IR 05000358/1980019
| ML19338F752 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1980 |
| From: | Daniels F, Warnick R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19338F750 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-358-80-19, NUDOCS 8010270161 | |
| Download: ML19338F752 (11) | |
Text
(}
V e
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-358/80-19
,
Docket No. 50-358 License No. CPPR-88 Licensee: Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company 139 East 4th Street Cincinnati, OH 45201 Facility Name:
W. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Inspection At: W. H. Zimmer Site, Moscow, OH Inspection Conducted: August 1, 4-8, 12-15, 18-21, 25-29, 1980 MdC &
Jap / /8,/ggo Inspectors:
F. T. Daniels
>
T. P. Gwynn (Observer)
RF M Approved By:
R. F. Warnick, Chief fe,f /pg
'
Projects Section 3 Inspection Summary Inspection on August 1, 4-8, 12-15, 18-21, 25-29, 1980 (Report No. 50-358/80-19)
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of previously identified items, bulletin and circular followup, fuel receipt and storage, pre-operational test program implementation controls, and plant tours.
This inspection involved a total of 152 inspector-hours onsite by the NRC Senior Resident Inspector including 18 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: Of the five areas inspected, three were found satisfactory, three noncompliances were identified in the area of preoperational test program (Infractions,10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III-inadequate design control par. 6; 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V - failure to follow procedure SU.ACP.15 par. 6; 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIV - inadequate measures to indicate status of components -
par. 6) and one noncompliance in the area of plant tours (Infraction -
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI - repetitive failure of weld rod control par. 7).
pod %\\
.-
.
DETAILS
.
1.
Personnel Contacted
- J. R. Schott, Plant Superintendent
- P. E. King, Assistant Plant Superintendent D. L. Erickson,, Chemistry / Radiation Control Supervisor R. W. Link, Operations Supervisor
- J. J. Wald, Station Quality Engineer R. E. Donnellon, Maintenance Supervisor
- R. P. Ehas, Senior Quality Engineer W. W. Schwiers, Quality Assurance Manager A. Sandfoss, Junior Chemistry Technician A. Delisle, Senior Maintenance Technician K. Floyd, Maintenance Technician W. Puckett, Weld Engineer and others of the station staff.
- Denotes personnel attending monthly exit meeting.
2.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Noncompliance (50-353/80-08-03): Failure to identify and report a reportable deficiency within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The inspector verified the required training sessions were completed in accordance with the commitment given in the response to the noncompliance.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were poted.
3.
IE Bulletin Followup For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presentation in the bulle-tin and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.
.
(Closed) Bulletin 79-03A, Longitudinal Weld Defects in ASME SA-312, Type 304 Stainless Steel Pipe.
Piping of this type was not used at Wm. H. Zimmer.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.
\\
l-2-
.
4.
IE Circular Followup
,
For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that if the circular were applic-able to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken.
(Closed) Circular 80-02, Nuclear Power Plant Staff Work Hours.
The inspector verified this item is now being tracked and completed in accordance with NUREG-0694.
(Closed) Circular 80-03, Protection from Toxic Gas Hazards.
The inspector verified a review was conducted and pr ?ection systems for toxic gases at Wm. H. Zimmer plant were found to be in accordance with applicable regulatory guides and FSAR.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.
5.
Fuel Receipt and Storage The inspector verified by inspection and document review that the storage, security, and environmental protection requirements of the Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) license, SNM-1823, were implemented and being followed.
a.
Documentatior Reviewed NE. SAD.03, Accountability of SNM, Revision 3, May 2,1980.
SE. SAD.03, Interim Access Control New Fuel Storage Area, Revision 6, June 25, 1980.
NE.FHP.20, Special Nuclear Material Physical Inventory, Revision 1, April 28, 1980.
SNM-1823, Special Nuclear Material License and Anendments, thereto.
b.
Inspections Conducted The refueling floor of the reactor building (627' elevation)
was inspected to verify all SNM license requirements were implemented.
In particular, the following requirements were verified:
(1) All water stations valved off and safety tagged.
(2)
150# dry chemical fire extinguisher in immediate area of the spent fuel pool.
-3-
.
(3) No accumulation of combustibles.
,
The integrity of security controls exercised, including the following were verified:
(1) Wall continuity at the access point to the refueling floor.
