IR 05000315/1989027
| ML17328A209 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 10/20/1989 |
| From: | Foster J, Ploski T, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17328A208 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-89-27, 50-316-89-27, NUDOCS 8910310206 | |
| Download: ML17328A209 (42) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report Nos.
50-315/89027(DRSS);
50-.316/89027(DRSS)
Docket Nos.
50-315; 50-316 License Nos.
DPR-58 DPR-74 Licensee:
American Electric Power Service Corporation Indiana Michigan Power Company 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, OH 43216
Facility Name:
Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and
Inspection At:
Donald C.
Cook "Site, Bridgman, MI Inspection Conducted:
September 19-22, 1989 M SM j~
Inspectors:
J.
Foster Team Leader u3 Z~
/'.
Pl oski
>o/z.o/I ate losao /bp ate Accompanying Inspectors:
J.
Stangeland J. Giitter u). Z~
Approved By:
W. Snell, Chief Radiological Controls and Emergency Preparedness Section lo/m/I ate Ins ection Summar Ins ection on Se tember 19-22 1989 (Re ort Nos.
50-315/89027(DRSS)
50-316 89027 DRSS p
i f
D.
C.
k Emergency Preparedness (EP) Exercise involving observations by four NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise (IP 82301).
The following aspects of the licensee's EP program were also evaluated:
onsite meteorological monitoring system (IP 80721)
and offsite dose assessment provisions (IP 82207).
The inspection involved three NRC inspectors and a
consultant.
Results:
No violations, deficiencies or deviations were identified.
One concern, related to the development and transmission of Protective Action Recommendations, was identified.
Exercise realism was significantly enhanced 89103l 0206 891020 PDR ADOCK 08000325 PNU
by the licensee's use of a plant simulator and simulated Technical Support Center for the first time in an evaluated exercise.
The licensee demonstrated an adequate response to a hypothetical scenario involving multiple 'equipment failures and a minor radiological releas DETAILS NRC Observers and Areas Observed J. Foster, Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Area (OSA), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
T. Ploski, EOF J.
Stangeland, EOF Dose Projection and Assessment J. Giitter, Control Room, OSA, Inplant Teams Persons Contacted American Electric Power Indiana Michi an Power Com an
"W. Smith, Jr.,
Former Plant Manager
- A. Blind, Plant Manager
"J. Rutkowski, Assistant Plant Manager - Production L. Gibson, Assistant Plant Manager - Technical Support
"B. Svensson,.Licensing Activity Coordinator
"K. Baker, Operations Superintendent
"J.
Sampson, Safety and Assessment
'Superintendent E. Morse, gC/NDE General-Supervisor T. Beilman, I8C Department Superintendent
~J.
Wojci k, Technical Superintendent
- Physical Sciences
'. Horvath, equality Assurance Supervisor
"D. Loope, Radiation Protection Supervisor
- M. Barfelz, Shift Technical Adviser
~P.
McCarty, AEPSC Site gA
- R. Heydenburg, AEPSC Site.(A
"J.
Kauffman, Construction Manager
"G. Griffin, Instrumentation 8 Control
~C. Miles, l8C General Superintendent
- E. Smarella, Public Affairs
"J. St.
Amand, Technical Engineering
- D. Noble, TPS
"T. A'rgenta, Nuclear Engineering Department
- L. Bounds, NOD
"S. Clovis, NOD
"S. Klementowicz, NOD
"S. Burgess, Simulator
"R. Ptacek, STA
- Denotes those attending the NRC exit interview held on September 21, 1989.
The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection.
General An exercise of the D.
C.
Cook Emergency Plan was conducted at the D.
C.
Cook plant site on September 20, 1989.
The daytime exercise tested the licensee's emergency support organizations'apabilities to respond to a.simulated accident scenario resulting in a minor
release of radioactive effluent.
This was a utility-only exercise.
The State of Michigan and local counties participated to a limited extent.
Attachment 1.describes the Scope and Objectives of the exercise and.
Attachment 2 describes the exercise scenario.
4.
General Observations a ~
Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the D.
C.
Cook Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
Coordination C.
The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timely.
If the scenario events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health and safety.
Observers d.
The licensee's observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with four NRC observers.
Exercise Criti ue A critique was held with the licensee and NRC representatives on September 21, 1989, the day after the exercise.
The NRC discussed the observed strengths and weaknesses during the exit interview.
5.
S ecific Observations (IP 82301)
Control Room (CR)
This was the first exercise in which the licensee utilized a new Control Room s'imulator and simulated Techni'cal Support Center.
Use of these facilities significantly increased the degree of realism of the exercise scenario.
At approximately 0720, initial conditions of the exercise were presented to Control Room personnel in the form of a routine shift turnover.
The simulator initially represented a plant in normal operation.
Control Room personnel quickly responded to the changing plant parameters and demonstrated their knowledge of plant normal and emergency operating procedures.
Events were accurately and promptly.
classified per the licensee's Emergency Action Level (EAL) scheme, and notifications to onsite personnel and offsite authorities were completed well within established time limit At approximately 0814, leakrate calculations made it evident to the operators that the scenario presented conditions which would require a reactor shutdown. in compliance with plant technical specifications.
The operators almost immediately indicated that an Unusual Event would have to be declared on the.initiation of reactor shutdown.
At 0820 the Shift Supervisor formally made the statement to the Control Room staff that he was declaring an Unusual Event and was assuming the position of Emergency Coordinator.
