IR 05000335/1998005
| ML17229A727 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 05/04/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17229A726 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-98-05, 50-335-98-5, 50-389-98-05, 50-389-98-5, NUDOCS 9805210223 | |
| Download: ML17229A727 (56) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONNISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos:
License Nos:
50-335, 50-389 DPR-67, NPF-16 Report No:
50-335/98-05.
50-389/98-05 Licensee:
Facility:
Florida Power and Light Company St. Lucie Plant Units 1 and
Location:
7585 S.
Highway A1A Jensen Beach.
FL 34957 Dates:
Harch 16-20.
1998 Inspectors:
W. Sartor, Exercise Team Leader J.
Kreh; Radiation Specialist G. Salyers, Emergency Preparedness Specialist Approved by:
K. Barr, Chief, Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety 98052i gggg033S, PDR ADOCK 05
Enclosure
l:
I
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ST.
LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-335/98-05 and 50-389/98-05 This routine, announced inspection was the observation and evaluation of the biennial emergency preparedness exercise for the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant.
This NRC/FEMA-evaluated exercise was a plume exposure pathway exercise with offsite participation by the State of Florida, St. Lucie County, and Hartin County.
The exercise was conducted on March 18, 1998, from 7:30 a.m. to 2:55 p.m.
This report summarizes the observations of the three-person NRC team that assessed the adequacy of the licensee's emergency preparedness program as it implemented its emergency plan and procedures in response to the simulated accident.
A separate FEMA report will be issued that evaluates the performance of the State and counties.
NRC Region II also participated in this exercise with a base team and site team.
The NRC team observed the licensee's response in the Control Room Simulator (CRS), the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operational Support Center (OSC),
and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
Based on the performance observed, the team concluded that the licensee successfully demonstrated its ability to implement the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.
Pro ram Areas Evaluated and Results Scenario--The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for testing the integrated emergency response capability.
Demonstration of site accountability and evacuation of non-essential personnel were not objectives for this exercise.
(P4.1)
Control Room Simulator --The Nuclear Plant Supervisor/Emergency Coordinator and his CRS staff were effective in performing initial emergency responsibilities.
(P4.2.b. 1)
Technical Support Center--The Emergency Coordinator and staff made good use of engineering resources in developing strategies to mitigate accident conditions.
However, they were not pro-active in pursuing alternate repair paths should their primary repair actions not be effective.
(P4:2.1.2)
Operational Support Center--The OSC functioned adequately and rofessionally.
The lack of. repair team mission assignments from the SC resulted in the OSC Supervisor not being challenged in the management of the OSC's response effort.
The licensee identified that the non-licensed operators were not tracked by the OSC to insure their avoidance of radiological conditions when appropriate.
(P4.2.b.3)
Emergency Operations Facility--The EOF functioned efficiently and professionally.
Appropriate and timely protective action recommendations were communicated to the State and local authorities.
(P4.2.b.4)
Re ort Details IV. Plant Su ort Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness (EP)
Exercise Scenario Ins ection Sco e
82302 The inspectors reviewed the exercise scenario to determine whether provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements of the licensee's Emergency Plan.'bservations and Findin s The licensee submitted the objectives for this exercise with a letter to the NRC dated December 31.
1997.
The scenario package was submitted with a letter dated January 27 '998.
A review of the package indicated that the scenario was adequate to exercise. the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of'he licensee and provided sufficient information to the offsite agencies for their participation in the exercise.
Areas of the plan specifically exempted from demonstration during the exercise included onsite personnel accountability and site evacuation of non-essential personnel.
Conclusion The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for testing the integrated emergency capability.
Onsite personnel accountability and site evacuation of non-essential personne1 were specifically exempted from demonstration.
Emer enc Res onse Faci lit ERF Observations and Criti ue Exercise Evaluation Sco e
82301 During this inspection, the inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's biennial, full-participation emergency preparedness exercise in the Control Room Simulator (CRS), Technical Support Center (TSC),
Operational Support Center (OSC).
and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
The inspectors assessed licensee recognition of abnormal plant conditions, classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies, development of protective action recommendations (PARs),
command and control, communications, and the overall implementation of the Emergency Plan.
In addition, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to evaluate the licensee's self-assessment of, the exercise.
Acceptance criteria are contained in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 'he licensee's Emergency Plan and associated implementing procedures.
and NRC guidance contained in NUREG-0654/FENA-REP-1.
Revision 1, "Criteria for Preparation and
I
Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants".
ERF Observations Findin s and Faci lit Criti ues b. 1 Control Room Simulator Observation and Findin s The CRS shift was provided a turnover briefing at 7: 10 a.m.
and assumed shift responsibilities at approximately 7:30 a.m.
The Nuclear Plant Supervisor (NPS) and shift operating staff represented the first line of response to the simulated abnormal conditions which began at 8: 15 a.m.
At that time the CRS received a loose parts monitor alarm on the 2A1 cold leg which cleared shortly thereafter.
Numerous discussions followed between the NPS. the Assistant Nuclear Plant Supervisor (ANPS),
and the Shift Technical Assistant (STA) regarding the need for a chemistry sample.
Shortly after 8:30 a.m. the decision to get a
chemistry sample was made.
When the request was made to chemistry at 8:48 a.m.. results were provided within 15 minutes since chemistry sampling had been required due to events occurring before shift turnover.
Further discussions between the NPS and the STA led to identification of the chemistry results as being off-normal high.
The NPS declared an Alert at 9:08 a.m.,
and assumed responsibilities as the Emergency Coordinator (EC).
The Emergency Plan and Procedures, and Abnormal Operating Procedures were effectively used by the EC and shift personnel in their response.
The inspector noted that the
'lassification was correct, notifications were timely, and the emergency response organization (ERO) was promptly notified to activate the emergency response facilities (ERFs).
The EC provided periodic briefings to the CRS shift until relieved of the EC responsibilities by the Technical Support Center (TSC)
EC at 9:45 a.m.
No further observations were made by the inspectors from the CRS.
Conclusion The Nuclear Plant Supervisor/Emergency Coordinator and his CRS shift were effective in performing initial emergency responsibilities.
b.2 Technical Su ort Center Observations and Findin s The TSC was promptly. staffed after the 9:08 a.m. Alert declaration.
Personnel began arriving within minutes of the Alert, and by 9:45 a.m.
the TSC was fully activated.
The inspector observed that appropriate dosimetry was issued to the oncoming staff and, facility radiological habitability surveys were routinely performed.
Upon activation, the TSC Emergency Coordinator (EC) assumed the responsibility of emergency classification from the CRS.
While still in an Alert, the EC, in consultation with the EOF Recovery Manager (RH),
correctly upgraded the emergency classification to a General Emergency (GE) at 10:24 a.m.
when two out of the three fission product barriers were lost and containment pressure was increasing with both containment spray pumps out of service (imminent loss of the third barrier).
The inspector observed the EC exercise effective command and control.
TSC briefings conducted by the EC were consistently clear, thorough.
and sufficiently frequent.
Each briefing was announced several minutes prior to beginning to allow the TSC staff an opportunity to prepare. All key functional managers in the TSC participated in the briefings.
The EC's Assistant, using a microphone.
preannounced upcoming briefs.
The inspector noted that the concept was good, but the use of the microphone was too loud, too frequent, and often overrode other announcements or important communications.
The preannouncements distracted from the operation of the TSC.
The TSC staff worked well together to determine effective mitigating actions with good technical analysis and conservative decisions.
Communication among the TSC staff was good.
Upon arriving in the TSC. the dose assessment staff promptly performed an offsite dose assessment.
The staff continued to monitor changing radiological conditions within the plant and performed dose assessments in response to those changes.
The Health Physics Supervisor continuously monitored plume direction and radiation readings in anticipation of evacuating and relocating the OSC.
