IR 05000333/1983017
| ML20024F723 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 08/18/1983 |
| From: | Doerflein L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024F520 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-83-17, NUDOCS 8309090616 | |
| Download: ML20024F723 (7) | |
Text
.
.
S. NUCLEAR REGULAlCRY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
83-17 Docket No.
50-333 C
License No.
DPR-59 Priority Category
--
Licensee:
Power Authority of the State of New York P. O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Facility Name:
J. A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At:
Scriba, New York Inspection Conducted.
July 1-31, 1983
_
Inspectors:
b
$ f1(o /S"3 L'. T. Doerflein, Resident Inspector
/datd date da Approved by:
htA.4ce
[//eE ff' /f' '3
' Chief Reagbr Projects Section 2C,
'date Division of Project and Resident Programs Inspection Summary:
Inspection on July 1-31, 1983 (Report No. 50-333/83-17)
l Areas Inspected: Routine and reactive inspection during day and backshift hours by one resident inspector (49 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br />) of licensee action on previous inspection findings, operational safety verification, surveillance observations, maintenance
!
observations, licensee event followup, and review of periodic and special reports.
Results: No violations were observed in the areas inspected.
l l
Region I Form 12 (Rev. February 1982)
l 8309090616 830923 PDR ADOCK 05000333 a G
PDR j
.
o DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Baker, Technical Services Superintendent R. Burns, Vice President, Nuclear Support-BWR T. Butler, Outage Ccordinator V. Childs, Assistant Operations Superintendent
- R. Converse, Superintendent of Power M. Cosgrove, Quality Assurance Superintendent
- M. Curling, Training Superintendent W. Fernandez, Maintenance Superintendent
- H. Keith, Instrument and Control Superintendent
- R. Liseno, Operations Superintendent
- C. McNeill, Resident Manager
- E. Mulcahey, Radiological & Environmental Services Superintendent T. Teifke, Security & Safety Superintendent R. Wiese, Assistant Maintenance Superintendent The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during this inspection including shift supervisors, administrative, operations, health physics, security, instrument and control, maintenance and contractor personnel.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed)
INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM (333/82-10-01): The licensee revised LER 82-18 to report the results of the investigation on the four improperly terminated smoke detectors. As a result of this investigation, the licensee implemented Engineering design control and installation procedures for the onsite engineering group to provide more control of modification development and installation. The licensee also revised Administrative Procedure No. 2.3, Procedure for Preoperational Tests, to provide additional controls on the review and approval of preoperational procedures and test results.
(Closed) VIOLATION (333/83-06-06): The inspector reviewed the operations department computerized program for biennial procedure review and approval and verified that all procedures have been reviewed within the last two and one half years. The inspector also reviewed the results of Quality Assurance Audit No. 892, dated June 28, 1983, and verified that an audit was conducted, as comitted to in the licensee's response to the violation, to ensure that each department had a schedule for procedure review and that this schedule was implemented.
(Closed) VIOLATION (333/83-06-07): The inspector verified that the licensee deleted Special Procedure No.14, AC Power Failures. To provide more management control in handling Technical Specification Amendments, the inspector noted that the iicensee revised Administrative Procedure No. 1.9, Control of Technical Specifications, requiring each department superintendent to review Technical Specification Amendments and provide a written sumary to the Resident Manager of the action required to implement the cmendment.
!
.
-
(Closed) UNRESOLVEDITEM(333/83-09-05): The licensee received the material specifications from General Electric for the recirculation system replacement piping and verified that the piping was type 316K.
Based on this documentation, the licensee completed the receipt inspection on May 4, 1983. The inspector reviewed the results of the receipt inspection and the documentation from General Electric and had no further questions.
(Closed)
INSPECTORFOLLOWUPITEM(333/83-15-02): The licensee revised LER 83-21 to correctly indicate that the cause of the missed surveillance was personnel error.