(2) Access controls.
(3) Storage area lighting.
(4) Security force awareness.
(5) Procedural compliance.
Environmental control measures for the fuel storage area, including the following were verified:
(1) Verification of dust and debris control.
(2) Protection against flooding.
(3) Protection against physical damage.
c.
Findings All SNM onsite is controlled and stored as required by the license.
A red tag on the isolation valve to fire station, IFP-25, was missing. The licensee replaced the red tag.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.
6.
Preoperational Test Program Implementation Controls The inspector reviewed two turnover packages to verify that controls were observed for system turnover, that a schedule for preoperational
,
testing was being maintained and kept current, that procedures and techniques used to collect water samples from safety related systems and perform maintenance on them was adequate, and that preventive maintenance or calibrations on systems turned over for preoperational testing had been incorporated into a schedule and were accomplished in accordance with that schedule.
The inspector made observations of the Residual Heat Removal (RH) and the Reactor Protection System (RP) to verify that these systems were green tagged consistent with the controls established in the turnover package; that controls were observed on turnover logs, records, or drawings prior to testing and subsequent to testing; that the collec-tion and analysis of a water sample from the condensate storage tank for ph, conductivity, chlorides, florides, sulfites, and silica was e4-
_.
.
.
_
.
.
performed in accordance with procedures; and that maintenance performed
,
on the station 125VDC battery was performed by qualified personnel in accordance with existing procedures.
a.
Documentation Reviewed (1)
SA. SAD.06 revision 8, Review, Approval, Issue, Revision, and Usage of Implementing Procedures.
(2) SU.ACP.15 revision 3, Tagging of Systems Turned Over for Preoperational Testing.
(3) SU.PRP.01 revision 12, System Release and Turnover.
(4) SU.PRP.07 revision 01, Area Turnover.
(5)
PT-RH-01, Jurisdiction Green Tagging for Preoperational
Testing, Residual Heat Removal (RH) System dated April 26,
1979.
PT-RH-01, revision 01, dated June 30, 1980.
PT-RH-01, revision 01, dated July 28, 1980.
(6) Piping and Instrument Detail (P&ID) Drawings:
-
l M-51, Residual Heat Removal System P&ID
.!
Sheet 1, revision R dated August 10, 1978.
Sheet 2, revision P dated August 10, 1978.
Sheet 3, revision L dated January 6, 1978.
Sheet 4, revision M dated July 14, 1978.
M-81, Containment Monitoring System P&ID Sheet 2, revision N dated November 2, 1979.
M-30, Service Water System P&ID Sheet 2, revision U dated September 14, 1979.
(7) Control and Instrumentation Detail (C&ID) Drawings:
M-730, Service Water System
.
Sheet 3, revision F dated May 21, 1979.
't M-751, Residual Heat Removal System Sheet 1, revision G dated December 19, 1979.
Sheet 2, revision C dated October 23, 1978.
Sheet 3, revision J dated December 19, 1979.
-5-
,
-
- - _.
,-.
---
.
Sheet 4, revision E dated lecember 19, 1979.
,
Sheet 5, revision D dated September 28, 1979.
.
Sheet 6, revision G dated June 13, 1979.
'
Sheet 7, revision H dated June 13, 1979.
.
Sheet 8, revision B dated January 27, 1978.
'
Sheet 9, revision D dated October 23, 1978.
Sheet 10, revision B dated February 2, 1976.
Sheet 11, revision B dated September 7, 1979.
.
(8) QA. SAD.01, revision 02, Quality Assurance (9) QA. SAD.05, revision 00, QA Program for Preoperational
,
Testing (10) SU.PRP.04, revision 05, Punchlist Item Completion and Maintenance in Turned Over and Non-Turned Over Areas (11) SU.ACP.20, revision 00, Review of Completed Work for Impact on the Preoperational Test Program (12) PT-RP-01, Jurisdictional Green Tagging for Preoperational Testing, Reactor Protection System (RP) dated February 12, 1979.
(13) ME. CMP.2.01, revision 01, Battery Cell Replacement (14) ME. CMP.2.15, revision 01, Battery Terminal Cleaning (15) ME. CMP.2.16, revision 02, Battery Cell Charging b.