The inspector observed that the licensee's procedure did not provide guidance as to when to relocate the OSC in the event of worsening radiological habitability conditions.
The Problem Solving Team was very creative in continuously using the System Parameter Display System (SPDS) computer, system prints, and procedure to pursue alternative success paths to circumvent scenario-induced failures.
As an example, they cross-tied the 2A2 load center to 282 and lined up 2B Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) to 2B Containment Spray Header.
The licensee's scenario package had postulated four mini-scenarios that would necessitate repair/damage control missions as a result of the initial conditions and accident sequence.
As it played out during the exercise.
the EC directed the OSC to pursue only one of. the four mini-scenarios as a damage control mission.
Although this did not impact the outcome of this scenario, the licensee and inspectors concluded that a
more pro-active pursuit of parallel or alternate repair paths would have been appropriate.
This conclusion was made even though drill control artificiality contributed to the TSC decision to not pursue some expected success paths.
As an example, after the Recirculation Actuation Signal, a high radiation reading inside the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
pump room was communicated to the players as a
b.3 high radiation reading outside the ECCS pump room.
Consequently the TSC chose not to dispatch a repair team from the OSC to repair the A Containment Spray (CS)
Pump.
The TSC status boards were maintained satisfactorily:
however, the status of OSC repair teams could be improved with more frequent updates.
Conclusions The Emergency Coordinator and staff made good use of engineering resources in developing strategies to mitigate accident conditions.
However. they were not pro-active in pursuing alternate repair paths should their primary repair actions not be effective.
0 erational Su ort Center Observations and Findin s At 9:08 a.m, an announcement via the plant public-address system (PA)
stated that an Alert had been declared; a follow-up PA announcement at 9: 12 a.m. directed ERF responders to report to the TSC and OSC.
By 9:25 a.m.,
the OSC was staffed with its procedurally specified minimum complement of 19 persons (including 12 health physics
[HP] technicians)
and was declared operational by the OSC Supervisor, well within the applicable time limit.
The OSC functioned adequately and professionally.
Status boards were well maintained, and in-plant repair teams (known as "re-entry" teams at St. Lucie) were effectively tracked.
Re-entry teams requested by the TSC were expeditiously formed and dispatched from the OSC.
The work load for the OSC was relatively lights with only four teams requested by the TSC.
Of these, only one performed a repair/damage control mission; the other three teams obtained samples (from the reactor coolant system and the plant vent)
and performed radiological assessments.
Despite this low level of activity (or perhaps because of it), the OSC Supervisor did not demonstrate an appropriate level of command and control, and appeared to be essentially uninvolved in the management of-the OSC's response effort.
For example, he did not conduct facility briefings as specified by Section 3. 1.5 of EPIP-05, but instead relied upon the TSC updates provided through an audiovisual link to the OSC.
On the other hand, several useful diagnostic discussions were initiated by members of the OSC management team.
Also, the HP Supervisor was attentive from the outset to the possibility that OSC habitability could be jeopardized by a radiological release because of the OSC's generally downwind position relative to the plant vent during the entirety of the (simulated) accident.
Equipment and supplies available at the OSC in support of the licensee's response to the simulated emergency were fully adequate.
The licensee noted during its critique process of the OSC
=
that the non-licensed operators were not tracked by the OSC to ensure thei r avoidance of radiological conditions when appropriate.
Conclusion The OSC functioned adequately and professionally.
The lack of repair team mission assignments from the TSC resulted in the OSC Supervisor not being challenged in the management of the OSC's response effort.
The licensee identified that the non-licensed operators were not tracked by the OSC to ensure their avoidance of radiological conditions when appropriate.
b.4 Emer enc 0 erations Faci lit Observation and Findin s Neither the staffing and activation nor the earlier operation of the EOF were observed by the NRC inspection team.
A review of information available however.
indicated the EOF was operational at 10:24 a.m., just three minutes after the TSC declared the General Emergency.
The activation appeared to be well coordinated -with the TSC because the EOF was able to make the notifications for the GE and it contained the appropriate protective.action recommendations (PARs).
The RH in the EOF maintained a good interface with the State of Florida via the Governor'
Authorized Representative in the EOF.
The EOF staff demonstrated the ability to control and coordinate the flow of information regarding off-site. radiological consequences with State radiological assessment personnel.
The EOF functioned well in providing the offsite interface and providing a continuing assessment of the radiological conditions to ensure PARs were modified when appropriate.
Conclusion The EOF functioned efficiently and professionally.
Appropriate and timely protective action recommendations were communicated to State and local authorities.
b.5 Licensee Faci lit Criti ues Following the exercise, the licensee conducted facility critiques in which the players provided their own assessment of their perf'ormance and identified areas that needed improvement.
The post-exercise critiques in the TSC, OSC, and EOF were observed by the inspectors and were observed to be thorough, open, and self-critical.
Deficiencies as well as strengths were self-identified by the exercise participants.
The inspectors also observed major portions of the licensee's controller/evaluator critique of the exercise.
The inspectors determined that the critique was comprehensive and adequately addressed weaknesses identified in the licensee's emergency response program during this exercise.
Exit Meeting Summary V. Mana ement Meetin s The Team Leader presented the inspection summary to licensee management on March 20, 1998.
The summary indicated the exercise was satisfactory; however a pro-active pursuit of parallel or. alternate repair paths and better control of the non-licensed operators provided areas for improvement.
Licensee Methodology for Dose Assessment and PARs During post-exercise discussions with licensee personnel, the inspectors ascertained that the methodology used by the licensee for deriving PARs was not consistent with current Federal guidance as presented in EPA 400. entitled
"Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents".
This guidance, which licensees were supposed to have implemented several years ago, specifies that decisions regarding protective actions for the public should be based on projected radiation doses that are avoidable.
and should not consider doses that have already been received by members of the public.
The inspectors discovered that St. Lucie's PAR methodology included doses already received in addition to projected doses in determining whether dose criteria for evacuation have been exceeded.
Licensee management stated that this was the methodology expressly preferred by the State.
Subsequent
.to the inspection, the NRC's.independent follow-up discussions with State of Florida officials confirmed that the PAR methodology described above was the approach currently used by the State.
and was basically unchanged since the early 1980s.
Because it included doses already received (i.e., unavoidable dose), it was a more conservative approach, although a case could be made that such an approach could lead to an unnecessary evacuation of the public to avoid a projected dose which would not alone meet the dose criteria for evacuation.
The NRC's determination is that the methodology for deriving PARs, as used by Florida Power and Light and Florida Power Corporation, is reasonable and conservative for protection of the public health and safety.
and that no additional NRC follow-up is needed at this time.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee M. Allen, Training Manager C. Bible, Engjneering Manager W. Bladow, Quality Manager J. Carpenter, Simulator Lead Controller G. Casto, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor D. Fadden, Services Manager D. Huey, Emergency Preparedness Lead Auditor S.
Knapp.
Emergency Preparedness Coordinator R. McCullers. Health Physics Supervisor R. Mothena, Manager, Plant Services J. Scarola.
Plant General Manager
.M.
Snyder
. Work Control Supervisor J. Stall. Site Vice President R. Walker, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator E.
Weinkam. Licensing Manager D. Whitwell, Technical Training Supervisor D. Wooldridge, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 82301:
Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors IP 82302:
Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED NONE Attachment (10 pages):
Objectives and Scenario Timeline
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1998 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUALEXERCISE MARCH 18, 1998 OBJECTIVES The St. Lucie Plant (PSL) 1998 Annual Exercise objectives are based upon Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements provided in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness forProduction and U&%zation Facilities. Additional guidance provided in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, Criteria forPreparation and Evaluate'on ofRadiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support ofNuclear Po~er Plants, was utilized in developing the objectives.
The exercise willbe conducted and evaluated using a realistic basis foractivities.
Scenario events willescalate to a General Emergency.
