IR 05000335/1998008
| ML17229A855 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 08/28/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17229A854 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-98-08, 50-335-98-8, 50-389-98-08, 50-389-98-8, NUDOCS 9809090311 | |
| Download: ML17229A855 (21) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos: 50-335 '0-389 License Nos:
DPR-67, NPF-16 Report Nos: 50-335/98-08, 50-389/98-08 Licensee:
Florida Power 5 Light Co.
Facility:
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. Units
Im 2 Location:
6351 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, FL 34957 Dates:
June 28 - August 1, 1998 Inspectors:
M. Widmann. Acting Senior Resident Inspector K. O'Donohue, Acting Senior Resident Inspector D. Lanyi, Resident Inspector G. Warnick
~ Resident Inspector
- In Training Approved by: L. Wert. Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects 9809090311 980828 PDR ADQCK 05000335 G
PDR Enclosure
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units
8
NRC Inspection Report 50-335/98-08, 50-389/98-08 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations.
engineering, maintenance, and plant support.
The report covers a 5-week period of resident inspection and includes inspection by a Division of Reactor Safety inspector in the area of fitness for duty.
~oerati ons
The conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious.
Control room activities were well controlled.
Operator trainees were effectively supervised.
(Section 01.1)
o The licensee identified that a Nuclear Watch Engineer (NWE) exceeded Technical Specification 6.2.2.2.f work hour limits of 24 'hours in a 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period.
The violation was caused by a personnel error involving the overtime computer tracking program.
The licensee's corrective action was prompt and appropriate.
(NCV 50-335.389/98-08-01, Work Hours Exceeded Due To Personnel Error, Section 01.2)
Housekeeping and configuration control for the AFW system was adequate.
Poor communication among the departments delayed resolution of a deficiency involving FME control.
(Section 02. 1)
Maintenance o
Routine maintenance and surveillance activities were satisfactorily performed.
Additionally, the Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System
"D" channel troubleshooting activities were well 'coordinated.
(Section Ml.1)
The licensee adequately verified the operability of the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator during its semiannual fast start test.
The licensee's troubleshooting activities to determine and correct the cause of a slow start were well coordinated and timely.
All Technical Specification requirements were met.
(Section M1.2)
The inspectors concluded that an inadvertent start of the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation System and Shield Ventilation system was due to personnel error.
The licensee's response was appropriate in forming a human factors review team.
The review team was thorough.
(Section M2. 1)
Plant Su ort I
The licensee appropriately notified individuals who tested positive for drugs or alcohol of their appeal rights and followed the implementing procedures as required by 10 CFR 26.28.
(Section S1.3).
Summar of Plant Status Re ort Detail s Both units remained at essentially full power for the entire report period.
Conduct of Operations 01. 1 General Comments 71707 I. 0 erations During this inspection peri.od, the inspectors observed numerous operational activities.
The activities included both control room activities and in-plant operations.
e Several shifts were observed performing routine control room activities.
The inspectors noted that pre-job briefings were detailed and included all personnel involved in the activity.
Three-way communication between operations personnel was generally good.
The inspectors noted that if the communication repeat back response was not readily performed when an alarm was announced.
the announcement was repeated until the appropriate response was received.
The inspectors also noted that although the communications between operations personnel and other departments was adequate, it did not always meet the three-way communications standard.
Operations management informed the inspectors that there is an ongoing effort to improve the communications among all departments.
~
The inspectors observed licensed operator trainees on shift for on-the-job training.
The trainees were constantly monitored when performing control board manipulations.
The inspectors noted that trainees were usually included in the technical discussions as part of their training activity.
The inspectors also noted that the presence of the trainees in the control room did not detract from the licensed operators'ontrol room board attentiveness.
e The inspector observed a plant tour of the Reactor Auxiliary Building performed by a Unit 2 Senior Nuclear Plant Operator (SNPO).
The tour was thorough. with appropriate attention given to system details.
The inspector asked several system and operational questions and noted that the SNPO had sound knowledge of the plant.
