IR 05000333/1991006
| ML20024G933 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1991 |
| From: | Oconnell P, Pasciak W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024G928 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-91-06, 50-333-91-6, NUDOCS 9105020155 | |
| Download: ML20024G933 (7) | |
Text
.
.
.
I s
U.S. NUCLT.AR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 1 Report No.
50 333/91 06 Docket No.
50 333 i
License No. 0PR-59 Licensee:
New York Power Authority F.o. Box (1-
-
Lycoming, New York 13093-Facility Name: Lames A. FitzPatrick Nuclear-Power Plant -
Inspection At:
Lycoming, New York Inspection Conducted:
March 11 15, 1991 Inspector:
2 8E A N f L'
PT Urconnell Radiation specialist date p o. >b
[- d> - 7/
Approved by a
j W. Pasttik Section Chief Facilities date RadiationkrotectionSect\\on Inspection Summary: Inspection conducted March 11 - 15 1991 ( Inspection ReporFNo. 5F33379T-65 )
Areas inspected: The inspection was a routine unannounced inspection of the radiation
)rotection program. Areas reviewed included: Training Plant Tours, Review of 31 ant Occurrence Re) orts, High Radiation Area Controls, Contamination Controls, and A ARA.
Results:
Within the scope of this inspection one violation and one unresolved item were identified.
The violation involved a failure to lock an area where the intensity of radiation was greater than 1000 mrem /hr.
The unresolved item involved the lack of in place filter testing of-the offgas HEPA filters.
.
P 91054X20155 910426]3 3 gDR ADOCK 05000p
_
_. _ _ _ _ -. _ _ _. _.... _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _. _. _ _ _ _ _ _. _
_ _ _ _
l
.
.
i
Details
)
1.0 Individuals Contacted 1.1 New York Power Authoritj
- E. Alberts, Radiolo ical and Environmental Services Supervisor
'
- T. Bergene, Radiolo ical and Environmental Services Supervisor
- W.FernandeziechnicalTrainingSupervisor Resid nt Manager
- J. Hamblin,
- R. Liseno, Superintendent of Power
- J. McCarty, Radiolo ical and Environmental Services Supervisor
- M. McMahan, Health P ysics General SupervisorRadiolo ical Engineering Gene
- J. Solint
- J. Solowski Radiological and Environmental Services Supervisor ualit Assurance Superintendent
- G. Tasick,R diolo ical and Environmental Services Superintendent
- G. Vargo, 1.2 NRC
- W. Pasclak, Chief,ident inspector FRPS, R. Plasse NRC Res
- W. Schmid [.NRCSeniorResidentinspector
- Denotes those individuals attending the exit meeting on March IS, 1991.
,
!
The inspector also contacted other licensee pimnnel.
2.0 Purpose and Scope of Inspection The inspection was a routine unannounced inspection of the radiation 3rotection program. Areas reviewed included: Trainin
)lant Occurrence Reports, High Radiation Area Contro$s,, Plant Tours}on
Contaminat
~
Controls, and ALARA.
l 3.0 Training i
The inspector reviewed the licensee's General Employee Training (GET)
)rogram.
The initial GET program consists of a proximately three and one i
1alf days of classroom training.
The course be ins with fitness for Duty i
training followed by seven hours of Site Orient tion trainin.
The next day individuals receive seven hours of radiation protection. RP)
'
training.
In the morning session a course on RP theory and undamentals sessionkadiationWorkPermit(RWP5trainingisgiven.gtheafternoonOn the fourth da is given followed by practical-f actor training.- Durin
,
.
respiratory protection training, fLt testing and self monitoring training.
!
are given to those individuals requiring this specific training.
Several examinations are given for the diffeient functional areas covered by GET,
,
with individuals needing at least an 80% to satisfactorily complete the course,
'
l'
!
i I
- _. _ _ _ _ _...., _.. _. _. -.. _.
. _ _.. - _ _, _ _ -
_ _ _ _ _... _ _, _. _......... _,..
., ~. _
'
.
.
j
I
!
The GET requalification program consists of a day and one half of training which focuses on recent plant and procedure changes as well as
'
,
!
recent plant and industry incidents.
-
The inspector reviewed initial GET and requalification GET lesson plans, attendance sheets and course hand outs. The scope of the examinations,idedradiationworkerswasconsistentwiththerequirements
'
training prov
of 10 CFR Part 19 and the recommendations of applicable Regulatory Guides. The inspector reviewed selected personnel training reports and a
to date status of the training. The licensee ensures verified the up duals with up to date RP trainina are allowed into the that only indivi i
Radiologically Controlled Areas (RCA)RP training has expired.of the facility by dosimetry of those individuals whose in
addition individuals cannot get a security badge-without completing i
initialdET. The inspector compared a list of personnel training i
Qompletion dates with dosimetry issue logs and verified that those individuals with expired training completion dates had not been issued
dosimetry. The licensee had an effective program for ensuring that all
'
personnel receive GET.