The following objectives forthe exercise are consistent with the aforementioned documents:
A. A
'de A s men d Cla ifica ion 1. Demonstrate the abilityto assess accident conditions.
2. Demonstrate the ability,to identify initiating conditions, determine Emergency
'Action Level (EAL)parameters and correctly classify the emergency throughout the exercise.
B. ~otification 1. Demonstrate the abilityto alert, notify and mobilize Florida Power and Light (FPL) emergency response personnel.
2. Demonstrate the abilityto alert and notify non-emergency response personnel.
3. Demonstrate appropriate procedures for both initial and follow-up notifications.
4. Demonstrate the capability to promptly notifythe State of Florida and Local Authorities of an emergency declaration or change in emergency classification.
5. Demonstrate the capability to promptly notifythe U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of an emergency or change in emergency classification 6. Demonstrate the abilityto provide accurate and timely information to State, Local, and Federal Authorities concerning class ofemergency; plant status/conditions, and whether a radioactive release is in progress, as appropriate.
7. Demonstrate the ability to provide periodic plant status updates to State,
. ~Local, and Federal Authorities.
FPL/PSL'8-EX/Rev.1
C. Communications
~ Demonstrate the availability and operability of emergency communications equipment for notification of State, Local, and Federal Authorities.
2. Demonstrate the means to provide follow-up information to State, Local, and Federal Authorities.
3.- Demonstrate the availability and operability of communications equipment in the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) for interfacility communications.
4. Demonstrate the availability and operability of emergency communications equipment necessary for offsite monitoring activities.
5. Demonstrate the means to acquire meteorological data necessary for emergency response.
0 E r
nc es n
2.
Demonstrate staffing of ERFs.
Demonstrate the timely activation ofthe Technical Support Center (TSC),
Operational Support Center (OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
3. Demonstrate the functional and operational adequacy ofthe Emergency Response Facilities, TSC, OSC, and EOF.
4. Demonstrate the ability of each Emergency Response Facility Manager to maintain command and control over the emergency response activities conducted within the facilitythroughout the exercise.
5. Demonstrate the ability of each facilitymanager to periodically inform facility personnel ofthe status ofthe emergency situation and plant conditions.
6. Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of Emergency Coordinator (EC)
responsibilities from the Nuclear Plant Supervisor (NPS) to designated senior plant management and transfer of prescribed responsibilities to the Recovery Manager (RM).
7. Demonstrate the abilityto promptly and accurately transfer information between ERFs.
8. Demonstrate the ability ofthe TSC to request, prioritize and control Emergency Response Teams (ERTs) in a timely manner.
9. Demonstrate the ability ofthe OSC to assemble, dispatch and control ERTs in a timely manner.
FPVPSL 98-EXIRev.1
10.
Demonstrate the capability for development ofthe appropriate Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) forthe general public within the 10 Mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
11. Demonstrate that the appropriate PARs can be communicated to State and Local Authorities within the regulatory time constraints.
'.
diplo icalAssessm n and Ex osur o
rol 1. Demonstrate the coordinated gathering ofradiological and non-radiological (meteorological) data necessary for emergency response, including collection and analysis of in-plant surveys and samples, as applicable.
2. Demonstrate the capability to calculate radiological release dose projections and perform timely and accurate dose assessment, as appropriate.
3. Demonstrate the abilityto compare onsite and off-site dose projections to Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) and determine and recommend the appropriate protective actions.
4. Demonstrate the abilityto provide dosimetry to emergency response personnel as required and adequately track personnel exposure.
5. Demonstrate the capability to confirm and periodically assess the habitability
'ofthe onsite ERFs.
6. Demonstrate the capability for onsite contamination control.
7. Demonstrate the abilityto adequately control radiation exposure to onsite emergency workers, as appropriate to radiological conditions.
8. Demonstrate the abilityto control and coordinate the flowof information regarding off-site radiological consequences between radiological assessment personnel stationed at the TSC and EOF.
9. Demonstrate the ability offield monitoring teams to respond to and analyze an airborne radiological release through direct radiation measurements in the environment, as appropriate.
- 10. Demonstrate the abilityto assemble and dispatch field monitoring teams.
11. Demonstrate the collection and analysis of air samples and provisions for effective communications and recordkeeping, as appropriate.
12. Demonstrate the abilityto control and coordinate the flowof information regarding off-site radiological consequences with State radiological assessment personnel in the EOF.
FPL/PSL 98-EX/Rev.1
F.
Qecovery 1. Demonstrate initial considerations for long term staffing ofthe FPL Emergency Response Organization.
2. Demonstrate initialconsiderations for de-escalation with State, County, and Federal (NRC) officials.
1. Demonstrate the timely and accurate response to news inquiries.
2. Demonstrate the abilityto brief the media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner.
3. Demonstrate the abilityto coordinate the preparation, review, and release of public information with State and l ocal Government Agencies, as appropriate.
H. gvalu~ai 1. Demonstrate abilityto conduct a post-drill critique to determine area's requiring improvement or corrective action.
I:
~Trainin 1. Provide the opportunity to assess the progress of upgraded training for members ofthe PSL Emergency Response Organization.
Areas ofthe PSL Emergency Plan that wi!I~NO be demonstrated during this exercise include:
1. Site evacuation of non-essential personnel 2. Onsite personnel accountability (other than TSC and OSC)
3. Actual shift turnover (long term shift assignments willbe demonstrated by rasters).
4. Actual drawing of a sample utilizingthe Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS).
5. Actual entry into contaminated or high radiation areas.
FPL/PSL 98-EX/Re v.1
FLORIDAPOWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1998 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUALEXERCISE MARCH18, 199&
3.2 Scenario Time Line Turnover Unit1 is operating at100% power. Allwork is progressing as scheduled in the POD.
Unit 2 is returning to 100'lo power following maintenance on 58 feedwater heater and is on a continuing 202 day uninterrupted run. The following equipment is out of service:
A QRP alarm was received at 0600. The NPS contacted Chemistry to begin RCS sampling as a result. The initiation of RCS sampling is scheduled to start after 0800 (at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> followingthe alarm).
2A Containment Spray train is out ofservice (OOS) for motor replacement and valve preventative maintenance.
The 2A Containment Spray system was placed on clearance at 0100 on March 17 and the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> limiting condition for operation (LCO) clock initiated at that time. The new pump motor is placed and wired. Test rotation, coupling, alignment, and testing are anticipated to be completed by 1600 today.
Unit 2 Reactor AuxiliaryBuilding (RAB) normal ventilation supply fan HVS-4A is OOS for motor replacement.
The motor was placed on clearance at 1600 on March 17 and the 7-day LCO clock started at that time.
Power Operated Relief valve (PORV) V-1476 is closed and has power removed because of problems to the valve. Power Operated Relief valve (PORV) V-1477 is closed due to excessive leakage on V-1475.
Atabout1000 this morning, a crew of 1 non-licensed operator, 1 IC Spec.,
and 1 HP are scheduled to make a containment entry to investigate a reoccurring low pressure alarm on 2A1 SIT. (ANN R-1 was received 2 times over the past 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and cleared after repressurizing all SITs.)
Meteorological Conditions are as follow:
o Skies are partly cloudy.
o The 0800 temperature is 78 degrees F.
o Wind is from the north (about 5 degrees) at 4-6 mph.
o Stability class is E.
FPUPSL PSL 98-X/Rev: 3
FLORIDAPOWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT.
1998 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUALEXERCISE Page 2 of 6 The forecast fortoday is for northeasterly winds at about10 mph. Skies willcontinue partly cloudy with the chance of rain at less than 20%. Seas willbe running at 2-3 feet. Bays and inland waters willhave a tight chop.
EVENT¹1 0815 0830 The Control Room (Simulator) receives a loose parts monitor alarm on the 2A1 cold leg. The alarm clears..A second alarm is received in the reactor vessel. Italso clears.