The inspector identified several minor deficiencies that the SNPO took actions to correct.
The conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious.
Control room activities were well controlled.
Operator trainees were effectively supervise.2 0 eration Overtime Ins ection Sco e
71707 The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding operations shift manning that resulted in an individual exceeding technical specification work hour limitations.
Observations and Findin s On July 21, the licensee identified, during a review of -security control point printouts, that during July 16, 17 and 18 '
Nuclear Watch Engineer (NWE) worked 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br /> in a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period.
This exceeded the Technical Specification (TS) 6.2.2.f limit of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period.
On July 16. the NWE worked four hours of overtime, beyond his scheduled eight hours, to provide shift coverage for the Fire Brigade Team Leader position on the peak shift.
The overtime tracking computer program was used to verify the overtime was within the TS requirements.
However, the NWE used the "read-only" mode of the program which di'd not allow changes to be saved by the program and after verifying he could work the four hours he minimized the program window.
Later that day, the computer was turned off without saving the new 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> entry.
On July 17. the NWE was asked to work overtime on July 18.
Again, the overtime tracking computer program was used to verify the extra hours could be worked and remain within TS 6.2.2.f work hour limits.
However, because the four hours of overtime worked on July 16 were not saved in the program, the new calculation was inaccurate and it indicated that working July 18 was allowable.
The NWE then worked July 18 which resulted in 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br /> worked in a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period.
The licensee implemented immediate corrective actions that included revising the Nuclear Plant Supervisor's turnover briefing checklist to include verification of working hours prior to starting the shift.
A night order was issued that addressed saving overtime tracking computer program inputs.
The inspectors noted that the immediate corrective actions were appropriate.
The inspectors reviewed the associated paperwork and statements and concluded that the TS 6.2.2.f overtime limits were exceeded due to personnel error.
The inspectors noted that this is the first personnel error with the program application since the overtime tracking computer program was implemented.
Interviews with plant personnel indicated that the licensee's efforts to increase the number of licensed operators, and therefore minimize overtime. is ongoing.
The inspectors also noted that the error was identified by a security computer review performed as part of the licensee's effort to address overtime issues.
TS 6.2.2.f states that the following guidelines shall be followed "..
an individual should not be permitted to work more than...
24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
period in any 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period...."
During,the period of July 16 through July 18 an NWE exceeded that limit when he worked 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br /> in a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period.
Although similar to recent VIO 50-335,389/97-11-01,
"Personnel Violating Technical Specification Overtime Limits," this is not considered an example of inadequate corrective action in that the overtime tracking computer program is generally effective and it was the misapplication by an individual that resulted in.the deficiency.
This non-repetitive, non-willful, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement policy and is identified as NCV 50-335.389/98-08-01,
"Work Hours Exceeded Due to Personnel Error."
c..
Conclusion The licensee identified that a Nuclear Watch Engineer exceeded Technical Specification 6.2.2.2.f work hour limits of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in a 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period.
The deficiency was caused by a personnel error involving the overtime computer tracking program implementation.
The licensee's corrective action was prompt and appropriate.
02.1 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 0 erational Status of the Auxiliar Feedwater S stems Ins ection Sco e (71707)
(37551)
The inspectors performed a walkdown of both units'uxiliary Feedwater (AFW) systems.
Additionally, the inspector reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for consistency and the applicable licensee's procedures.
Observations and Findin s The inspectors reviewed the information in both units'FSARs.
This information was compared with procedural requirements and plant drawings.
No discrepancies were noted.
The inspector then performed a
walkdown of both units'FW systems using AFW and Feedwater system drawings.
The inspectors noted only minor discrepancies such as loose valve handles, valve wrenches hanging on electrical panels and on the condensate storage tank, and several minor labeling deficiencies.
Cleanliness of the area was adequate.
The inspectors identified that a vertically mounted pressure well, PX-12-188, at the suction of the 28 AFW pump was not capped.
The pressure wells on the other three motor driven AFW pumps were capped.
