates had been successfully stopped.
Licensee personnel stated that monthly inspections were initiated to check for water seepage around the bearing plates.
Inspection reports for Unit 1 and Unit 2 were reviewed and determined acceptable.
(Open) Unresolved Item (373/78-28-02) - Two Unit 1 tendons contained three broken wires each, with a maximum of two broken wires allowed.
The status of this item was reviewed. Reference Section II, paragraph 1.c(4) of this report.
(Closed) Noncompliance (374/78-08-06) - Failure to promptly remove corro-sion-protective grease to avoid contaminating concrete or other surfaces.
Amendment 3 to Specification J-2533 which is clarified by ECN SD-1024, Section 13-210.7g states in part that, " Grease that is spilled on these surfaces (i.e. concrete, etc) shall be promptly removed, to complete satisfaction of Purchaser's representative at Contractors expense." The inspector toured the Unit 1 and 2 containment areas and determined that all areas inspected with potential for corrosion-protective grease con-tamination were clean and adequately maintained.
Review of 10 CFR 50.55(e) Item Reported by the Licensee During this inspection, no investigative work was being performed by the licensee on the Unit 2 shop end button-head cracking.
In seven of ten Unit 2 tendons inspected, the Inryco shop button-heads contained heads with cracks exceeding 0.060 inches.
Pursuant with the 50.55(e) report, the licensee had instituted a program to inspect 5% of the Unit I shop end button-heads for possible failure to-3-
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meet the splitting criteria. The grease cap for tendon V16B was removed, and the Walsh QA Manager and the inspector observed at least four button-heads on the shop fabricated end which may exceed the.060 inch maximum cracking allowed. Licensee and Walsh personnel had not decided at the time of this inspection what method would be used to measure the button-head cracking, due to the installation of the tendons and the subsequent inaccessibility of the button-heads.
This item remains open and will be reviewed further during a subsequent inspection.
Functional Areas Inspected - Sections I and II-4-
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Section I Prepared by C. M. Erb Reviewed by D. H. Daaielson, Chief Engineering Support Section 2 1.
Safety Relief Valves for Unit 1 The quality records for safety relief valve S/N N56000-02-0016 were examined. This Class 1 valve was manufactured by Crosby Valve and Gage Company. This valve has 6" inlet and 8" outlet opening.s and was built to the requirements of Sargent 6 Lundy specificatior J-2500 and ASME Section III, 1971, with summer 1972 addenda.
The valve was source inspected by the supplier (GE Company).
The material and test result certifications appeared to be acceptable.
2.
Main Steam Isolation Valves - Unit 1 Quality Records for MPL-B21-F022, a 26" main steam isolation valve inside containment and MPL-B-21-F028, a 26" main steam isolation valve outside containment were examined.
These valves are Class 1 valves and were fabricated to the requirements of ASME Section III, 1971 with winter 1971 addenda. Rockwell International Corporation manufactured these valves, which were supplied by GE Company. The certificate of shop iaspection was signed by the Lumbermans Mutual Casualty Company. Material certifications, NDT records and weld repair records were acceptable.
3.
Flow Control Valve - Unit 1 A 24" flow control valve S/N 71-2001-001A was examined where installed.
This is a Class 1 valve and was f abricated by ITT Hammel Dahl and supplied by GE Company. The valve was manufactured to the require-ments of ASME Section III 1971, summer addenda and is stamped NPV-1.
This stainless steel valve is designed for 1675 psig and temperature of 575 F.
A hydro was performed at 3900 psi and material certifi-cations and NDT records were acceptable.
4.
Observation Downcomer Work in Suppression Pool - Unit 2 Welding operations where steam downcomer pipes are being a.
attached to each other using carbon steel collars Td I-beam-5-
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connecting members were observed. This bracing work is being performed to the requirements of ASME Section III, 1977 Division 1, subsection NF, which covers component supports.
There are 96 downcomer pipes which are attached to each other with this bracing above pool water level. Weld procedure No. WPS E7018/83670 is being used for the welding as well as GWPS-SMAW, WPS-800, Revisicn 10.