(Closed)
INSPECTORFOLLOWUPITEM(333/83-15-05): As noted in paragraphs 4 and 5 of.this report, the inspector observed portions of the maintenance and subsequent Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) on the B outside containment Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV). The inspector also reviewed the post maintenance LLRT data sheets for the D inboard MSIV and verified that both MSIV's met the Technical Specification limit on leakage.
3.
Operational Safety Verification a.
Control Room Observations Daily, the inspector verified selected plant parameters and equipment availability to ensure compliance with limiting conditions for operation of the plant Technical Specifications. Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being taken.
The inspector observed shift turnovers biweekly to ensure proper control room and shift manning. The inspector direcFv observed the operations listed below to ensure adherence to approved, ocedures:
Issuance of RWP's and Work Request / Event / Deficiency forms
--
No violations were observed.
b.
Shift Logs and Operating Records Selected shift logs and operating records were reviewed to obtain information on plant problems and operations, detect changes and trends in perfonnance, detect possible conflicts with Technical Specifications or regulatory requirements, determine that records are being maintained and reviewed as required, and assess the effectiveness of the commu-nications provided by the logs.
No violations were observed, c.
Plant Tours During the inspection period, the inspector made observations and conducted tours of the plant. During the plant tours, the inspector j
.
.
conducted a visual inspection of selected piping between containment and the isolation valves for leakage or leakage paths. This included verification that manual valves were shut, capped, and locked when required and that motor operated valves were not mechanically blocked.
The inspector also checked fire protection, housekeeping / cleanliness, radiation protection, and physical security conditions to ensure compliance with plant procedures and regulatory requirements.
No violations were observed.
d.
Tagout Verification The inspector verified that the following safety-related protective tagout records (PTR's) were proper by observing the positions of breakers, switches and/or valves.
PTR's 830733 and 830735 on the A and C Emergency Diesel
--
Generators, respectively.
PTR's 830772 and 830774 on the B Residual Heat Removal System.
--
PTR 830831 on Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System valve
--
No violations were observed.
4.
Surveillance Observations The inspector observed portions of the surveillance procedures listed below to verify that the test instrumentation was properly calibrated, approved procedures were used, the work was performed by qualified personnel, limiting conditions for operation were met, and the system Wds Correctly restored following the testing:
F-ST-9B, Emergency Diesel Generator Full Load Test and Emergency
--
Service Water Operability Test, Revision 17, dated November 4, 1982, performed July 12, 1983.
F-5T-39B, Type "B" and "C" LLRT of Containment Penetrations, Revision
--
10, dated May 11, 1983, performed July 12, 13, and 25, 1983.
The inspector observed portions of the post maintenance Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) on the B outside containment Main Steam Isolation Valve (29-A0V-868) and the feedwater outside containment isolation check valves (34-NRV-111AandB). The inspector verified that the leakage across valves 29-A0V-86B and 34-NRV-111B was acceptable. Valve 34-NRV-111A still leaked excessively and had to be reworked. The inspector reviewed the data sheet for the subsequent LLRT on valve 34-NRV-111A and noted that it's leakage was acceptable.
No violations were observed.
.
..
5.
Maintenance Observations a.
The inspector observed portions of various safety-related maintenance activities to determine that redundant components were operable, these activities did not violate the limiting conditions for operation, required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the work, approved procedures were used or the activity was within the " skills of the trade," appropriate radiological controls were properly implemented, ignition / fire prevention controls were properly implemented, and equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to service.
b.
During this inspection period, the following activities were observed:
WR 03/25005 on Scram Pilot Valve preventive maintenance.
--
WR 05/20163 on Reactor Protection System scram relays (5A-K14
--
and 15 relays) preventive maintenance.
WR 27/20015 on the preoperational testing of the Post Accident
--
Sarpling System in accordance with Preoperational Procedure No.
27M, Post Accident Sampling System, Revision 0, dated July 15, 1983.
WR 29/26640 on the repair of Main Steam Isolation Valve 29-A0V-86B.
--
WR 34/25794 on the repair of feedwater containment isolation valve
--
34-NRV-111A.
WR 93/15243 on the annual inspection and preventive maintenance on
--
A and C Emergency Diesel Generators.