The drawings did not indicate that a cap should be installed on these wells, but the licensee's Foreign Material Exclusion (FNE) area procedure, QI 13-PR/PSL-Z, Revision 36,
"Foreign Material Control, Housekeeping and Cleanliness Control Hethods," section 5.15.3.H, stated
"Open systems or components shall not be left unattended unless openings are covered to
08.1 prevent entry of foreign material."
Although the procedure infer red that the procedure was applicable to ongoing maintenance, the licensee agreed that the pressure well should have an FME cover.
The ceiling of the AFW pump room is the deck grating of the steam trestle.
Therefore.
foreign material could fall into the pressure well. If the well was not inspected before its next use, foreign material could enter the suction of the AFW pump. possibly damaging the pump.
The Assistant Nuclear Plant Supervisor and Assistant Operation Supervisor were informed of this condition on July 22.
The System and Component Engineer and the Engineering Supervisor were informed on July 24, The condition was corrected July 27, by installing'n FME cover over the opening.
The inspectors found the preliminary corrective actions adequate, but questioned why it required five days to complete.
The cause of the delay in addressing the concern was due to poor communications among the site's departments.
Although Operations was given all of the necessary information to address the issue. this information was not communicated to Engineering and Maintenance.
No single group took ownership of the concern for resolution.
The inspectors discussed the communication issues with Operations and Maintenance management on July 29.
All parties agreed that the communications between departments were inadequate.
Maintenance initiated Condition Reports 98-1137 and 98-1153 to address the individual concern, a broader concern that vertical vent pipes and pressure test wells are not consistently capped, and the communications issues.
Other issues identified by the inspectors were promptly and adequately addressed.
Conclusions Housekeeping and configuration control for the AFW system was adequate.
Poor communication among the departments delayed resolution of an identified deficiency involving FME control.
Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)
(92700)
(92902)
Closed VIO 50-389/EA-97-501/01013/01023/01033
"Issues Relating to Unit 2 Containment Cooler Fans."
between May 16, 1997 and October 8, 1997 and Closed LER 50-389/97-007-00 Inoperable Containment Cooling Fan Results in Operation of Facility Outside Design Basis" (92700):
The escalated enforcement action and LER resulted from the licensee's failure to have two operable trains of containment cooling available during operation of Unit 2 in Modes
~ 2, and 3.
In addition, it was
identified that the subject containment coolers did not have adequate post maintenance or surveillance testing performed.
The event was previously inspected and the results detailed in NRC IR 50-335, 389/97-15.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions in the response to the Notice of'iolati,on, and found that all but one corrective action had been completed.
The remaining item was a revision to an annunciator response procedure that is currently being processed by the licensee.
The licensee plans to complete that revision prior to the Unit 2 fall refueling outage.
Based on this review, these violations and LER are closed.
Closed VIO 50-38 /EA-96-249/02014
"Failure to Update Annunciator Response Procedures Following Plant Configuration Management Implementation."'he subject escalated enforcement action resulted from the licensee's failure to adequately review and coordinate changes to the design of the facility.
Specifically, an inadequate configuration control processes failed to ensure that procedures and processes affected by plant modifications were identified and updated in a timely manner to accurately reflect the modifications implemented.
The event was previously inspected and the results detai led in NRC IR 50-335, 389/96-12.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions, committed to in thei r response to the Notice of Violation, and found that all of the corrective actions had been completed satisfactorily.
Based on this review, this violation is closed.
Closed LER 50-335/97-009-00
"Inoperable PORV [Power Operated Relief Valve] Block Valve Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications" (92700):
This LER documented a licensee determination that one PORV block valve was inoperable due to Load Sensitive Behavior (LSB) assumptions used in the St. Lucie Motor Operated Valve (MOV)
program being non-conservative.
The inspector reviewed the LER and the associated corrective actions that included improvements in the MOV program; revised documentation for the GL 89-10 program:
and rework of'he valve stem and wedge, gearbox, torque switch and switch logic.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's corrective actions were adequate to prevent recurrence.
This issue was reviewed in detail as discussed in Inspection Report ( IR)
97-11.
