IR 05000322/1979006
| ML20054D920 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/16/1979 |
| From: | Bateman W, Durr J, Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054D908 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-322-79-06, 50-322-79-6, NUDOCS 8204230505 | |
| Download: ML20054D920 (6) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT W %.
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a un vn Report No. 50-322/79-06
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Docket No. 50-322 License No. CPPR-95 Priority --
Category A Licensee:
Long Island Lighting Company
.175 East Old Country Road Hicksville, New York 11801 Facility Name:
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1 Inspection At:
Shoreham, New York Inspection Conducted:
April 9-12,1979 6/7 '?
Inspectors:.
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pjd.P.Durr,ReactorInspector date signed Obka,u---
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W. H. Batedian, Reactor Inspector date tigned Approved By: -' MS
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L. E. Tripp, Chief, Engineering Support date signed Section No. 1, Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Inscection Summary:
Inspection on April 9-12, 1979 (Report No. 50-322/79-06)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by two regional based inspectors of piping installation and storage activities.
The inspection involved 52 inspector-hours on site by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
Three apparent items of noncompliance were identified in the two areas inspected (Infraction - failure to identify lack of penetra-tion in a full penetration weld - paragraph 3; infraction - failure to store equipment in accordance with instructions; and, deficiency -
failure to take prompt corrective action - paragraph 2).
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OETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Long Island Lighting Comoany
- D. M. Durand, Operating QA Engineer
"T. F. Gerecke, QA Manager A. R. Muller, QA Engineer
- E. J. Nicholas, QA Specialist
- J. P. Navarro, Project Manager
"J. H. Taylor, Startup Manager Stone and Webster
- T. Arrington, Superintendent, Field QC
- R. Costa, Project QA Manager
- C. A. Fonseca, Head-Site Engineering Office
- J. Hasset, Senior QC Inspector
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- K. A. Howe, General Superintendent of Construction (UNICO)
Courter and Comoany
- J. Arcuri, Assi t' ant Project Manager, Construction J. Carpanini, QC Inspector
- A. B. Czarnomski, Project Manager
- T. Hamblin, Reactor Pressure Vessel Hydro Coordinator
"J. K. Lemond, Assistant Project Engineer J. Meditz, Training Supervisor
- R. C. Nayar, Project Engineer
- R. P. Oliva, QC Supervisor
- D. W. Papa, QA Manager
- J. Schmit, Assistant Superintendent SQA l
l E. J. Staudte, Construction Manager l
- J. Cockroft, QC
- R. Pulsifer, Resident Site Manager l
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
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2.
Plant Tour
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The inspectors toured the reactor building and containment areas on
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April 9, 1979, observing the pipe rigging, handling, and in place I
storage practices.
They observed the work in progress and discussed the technical aspects of the work with the craftsmen, supervisors, and quality control technicians.
It was noted that the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) turbine and pumps-were being exposed to construction dirt.
Specifically, the turbine and pump gear type couplings were open and covered with dirt; in excess of seven pipe openings were open and unsealed; one shaft bearing housing was open; and the electrical junction box No.
lJB-580 was open.
The inspector interviewed several of the workmen in the immediate area in an effort to determine if work was currently in progress on these items.
None of the workmen interviewed was aware of work in progress on these items.
A review of the maintenance and storage program established that the HPCI unit had been turned over to the LILCO operations group.
When this transfer occurred, the Storage History Card, established and maintained by the construction phase, was transferred to the operations group.
The Operational Quality Assurance Manual, Appendix 4A, requires that either the Storage History Card be continued or an Interim Operating Instruction be issued.
No Interim Operating Instruction had been issued and the Storage History Card, File:
lE41-SHC, Equipment No. lE41-TU-002, indicated that the.last inspec-tion / maintenance was performed on or about February 22, 1978.
The equipment was transferred to the operations group on May 23, 1978.
Item-(c) on the Storage History Card specifies, "All openings capped, sealed, or plugged..."
In addition, the General Electric specification 22A2724 requires that openings be sealed and the unit be maintained per vendor requirements and recommendations.
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case, the Terry Steam Turbine Company Standard Practice Specifica-
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tion SP-ll, Extended Storage Checklist.
This document specifies that openings shall be sealed and the entire unit covered with plastic or heavy canvas.
In addition to the foregoing and subsequent to the plant tour, the inspector observed that the mechanical seal piping to the core
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spray pump (CS) E21-P0138, and the residual heat removal (RHR)
pumps Ell-P014A, B, and D, were also unsealed.