Findings (1) An audit of the Green Tag List contained in the Residual Heat Removal (RH) System Preoperational Test Release, PT-RH-01, and its revisions revealed the following:
'
(a) Two revisions to PT-RH-01, dated June 30, 1930 and July 28, 1980, were each designated revision 01.
This loss of administrative control was occasioned by the use of an Inter-Department Memorandum in the promulgation of the first revision 01 rather than the administrative 1y controlled form required by the licensee procedure SU.ACP.15 revision 03.
This loss of administrative control resulted in two green tags fcom the same system release being hung on each of the f.ollowing valves:
)
-1E12F348 (A&B)
'
-1E12F009-1E12F303-6-
.
,
.
In addition, physical inspection of these valves
- .
revealed that both assigned tags were attached to each of the above listed valves except valve IE12F009, which had only one of two assigned tags attached. There was no record on the tag sheet as to the disposition of the missing tag.
(b) The following instruments in the RH system were listed twice on the system release PT-RH-01:
.
-FI1E12AR603Al-HS1E12AS016B-HS1E12AS016B1 (c) Physical inspection of approximately 1/3 of the com-ponents green tagged by PT-RH-01 revealed that the following tags were either missing or mutilated:
Missing 400808-07190-07210-00990-07193-07213-07121-07202-07216-07128-07204-07220-07145-07205-07223 Mutilated-00789-00865-00905-00832-00882 (d) The green tag (#09001) on IC71B-SI on 1H13-P610 of the RP system was missing.
These represent examples of failure to follow'Wm. H. Zimmer administrative procedure SU.ACP.15 revision 03 " Tagging of Systems Turned Over For Preoperational Testing." These failures are considered to be in noncompliance with the requirement of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, and W. H. Zimmer FSAR, Section 17.1.5.1, which states in part m
that activities affecting the quality of the facility are accomplished in accordance with written instructions, procedures or drawings.
(50-358/80-19-01)
(2) Review of the RH System Piping and Instrument Detail (P&ID)
and Control and Instrumentation Detail (C&ID) drawings with respect to the green tag list of PT-RH-01 revealed the following:
(a) The following valves, which are part of the RH System, were not included on the system release PT-RH-01 or its revisions:
-7-
. _ - -
.
-1E12F061-1E12F328 o-1E12F062-1E12F393-1E12F084A-1E12F394-1E12F104 (A&B)
-1E12F395 (b) The following electrical instruments, which are part of the RH system, were not included on the system release PT-RH-01 or its revisions:
-HSIE12AS058B-HSIE12AS035 (A&B)
-HSIE12AS036A (c) There was no tag issued by PT-RH-01 or its revisions for the 480 VAC supply to the motor operator for i
valve 1E12F064A, although both the operator supplies for IE12F064B and IE12F064C were tagged.
(d) Physical inspection of system instruments revealed that Instruments FTIE12-N015C and N007B had been removed for calibration but the green tags for these instruments, issued by PT-RH-01 (#07126 and #07159, respectively), were still hanging from an adjacent oipe.
The above demonstrates that the licensee's program for juris-dictional tagging, which identifies a systems' status with respect to operability and readiness for preoperational testing, is inadequately implemented and maintained. This program failure is considered to be noncompliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIV, and the Wm. H. Zimmer FSAR, Sections 17.1.14.2 and 17.1.14.3 which state in part that procedures are established which indicate the operating status of structures, systems and components, and that these procedures are documented and audited by QA&S to ensure their proper performance.
(80-358/80-19-02)
i (3) Further inspection of problems encountered during review of the RH system P&ID and C&ID drawings revealed the following:
(a) Valves 1E12F370 and IE12F371 are listed by the Mechanical Department Valve List (MDVL) as being shown on P&ID M-51-3 but do not appear (M-51-3, revision L).
(b) Valve IE12F385B is mislabeled as IE12F386A on C&ID M-751-7.
(c) Valves 1E12F396 and IE12F397 are shown on C&ID M-751-11, but are not listed by the MDVL.
,
-8-L-
.
.
.
_
_
.
d These represent examples of a failure to maintain and
review design documents which could affect station quality.
This failure is considered to be in noncompliance with the requirement of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III and the
Wm. H. Zimmer FSAR, Sections 17.1.3 and 17.1.3.6.1 which state in part that design control reviews are conducted to ensure that the designs are correctly translated into design documents such as specifications and drawings, and that documents such as design drawings are reviewed by GED and audited for compliance by QA&S.