'
l Early in February 1991 the licensee im)1emented a new RWP program.
The new plogram included several changes witch were significantly different
,
i from the previous program.
Prior to implementation, the licensee scheduled all radiation workers to attend a two hour trainins session on
the new RWP program. After February 1991 the initial GLT anc l
requalification GET included training on the new RWP program.
The inspector reviewed the training on the new RWP program.
The training
.
consisted of a two hour lecture of the program requirements. During the
!
which coincided with a mini-maintenance outage, course of the inspection {he new RWP program with Radiological and the inspector discussed
!
Environmental Services technicians, RES supervisors, and plant and contractor workers from(RES;lvaruous departments.
All individuals were
!
'
knowledqeable of the requirements of the new program. The inspector also reviewec the implementation of the new RWP program throughout the inspection and noted that the licensee was effectively implementing the new program, i
The= inspector reviewed the licensee's program for training RES technicians. The inspector reviewed lesson plans, personnel training
'
records and the RES technician qualification manual. All permanent staff RkS technicians must com l t two week boiling water reactor wori,;i systems training course.p e e a (BWR The technicians must also demonstrate a 1ng knowledge of-the radiological-impact of operating different
- -
systems. The qualification manual contains specific sign-off areas to
.
document that-a RES technician has successfully demonstrated an acceptable level of knowledge of BWR systems.
Discussions with RES J
technicians ind!nted that the technicians were given adequate systems training.
.-
!
!
L
-.., _ -. _ - _ _ _ _ _. _ ~ - - _, _
-_-_
--
. --
r
!
The licensee provided the inspector a list of the proposed toaics for the 1991 RES technician continuing training.
Topics included air >orne radioactivity sampling, asbestos sampling, radioactive material control, i
and dosimetry.
No discrepancies were noted in the licensee's initial or continuing RES technician training program.
The licensee's Technical Specifications require that RES technicians meet the two year working experience requirement of American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 18.1.
This requirement is specified in
)rocedures and the licensee's Radiation Protection Manual.
The Corporate ladiological Control Program Manual requires that the licensee, at a minimum, ensure that technicians meet the Technical Specification requirements and it recommends the use of the more stringent experience requirement of ANSI 3.1.
The 1teensee stated that, informally they have beentryingtohirecontractor?.EStechnicianswhomeettheAN$13.1 experience requirement. The inspector reviewed the qualifications of selected RES technicians, All the technicians met the experience requirement of ANSI 18.1 and several met the requirements of ANSI 3.1.
The licensee's training and qualification program was consistent with Technical Specification requirements.
4.0 Plant Tours The inspector conducted several tours of the facility to verify proper posting of areas including verifying dose rates throughout the plant. The general housekeeping and definition of contaminated areas within the plant was good.
The inspector observed several ongoing work activities within the RCAs of the facility.
Pro >er radiological controls were specified on the governing RWPs for the wor ( activities observed. All work activities observed were conducted in accordance with the RWP.
The licensee was effectively implementing their new RWP program.
5.0 Review of Plant Occurrence Reports (POR)
The inspector reviewed POR 91-068, which involved a hydrogen detonation in the offgas system. While reducing power at approximately 5:00 p.m. on March 8, 1991, the hydrogen recombiner in the offgas system tri) ped offline. A short time later a detonation originating from the )ase of the plant stack was heard. The control room alarm for the offgas filters enunciated and the stack monitor showed a momentary upscale spike.
The licensee inspected the offgss system and noted that an apparent hydrogen detonation had occurred which destroyed the offgas HEPA filters.
During this inspection, the licensee was in the process of inspecting the entire offgas system to ensure that no other structural damage resulted from the detonation.
The licensee was also developin arevent a similar detonation in the future. g corrective actions to The inspector toured the
)ase of the stack reviewed applicable logs and monitor readouts and concluded that the licensee took appropriate immediate corrective actions.
___
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _.
_ _._. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _._ _ _
.
!
.
While reviewing the offgas system desian, the inspector noted that the licensee does not conduct in place testing of the offgas HEPA filters.
The licensee's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) testing the states, in Section 11.4.7 that 'Means are provided for periodically leaktlghtnessand/orperformanceofthefilterswhentheyareinitially i
installed or replaced. Tests during operation consist of taking filter inlet and outlet samples by drawing them through a DOP Particle Octection System to determine filter performance". At the exit meeting on March 1991 the licensee stated that they had not. interpreted Section 15,4.7 of the FSAR as requiring DOP testing of the filters.