This bracing involves welding carbon steel to the stainless pipe and type 309 weld rod is used. Qualification No. 2507 which covers material from 3/16 to 4.0 thick is applicable. Weld rod 7018 is used in welding the carbon steel to carbon steel materials.
Weld rod control was satisfactory with the ovens maintained at 250 F and in a locked condition. Arrangements were made to pick up daily, stubs or rods accidently falling from the scaffold to the suppression pool floor.
b.
There are 18 Safety relief valve (SRV) downcomers which will be braced from the suppression pool floor.
This bracing will require that embeds be placed in the present floor and the entire bracing will be submerged in the pool.
Each SRV downcomer will be fitted on the exit end with a German designed quencher which will be attached to the floor embeds.
The licensee stated that carbon steel bracing coated with a carbo line coating will be used between the quencher and embed.
The inspector questioned whether any coating would withstand the service and how an inservice inspection would be made.
This item is considered to be an unresolved item and will be examined again (50-373/78-31-01).
5.
Status of Work on Reactor Internals In Unit 1, all 185 CRD housings and all flux monitoring tubes have been installed and tested.
In Unit 2, 95 of the CRD housings and all flux monitoring tubes have been installed. Feedwater safe end work is complete in Unit 1, but qualification of welders is underway for the feedwater safe end work in Unit 2.
Replacement work on the recirculation inlet (N2) nozzles for both plants has not started.
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Section II Prepared by F. C. Hawkins Reviewed by R. L. Spessard, Chief Engineering Support Section 2 1.
Containment Post-Tensioning Review of Quality Records (Units 1 and 2)
The inspector reviewed the Walsh Construction Company quality records relative to tendon installation, field button-head fabrication, tensioning, and greasing for horizontal tendon Nos. 54CB, 55CB, 56CB, 57CB, 36EG, 37EG, 38EG and 57EG and vertical tendon Nos. V1A, V2A, V3A, V221C, V222C and V223C.
a.
Installation The Tendon Pulling Card for each specified tendon was reviewed and found to include adequate and acceptable inspection for tendon length and wire condition with respect to both corrosion and mechanical damage. All records reviewed indicated the tendons listed above to be of acceptable condition, specified as either "A" or "B."
Condition "A" denotes that corrosion protection is in-tact and there is no visible oxidation. Condition "B" denotes light, thin, removable red oxide that is visible when looking parallel, but not directly normal to the wire.
b.
Field Button-Head Fabrication The Button-Heading Card for each tendon was reviewed by the inspector. Post-Tensioning-Field Installation and QC Manual, Section 4.3.1.c allows a maximum of four button-heads per 90 wire tendon to fail the Button-Head Criteria 1610 require-ments for the field fabricated end.
Tha following specific documentation was reviewed:
Field Button-Head Field Button-Head Tendon No.
Inspection Tendon No.
Inspection F'4CB OK VIA 1 split head
2 undersize H55CB 1 double head V2A 1 undersize 2 undersize 7-
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H56CB OK V3A OK H57CB 2 undersize V221C 2 undersize 1 split H36EG 1 split V222C 2 undersize 1 split H37EG OK V223C
- 7 undersize
- 6 split
- 1 eccentricity failure H38EG OK
- Five tendon wires were cut and satisfactorily replaced.
Five undersize button-heads were enlarged to meet size criteria.
Four failing button-heads remained. This meets the failure criteria, c.
Post-Tensioning The Tendon Stressing Cards for the specified Unit I tendons were reviewed by the inspector. The following specific documentation was reviewed:
(1) The calibration record of Gauge N1124 was reviewed and found to be acceptable with respect to accuracy and frequency.
(2) The inspector reviewed the Walsh Inspection Checklist and determined that the tendon stressing sequence requirements had been met for Unit I work.
(3) Tendon Stressing Cards for tendons VIA, V2A, V3A, 54CB, 55CB, 56CB and 57CB were reviewed and found acceptable with respect to proper number and size of shims installed, calculated elongation vs. measured elongation (see item 4 below), and overstress value.
