IR 05000339/1993017

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Summary of Enforcement Conference Insp Repts 50-338/17 & 50-339/93-17 on 930520 Re Failure to Maintain Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Operable for About 18 Min Following Reactor Trip on 930416
ML20036C289
Person / Time
Site: North Anna  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 05/26/1993
From: Merschoff E
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Stewart W
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
References
NUDOCS 9306160054
Download: ML20036C289 (26)


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MAY 2 6 093 Docket Nos. 50-338, 50-339 License Nos. NPF-4, NPF-7 Virginia Electric and. Power Company ATTN: Mr. W. L. Stewart Senior Vice President - Nuclear 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-338/17 AND 50-339/17

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This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on May 20, 1993. This meeting concerned activities authorized for your North Anna facility. The specific issue discussed at this conference related to.the failure to maintain the Auxiliary Feedwater System operable for about 18-minutes following a.. reactor trip on April 16, 1993,. and the failure to follow procedures which contributed to the event. -This Enforcement.. Conference was open for public observation in accordance with the Commission's trial program

~for.' conducting open' Enforcement Conferences as discussed in the Federal

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Register, 57 FR 30762, July 10, 1992.

Your presentation was -beneficial.in clarifying the issues involved and provided us.with an understanding of.your.

corrective actions. A;11st of Attendees, Enforcement Conference-Summary, and.

a copy of your handout are enclosed. We._are_ continuing our review of.this issue to determine the appropriate enforcement action.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's, " Rules of Practice," Part~2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of the letter and its enclosures-will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact us.

Sincerely, Ofiginal signed by Jon R. Johnson (for)

Ellis W. Merschoff, Director Division of Reactor Projects Enclosures:

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List of Attendees 2.

Enforcement Conference Summary 3.

Enforcement Conference Handout cc w/encls:

(See page 2)

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9306160054.930526

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4 Virginia Electric & Power Company

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M. L. Bowling, Jr., Manager Nuclear Licensing Virginia Electric & Power Company 5000 Dominion Boulevard

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Glen Allen, VA 23060 G. E. Kane, Station Manager

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North Anna Power Station P. O. Box 402 Mineral, VA 23117 Executive Vice President Old Dominion Electric Cooperative 4201 Dominion Boulevard

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Glen Allen, VA 23060 Dr. W. T. Lough

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Virginia Corporation Commission P. O. Box 1197 Richmond, VA 23209 William C. Porter, Jr.

I County Administrator Louisa County P. O. Box 160 Louisa, VA 23093 Michael W. Maupin, Esq.

Hunton and Williams Riverfront Plaza, East Tower 951 E. Byrd Street Richmond, VA 23219 Attorney General Supreme Court Building 101 North 8th Street Richmond, VA 23219 Robert B. Strobe, M.D., M.P.H.

State Health Commissioner Virginia Department of Health P. O. Box 2448 Richmond, VA 23218 bec w/encls:

G. Belisle, RII S. Vias, RII L. Engle, NRR bec w/encls cont'd:

(See page 3) y

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MAY 2 6'l993 Virginia Electric & Power Company

bec w/encls cont'd:

Document Control Desk NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Route 2, Box 78-A Mineral, VA 23117 NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Route 1, Box 166 Surry, VA 23883 AaGMsew,Dn$

T. l' eel >les, MS

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ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION L. A. Reyes, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region II (RII)

E. W. Merschoff, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), RII H. N. Berkow, Director, Project Directorate II-2, Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff (EICS), RII B. Uryc, Senior Enforcement Specialist, EICS, RII C. F. Evans, _ Regional Counsel, RII L. B. Engle, Project Manager, Project Directorate II-2, NRR G. A. Belisle, Chief, Branch 2A, DRP, RII M. S. Lesser, Chief, Section 3A, DRP, RII R. F. Aiello, Senior Examiner, DRS, RII D. M. Tamai, Project Engineer / Intern, Branch 2A, DRP, RII

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VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY J. P. O'Hanlon, Vice President Nuclear Operations G. E. Kane, Station Manager, North Anna Power Station (NAPS)

L. N. Hartz, Manager - Nuclear Quality Assurance M. L. Bowling, Manager - Nuclear Licensing D. A. Heacock, Assistant Station Manager - Nuclear Safety and Licensing, NAPS R. H. Tillack Jr., Unit Supervisor - Senior Reactor Operator, NAPS

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S. B. Clements, Reactor Operator, NAPS J. W. Norvelle, News Services Coordinator

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ENCLOSURE 2

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t ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY i

On May 20, 1993, representatives from Virginia Electric and Power Company

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(VEPCO) met with the NRC in the Region II Office in Atlanta, Georgia, to discuss the operators' actions, which defeated an engineering safety feature following a reactor trip even though a valid start signal was present. Also discussed, was the failure to follow procedures which contributed to the event. The event occurred on April 16, 1993, at the North Anna Power Station.

Opening remarks, concerning the purpose of the meeting, were presented by

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Mr. L. A. Reyes, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region II (RII). Mr. G. R.

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Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff, RII, i

provided a discussion of the NRC Enforcement Policy. An overview of the issue and a discussion of the apparent violation were presented by Mr. E. W.

Merschoff, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, RII.

Following these remarks, VEPC0 gave a presentation, Enclosure 3, on the issue.

An introduction to the VEPCO's presentation was given by Mr. J. P. O'Hanlon, i

Vice President, Nuclear Operations. The management perspective of the issue

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was given by Mr. G. E. Kane, Station Manager, North Anna Power Station (NAPS).

The chronology of the event as viewed by the operators was given by Mr. R. H.