No violations were observed.
6.
Licensee Event Followup At about 3:30 p.m. on July 13, 1983, the licensee contaminated the Service Air System when a radioactive waste operator crossconnected the Service Air System with the Condensate Transfer System for approximately six minutes I
total while working on the Waste Collector Filter. The operator was trying to clear a plugged differential pressure transmitter line on the Waste Collector Filter and opened the filter condensate supply (20-A0V-129) and service air supply (20-A0V-121) valves simultaneously. This allowed con-l taminated water from the Condensate Transfer System, which operates at a l
pressure 30 psig greater than the Service Air System, to enter the air header.
The control room operators, aware of the water in the air system as a result of a air system dryer trouble alann, thought the water was being introduced from the Turbine Building Closed Loop Cooling (TBCLC) or Service Water Systems and began draining the air header. Based on a high temperature alarm on the
"C" air compressor and the results of a sample which indicated the water in the air system was of low conductivity, the operators concluded there was a TBCLC to air system leak and secured and isolated the "C" air compressor.
As this apparently coincided with the radioactive waste operator shutting i
valves 20-A0V-121 and 129, stopping the introduction of condensate into the J
.
____
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _
_
.___
.
.
air system, it caused the control room operators to continue to believe that the TBCLC system was the source of the water and they continued to drain the air header through various service air connections. At about 9:00 p.m. it was noted by the control room operators that the floor under one of the connections used to drain the air header in the turbine building was now posted as a contaminated area, the result of a routine survey. A sample taken on the air header confirmed that the water was contaminated at 2.01 E-4 microcuries per milliliter. At 11:35 p.m. on July 14, 1983, con-tamination was also found around a service air connection and on the floor in the pump house screenwell. A sample of the water taken from the air header in the screenwell had an activity of 5.07 E-5 microcuries per milliliter.
All of the water drained from the Service Air header was drained to the floor drains all of which, with the exception of four drains in the screenwell which drain to the discharge canal, are processed as radioactive waste. The operator who drained the air header in the screenwell estimated that he drained approximately ten gallons of water via one of the drains which empties into the discharge canal.
Based upon this volume and the activity of 5.07 E-5 microcuries per mi'liliter, the licensee calculated that a total of 1.91 microcuries were unintentionally released to the environment. No release limits were exceeded.
To prevent recurrence of this event: the licensee implemented a change to procedure F-0P-49, Liquid Radioactive Waste System, to caution operators of the potential for crossconnecting the Condensate Transfer and Service Air Systems in the Radioactive Waste (RW) Building; the licensee submitted a modification proposal to install a check valve in the service air line to the RW building to prevent introduction of condensate into the air system; and all service air connections which could have the potential for releasing radioactive fluids to the environment, were Special Condition tagged to prevent operation without Shift Supervisor permission.
While the Service Air System is contaminated, the licensee has implemented an increased sampling program on the Breathing Air (supplied by Service Air)andtheServiceAirSystems. Samples are taken on breathing and service air twice a day and on the Service Air System moisture whenever available.
To date, no contamination has been identified in the Breathing Air System samples. This increased sampling program will continue until the Service Air System is decontaminated. The inspector will review the results of the licensee's sampling program and decontamination of the Service Air System in a subsequent inspection.
(333/83-17-01) The licensee is also preparing a safety evaluation in accordance with IE Bulletin 80-10, Con-tamination of Nonradioactive System and Resulting Potential for Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release to Environment, to justify continued operation of the contaminated Service Air System. This item is unresolved pending completion of the safety evaluation, PORC approval and subsequent review by the inspector.
(333/83-17-02)
,
.
.
-
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _
.
.
.
.
.
.
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.
7.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special reports. The review included the following:
Inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report information. The following periodic report was reviewed:
June 1983 Operating Status Report, dated July 8, 1983
--
No violations were observed.
8.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviations. The unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 6.
9.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings. On August 1,1983, the inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) and sumarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are described in this report. At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector.
_ _ _ - - - - _ _ - - -. - - - - - -
)