No repeat alarms are received.
V
" Chemistry is performing periodic RCS sampling as a result ofthe return to fullpower. Atabout this time, a sample should be taken.
(NOTE TO CONTROLLERS: dependant on actual sampling time, this event time may change.)
0900 Chemistry reports that the Unit 2 RCS sample results are 280 uci/ml Dose Equivalent (DE) I-131.
0915 An ALERTshould be declared at about this time. A controlled shutdown should begin in accordance with (IAW)Off-normal Operating Procedure (ONOP) 2-01200032 "Excessive Reactor Coolant Activity".
Notifications to the State and Counties willactually occur over the Hot Ring Down (HRD) telephone or (in case of actual out ofservice) alternate means.
Initial notification to the NRC over the Emergency Notification System (ENS) willactually occur.
0920 Emergency Response Facilities should be activated via plant PA at about this time.
EVENT
¹2'940 The Control Room (Simulator) receives another loose parts monitor alarm on the 2A1 cold Ieg. The alarm again clears.
0945 The Control Room receives a high vibration alarm on Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 2A1. The alarm clears, but intermittently comes back in and clears.
Itshould appear that RCP seal degradation is in progress.
1000 The Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operational Support Center (OSC) should be operational by about this time.
FPL/PSL PSL 98-X/Rev. 3
, FLORIDAPOWER AND I lGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1998 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUALEXERCISE Page 3 of 6 CONTROLLER NOTE: This event should occur after checking with the drill master controller to ensure the EC duties have been transferred from the Control Room to the EC in the TSC. The event is really not dependent on where the plant is in the down power and may be held up, ifnecessary.
EVENT¹3,
.1015 A Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)occurs in containment as a result ofan RCS cold leg (2A1) break.
The reactor and turbine are tripped. Within minutes, a "reactor cavity leakage high" annunciator indicates leakage.
Containment pressure, temperature, and radiation levels increase and RCS pressure decrease.
Afterstandard post-trip actions, the operations crew enters Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) 2-EOP-03, LOCA.
During the trip, feed breaker (2-20402) to the 2B2 and 2B5 480 VoltLoad Centers opens and deenergizes the 282 and 285 Load Centers.
Operators stabilize the plant and requestassistance from the TSC and OSC.'
Operations and Electrical personnel are dispatched to investigate.
'-
CONTROLLERS NOTE: The breaker mock up in the Nuclear Training Center should be used by repair teams responding to this event.
Following Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) and Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS), the remaining RCP's are secured when Pressurizer (PZR) pressure falls below 1300 psia and a natural circulation cool down has been established.
The Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System (RVLMS)indicates head voiding. Safety Injection Tanks (SIT's) are injecting.
Additional substantial mechanical damage occurs to fuel cladding resulting from pressurized thermal shock to already damaged fuel (foreign material fretting). Activityreleased from the core willapproach approximately 15/o gas gap levels.
The 28 Containment Spray Pump starts, then stops, failingto supply water on receipt of Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS). Containment temperature, pressure, and radiation levels continue to increase because ofthe lack of Containment Spray and only two available Containment Coolers.
FPUPSL PSL 98-X/Rev. 3
FLORIDAPOWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1998 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUALEXERCISE Page4of 6
. 1030 1100 EVENT¹4 1115 NOTE: Transfer of responsibilities from the EC to the Recovery Manager
'(RM) in the EOF could occur around the time ofthe LOCA. DO NOT PROMPT TO DELAYTURNOVER. Evaluate the decisions ofthe EC and RM to determine when transfer of duties should o'ccur based on the events in progress.
The event should now be upgraded to a SITE AREA EMERGENCY by the EC at about this time based on leakage greater than the capacity ofthe available charging pumps.
The EOF should be operational by about this time, State and county representatives should have responded to the EOF and arrive at this time or shortly thereafter.
The Emergency News Center (ENC) staff should be preparing to receive media.
It is likelythat some protective actions willbe issued by the Martin or St.
Lucie County at SITE AREA EMERGENCY. Results ofthese discussions should be relayed back to the TSC.
C High Containment Pressure, combined with heat related stresses on the steel liner, causes a loss of containment integrity between the Unit 2 Containment and the Shield Building via a failure of penetration welds. As radioactivity escapes into the shield building, HVE 6 A pick up and vent the release through the plant vent. Due to the large volume ofthe Shield Building, the source term activity willtake some time to substantially affect offsite dose estimates.
1130 1130 NRC representatives should arrive to the EOF at about this time. All NRC Site Response Team members should report to the EOF prior to responding to the site. (This should demonstrate a more realistic coordination between NRC, FPL, and county responders in planning access to the site following.a site evacuation and/or PARs issued by the county.)
The release pathway should be observable at about this time. Plant Vent effluent monitors begin a marked increase.
This release willcontinue throughout the exercise.
FPL/PSL PSL 98-NRev. 3
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1998 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUALEXERCISE PAGE 5 OF 6 Recirculation Actuation System (RAS) should occur at about this time.
Area Radiation Monitors in the Reactor AuxiliaryBuilding (RAB) should alarm to indicate increased dose rates.
1145 A GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared by about this time based on loss of 3 fission product barriers. Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) should be issued upon considering plant conditions and off-site dose calculations.
1215 1230 CONTROLLERS NOTE: Plant conditions indicate that minimum PARs only should be issued (SHELTER 0-2 (CR) and 2-5 (DW) ). This is based on CETs < 700 deg., core protection capability maintained, and CHRRMs < 4.2 E 4 R/hr). As offsite dose calculations increase to exceed Protective Action Guide (PAG) recommendations at 1 mile (> 1 Rem TEDE or >5 Rem CDE), EVACUATIONPARs should be issued.
I,'I Ator after this time, offsite dose calculations should indicate that increased PARs should be issued based on exceeding PAGs at 1 mite.
Wind direction down the Indian River prevents field teams from following the leading edge ofthe plume until it reaches the western shore ofthe river near the St,. Lucie/Martin County line.
Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) have stabilized the leak and covered the core.
The highest CHRRM readings, and effluent monitor readings should have occured at about this time and begin to drop inside Containment.
A long term release (through the Shield Building) will continue through the exercise as the large volume in the Shield Building willtake some time to evacuate.
EVENT¹5 1300 Power may be restored to the 2B2 and 2B5 480 VoltLoad Centers by repairing/replacing feed breaker 2-20402 by this time. When HVE 6B is started, itwillmechanically fail.
CONTROLLER NOTE: Efforts wiltbe allowed, as willother imaginative efforts to terminate the release, but release willnot be terminated during the drill.
FPL/PSL PSL 98-X/Rev. 3
FLORIDAPOWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1998 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUALEXERCISE Page6of6 1330 1400 EVENT¹6 1500 Cool down, depressurization, and/or Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI)
have refilled the reactor vessel.
Containment pressure and offsite doses
~ are declining slowly, but continue through the Plant Vent as HVE 6A continues to pull the radioactive release from the Shield Building.
Long term prognosis for shut down and initial recovery discussions of Unit 2 should have occurred by this time. State, County and NRC officials should have been briefed on the conditions at the plant and considerations for eventual de-escalation may be discussed.
The exercise may be terminated after this time based on the decision of the master controller and lead facilitycontrollers after reviewing the exercise objectives.
Detailed in-facilitycritiques willbe conducted followingtermination ofthe exercise.
FPL/PSL PSL 98-X/Rev. 3
gag RECy
~o Cp
~v
SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS.
50-335/98-05 AND 50-389/98-05
Dear Hr. Plunkett:
On March 20.
1998. the NRC completed an inspection at your St. Lucie Nuclear Plant.
The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection.
During the week of March 16-ZO, 1998.
an inspectioh team observed selected portions of your emergency organization's response in key facilities during the emergency preparedness plume exposure exercise conducted on March 18, 1998.