Tillack, Jr., Unit Supervisor - Senior Reactor Operator, NAPS and Mr. S. B.

Clements, Reactor Operator, NAPS. A presentation of the root cause, corrective actions and safety significance of the event was given by Mr. D. A.

Heacock, Assistant Station Manager - Nuclear Safety and Licensing, NAPS.

j Closing remarks were provided by Mr. O'Hanlon.

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Following a question and answer period, the NRC closed the meeting by thanking VEPC0 for their presentation and stating that the presentation had served to enhance the NRC's understanding of the issue and VEPC0's corrective actions.

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ENCLOSURE 3

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VIRGINIA POWER

North Anna Power Station Enforcement Conference May 20,1993

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AGENDA

. INTRODUCTION J. P. O'HANLON MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE G. E. KANE CHRONOLOGY R. H. TITJ ACK/

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S. B. CLEMENTS ROOT CAUSE, D. A. HEACOCK CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND

. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

' CLOSING REMARKS J. P. O'HANLON

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MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE VIRGINIA POWER G.E.KANE STATION MANAGER

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MANAGEMENT STANDARDS All communications must ensure accuracy, l

completeness and understanding of information to facilitate the effective implementation of

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procedures The unit SRO shall maintain a broad

perspective of conditions affecting the safety of the unit as a matter of highest priority at all times The unit SRO shall not become involved in any

single operation that may cause distraction when multiple operations are required in the Control Room Procedure compliance is required

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MANAGEMENT ISSUES Communications, command and control by the

crew after the trip Understanding / implementation of existing

Emergency Procedures Adequacy of training as it applies to team

performance AEOD performed assessment and we will

review the final report to identify possible enhancements Industry and management review of simulator

l performance is routinely performed and input from these assessments is used to improve crew performance

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OPERATING CREW ORGANIZATION CHART

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ADVISOR UNIT 1 SRO/

PROCEDURE UNIT 2 SRO READER UNIT 2 CONTROL UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR -

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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 07:00 Shift Turnover - Crew assumed the Shift 07:16:45 Reactor trip due to turbine trip. The turbine trip was caused by a malfunction in the Main Generator voltage regulator circuitry - crew enters 2-E-0, " Reactor Trip and Safety Injection" and performs immediate actions 07:16:51 AFW pumps auto start on Lo-Lo S/G level 07:20 Crew transitions to 2-ES-0.1, " Reactor Trip Response" (Tavg at nominal no-load temperature of 547 F, total AFW flow exceeds 1400 gpm)

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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS L

07:26 Tavg decreased to approximately 540 F

Steam Generator Narrow Range levels are:

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A - 5%,

B - 12%,

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AFW flow still exceeds 1400 gpm Verified Main Feedwater is available to feed Steam Generators AMSAC is reset and AFW pumps secured and defeated in an attempt to stop cooldown

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07:45 Step 12, "STOP AFW PUMPS" is reached in ES-0.1. Procedure reader (SRO) notes AFW Pumps are defeated and immediately informs

Shift Supervisor who directs pumps to be returned to AUTO.

All S/Gs levels were greater than 20%. Tavg is stable at 548 F

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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 08:30 Transitioned to 2-OP-3.2, Unit stable in Mode

with steam dumps in steam pressure mode, MFRV bypasses in AUTO

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ROOT CAUSE, CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE VIRGINIA POWER D.A.HEACOCK Assistant Station Manager - NS&L

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r ROOT CAUSE Insufficient command and control of the unit

trip response and inadequate communications

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between the operations crew members resulted in defeating the AFW pump, when a valid start

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signal was present CONTRIBUTING CAUSES Improper. implementation of the company policy

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on defeating automatic safety functions

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Management expectation of communications and

problem solving utilizing all crew members was

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not. effectively conveyed

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

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The directly involved operators were removed

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from licensed duties and are receiving remediation designed to enhance their control room communication skills.

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Event is being discussed as part of the Licensed

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Operator Requalification Program

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

  • Operations personnel have been reinstructed on the correct method of re-entering a procedure step.when step related conditions change subsequent to leaving that step
  • Operations personnel have been reinstructed on the policy on defeating automatic safety functions
  • Operations personnel have been reinstructed on

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the application of nomenclature used in procedures

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i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS L

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  • Team building / communications training:

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Management will ensure observations of crew simulator training stress improved communications and team problem solving

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Distractors will be interjected into training

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sessions to allow the crew to observe and

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correct the situation

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SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE Heat Sink was maintained throughout the event,

and therefore, minimal safety consequences resulted from the event

Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps auto. start capability was disabled for approximately 19 minutes but

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could have been made available immediately by

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manual operator action

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Auxiliary Feedwater System was always under

cognizance of Licensed Operator l

Main Feedwater was available and used to

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SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE T

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2-ES-0.1, " Reactor Trip Response", identified and corrected the situation i

Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps were immediately

returned to automatic in accordance with the Action Statement of the Technical Specifications when identified The STA and licensed operators would have

immediately identified any Loss of Heat Sink

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and 2-FR-H.1," Response to Loss of Heat Sink"

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l would have directed the Operator to restore l

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CONCLUSIONS Event was licensee identified

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AFW Pumps were immediately returned to

. automatic in accordance with Technical Specifications when identified by the crew Significance of this event was recognized by

management and promptly reported to the NRC

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Virginia Power Nuclear Safety Policy restricts

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the defeating of automatic safety functions

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CONCLUSIONS Event had minimal safety significance

Event is considered to be an isolated

occurrence Effective corrective action to address

- management issues has been implemented Corrective action associated with Licensed

Operator.Requalification Program training is being implemented l

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