Violation 335,389/97-11-05,
"Failure to Maintain Motor Operated Valve Calculations, Design Documents.
Supporting Test Results, and Equipment Data Base Current and Consistent."
addressed this issue.
This LER is close. 4 Closed LER 50-335/97-010-01
"Inadvertent Core Alteration Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Stuck Control Element Assembly (CEA)"
(92901):
This event was discussed in IR 50-335, 389/ 97-13.
The LER describes the root cause investigation and corrective actions implemented to prevent recurrence.
The corrective actions taken were found to be adequate.
High friction involving the CEA extension shaft was a significant factor in this accident.
As discussed in IR 97-13.
NRC inspectors concluded the unlatching procedure was adequate and personnel followed the procedure.
This LER is closed.
Hl Ml.l II. Maintenance Conduct of Maintenance Maintenance Work Order and Surveillance Observations 61726 62707 Ins ection Sco e
The inspectors observed all or portions of'he following maintenance and surveillance activities.
98013726
98011163
98012383
2-0700051 98013391
98013413
2-1400050 1-1400052 98012998
Auxilia'ry Feedwater Actuation System Cab "D" Failed Monthly Test Trouble Shooting per GHP-21 AFAS Monthly Functional AFAS Monthly Functional Test, Revision
Safety Parameter Display System CRT g3, TCOLD Swings Almost 0.7 Degrees Reactor Protection System
"D" Cabinet Pegged Low Reactor Protection System Monthly Functional Test, Revision 40 Engineered Safeguards Actuation System
- Channel Functional Test, Revision 40 Fuel Handling Radiation Monitor Observations and Findin s The observed maintenance and surveillance activities were completed by personnel knowledgeable of their assigned tasks.
Procedures were present at the work location and being followed.
Procedures provided sufficient detail and guidance for the intended activities.
During the performance of 2-0700051, channel
"D" was found out'of calibration.
The licensee initiated troubleshooting activities to address this condition.
The inspectors noted those troubleshooting efforts were well coordinated.
Troubleshooting activities were performed over a three day,period.
The status of the troubleshooting was accurately communicated to the on-coming crews.
Two loose cables in the RPS
"D" channel drawer were identified as causing AFAS channel
"D" to be out of calibration and the cause for electrical noise seen on RPS channel
"D" and TCOLD channel noise.
After ensuring the cables were
reconnected correctly, the AFAS functional test was completed.
A CR was initiated to review the cause of the loose cables.
The inspectors also noted that Instrumentation and Controls personnel used three way communications and maintained the applicable paperwork per management's expectations.
Conclusions
~ The inspectors concluded that routine maintenance and surveillance activities were satisfactorily performed.
Additionally, AFAS "D" channel troubleshooting activities were well coordinated.
Semi-annual Fast Start of the 1A Emer enc Diesel Generator Ins ection Sco e
61726 The inspectors observed the semi-annual fast start of the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG).
Additionally, the inspectoi s reviewed the subsequent corrective actions due to a failure to start in the required time.
Observations and Findin s On July 2, the licensee performed a fast start of the 1A EDG to meet Technical Specifications (TS) 4.8. 1. 1.2.a, 4.8. 1. 1.2.b, 4.8. 1.1.2.c, and 4.8. 1. 1.2.d requirements.
The inspector verified that Procedure OP 1-2200050A, Revision 40,
"1A Emergency Diesel Generator Periodic Test and General Operating Instructions,"
met all requirements of the aforementioned TS.
The inspector observed the pre-job brief for the evolution.
and determined that all aspects expected to be covered by Procedure AP 0010120 'evision 104,
"Conduct of Operations."
were reviewed and discussed by the crew and supervision.
.The inspector observed the field activities by the Non-Licensed Operators (NLO) in preparation for the load run.
Both NLOs were using a
current revision of the procedure and were following the procedure as written.
Communications between the NLOs and the Control Room were crisp and timely.
The inspector also noted that the Nuclear Plant Supervisor was observing the evolution as a routine part of his duties.
