IR 05000317/1989020
| ML19327A899 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1989 |
| From: | Craig Gordon, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19327A895 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-317-89-20, 50-318-89-22, NUDOCS 8910190100 | |
| Download: ML19327A899 (6) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
H Report Nos.
50-317/89-20 & 50-317/89-22 Docket Nos.
50-317 & 50-318
' Priority Category C-
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Licensee: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company MD Rts 2 & 4, Post Office Box 1535 Lusby Maryland 20657 Facility Name: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2 Inspection At:
Lusby, Maryland Inspection Conducted: September 13-15, 1989
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'NRC Team Members:
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l C. Z.(yordon, Regional Team Leader
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E. Fox, Region I T. Johnson, SRI Peach Bottom V.Pritchett,RI F. _ Victor, Sonalysts Approved By:
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'W. //.az s, Chief, Emergency date Pfepar..ess Section
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Inspection Summary:
Inspection on September 13-15, 1989 Ceport Nos. 50-317/89-20 & 50-318/89-22)
Areas Inspected: Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's full-participation annual emergency preparedness exercise conducted on September 14, 1989. The inspection was performed by a team of five NRC Region I and contractor personnel, Results: No violations were identified.
The licensee's response actions for this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on September 15, 1989.
M. E. Bowman, General Supervisor Planning and Support G.C. Creel,VicePresident-Nuclear R. E. Denton, Manager, Quality Assurance Services Division R.C.Dernokte, Supervisor Emergency Planning Unit a, Manager facilities Manacement T. E. Forge
EmergencyPlanner D. G. Frazier, Emergency Planning Analyst
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F. G. Kramme, W. J. Lippold, General Supervisor, Technical Services Engineering N. '. Millis, General Supervisor, P.adiation Safety i
T. N. Pritchett, General Supervisor-Technical Services K. W. Rosers, Supervisor, Video Services G. C. Rucigier, Emergency Planning Analyst L. B. Russell, Manager, Calvert Cliffs L. J. Smialek,~ Senior Plant Health Physicist B. A. Watson, Plant Health Physicist During the conduct of the inspection, other licensee emergency response per-sonnel were interviewed and observed.
2.0 Emergency Exercise The ~Calvert Cliffs full-participation exercise was conducted on September 14, 1989 from 7:00 a.m. until-3:30 p.m.
Subsequently, the State of Marylana and the c,ounties of Calvert, Dorchester, and St. Mary s participated. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) observed offsite activities.
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2.1.
Pre-exercise Activities The exercise objectives, submitted to the NRC Region I on June 7, 1989 were reviewed and, following revision, datermined to adequately test the licensee's Emergency Plan. On July 11, 1989 the licensee submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evaluation.
Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario. As a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario and supporting data provided by the licensee. It was determined that the revised scenario would provide for the adequate testing of major portions of the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP) and also provide the opportunity for licensee personnel to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action.
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NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on September 13, 1989 and
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participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the scenario. Suggested NRC changes to the scenario were made by the licensee and were also discussed during the briefing.
The licensee stated that certain emergency resg,nse activities would be simulated and indicated in the scenario that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviations or disruption of normal plant operations.
The exercise scenario included the following events:
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Offsite traffic. accident causing mediccl response and transportation
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drill)pital of contaminated / injured individual (FEMA observed MS-1 to hos
Condensate storage tank rupture;
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Increasing in-plant radiation levels; Loss of HPSI pumps;
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Rapid increase of temperature in core exit thermocouples and core
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uncovery; h
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Offsite release of radioactivity to the environment;
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Declaration of Unusual Event Alert, Site Area Emergency, and
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General Emergency classificaf, ions;
--- Recommendation of protective actions to offsite officials; and s
L Management of recovery operations.
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l The above events caused the activation of the licensee's onsite and offsite j
emergency response facilities.
2.2 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made aetailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilit.ies, and actions of emergency response personnel during the-operation of the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed:
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Detection, classification, and assessment of the scenario events;
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Direction and coord; nation of the emergency response; 3.
Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies; 4.
Communications /informatica flow, and record keeping;
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5.
Assessment and projection of radiological dose and consideration of protective actions; e
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Provisions for in-plant radiation krotection-radiological surveys; 6.
