IR 05000315/2019010
| ML19240A296 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 08/28/2019 |
| From: | Eric Duncan Reactor Projects Region 3 Branch 4 |
| To: | Gebbie J Indiana & Michigan Electric Co |
| References | |
| IR 2019010 | |
| Download: ML19240A296 (16) | |
Text
August 28, 2019
SUBJECT:
DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000315/2019010 AND 05000316/2019010
Dear Mr. Gebbie:
On August 1, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at D.C. Cook Units 1 and 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. J. Petro, Managing Director of Engineering, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations corrective action program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
The team also evaluated the stations processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
The NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. The finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at D.C. Cook. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Eric R. Duncan, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000315 and 05000316 License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000315 and 05000316
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000315/2019010 and 05000316/2019010
Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-010-0046
Licensee:
Indiana Michigan Power Company
Facility:
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Bridgman, MI
Inspection Dates:
July 15, 2019 to August 01, 2019
Inspectors:
G. Hausman, Senior Reactor Inspector
J. Mancuso, Resident Inspector
J. Neurauter, Senior Reactor Inspector
J. Winslow, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Eric R. Duncan, Chief
Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process.
The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Unit 1 Steam Dump Valves Inadvertently Failed Open Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000315/2019010-01 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71152B A self-revealed Green finding was identified when the licensee failed to ensure that all design specifications for the Unit 1 Alarm Log Computer (ALPC) associated with a reactor controls and instrumentation (RCI) system engineering change were met. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure a design specification that the engineering workstation shall not include the capability for direct control functions was met when an engineer opened an ALPC human machine interface display screen on the system's Unit 1 engineering workstation and the steam dump valves re-positioned to 75 percent open.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 02.04)
- (1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the licensees corrective action program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment.
- Corrective Action Program Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the corrective action program (CAP) in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems.
- Operating Experience, Self-Assessments, and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations processes for the use of operating experience, audits, and self-assessments.
- Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs used to establish and maintain a safety conscious work environment.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Assessment 71152B Corrective Action Program: Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that the licensee's performance in the areas of problem identification and the implementation of the process for prioritizing and evaluating these problems adequately supported nuclear safety.
The inspectors performed reviews of the essential service water system and the auxiliary feedwater system. Additionally, the inspectors performed an expanded 5 year review of the emergency diesel generator system. As part of these reviews, the inspectors conducted system walkdowns and evaluated condition reports, engineering changes, and work orders. Interviews with licensee staff were also conducted as part of the reviews.
The inspectors identified a weakness in the effectiveness of corrective actions taken to resolve an issue documented in the CAP. A minor violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V was identified when the inspectors reviewed the corrective actions and effectiveness reviews for AR 2018-1045 associated with a root cause evaluation in the Security Department. This minor violation is documented in this inspection report.
Operating Experience and Self-Assessments and Audits: Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that the licensee's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee was generally effective in the use of operating experience in the CAP. When performing causal analyses and determining corrective actions, the inspectors determined that operating experience was routinely utilized and reviews were completed in accordance with licensee procedures. In addition, the team sampled operating experience from the NRC, industry, vendors, and third party groups and determined that for the samples selected that appropriate assessments for applicability to the licensee were performed.
The inspectors also reviewed licensee self-assessments and audits. The inspectors determined that the licensee was adequately performing self-assessments and audits in accordance with licensee procedures and implementing corrective actions as needed.
Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors found no evidence of challenges to the licensee's safety conscious work environment (SCWE).
The licensee's employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of several means available. The inspectors observed various station meetings, including those in which new CAP items were reviewed, and interviewed a representative cross-section of station personnel.
Additionally, the inspectors assessed the overall health of the Employee Concerns Program.
Specifically, the inspectors interviewed the Employee Concerns Program Manager, reviewed recent case logs and case files, and considered statements received during interviews with station personnel.
Unit 1 Steam Dump Valves Inadvertently Failed Open Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events
Green FIN 05000315/2019010-01 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71152B A self-revealed Green finding was identified when the licensee failed to ensure that all design specifications for the Unit 1 Alarm Log Computer (ALPC) associated with a reactor controls and instrumentation (RCI) system engineering change were met. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure a design specification that the engineering workstation shall not include the capability for direct control functions was met when an engineer opened an ALPC human machine interface display screen on the system's Unit 1 engineering workstation and the steam dump valves re-positioned to 75 percent open.
Description:
On May 7, 2019, with Unit 1 in Mode 3, and during RCI troubleshooting activities at the engineering workstation for the RCI system, the Unit 1 Group 1 steam dump valves unexpectedly re-positioned to 75 percent open as indicated on the Reactor Operator ALPC.