(50-358/80-19-03)
(4) Several typographical errors were found in PT-RH-01 which could have resulted in green tags being attached to the wrong equipment, or in green tags not being hung at all.
These typographical errors include the following:
(a)
PT-RH-01, revision 0, UY1E12K065A should be UY1E12K605A per the C&ID drawing.
(b)
PT-RH-01, revision 0, ZI1E12R609B should be ZI1E12R608B
per the C&ID drawing.
(c)
PT-RH-01, revision 0, IE12F388C should be IE12F338C per the placard on 480VABMCC IE compartment 7D.
(d)
PT-RH-01, revision 0, 480VABMCC IB compartment 1D should be 480VABMCC IB compartment 11C per physical inspection.
l (e)
PT-RH-01, revision 0, 480VABMCC 1A compartment 1A should be 480VABMCC 1A compartment 11A per physical inspection.
)
(5) Prior to performance of maintenance on the station 125VDC
'
battery, the senior raintenance technician identified an outstanding revision to ME. CMP.2.01 which requires torquing of all bolts removed from the battery seismic restraints affected by cell replacement. Cell replacement was completed per the referenced procedures. However, in the process of reassembling the seismic restraints, the senior maintenance technician attempted to torque a restraint bolt to 96 ft-lb (value specified in a torque-wrench manufac-turers guidebook for mild SAE 2 steel) rather than the 27 ft-lb recommended by the battery manufacturers
-
instruction book, resulting in bolt failure. This problem was due to a lack of sufficient torque specifications in the maintenance procedure ME. CMP.2.01, revision 01.
This is considered an unresolved item (50-358/80-19-04) and will be reviewed in subsequent inspections.
-9-
-. -
-
-
_-
-
.
-
..,
.
7.
Plant Tours
The following items were observed during the frequent tours made by i
the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. All items were acknowledged by the licensee and except for item c, were corrected or will be corrected in the near future.
a.
Six loose 3 amp /250V fuses were observed behind panel PM-03J in the control room.
b.
Cable tray 4043B and cables installed in it were observed for fire damage received from a fire caused by temporary lighting bulb guard catching fire.
Four cables appeared damaged and will be replaced. Also, the plastic light bulb guards are being replaced with metal guards.
c.
Weld rod warinac IA-18 was observed on August 19, 1980, to be de-energized with weld rod (E-7018) contained in it.
The weld rod issue form attached to the warmer was dated August 18, 1980, although weld rod warmer IA-18 was listed as missing by the welding engineers secretary since August 13, 1980. The release and check-in forms for IA-18 on August 18, 1980, showed that it was taken from the rod shack with one-half pound of E-7018 (low hydrogen) weld rod and returned with no weld rod. As of August 29, 1980, the warmer was not returned to the rod shack. Weld rod control has been brought to the attention of the licensee for many years and has been cited as items of noncompliance at least 11 times in the last five years; this noncompliance being the third this year. This item which is repetitive of previously identified items of noncompliance in weld rod control is indicative that previous corrective actions have been inadequate.
This was identified as noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Action) and the Wm. H. Zimmer FSAR.
(50-358/80-19-05)
d.
Instrument ITI-WR106 meter face was observed to be broken.
e.
Weld rod heating ovens (W-38 and W-25) was observed to have weld red. in them which was not segregated in accordance with location map on the door front.
f.
Two green tags, one for 1SA-082A and one for 1SA-083C, of the PT-SA-01 release for preoperational control were both attached to the valve handwheel for ISA-082A. Also, the tag for 1SA,083C was not filled in properly.
,
8.
Monthly Exit Meeting The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on August 29, 1980. The inspector
- 10 -.
.
. -..
_ -. _ -
.....-.
..
.
sun.:narized the scope and findings of the inspection. The inspector
,,
en.phasized that noncompliance for weld rod control was due to the lack of adequate corrective action to eliminate the problem cc at least reduce the number of violations against the procedural requirement for veld rod control.
<
,
I
1 I
I
..
l l
I
,
!
I i
i
$,
-
l l
.!
-
i
,
- 11 -
-..
.
. ~
.
-
, _ _ _ _ _
_
.. _ _ _
_.
. _ _..