The emergency.response observed during the simulated accident was considered satisfactory.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2 '90 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice,"
a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room'.
Sincerely, Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389 License Nos.
Enclosure:
NRC,Inspection Report
REGION II==
Docket Nos:
License Nos:
50-335.
50-389 DPR-67.
NPF-16 Report No:
50-335/98-05.
50-389/98-05
'icensee:
Florida Power and Light Company Facility:
St. Lucie Plant Units 1 and
Location:
7585 S.
Highway AlA Jensen Beach, FL 34957 Dates:
March 16-20.
1998 Inspectors:
W. Sartor.
Exercise Team Leader J.
Kreh. Radiation Specialist G. Salyers.
Emergency Preparedness Specialist, Approved by:
K. Barr, Chief, Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Encl osure
b.
Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants
.
ERF Observations Findin s and Faci lit Criti ues b.l Control Room Simulator Observation and Findin s The CRS shift was provided a turnover briefing at 7:10 a.m.
and assumed shift responsibilities at approximately 7:30 a.m.
The Nuclear Plant Supervisor (NPS)
and shift operating staff represented the first line of response to the simulated abnormal conditions'which began at 8:15 a.m.
At that time the CRS received a loose parts monitor alarm on the 2Al cold leg which cleared shortly thereafter.
Numerous discussions followed between the NPS, the Assistant Nuclear Plant Supervisor (ANPS).
and the Shift Technical Assistant (STA) regarding the need for a
chemistry sample.
Shortly after 8:30 a.m. the decision to get a
chemistry sample was made.
When the request was made to chemistry at 8:48 a.m., results were provided within 15 minutes since chemistry sampling had been required due to events occurring before shift turnover.
Further discussions between the NPS and the STA led to identification of the chemistry results as being off-normal high.
The NPS declared an Alert at 9:08 a.m..
and assumed responsibilities as the Emergency Coordinator (EC).
The Emergency Plan and Procedures.
and Abnormal Operating Procedures were effectively used by the EC and shift personnel in their response.
The inspector noted that the classification was correct. notifications were timely, and the emergency response organization (ERO) was promptly notified to activate the emergency response facilities (ERFs).
The EC provided periodic briefings to the CRS shift until relieved of the EC responsibilities by the Technical Support Center (TSC)
EC at 9:45 a.m.
No further observations were made by the inspectors from the CRS.
Conclus ion The Nuclear Plant Supervisor/Emergency Coordinator and his CRS shift were effective in performing initial emergency responsibilities.
b.2 Technical Su ort Center Observations and Findin s The TSC was promptly staffed after the 9:08 a.m. Alert declaration.
Personnel began arriving within minutes of the Alert, and by 9:45 a.m.
the TSC was fully activated.
The inspector observed that appropriate dosimetry was issued to the oncoming staff and, facility radiological habitability surveys were routinely performed.
Upon activation. the TSC Emergency Coordinator (EC)
assumed the responsibility of emergency classification from the CRS.
While still in
. ay Alert. the EC. in consultation with the EOF Recovery Hanager (RN),
correctly upgraded the emergency classification to a General Emergency (GE) at 10:24 a.m.
when two out of the three fission product barriers were lost and containment pressure was increasing with both containment spray pumps out of service (imminent loss of the third barrier).
The inspector observed the EC exercise effective command and control.
TSC briefings conducted by the EC were consistently clear, thorough, and sufficiently frequent.
Each briefing was announced several minutes prior to beginning to allow the TSC staff an opportunity to prepare. All key functional managers in the TSC participated in the briefings.
The EC's Assistant, using a microphone.
preannounced upcoming briefs.
The inspector noted that the concept was good; but the use of the'icrophone was too loud, too frequent, and often overrode other announcements or important communications.
The preannouncements distracted from the operation of the TSC.
The TSC staff worked well together to determine effective mitigating actions with good technical analysis and conservative decisions.
Communication among the TSC staff was good.
Upon arriving in the TSC. the dose assessment staff promptly performed an offsite dose assessment.
The staff continued to monitor changing radiological conditions within the plant and performed dose assessments in response to those changes.
The Health Physics Supervisor continuously monitored plume direction and radiation readings in anticipation of evacuating and relocating the OSC.
The inspector observed that the licensee's procedure did not provide guidance as to when to relocate the OSC in the event of worsening radiological habitability conditions.
The Problem Solving Team was very creative in continuously using the System Parameter Display System (SPDS) computer, system prints, and procedure to pursue alternative success paths to circumvent scenario-induced failures's an example, they cross-tied the 2A2 load center to 282 and lined up 28 Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) to 28 Containment Spray Header.
The licensee's scenario package had postulated four mini-scenarios that would necessitate repair/damage control missions as a result of the initial conditions and accident sequence.
As it played out during the exercise, the EC directed the OSC to pursue only one of the four mini-scenarios as a damage control mission.
Although this did not impact the outcome of this scenario.
the licensee and inspectors concluded that a
more pro-active pursuit of parallel or alternate repair paths would have been appropriate.
This conclusion was made even though drill control artificiality contributed to the TSC decision to not pursue some expected success paths.
As an example. after the Recirculation Actuation Signal, a high radiation reading inside the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
pump room was communicated to the players as a
b.3 high radiation reading outside the ECCS pump room.
Consequently the TSC chose not to dispatch a repair team from the OSC to repair the A Containment Spray (CS)
Pump.
The TSC status boards were maintained satisfactorily; however. the status of OSC repair teams could be improved with more frequent updates.
Conclusions The Emergency Coordinator and staff made good use of'ngineering resources in developing strategies to mitigate accident conditions.
However, they were not pro-active in pursuing alternate repair paths should their primary repair actions not be effective.
0 erational Su ort Center Observations and Findin s At 9:08 a.m.
an announcement via the plant public-address system (PA)
stated that an Alert had been declared:
a follow-up PA announcement at 9:12 a.m. directed ERF responders to report to the TSC and OSC.
By 9:25 a.m.. the OSC was staffed with its procedurally specified minimum complement of 19 persons (including 12 health physics
[HP3 technicians)
and was declared operational by the OSC Supervisor.
well within the applicable time limit.
The OSC functioned adequately and professionally.
Status boards were
.
well maintained.
and in-plant repair teams (known as "re-entry" teams 'at St. Lucie) were effectively tracked.
Re-entry teams requested by the TSC were expeditiously formed and dispatched from the OSC.
The work
. load for the OSC was relatively light, with only four teams requested by the TSC.
Of these, only one performed a repair/damage control mission:
the other three teams obtained samples (from the reactor coolant system and the plant vent)
and performed radiological assessments.
Despite this low level of activity (or perhaps because of it). the OSC Supervisor did not demonstrate an appropriate level of command and control, and appeared to be essentially uninvolved in the management of the OSC's response effort.
For example.
he did not conduct facility briefings as specified by Section 3.1.5 of EPIP-05, but instead relied upon the TSC updates provided through an audiovisual link to the OSC.
On the other hand, several useful diagnostic discussions were initiated by members of the OSC management team.
Also. the HP Supervisor was attentive from the outset to the possibility that OSC habitability could be jeopardized by a radiological release because of the OSC's generally downwind position relative to the plant vent during the entirety of the (simulated) accident.
Equipment and supplies available at the OSC in support of the licensee's response to the simulated emergency were fully adequate.
The licensee noted during its critique process of the OSC that the non-licensed operators were not tracked by the OSC to ensure their avoidance of radiological conditions when appropriate.
Conclusion The OSC functioned adequately and professionally.
The lack of repair team mission assignments from the TSC resulted in the OSC Supervisor not being challenged in the management of the OSC's response effort.
The licensee identified that the non-licensed operators were not tracked by the OSC to ensure their avoidance of radiological conditions when appropriate.
b.4 Emer enc 0 erations Facilit Observation and Findin s Neither the staffing and activation nor the earlier operation of the EOF were observed by the NRC inspection team.