(4) Walsh NCR 146 and NCR 137 concerning three broken wires each in tendons No. SSCB and No. V9A were reviewed. The construction specification allows a maximum of 2% broken wires (two wires) in each tendon after post-tensioning is complete. Proposed correc-tive action for both tendons includes destressing and replacement.
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As previously reported (Unresolved item No. 50-373/78-28-02), this item remains open and will be reviewed af ter destressing and replacement is complete.
Walsh NCR No. 139 concerning measured elongation exceeding calculated elongation by more than the specified 10% for tendon No. V3A was also reviewed and determined acceptable.
d.
Greasing The Greasing Cards for initial and final greasing of tendons VIA, V2A, V3A, 54CB, 53CB, 56CB, 57CB and the initial greasing of tendons 36EG, 37EG and 38EG were reviewed and determined to be acceptable.
The inspector requested clarification of Specification J2533, Section 13-212.4 b4. which states that, " Potential leakage of the grease into the concrete, and potential harmful ef fects of varying temperatures, shall also be investigated and established." Licensee personnel were unable during this inspection to interpret this specifi-cation requirement and clarify it to the inspector.
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This item is considered unresolved.
(373/78-31-02);
341/78-22-02)
e.
Personnel Qualifications The inspector reviewed the training and qualification records of two Walsh Construction Company QC technicians and deter-mined that each met the requirements of ANSI N45.2.6.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
2.
Containment Post-Tensioning - Observation of Work Activities (Unit 2)
a.
Installation The inspector observed the installation on December 6, 1978 of horizontal tendon 57EG.
The tendon was noted by the Wa!sh QC inspector to be in category "A" condition with one wire bent approximately 25 at twenty feet from the field end.
b.
Storage it was observed that tendons V211A, V212A, V213A, V214A, V215A, V216A, V217A, V218A, V219A, V220A and V221A have-9-
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been installed and have been maintained in-place without initial or final grease for approximately six months, to date. These tendons will remain in this condition until the button-head cracking problem is resolved.
In conjunction with tendon storage, past problems and resolution of these problems, the inspector reviewed Walsh Construction Company NCR No. 142R.
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Walsh NCR No. 142R concerned the formation of red oxide and the slight pitting of field stored tendons and tendon Nos. V49C, V3C, V28C and V60C which were stored in-place approximately five months prior to their initial greasing.
Tendons V49C, V3C, V28C and V60C were found to be in Category "F" condition during stressing operations.
Each of these tendons was noted to be in Category "A" condition during their installation. Vertical tendons are stressed prior to their initial and final greasing.
Walsh NCR No. 142R specified that to prevent recurrence of this corrosion, the " areas showing signs of rusting be burnished with emery cloth and regreased, as necessary" and that, " tendons in storage will be reinspected as recommended by Inryco." The Sargent & Lundy Inter-Office Memorandum dated May 8, 1978 states that, "Each month the tendon assembly packages will be opened up, inspected and if any rusting is noted, the rusting will be removed and recoated with preservative." All records reviewed by the inspector indicated that tendons have been adequately main-tained or repaired to acceptable condition before instal-lation.
It is the inspectors concern that the Unit 2 vertical tendons being stored in-place for extended periods of time (i.e. six months) prior to initial greasing do not meet the manufac-turers storage requirements and are, therefore, susceptible to corrosion and pitting.
Further, monthly tendon storage inspection of the type specified by the disposition of Walsh NCR No. 142R cannot be performed due to the installation of the tendons.
This item is considered unresolved.
(374/78-22-03)
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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t Unresolved Items
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Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of non-compliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Section I, paragraph 4.b and Section II, paragraphs 1.d and 2.b.
Exit Interviaw The inspectors met with licensee and contractor representatives (denoted in Persons Contacted paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on December 13, 1978. The inspectors summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and findings, and discussed three unresolved matters identified during the inspection.
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