Although these
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4 pumps are under the contruction phase maintenance program, the
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General Electric Specification 22A2724 applies.
The failure to properly store and maintain the HPCI, CS, and RHR pumps in accordance with established instructions and specifica-tions is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.
This is
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an item of noncompliance (322/79-06-01).
The inspector notified the responsible licensee personnel of the detrimental conditions unde which the HPCI unit was being stored on April 9, 1979.
The inspector reinspected the area on April 10, 11,
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and 12, 1979 to see if any corrective actions had been taken.
No corrective actions were taken and, in addition, on the reinspection of April 12, 1979, there was water raining down on the unit.
The LILCO Operational Quality Assurance Manual, Section 16.3.1, Corrective Action, and the Startup Manual, 4.6.1, requires that conditions adverse to quality be promptly identified and corrective
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actions taken.
The failure to initiate prompt corrective actions to correct the HPCI unit storage conditions in accordance with prescribed pro-cedures is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.
This is an item of noncompliance (322/79-06-02).
3.
Safety Related Picing - Observation of Work The residual heat removal (RHR) system and the core spray (CS)
piping systems were selected for a visual walkdown inspection.
The RHR system was inspected frem the containment isolation valve VGW-15A-2 MOV-31C through the "C" RHR pump to the RHR heat exchanger.
The CS system was inspected from the containment penetration X-218 through the pump to the containment penetration X-208.
The inspection was confined to those parts depicted on isometric drawings Nos. 11, 39, 40, 55, 63 and 64 which are accessible from~ existing scaffolds and platforms.
The inspection consisted of examinations of weld appearance and location, hanger locations, pipe surface defects, installed configurations consistent with drawings, and valve locations l
and orientation.
l The inspection identified are strikes, weld overgrind conditions, improper valve orientation, and weld defects.
The inspector verified l
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that:
(1) the defects were previously identified by the licensee's quality control program; (2) the quality control program had not yet performed its final inspection; and (3) those defects identified by the inspection were incorporated into the quality control correc-tion system (reference Deficiency Correction Orders No. 1998, 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021).
The visual inspection of the integral pipe lugs lE21-PSR-040, drawing M-12125-27-3, Pipe Supports of Reactor Core Spray Piping, disclosed a lack of full penetration on the root of "C" weld.
The fitup sketch NW-1000, " Types of Attachment Welds for Class 1, 2, and 3 Components," specifies a full penetration weld be employed.
A review of the Component Checklist for IE21-PSR-040 disclosed that the final weld inspection was performed on April 5, 1979.
The failure to provide a full penetration weld in accordance with NW-1000 is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix 8, Criterion IX.
This is an item of noncompliance (322/79-06-03).
During the review of applicable documents for the visual walkdown inspection, it was noted that the marked up flow diagrams specified by Quality Assurance Procedure QAP-8.2, paragraph 3.3, were not being maintained to reflect the current status of the hydrostatic test program.
The licensee stated that due to personnel and job function changes the composite flow diagrams are not current.
He expects these to be made to reflect the current status within 30 days.
This item is considered unresolved (322/79-06-04).
The inspector collected 28 unused, full length E-7018 welding electrodes while performing the pipe walkdown inspection.
The licensee presented a memorandum, dated March 30, 1979, a Deficiency Correction Order No. 1591, and four Interoffice Correspondence, dated January 25-30 and February 1-15, 1979, all dealing with weld rod control and what appears to be adequate steps to correct the situation.
Specifically, the March 30, 1979, memorandum, " Subject:
Rod Control Audit" initiates a program by which a count will be i
made of issued rods versus returned rods and stubs to assure control of filler metal.
The licensee stated that this check is currently being performed as a bi weekly surveillance.
This item is unresolved pending verification of effective corrective actions and is a continuation of the previously resolved item of noncompliance (322/78-02-01).
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The pipe walkdown inspection identified arc strikes in 19 areas.
Some of the areas contained multiple arc strikes.
The licensee stated that during the welders initial training they are instructed about the potential defects that are introduced because of arc strikes.
He also stated that, due to the large numbers identified by the NRC inspector, additional steps will be taken to protect the piping.
This matter is considered unresolved pending implementa-tion of the licensee's corrective actions (322/79-06-05).
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is re-quired to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discusssed in paragraph 3.
5.
Exit Interview
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The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in para-graph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on April 12, 1979.
They summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' statements.
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