A review of informatioW available however. indicated the EOF was operational at 10:24 a.m., just three minutes after the TSC declared the General Emergency.
The activation appeared to be well coordinated with the TSC because the EOF was able to make the notifications for the GE and it contained the appropriate protective action recommendations (PARs).
The RN in the EOF maintained a good interface with the State of Florida via the Governor'
Authorized Representative in the EOF.
The EOF staff demonstrated the ability to control and coordinate the flow of information regarding off-site radiological consequences with State radiological assessment personnel.
The EOF functioned well in providing the'ffsite interface and providing a continuing 'assessment
'of the radiological conditions to ensure PARs were modified when appropriate.
Q)~nlu~si in The EOF functioned efficiently and professionally.
Appropriate and timely protective action recommendations were communicated to State and local authorities.
b.5 i ens e Facilit Criti ues Following the exercise, the licensee conducted facility critiques in which the players provided their own assessment of their performance and identified areas that needed improvement.
The post-exercise critiques in the TSC.
OSC.
and EOF were observed by the inspectors and were observed to be thorough, open.
and self-critical.
Oeficiencies as well as strengths were self-identified by the exercise participants.
The inspectors also observed major portions of the licensee's controller/evaluator critique of the exercise.
The inspectors determined that the critique was comprehensive and adequately addressed weaknesses identified in the licensee's emergency response program during this exercise.
p4 P4.1 a
~
C.
P4.2 Re ort Oetai ls IV. Plant Su ort Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness (EP)
Exercise Scenario Ins ection Sco e
82302 The inspectors reviewed the exercise scenario to determine whether provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements of the licensee's Emergency Plan.
Observations and Findin s The licensee submitted the objectives for this exercise with a letter to the NRC dated Oecember 31, 1997.
The scenario package was submitted with a letter dated January 27, 1998.
A review of the package indicated that the scenario was adequate to exercise the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient information to the offsite agencies for their participation in the exercise.
Areas of the plan specifically exempted from demonstration during the exercise included onsite personnel accountability and site evacuation of-non-essential personnel.
Conclusion The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for testing the integrated emergency capability.
Onsite personnel accountability and site evacuation of non-essential personnel were specifically exempted from demonstration.
Emer enc Res onse Facilit RF Observations and Criti ue Ex reise valuation Sco e 82301 Ouring this inspection, the inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's biennial, full-participation emergency preparedness exercise in the Control Room Simulator (CRS)
~ Technical Support Center (TSC)
~
Operational Support Center (OSC).
and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
The inspectors assessed licensee recognition of abnormal plant conditions.. classification of emergency conditions. notification of offsite agencies, development of protective action recommendations (PARs),
command and control. communications.
and the overall implementation of the Emergency Plan.
In addition, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to evaluate the licensee's self-assessment of the exercise.
Acceptance criteria are contained in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. the licensee's Emergency Plan and associated implementing procedures, and NRC guidance contained in l)IREG-0654/FEN-REP-1.
Revision 1, "Criteria for Preparation and
Exit Meeting Summary V. Mana ement Meetin s The Team Leader presented the inspection summary to licensee management on March 20.
1998.
The summary indicated the exercise,was satisfactory:
however a pro-active pursuit of parallel or alternate repair paths and better control of the non-licensed operators provided areas for improvement.
Licensee Methodology for Oose Assessment and PARs Ouring post-exercise discussions with licensee personnel, the inspectors ascertained that the methodology used by the licensee for deriving PARs was not consistent with current Federal guidance as presented in EPA 400, entitled
"Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents-.
This guidance, which licensees were supposed to have implemented several years ago, specifies that decisions regarding protective actions for the public should be based on projected radiation doses that are avoidable, and should not consider doses that have already been received by members of the public.
The inspectors discovered that St. Lucie's PAR methodology included doses already received in addition to projected doses in determining whether dose criteria for evacuation have been exceeded.
Licensee management stated that this was the methodology expressly preferred by the State.
Subsequent to the inspection.
the NRC's independent follow-up discussions with State of Florida officials confirmed that the PAR methodology described above was the approach currently used by the State, and was basically unchanged since the early 1980s.
Because it included doses already received (i.e.. unavoidable dose), it was a more conservative approach, although a case could be made that such an approach could lead to an unnecessary evacuation of the public to avoid a projected dose which would not alone meet the dose criteria for evacuation.
The NRC's determination is that the methodology for deriving PARs.
as used by Florida Power and Light and Florida Power Corporation, is reasonable and conservative for protection of the public health and safety, and that no additional NRC follow-up is needed at this time.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED I/
\\
Licensee H. Allen, Training Manager C. Bible, Engineering Manager W. Bladow, Quality Manager J. Carpenter, Simulator Lead Controller G. Casto.
Emergency Preparedness Supervisor D. Fadden.'ervices Manager D. Huey.
Emergency Preparedness Lead Auditor S.
Knapp, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator R. McCullers, Health Physics Supervisor R. Hothena, Manager, Plant Services J. Scarola, Plant General Manager H. Snyder, Work Control Supervisor.
J. Stall. Site Vice President R. Walker, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator E.
Weinkam. Licensing Manager D. Whitwell, Technical Training Supervisor D. Wooldridge, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 82301:'valuation of Exercises'for Power Reactors IP 82302:
Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED.
CLOSED.
AND DISCUSSED NONE Attachment (10 pages):
Objectives and Scenario Timeline
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ST.
LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-335/98-05 and 50-389/98-05 This routine, announced inspection was the observation and evaluation of the biennial emergency preparedness exercise for the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant.
This NRC/FEMA-evaluated exercise was a plume exposure pathway exercise with offsite participation by the State of Florida't. Lucie County, and Martin County.
The exercise was conducted on March 18.
1998, from 7:30 a.m. to 2:55 p.m.
.This report summarizes the observations of the three-person NRC team that 'assessed the adequacy of the licensee's emergency preparedness program as it implemented its emergency plan and procedures in response to the simulated accident.
A separate FEMA report will be'issued that evaluates the performance of the State and counties.
NRC Region II also participated in this exercise with a base team and site team.
The NRC team observed the licensee's response in the Control Room Simulator (CRS). the Technical Support Center (TSC). the Operational Support Center (OSC),
and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
Based on the performance observed, the team concluded that the licensee successfully demonstrated its ability to implement the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.
Pro ram Areas Evaluated and Results Scenario--The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for testing the integrated emergency response capability.
Demonstration of'ite accountability and evacuation of non-essential personnel were not objectives for this exercise.
(P4.1)
Control Room Simulator --The Nuclear Plant Supervisor/Emergency Coordinator and his CRS staff were effective in performing initial emergency responsibilities.
(P4.2.b.1)
Technical Support Center--The Emergency. Coordinator and staff made good use of engineering resources in developing strategies to mitigate accident conditions.
However, they were not pro-active in pursuing alternate repair paths should their primary repair actions not be effective.
(P4.2.b.2)
Operational Support Center--The OSC functioned adequately and rofessionally.
The lack of repair team mission assignments from the SC resulted in the OSC Supervisor not being challenged in the management of the OSC's response effort.
The licensee identified that the non-licensed operators were not tracked by the OSC to insure their avoidance of radiological conditions when appropriate.
(P4.2.b.3)
Emergency Operations Facility--The EOF functioned efficiently and professionally.
Appropriate and timely protective action recommendations were communicated to the State and local authorities.
(P4.2.b.4)
FLORIDAPOWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1998 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUALEXERCISE MARCH18, 1998 OBJECTIVES The St. Lucie Plant (PSL) 1998 Annual Exercise objectives are based upon Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements provided in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness forProduction and Utilization Facilities. Additional guidance provided in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, Criteria forPreparation and Evaluation ofRadiologica/Emergency Response Plans and Preparednessin Support'of Nuclear Power Plants, was utilized in developing the objectives.