The 1A EDG was appropriately declared out of service to allow the NLOs to complete their pre-start checks.
The inspector observed the start of the lA EDG from the Unit 1 Control Room.
Two operators timed the start using currently calibrated stopwatches.
TS 4.8. 1. 1.2 required the diesel to reach rated speed and voltage within 10 seconds of the start signal.
Past performance on this machine indicated that a time of 8.5 to 9.0 seconds would be expected.
During a fast start, the expected response of the frequency meter is to move from the failed position (approximately at the 65 Hertz mark) to less than 55 Hertz rapidly, and then rapidly rise back to 60 Hertz.
However, during this start, the inspector observed the frequency meter pause at 60 Hertz for greater than one second before proceeding to the
M2 M2. 1 55 Hertz mark.
The time lag was long enough in this instance that one of the watch operators stopped his watch thinking that the diesel had achieved its desired speed.
The other operator timed the start at 10.07 seconds.
This time did not meet the TS requirements.
The licensee decided to complete the surveillance, maintaining the diesel out of service.
A team was assembled to determine the cause of the problem.
Condition Report 98-1019 was initiated.
The remainder of
~ the diesel load run was completed without further incident.
TS 3.8. 1. 1 Action Statement b, required the licensee to demonstrate the operability of the
EDG within eight hours if a common mode failure could not be disproved.
At first the licensee interpreted this as allowing a slow start of the 1B engine to prove operability.
They did not consider that the TS required verifying that a
common mode failure had not occurred on the EDG.
Shortly before midnight, after further discussion with the inspector, the licensee decided to perform a fast start of the 1B EDG to prove operability.
The EDG.started satisfactorily (9.34 seconds)
and operability was substantiated.
Troubleshooting of the 1A EDG started after completion of its load run and continued into the midnight shift.
Initially, the licensee suspected either a governor problem or a sticking frequency meter.
Troubleshooting on the governor indicated no problems.
Since the NPS observed no anomalies with respect to the start of the engine, the licensee suspected the meter.
The meter was replaced and the diesel was restarted successfully (8.57 seconds).
The condition report was dispositioned and the engine was declared operable early on day shift on July 3.
k The inspector reviewed all surveillance records and the condition report disposition and found that all work was completed adequately.
All TS requirements were met.
Conclusions The licensee adequately verified the operability of the 1A EDG during its semi -annual fast star t.
The licensee's troubleshooting activities to determine and correct the cause of a slow start were well coordinated and timely.
All TS requirements were met.
Maintenance and Material Condition Of Facilities and Equipment Radiation Monitor RM-9 Testin Ins ection Sco e 61726 On July 23. instrumentation and controls (18C) journeymen inadvertently started the Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System and realigned the Shield Ventilation System while performing a periodic calibration of the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool area radiation monitors.
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances and the licensee's actions on this issu S1.3 a.
Observations and Findin s On July 23, IKC Journeymen performed the technical specification requi red 18 month calibration on Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool
"A" train area radiation monitors (RIM-26-7, 9, and ll).
The calibration procedures included functional tests of the power supply.
All three radiation
.
monitors have a common power supply.
Mhile installing the test equipment for the power supply test on RIM-26-9. the 18C journeyman plugged in a test adapter in the wrong outlet.
The test adapter consisted of a standard plug on one end and two uninsulated banana plugs on the other end.
The banana plugs were crossed when the test adapter was plugged in and caused a momentary low voltage condition in the power supply. for RIM-26-7, and 11.
The low voltage signal resulted in an invalid start signal for the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation system and Shield Ventilation System.
A human factors review team was formed to determine the root cause and corrective actions.
The inspectors noted that appropriate personnel participated in the team.
The inspectors observed portions of the review team's activities and determined that the review was thorough and independent.
An accurate sequence of events was developed through interviews and written statements.
The inspector examined the test equipment and associated procedures.
The inspectors reviewed the preliminary root cause and contributing causes identified by the team and determined that the significant issues were addressed.
The inspectors also noted that the recommended corrective actions adequately addressed the root cause and contributing causes.