Performance of offsite and in-plan 7.
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Maintenance of site security and access control; 9.
Performance of technical support, repair and corrective actions; 10. Forformance of first aid and rescue; 11. Assembly and accountability of personnel;
12. Provisions for communicating information to the public; and 13. Management of recovery operatione.
3.0 Exercise Observations
The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and use of ths facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response
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plan and implementing procedures.
l 3.1 Exercise Strengths The team also noted the following actions that )rovided strong positive indi-
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cation of the licensee's ability to cope with a) normal plant conditions:
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-- Prompt recognition of initiating conditions and corresponding
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l classification of events;
-- Core damage assessment performed in the Technical Support Center was effectively accomplished and the information was quickly and continuously provided to the Emergency Operations Facility, Operations Support Center,
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and control room;
-- Communications among TSC staff members were clear which resulted in proper assignment of special maintenance tasks; and
-- Use of the new Operations Support Center was effective in implementing inplant repair and corrective actions by crafts personnel.
3.2 Exercise Weaknesses An exercise weakness is a finding that the licensee's demonstrated level of preparedness could have precluded effective implementation of the emergency plan in the event of an actual emergency in the area being observed.
-- Following declaration of the Site Area Emergency, it was not clear to response personnel who was responsible for transmitting notification
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messages to offsite authorities. As a result, official notification of the Site Area Emergency exceeded the 15 minute NRC requirement (50-317/89-20-01 and 50-318/89-22-01).
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3.3 Areas for Improvement An area for improvement is a finding that did not have a significant negative the licensee for corrective action.g the exercise, but should be evaluated by impact on overall performance durin The licensee conducted an adequate self-critique of. the exercise which also identified same of these areas.
-- Control room staff were une.ble to correctly verify information on the-events associated with the offsite medical drill.
-- During the medical response, problems were observed in establishing and maintaining.a contamination control boundary.
-- After the Alert and Site Area Emergency classifications, followup notifications transmitted from the TSC to the EOF were not confirmed by the TSC communications staff per Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedure (ERPIF) 3.0.
-- ERPIP 4.1.3, "TSC Director', is written in general terms and does not provide adequate detail for the TSC Director to effectively carry out emergency duties nor assign the response functions of Technical Analyst, Operations Analyst, Computer Maintenance personnel, and Chemistry Director.
In addition, TSD status summaries were not provided to TSC personnel in
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L accordance with this procedure.
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-- Emergency Operations Procedures (EOP) were not used by TSC personnel to check implementation by control room staff.
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-- Inconsistencies were found between status boards, control room panels,hand L
ERPIP's regarding labeling and identification of the operating and hig range main plant vent radiation monitors.
-- Some press releases contained erroneous information and led to confusion in responding to media inquiries.
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-- During activation, t!.a EOF experienced an actual temporary loss of primary and backu Onsite and offsite communications capability were not L
l-affected.p )ower.)ower to the Midas computer was lost and the licensee adequately implemented backup dose assessment methodologv. However, overall habitability was affected due to loss of buil' ding lighting and ventilation.
The licensee should review the surveillance program to ensure that EOF response capability can be maintained during a long term emergency. This item is unresolved (50-317/89-22-02 and 50-318/89-20-02).
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4.0 Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items Based upon discussions with licensee representatives, examination of proccdures and records, and observations made by the NRC team during the exercise, the items identified during the previous emergency exercise were not repeated with one exception.
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-- Sta ng the Control Room portien of the exercise outside the panel and dis ay area detracts from realism and hinders response actions of shift sta with regard to recognition of degrading plant functions, communications, and notifications.
Licensee representatives stated that plans were being made to move to the simulator for the 1990 annual exercise.
5.0 Exit Meeting and NRC Critique Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee representatives 1;sted in Section 1 of this report.
Team observations made during the exercise were semmarized.
The licensee was informed that previously identified items were adequately addressed with the exception of control room staging and that no violations were
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- observed._ Although there were areas identified for corrective action, the NRC
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team determined that within the scope-and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they coitld implement their Emergency L
Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner that would provide j
adequate prctective measures for the health and safety of the public.
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Licensee management acknowledged the findinas and indicated that they would l
evaluate and take appropriate action regarding the items identified for corrective action.
At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.
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