A licensee cause evaluation subsequently determined that during the troubleshooting activities that were in progress at the time of the event, an ALPC human machine interface display screen on the RCI system's engineering workstation that was opened as part of the troubleshooting activities caused an inadvertent demand signal to be sent to the Unit 1 steam dump valves, which caused the valves to re-position to 75 percent open. The licensee determined that software files stored on the engineering work station to support testing for a recently installed RCI system change were not removed and, as a result, the steam dump valves re-positioned when the engineering workstation was opened. This was contrary to the design specifications for the RCI engineering change, which stated that the engineering workstation shall not include the capability for direct control functions.
Corrective Actions: As a part of their immediate corrective actions, operators placed the steam dump control selector switches to off and ensured that the Unit 1 Group 1 steam dump valves re-positioned closed. Additionally, the licensee deleted the ALPC software files that resulted in the unexpected demand signal from the Unit 1 engineering workstation and performed an extent of condition review on Unit 2.
Corrective Action References: AR 2019-4970, Unit 1 Steam Dumps Failed Open
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to ensure that all design specifications for the ALPC associated with an RCI system modification were met. Specifically, the licensee failed to comply with a design specification that the engineering workstation shall not include the capability for direct control functions, which was identified during troubleshooting by an engineer using the RCI system's engineering workstation when the steam dumps unexpectedly re-positioned to 75 percent open.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the inadvertent opening of the steam dump valves in Mode 3 caused a Reactor Coolant System pressure and temperature transient. However, if left uncorrected, when operating in Mode 1 the inadvertent opening of the steam dump valves could cause a significant power transient which would affect the Initiating Events cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors answered No to all the Transient Initiators questions in Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions. Therefore, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (i.e.,
Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision making-practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. Specifically, in this instance, the licensee did not ensure that factory acceptance testing and post modification testing for the engineering workstation associated with the RCI system engineering change positively validated the design specification that the engineering workstation not include the capability for control functions. As a result, the licensee was unaware that the RCI system's engineering workstation could perform direct control functions due to the ALPC software files being located on the engineering workstation.
Enforcement:
The inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
Minor Violation 71152B Minor Violation: The inspectors reviewed AR 2018-1045 associated with a root cause evaluation in the Security Department. During the review, the inspectors identified that one of the corrective actions to prevent recurrence (CAPRs) associated with the supervisory review of electronic logs was not being performed as written. Specifically, the Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) approved CAPR 2018-1045-28 to, Establish a requirement for Security supervision to perform a shiftly review of new electronic logs. The inspectors, however, identified that Security supervision was only reviewing a portion of the new electronic logs shiftly, and not performing a full review of electronic logs shiftly as directed by the CAPR. Licensee procedure PMP-7030-CAP-002, Condition Action and Closure, Step 3.3, states, in part, that CARB concurrence is required for the following:...CAPR approvals; CAPR modifications; and making any changes to an open CAPR assignment that has been previously reviewed and concurred with by CARB. However, CAPR 2018-1045-28, which was a CAPR assignment that had been previously reviewed and concurred with by CARB, was modified by Security supervision to only review a portion of the new electronic log shiftly without CARB approval. The inspectors identified this as a minor violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings. This issue was documented in the licensee's CAP as AR 2019-7109.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. Consistent with the guidance in IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, the inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was not a finding of more than minor significance based on answering 'No' to all of the more-than-minor screening questions. The inspectors also reviewed the examples of minor issues in IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, and determined that this issue was most closely related to Example 4.a in that that this was a procedural error that had no safety impact.