Included as corrective actions was a recommendation for a human performance workshop for maintenance personnel, procedure revision.
manufacturing an improved test adapter and purchasing different test equipment.
The inspectors determined these corrective actions to be adequate.
Conclus ions The inspectors concluded that the inadvertent start of the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation System and Shield Ventilation system was due to personnel error.
The inspectors also concluded that the licensee's response was appropriate in forming a human factors review team.
The review team was thorough.
Conduct of Security and Safeguar ds Activities Fitness for Out Ins ection Sco e
81602 The inspector reviewed the licensee's process for employees who tested positive for drugs or alcohol for comp')iance with 10 CFR 26.2 b.
Obser vations and Findin s The inspector reviewed Fitness for Duty (FFD) procedures for the period of 1994 to present to determine if the provisions of 10 CFR 26 were being met.
FFD-5, "Processing and Reporting Test Results."
Rev.
2.
dated June 13, 1994, stated in.general that individuals will be informed of their right to appeal a positive drug test and have 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from the time of notification to make that request.
Additionally, if the appeal test is confirmed positive. the individual is responsible for payment.
If the confirmed test results reverse the positive determination.
the costs incurred will be the responsibility of Florida Power and Light.
The individual has the opportunity to select a testing laboratory from a list of Department of Hea')th and Human Services approved laboratories.
The split sample is then sent to the chosen laboratory for analysis.
All test results are confirmed by the Medical Review Officer.
The inspectors reviewed the records for 20 individuals who had tested positive for drugs or alcohol during the period of January 1,
1997 to December 12, 1997.
Of those records reviewed, several individual invoked the appeal process.
All records indicated that the licensee followed their appeal process in accordance to the implementing procedure.
Conclusions The licensee appropriately notified individuals who tested positive for drugs or alcohol of their appeal rights and followed the implementing procedures as required by 10 CFR 26.28 V. Mana ement Meetin s and Other Areas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 30, 1998.
The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The security inspection pre-exit was conducted on July 33.,
1998.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identified.
Licensee PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
'. Allen, Training Manager C..Bible. Site Engineering Manager
.
W. Bladow. Site Quality Manager D. Fadden, Services Manager
R. Heroux, Business Manager J. Holt, Maintenance Manager H. Johnson'perations Manager C. Marple. Operations Supervisor A. Stall, St. Lucie Plant Vice President E. Weinkam. Licensing Manager R. West, St. Lucie Plant General Manager.
Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance.
chemistry/radiation, and corporate personnel.
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551 IP 61726 IP 62707 IP 71707 IP 81502 IP 92700 IP 92901 IP 92902 Onsite Engineering Surveillance Observations Maintenance Observations Plant Operations Fitness for Duty Program Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities Followup - Plant Operations Followup - Maintenance
~0ened 50-335,389/98-08-01 Closed 50-335,389/98-08-01 ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED NCV
"Work Hours Exceeded Due to Personnel Error" (Section 01.2)
"Work Hours Exceeded Due to Personnel Error" (Section 01.2)
50-389/EA-97-501/01013 VIO 50-389/EA-97-501/01023 VIO
"Failure to Maintain Two Trains of Containment Coolers Operable as Required By Technical Speci fications" (Section 08.1)
"Failure to Follow Procedure for Post Maintenance Test of Containment Cooler Fan" (Section 08.1)
50-389/EA-97-501/01033 VIO
"Inadequate Survei 1 1 ance Test of Containment
.
Cooler Fans" (Section 08. 1)
50-389/97-007-00 LER
" Inoperable Containment Cooling Fan Results in Operation of Facility Outside Design Basis" (Section 08. 1)
V
~
50-389/EA-96-249/02014 VIO
"Failure to Update Annunciator Response Procedures Following Plant Configuration Management Implementation" (Section 08.2)
50-335/97-009-00 50-335/97-010-01 LER
"Inoperable Power Operated Relief Valve Block Valve Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications" (Section 08.3)
LER
" Inadvertent Core Alteration Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Stuck Control Element Assembly" (Section 08.4)