11.
The licensee stated that they would re evaluate their program for offgas HEPA filter testing and determine the intent of Section 11.4.7 of the FSAR.
This matter remains unresolved and will be reviewed during a future Effluents Radiation Protection inspection. (50 333/91-06 01)
6.0 Control of High Radiation Areas (HRA)
.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for postina and controlling access to HRAs throughout the facility.
The licensee takes a conservative approach to controlling HRAs by administratively requiring
-
the access to several HRAs in the facility to be kept locked.
The licensee recently installed locked gates around HRAs including the
drywell mezzanine and the tip room mezzanine.
This is considered a good initiative.
The inspector reviewed several radiological incident reports which indicated that the licensee and the NRC Resident inspector noted several l
recent examples of HRAs found unlocked which was contrary to the l
licensee's administrative controls. Most of the examples involved areas which are only administrative 1y required to be locked because the general area dose rate was less than 1000 mrem /hr.
However one exam)1e included a March 9, 'J91 incident in which an individual taped over tie lock to the personnel access gate to the drywell, thereby defeating the locking mechenism.
The individual then left the area.
The personnel access gate was unlocked and positive access control was not maintained into containment for approximately two hours before an operator discovered the defeated lock and secured the personnel access gate.
There were areas inside the personnel access gate in which the intensity of radiation was greater than 1000 mrelq/hr as noted on radiological surveys of the drywell.
The inspector noted that recently the Resident ins)ectors documented a Non-cited Violation for a similar incident where tie steam tunnel had been found unlocked in December 1900.
The failure to maintain the drywell personnel access gate locked is a violation of Technical S)ecification 6.ll.A.1{ which states,-in part, that locked doors shall >e provided to preven unauthorized entry into such areas (i.e., each high radiation area in which the intensity of radiation is greater than 1000 mrem /hr).
(50333/91-06-02)
,
.. u
,--
.m.m.
..
...,..,,.. _,..,
,,_ _..,,,.
_,
rom,.,,_.,,.-
...,.,_
,.,,.m_.,_..,e
, e
,
.wm+___,_,-,.rm..
rv,y,,...
,
.
.
Theinspectordeterminedthat{ionwasnotwarranted.due to the repeat nature of the the use of enforcement discre The licensee stated that they intended to submit a Licensee Event Report (LER) initiated a LER for the March 9, 1991 incident.
It was noted that the licensee had not for the December 1990 incident where the access to the steam tunnci was found unlocked.
At that time the licensee's Plant Operations Review Committee concluded that the incident did not warrant a LER.
The licensee stated that they would review the criteria for issuing LERs.
This item will be reviewed during a future inspection.
7.0 Contamination Controls The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for contamination monitoring of personnel and equipment leaving the RCAs and leaving the site. All equipment leaving the RCAs is manually frisked and all individuals must clear through a personnel contamination monitor prior to exiting the RCAs.
The personnel contamination monitors are source checked daily and calibrated on a quarterly basis.
The inspector reviewed calibration records and no discrepancies were noted.
All individuals leaving the site must pass through an exit portal monitor.
The exit checked quarterly. portal monitor is calibrated semi annually and source The inspector reviewed calibration and source check records and no discrepancies were noted.
The exit >ortal monitors are located in the vicinity of the security guards at tie )lant exit area.
!
The inspector discussed with several security guards lie proper res>onse to a portal monitor alarm. All the security guards were aware of tie procedural requirement to notify the RES department if an individual alarmed the portal monitor on the first and second attempt to pass through the portal monitor.
individuals for contamination prior to leaving theThe licensee had an effective pro RCA or the site.
The inspector reviewed several radiological incident reports and noted that the licensee is making progress in reducing the number of personnel contaminations.
This is considered a program improvement.
8.0 ALARA The inspector reviewed several ALARA reviews for work conducted during the mini outage.
Prior to the start of the mini-outa established an ALARA goal of approximately 45 person ge the licensee rem.
At the end of the inspection period, which was near the scheduled erd of the mini-outage, the licensee was well below the ALARA to date outage goa.
t
The licensee anticipated that they would complete the mini outage with cumulative exposures well below the ALARA goal of 45 person rem.
The ALARA reviews and planning were thorough and well documented.
At the time of the inspection the licensee was still finalizing the 1991 ALARA goal.
The licensee anticipated that the goal would be significant1v less than the 1990 cumulative man rem of 884 person rem.
This item will be reviewed during a future inspection.
9.0 Exit Meeting The inspector inet with licensee representatives (denoted in Section 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on March 15, 1991. The inspector summarized the purpose, scope, and findings of the inspection.
i
%
-
. -