Enforcement:
This failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V constituted a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On August 1, 2019, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Mr. J. Petro, Managing Director of Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Calculations
SD-180731-001
Component Cooling Water (CCW) System Heat Exchanger
(HE-15E/W) Tube Flaw Structural Evaluation
Corrective Action
Documents
Inadequate Evaluation on NSAL-00-009
01/07/2010
AR 2010-3656
1-ABD-B-3D Breaker Tripped Open When Pump Auto
Started
10/14/2010
AR 2013-1347
Fuel Injector Pump Spraying Fuel Oil on Diesel Surveillance
07/18/2014
AR 2013-6194
Reserve Feed Tripped Due to a Fault
06/19/2014
AR 2014-15099
Identified Pin Hole Leak in 2-HV-AFP-EAC Essential Service
Water Piping
2/02/2014
AR 2014-9231
AutoPIPE - Time History Error
08/06/2014
AR 2014-9877
Foreign Material Exclusion Cover Installed on AB Diesel
Generator Vent Caused Indicator Problems
2/19/2016
AR 2015-14015
Bentley Software STAAD.Pro Has Critical Errors
10/28/2015
AR 2015-14961
Inability of Component Cooling Water System to Supply
Make Up
11/17/2015
AR 2015-6917
Unit 1 AB Emergency Diesel Generator Tripped During Post
Maintenance Testing Run
2/24/2017
AR 2015-8935
PAA 15-05-01 Interface Between Design Engineering and
Procurement Engineering
07/10/2015
AR 2015-8935-46
Evaluate Change Management Plan Effectiveness
06/01/2017
AR 2015-8935-47
Final Effectiveness Review Based Upon Revised Change
Management Plan
06/12/2017
AR 2016-13049
Unit 2 CD Emergency Diesel Generator Essential Service
Water Supply Line Pipe Degradation
11/10/2016
AR 2016-14625-
Interim Effectiveness Review - Emergency Diesel Generator
Delivery Valve Holder
11/03/2017
AR 2016-14625-
Perform Final Effectiveness Review - Emergency Diesel
Generator Delivery Valve Holder
2/13/2017
AR 2016-8003
Unit 1 CD Emergency Diesel Generator Seized Fuel Injection
Pump Failure Analysis
05/24/2017
AR 2017-13059
U1 TDAFP Failed Surveillance, Failed to Reach Rated
Speed
2/21/2017
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
AR 2017-1330
AREOR 2015 Contained Documentation Errors
2/02/2017
AR 2017-2597
Primary Water Does Not Meet Operating Basis Earthquake
Design Requirements
03/06/2017
AR 2017-3227
Commercial Grade Part Installed on Safety Related
Component
03/24/2017
AR 2017-3711
Declining Performance Trend of CAP Quality
04/10/2017
AR 2017-4629
Part 21 Relay Found in 1-CD Emergency Diesel Generator
OME-150-CD Inverter
06/13/2017
AR 2017-5836
Unit 2 Containment Spray Additive Tank Percent Sodium
Hydroxide Below Administration Limit
06/12/2017
AR 2017-6217
Compensatory Action Will Not Supply Adequate Flow for
CCW Makeup
06/22/2017
AR 2017-6571
U1 EMDAFP Outboard Bearing Housing Cap Missing Gasket
07/06/2017
AR 2017-7002
NCV 2017-007-01: EDC Procedure Provides Incorrect
Guidance
07/21/2017
AR 2017-7015
NCV 2017-007-01: Operability Evaluation Performed for AR
00863160
07/21/2017
AR 2017-7192
Worker Entered Radiologically Controlled Area Without
Radiation Work Permit or Self-Reading Dosimeter
07/25/2017
AR 2017-7211
NCV 2017-007-01: Timely Resolution of Potentially Non-
Conforming/Degraded Issues
07/27/2017
AR 2017-8605
Material Grade Change Not Captured in Impact Review for
Engineering Changes
09/08/2017
AR 2017-8607
Seismic and Piping Calculations Do Not Match Installation
Engineering Change
09/08/2017
AR 2017-8921
1-MDFPX2B Relay Failed Testing
09/16/2017
AR 2017-9683
Insufficient Maintenance of Safety Related Components
09/29/2017
AR 2018-0634
Unit 1 Letdown Safety Lifted While Removing Letdown
Orifice
05/23/2018
AR 2018-10405
Discrepancy between Design and UFSAR Damping Values
11/14/2018
AR 2018-10443
Commercial Grade Dedication Deficiency
11/15/2018
AR 2018-1045
Root Cause Evaluation in Security Department
01/31/2018
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
AR 2018-3506
Radiation Protection Did Not Verify Dose Rates for Unit 1
CLV Work
03/27/2018
AR 2018-6917
Potential Commonality in Recent Repeat Events
07/05/2018
AR 2018-7570
Component Cooling Water to Essential Service Water Leak