The exercise willbe conducted and evaluated using a realistic basis for activities.
Scenario events willescalate to a General Emergency.
The following objectives forthe exercise are consistent withthe aforementioned documents:
A. Acciden Assessment nd Classification 1. Demonstrate the abilityto assess accident conditions.
.
2. Demonstrate the abilityto identify initiating conditions, determine Emergency Action Level (EAL)parameters and correctly classify the emergency throughout the exercise.
B. ~No jgca~tio 1. Demonstrate the abilityto alert, notifyand mobilize Florida Power and Light (FPL) emergency response personnel.
2. Demonstrate the abilityto alert and notifynon-emergency response personnel.
3. Demonstrate a ppropriate procedures for both initial and follow-up noNications.
4. Demonstrate the capability to promptly notifythe State of Florida and Local Authorities of an emergency declaration or change in emergency classification.
5. 'Demonstrate the capability to promptly notifythe U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of an emergency or change in emergency classification.
6. Demonstrate the abilityto provide accurate and timely information to State, Local, and Federal Authorities concerning class of emergency, plant status/conditions, and whether a radioactive release is in progress, as appropriate.
7. Demonstrate the abilityto provide periodic plant status updates to State,
. - Local, and Federal Authorities.
FPLIPSL 98-EX/Re v.1
10.
Demonstrate the capability for development ofthe appropriate Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) forthe general public withinthe 10 Mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
11. Demonstrate that the appropriate PARs can be communicated to State and Local Authorities withinthe regulatory time constraints.
E. Radiolo ical Asse sment and Ex osure Control 1. Demonstrate the coordinated gathering ofradiological and non-radiological (meteorological) data necessary for emergency res ponse, including collection and analysis of in-plant surveys and samples, as applicable.
2. Demonstrate the capability to calculate radiological release dose projections and perform timely and accurate dose assessment, as appropriate.
3. Demonstrate the abilityto compare onsite and off-site dose projections to Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) and determine and recommend the appropriate protective actions.
4. Demonstrate the abilityto provide dosimetry to emergency response personnel as required and adequately track personnel exposure.
5. Demonstrate the capability to confirm and periodically assess the habitability ofthe onsite ERFs.
6. Demonstrate the capability for onsite contamination control.
7. Demonstrate the abilityto adequately control radiation exposure to onsite emergency workers, as appropriate to radiological conditions.
8. Demonstrate the abilityto control and coordinate the flowof information
'egarding off-site radiological consequences between radiological assessment personnel stationed at the TSC and EOF.
9. Demonstrate the ability offield monitoring teams to respond to and analyze an.
airborne radiological release through direct radiation measurements in the environment, as appropriate.
10. Demonstrate the abilityto assemble and dispatch field monitoring teams.
11. Demonstrate the collection and analysis of air samples and provisions for effective communications and recordkeeping, as appropriate.
12. Demonstrate the abilityto control and coordinate the flowof information regarding off-site radiological consequences with State radiological assessment personnel in the EOF.
FPL/PSL 98-EX/Rev.1
)
C. Communications 1. Demonstrate the availability and operability ofemergency communications equipment for notification of State, Local, and Federal Authorities.
2. Demonstrate the means to provide follow-up information to State, Local, and Federal Authorities.
3. Demonstrate the availability and operability of communications equipment in the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) for interfacility communications.
4. Demonstrate the availability and operability ofemergency communications equipment necessary for offsite monitoring activities.
5. Demonstrate the means to acquire meteorological data necessary for emergency response.
D. Em r enc Res ons 1. Demonstrate staffing of ERFs.
2. Demonstrate the timely activation ofthe Technical Support Center (TSC),
Operational Support Center (OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
3. Demonstrate the functional and operational adequacy ofthe Emergency Response Facilities, TSC, OSC, and EOF.
4. Demonstrate the ability ofeach Emergency Response Facility Manager to maintain command and control over the emergenc'y response activities conducted withinthe facilitythroughout the exercise.
5. Demonstrate the ability ofeach facilitymanager to periodically inform facility personnel ofthe statu~f the emergency situation and plant conditions.
'.
Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of Emergency Coordinator (EC)
responsibilities from the Nuclear Plant Supervisor (NPS) to designated senior plant management and transfer ofprescribed responsibilities to the Recovery Manager (RM).
7. Demonstrate the abilityto promptly and accurately transfer information between ERFs.
8. Demonstrate the ability ofthe TSC to request, prioritize and control Emergency Response Teams (ERTs) in a timely manner.
9. Demonstrate the ability ofthe OSC to assemble, dispatch and control ERTs in a timely manner.
FPL/PSL 98-EX/Rev.1
F.
~ecoveree e
1. Demonstrate initial considerations for long term staffing ofthe FPL Emergency Response Organization.
2. Demonstrate inibal considerations for de-escalation with State, County, and Federal (NRC) officials.
G.
Public nformation 1. Demonstrate the timely and accurate response to news inquiries.
2. Demonstrate the abilityto briefthe media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner.
3. Demonstrate the abilityto coordinate the preparation, review, and release of public information with State and Local Government Agencies, as appropriate.
H. Evaluation 1. Demonstrate abilityto conduct a post-drill critique to determine areas requiring improvement or corrective action.
I:
~Tra inin 1. Provide the opportunity to assess the progress of upgraded training for members ofthe PSL Emergency Response Organization.
Areas ofthe. PSL Emergency Plan that willNOT be demonstrated during this exercise include:
1. Site evacuation ofnon-essential personnel
" 2. Onsite personnel accountability (other than TSC and OSC)
3. Actual shiftturnover (long term shift assignments willbe demonstratedby rosters).
4. Actual drawing of a sample utilizingthe Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS).
5. Actual entry into contaminated or high radiation areas.
FPLtPSL 98-EXlRev.1
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1998 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUALEXERCISE MARCH18, 1998 3.2 Scenario Time Line Turnover Unit1 is operating at100% power. Allwork is progressing as scheduled in the POD.
Unit 2 is returning to 100'/o power followingmaintenance on 5B feedwater heater and is on a continuing 202 day uninterrupted run. The following equipment is out ofservice:
A QRP alarm was received at 0600. The NPS contacted Chemistry to begin RCS sampling as a result. The initiation of RCS sampling is scheduled to start after 0800 (at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> followingthe alarm).
2A Containment Spray train is out ofservice (OOS} for motor replacement and valve preventative maintenance.
The 2A Containment Spray system was placed on clearance at 0100 on March 17 and the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> limiting condition for operation {LCO)clock initiated at that time. The new pump motor is placed and wired. Test rotation, coupling, alignment, and testing are anticipated to be completed by 1600 today, Unit 2 Reactor AuxiliaryBuilding (RAB) normal ventilation supply fan HVS-4A is OOS for motor replacement.
The motor was placed on clearance at 1600 on March 17 and the 7-day LCO clock started at that time.
Power Operated Relief valve (PORV) V-1476 is closed and has power removed because ofproblems to the valve. Power Operated Relief valve (PORV) V-1477 is closed due to excessive leakage on V-1475.
Atabout1000 this morning, a crew of 1 non-licensed operator, 1 IC Spec.,
and 1 HP are scheduled to make a containment entry to investigate a reoccurring low pressure alarm on 2A1 SIT. (ANN R-1 was received 2 times over the past 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and cleared after repressurizing all SITs.}
Meteorological Conditions are as follow:
o Skies are partly cloudy.
o The 0800 temperature is 78 degrees F.
o Wind is from the north (about 5 degrees) at4-6 mph.
o Stability class is E.