Identified on Unit 1 East Component Cooling Water Heat
Exchanger
07/27/2018
AR 2018-8046
Unsupported 1 Safety Injection Line at 1-GSI-R509
08/13/2018
AR 2018-9481
High Steam Generator Sodium Concentration in Unit 2
10/09/2018
AR 2019-1165
Staff Did Not Fully Correct Identified Condition
2/05/2019
AR 2019-1409
Issue with Effectiveness Review Performed in 2016-2026-18
2/13/2019
AR 2019-1677
Problem Identification and Resolution Self-Assessment
Finding
2/21/2019
AR 2019-1680
Problem Identification and Resolution Self-Assessment
Finding
2/21/2019
AR 2019-1681
Problem Identification and Resolution Self-Assessment
Finding
2/21/2019
AR 2019-3227
Degraded Concrete Pier in Unit 1 Forebay
03/28/2019
AR 2019-3285
Potential Issue Identified with Corrective Actions
03/29/2019
AR 2019-3770
Water Leaking from 1-HV-AFP-T2AC, TDAFP Room Cooler
04/12/2019
AR 2019-4188
1-HV-AFP-T2AC Piping Leak
04/21/2019
AR 2019-4968
Steam Dump Controller Failed
05/07/2019
AR 2019-4970
Unit 1 Steam Dumps Failed Open
05/07/2019
AR 2019-5396
N-44 Was Declared Inoperable
07/13/2019
AR 2019-5469
1-WRV-772 and 1-WRV-762 Failed Full Stroke on Backup
Air
05/22/2019
AR 2019-6920
1AB Emergency Diesel Generator Assumed Load After
Divorcing from T11A Bus
07/16/2019
GT 2017-9541
RA-NRC Bulletin Gap Analysis
09/27/2017
GT 2018-0355
Evaluate EN 53151 Defect in Thermostatic Valve Assemblies
01/11/2018
GT 2018-10826
High Pressure Coolant Injection Inboard Steam Valve Failure
2/03/2018
GT 2018-4488
Enhancements to 12-EHP-4030-056-218
10/17/2018
GT 2019-5044
Refuel Platform Hoist Failure During Fuel Movement
05/09/2019
Corrective Action
AR 2019-6942
Logs were Not Completed or Identified
07/17/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
AR 2019-7109
Procedure Step Was Not Implemented as Intended
07/22/2019
AR 2019-7471
Deficiencies in AR 2015-14015 - STAAD.Pro Critical Errors
08/01/2019
Engineering
Changes
Unit 1 - Reactor Controls Instrumentation System Upgrade
Install Mechanical Jumper
06/25/2018
Miscellaneous
Management Screening Committee Agenda
Various
Daily Screened Actions
Various
Operating Experience Screening Committee Agenda
07/18/2019
Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment Summary
05/19/2017
Corrective Action Review Board (CARB)
Various
50.59 Evaluation
2015-0479-01
2-TM-15-49-R2: Compensatory Action in Support of
Component Cooling Water Passive Failure
11/25/2015
50.59 Screen
2015-0479-01
2-TM-15-49-R2: Compensatory Action in Support of
Component Cooling Water Passive Failure
11/24/2015
50.59 Screen
2017-0331-00
EC 55754: Compensatory Action in Support of Component
Cooling Water Failure
10/27/2017
FCR 55461-006
Field Change Request: Modification and Addition of Supports
Located on 3 Inch Primary Water Piping (EC 55461 HC
Revision 0)
LER 315/2010-
001-00
AB Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps
06/18/2010
LER 315/2013-
2-00
System Actuation of the Unit 1 CD Emergency Diesel
Generator
06/24/2013
LER 315/2014-
2-00
Non-Compliance with LCO 3.8.1 During Surveillance
Preparations
10/20/2014
LER 315/2015-
001-00
Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications
07/29/2015
LER 316/2005-
001-00
Reactor Trip from RCP Bus Under-Voltage Signal
Complicated by Diesel Generator Output Breaker Failure
01/09/2006
LER 316/2016-
2-00
Emergency Diesel Generators Declared Inoperable Due to a
Manufacturing Design Issue
2/09/2017
LER 316/2018-
001-00
Valid Actuation of the Unit 2 CD Emergency Diesel
Generator During Testing
06/04/2018
Technical Report - Improving the Effectiveness of Issue
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Resolution to Enhance Safety and Efficiency
NEI Efficiency
Bulletin: 17-14
Improving the Effectiveness of Issue Resolution to Enhance
Safety and Reliability
ODMI 1-18-001
Component Cooling Water Leakage Trending
05/01/2019
Operability
Evaluations
AR 2018-3803-1
Increasing Trend in Vibrations and Noise on 1-PP-7E
Essential Service Water
04/08/2018
AR 2018-7570-1
Component Cooling Water to Essential Service Water Leak
Identified on Unit 1 East Component Cooling Water Heat
Exchanger
08/02/2018
Procedures
1-OHP-4021-003-
001
Letdown, Charging and Seal Water Operation
1-OHP-4024-122
Annunciator #122 Response: Plant Service
1-OHP-4024-130
Annunciator #130 Response: Makeup Water System
2-EHP-5043-
CGD-001
2-EHP-5043-
EDC-001
Evaluation of Degraded/Non-Conforming Conditions
2-EHP-5043-
ERP-001
Engineering Review of Procurement Documents
2-OHP-5030-
016-001
Supplying Essential Service Water to Component Cooling
Water for Makeup Using a Temporary Modification
2-THP-6010-
RPP-006
Radiation Permit (RWP) Processing
2-THP-6010-
RPP-104
Personnel Dosimetry Use in Varying Radiation Fields
2-THP-6010-
RPP-401
Performance of Radiation and Contamination Surveys
2-THP-6010-
RPP-407
Special Radiological Evolutions
2-THP-6020-
CHM-309
Make-Up Plant
2-OHP-4024-222
Annunciator #222 Response: Plant Service
DTG-EQR-003
System Health Report
DTG-NCAP-001
Processing Non-Corrective Action Program Actions
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
ECP Desktop
Guideline
Employee Concerns Program
PMI-2015
Policy for Maintaining A Safety Conscious Work Environment
PMI-7030
Corrective Action Program
PMI-7034
Self-Assessment and Bench-Marking Programs
PMP-7030-CAP-
2
Condition Action and Closure
PMP-7030-CAP-
004
Conduct of Effectiveness Reviews
PMP-7030-CAP-
005
Conduct of Causal Evaluations
PMP-7030-MOP-
001
Corrective Action Program Management Oversight Process
PMP-7034-SAP-
001
Conduct of Self Assessments
SPP-2060-SFI-
106
Security Conduct of Operations
Self-Assessments
System Health Report: Essential Service Water - Unit 1
Q2 - 2018
System Health Report: Essential Service Water - Unit 1
Q4 - 2018
System Health Report: Essential Service Water - Unit 2
Q2 - 2018
System Health Report: Essential Service Water - Unit 2
Q4 - 2018
GT 2017-0614
Measuring & Test Equipment Quick Hit Self-Assessment
11/14/2017
GT 2017-0651
Equipment Status Control Quick Hit Self Assessment
11/20/2017
GT 2018-0493
Chemistry Primary Water System Quick Hit Self-Assessment
11/13/2018
GT 2018-0497
Conduct of Chemistry Quick Hit Self-Assessment
03/05/2019
GT 2018-0500
Management of Non-Conforming Conditions Quick Hit Self-
Assessment
04/24/2019
GT 2018-0947
Measuring & Test Equipment Quick Hit Self-Assessment
01/14/2019
GT 2018-0966
Operations Decision Making Quick Hit Self Assessment
11/13/2018
GT 2018-10453
NRC Inspection Full Self Assessment - PI&R
11/15/2018
GT 2018-11397
Behaviors Excellence Plan Effectiveness
05/01/2019
GT 2018-1678
Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls, In-
Plant Radioactivity Control and Mitigation, and Occupational
04/02/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Dose Assessment Full Self-Assessment
GT 2018-2898
Exam Administration and Evaluation Methods Quick Hit Self
Assessment (Rhew)
2/20/2018
GT 2018-4227
Standard Design Process - Expectations for Effective Design
Changes Quick Hit Self-Assessment
2/20/2018
NOS-17-06
Nuclear Oversight Audit: Corrective Action Program
07/13/2017
NOS-17-10
Nuclear Oversight Audit: Engineering, Design Control, and
Inservice Inspection/Inservice Testing
11/16/2017
NOS-18-01
Nuclear Oversight Audit: Radiological Environmental
Monitoring Program (REMP)/Process Control Program
2/15/2018
NOS-19-01
Nuclear Oversight Audit: Radiological Environmental
Monitoring Program/Off-site Dose Calculation Manual
03/18/2019
NOS-19-05
Nuclear Oversight Audit: Corrective Action Program
07/30/2019
Work Orders
Perform Ultrasonic Test on Piping Downstream of 2-WHO-
718 Heat Exchanger
10/13/2016
MTM, 1-HE-15E, Inspect for Tube Leaks, Install Tube Plugs
05/30/2019
Perform License Renewal Activity: System Engineer
Walkdown - Unit 2 Essential Service Water System
03/12/2018
1-WPX-731-V1, EC-55711, Replace Valve & Upstream
Piping
09/22/2017
1-WPX-735-V1, EC-55711, Replace Valve & Upstream
Piping
09/20/2017
2-WPX-736-V1, Replace Valve EC-55895
04/18/2018
2-WPX-732-V1, Replace with 2 Valve/Piping EC-55895
04/05/2018
Install Pipe Supports 12-APW-R4002, R4003, R4004
2/05/2019
Unit 1 CCW Cross Tie Valve Seat Leak Test
11/04/2017
Unit 2 CCW Cross Tie Valve Seat Leak Test
04/12/2018
Perform License Renewal Activity: System Engineer
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