FPVPSL PSL 98-X/Rev. 3
~ ~
FLORIDAPOWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
"I998 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUALEXERCISE Page 2 of 6 EVENT¹1 0815 0830 0900 0915 0920 The forecast fortoday is for northeasterly winds at about10 mph. Skies willcontinue partly cloudy withthe chance ofrain at less than 20%. Seas
. willbe running at 2-3 feet. Bays and inland waters willhave a fight chop.
The Control Room (Simulator) receives a loose parts monitor alarm on the 2A1 cold Ieg. The alarm clears.
Asecond alarm is received in the reactor vessel.
Italso clears.
No repeat alarms are received.
Chemistry is performing periodic RCS sampling as a result ofthe return to fullpower. Atabout this time, a sample should be taken.
(NOTE TO CONTROLLERS: dependant on actual sampling time, this event time may change.)
Chemistry reports that the Unit 2 RCS sample results are 280 uci/ml Dose Equivalent (DE) l-131.
l An ALERTshould be declared at abobt this time. Acontrolled shutdown should begin in accordance with (IAW)Off-normal Operating Procedure:
(ONOP) 2-01200032 "Excessive Reactor Coolant Activity".
Notifications to the State and Counties willactually occur over the Hot Ring Down (HRD) telephone or (in case ofactual out ofservice) alternate means.
Initialnotification to the NRC over the Emergency Notification System (ENS) willactually occur.
Emergency Response Facilities should be activated via plant PA at about this time.
EVENT¹2 0940 0945 1000 The Control Room (Simulator) receives another loose parts monitor alarm on the 2A1 cold Ieg. The alarm again clears.
The Control Room receives a high vibration alarm on Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 2A1. The alarm clears, but intermittently comes back in and clears. Itshould appear that RCP seal degradation is in progress.
The Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operational Support Center (OSC) should be operational by about this time.
FPL/PSL PSL 98-X/Rev. 3
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY
.ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
'998 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUALEXERCISE Page 3 of 6
. CONTROLLER NOTE: This event should occur after checking with the drill master controller to ensure the EC duties have been transferred from the
'ontrol Room to the EC in the TSC. The event is really not dependent on where the plant is in the down power and may be held up, ifnecessary.
EVENT¹3 1015 A Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) occurs in containment as a result of an RCS cold leg (2A1) break.
The reactor and turbine are tripped. Within minutes, a "reactor cavity leakage high" annunciator indicates leakage.
Containment pressure,
~ temperature, and radiation levels increase and RCS pressure decrease.
Afterstandard post-trip actions, the operations crew enters Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) 2-EOP-03, LOCA.
.
During the trip, feed breaker (2-20402) to the 282 and 285 480 VoltLoad Centers opens and deenergizes the 282 and 285 Load Centers.
Operators stabilize the plant and request assistance from the TSC and OSC.
Operations and Electrical personnel are dispatched to investigate.
'ONTROLLERS NOTE: The breaker mock up in the Nuclear Training Center should be used by repair teams responding to this event.
Following Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) and Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS), the remaining RCP's are secured when Pressurizer (PZR) pressure falls below 1300 psia and a natural circulation cool down has been established.
The Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System (RVLMS)indicates head voiding. Safety Injection Tanks (SIT's) are injecting.
Additional substantial mechanical damage occurs to fuel cladding resulting from pressurized thermal shock to already damaged fuel (foreign material fretting). Activityreleased from the core willapproach approximately 15% gas gap levels.
The 28 Containment Spray Pump starts, then stops, failingto supply water on receipt of Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS). Containment temperature, pressure, and radiation levels continue to increase because ofthe lack of Containment Spray and only two available Containment Coolers.
FPL/PSL PSL 98-X/Rev. 3
FLORIDAPOWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1998 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUALEXERCISE
.
Page 4 of 6 1030 1100 NOTE: Transfer ofresponsibilities from the EC to the Recovery Manager
'
'(RM) in the EOF could occur around the time ofthe LOCA. DO NOT PROMPT TO DELAYTURNOVER. Evaluate the decisions ofthe EC and RM to determine when transfer of duties should occur based on the events in progress.
The event should now be upgraded to a SITE AREA EMERGENCY by the EC at about this time based on leakage greater than the capacity ofthe available charging pumps.
'he EOF shauld be operational by about this time. State and county representatives should have responded to the EOF and arrive at this time or shortly thereafter.
The Emergency News Center (ENC) staff should be preparing to receive media.
It is likelythat some protective actions willbe issued by the Martin or St.
Lucie County at SITE AREA EMERGENCY. Results ofthese discussions should be relayed back to the TSC.
I'VENTS 1115 High Containment Pressure, combined with heat related stresses on the steel liner, causes a loss of containment integrity between the Unit 2 Containment and the Shield Building via a failure of penetration welds. As radioactivity escapes into the shield building, HVE 6 A pick up and vent the release through the plant vent. Due to the large volume ofthe Shield Building, the source term activity willtake some time to substantially affect offsite dose estimates.
1130 1130 NRC representatives should arrive to the EOF at about this time. AIINRC Site Response Team members should report to the EOF prior to responding to the site. (This should demonstrate a more realistic coordination between NRC, FPL, and county responders in planning access to the site following a site evacuation and/or PARs issued by the county.)
The release pathway should be observable at about this time. Plant Vent effluent monitors begin a marked increase.
This release willcontinue throughout the exercise.
FPL/PSL PSL 9B-XIRev. 3
F'
FLORIDAPOWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1998 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUALEXERCISE PAGE 5 OF 6
. Recirculation Actuation System (RAS) should occur at about this time.
Area Radiation Monitors in the Reactor AuxiliaryBuilding (RAB)should alarm to indicate increased dose rates.
f 1145 A GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared by about this time based on loss of 3 fission product barriers. Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) should be issued upon considering plant conditions and off;site dose calculations.
1215 1230 CONTROLLERS NOTE: Plant conditions indicate that minimum PARs only should be issued. (SHELTER 0-2 (CR) and 2-5 (DW) ). This is based on CETs < 700 deg., core protection ca pability maintained, and CHRRMs < 4.2 E 4 R/hr). As offsite dose calculations increase to exceed Protective Action Guide (PAG) recommendations at 1 mile (> 1 Rem TEDE or >5 Rem CDE), EVACUATIONPARs should be issued.
Ator after this time, offsite dose calculations should indicate that increased PARs should be issued based on exceeding PAGs at1 mile.
Wind direction down the Indian River prevents field teams fromfollowing the leading edge ofthe plume until it reaches the western shore ofthe river near the St. Lucie/Martin County line.
Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) have stabilized the leak and covered the core.
The highest CHRRM readings, and effluent monitor readings shoutd have occured at about this time and begin to drop inside Containment.
A Iong term release (through the Shield Building) will continue through the exercise as the large volume in the Shield Building willtake some time to evacuate.
EVENT45 1300 Power may be restored to the 282 and 285 480 VoltLoad Centers by repairing/replacing feed breaker 2-20402 by this time. When HVE68 is started, itwillmechanically fail.
CONTROLLER NOTE: Efforts willbe allowed, as willother imaginative efforts to terminate the release, but release willnot be terminated during the drill.
FPL/PSL PSL 98-X/Rev. 3
FLORlDAPOWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
~1998 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUALEXERCISE Page 6 of 6 1330 1400 EVENT46 1500 Cool down, depressurization, and/or Low Pressure Safety injection (LPSI)
have refilled the reactor vessel.
Containment pressure and offsite doses are declining slowly, but continue through the Plant Vent as HVE 6A
'ontinues to pull the radioactive release from the Shield Building.
Long term prognosis for shut down and initialrecovery discussions of Unit 2 should have occurred by this time. State, County and NRC officials should have been briefed on the conditions at the plant and considerations for eventual de-escalation may be discussed.
The exercise may be terminated after this time based on the decision of the master controller and lead facilitycontrollers after reviewing the exercise objectives.
Detailed in-facilitycritiques willbe conducted followingtermination ofthe exercise.
FPL/PSL PSL 9B-X/Rev. 3