Only slightly later, at 0828, the Emergency Coordinator properly declared an escalation to the Alert classification.
The inplant Public Address (PA) announcement following this declaration properly directed personnel to activate the Technical Support Center (TSC),
Operations Support Area (OSA), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF),
Emergency Operating procedures were well utilized, with "repeat backs" of procedure steps and instrument readings where required by the procedure.
Transitions from one procedure to another were properly announced.
Operator professionalism was very good.
Noise levels in the Control Room were acceptable, considering the number of alarms activated during the major transient (reactor scram and Safety Injection initiation).
Operators quickly recognized that one train of the Safety Injection system did not automatically start.
They manually-initiated the syst'm; At approximately 0841, a Site Area Emergency (SAE) was properly declared when the containment spray system was initiated to reduce increasing containment pressure.
An inplant PA announcement indicated that the TSC, OSA, and EOF should be activated,,
and that plant personnel should report to an accountability location.
Later in the exercise, a very good discussion of the merits of isolating a leaking Reactor Heat Removal (RHR) system pump took place.
The discussion included the possible benefits of halting or reducing the relatively minor reactor coolant system leak versus the possible drawbacks of shutting down a cooling system train which was otherwise functioning well.
Each of the three public address announceme'nts made to onsite personnel from the Control Room advised them of the emergency classification, but did not provide any information as to the cause of the classification.
In a real event, this could cause unnecessary apprehension or uncertainty on the part of plant staff, and possible disruption of Control Room activities by personnel attempting to determine plant status information.
Based upon the above findings, this portion, of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following item is recommended for improvement:
~
The procedure which provides for initial notification of inplant personnel following an emergency classification
should be revised to require inclusion of the reason for the emergency classification in inplant public address announcements.
Technical Su ort Center TSC The licensee utilized a'simulated Technical Support Center for this exercise.
This facility, adjacent to the simulator, mimics the general layout and configuration of the actual TSC, and has computer displays driven by the simulator's computer system.
This facility is unique in NRC Region III, and greatly enhanced the realism of the overall response to scenario events.
The TSC was manned and ready to assume its responsibilities at approximately 0845, well within the activation time goal.
Personnel assigned TSC duties displayed good exercise deportment throughout the exercise.
Status boards were well utilized, and an electronic copyboard was used to display and record chronological events.
A listing of teams dispatched from the Operations Staging Area supplemented boards depicting the emergency organization, plant
- parameters, and other information.
TSC personnel actively followed plant'vents, sought methods of mitigating the accident scenario, and continuously looked for events which would require a change in emergency classification.
Periodic briefings of TSC personnel, kept them well aware on inplant and offsite events.
Noise levels were good, Status board listings were adequately current throughout the exercise.
Sufficient notes and logs were kept to allow reconstruction of actions taken and decisions made during the simulated accident.
Per the Emergency Plan, when the Emergency Operations Facility is activated, the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC)
moves to the EOF to assume primary responsibility for the licensee's overall accident response effort.
During the time the SEC is relocating to the EOF, another individual assumes his responsibilities in the TSC.
This transition of authority was performed smoothly, and was announced to TSC personnel.
k At 0945, a General Emergency (GE) was declared, based on the ongoing release being indicative of loss of all fission product barriers.
The GE declaration was not anticipated by the scenario authors, but was a conservative interpretation of the plant's emergency action levels.
'As in the Control Room, considerable technical discussion took place as to the advisability of isolating the East Reactor Heat Removal system in order to halt the minor system leak.
As the leak was the source of the relatively small radioactive release, the decision was ultimately made to isolate the system.
Assembly and accountability of plant personnel in response to the Site Area Emergency was reported to the TSC as completed at
approximately 0911, which was 30 minutes after the Site Area Emergency was declared, and at the 30 minute timeliness goal.
While TSC personnel were apparently aware of the status of the other emergency response facil-ities, none of the status boards or chronological logs.noted their activation times.
Several magnetic signs depicting priorities (from 1 to 5) were available for use on the status board tracking inplant teams.
Only the "priority j." sign was noted to be in use.
As a result, at times it was not clear exactly what was the priority for completion of actions in progress.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following item is recommended for improvement:
~
A small status board, or a section of a status board should be utilized to list tasks to be accomplished and their relative priority for accomplishment.
0 erational Sta in Area OSA) and In lant Teams The licensee demonstrated that the OSA could be manned promptly.
All required personnel had reported to the OSA within thirty minutes of the Site Area Emergency (SAE) declaration.
Upon arriving at'he OSA, staff members were briefed by the OSA manager and the Radiation Protection Director (RPD).
The OSA manager provided information on plant status, while the RPD provided information on radiological conditions in the plant.
Status boards were usually well maintained.
A status board providing in-plant information, including team designation, team purpose, team leader, team members, and departure and arrival times, was particularly well maintained.
In addition, a well organized board was utilized to provide the names of managers and available personnel, by discipline.
On this board, magnetic name holders with paper name inserts, color coded per the individuals discipline (electrical, maintenance, radiation protection, instrumentation and control), allowed rapid assessment of available OSA resources.
In contrast, the chalkboard in the team assembly area was not promptly updated and was somewhat difficult to comprehend (partly due to the use of non-standard acronyms and the presentation of information in a non-chronological manner).
The licensee demonstrated the ability to assemble, brief and dispatch several types of emergency response teams.
A total of eight teams were dispatched from the OSA during the exercise.
Damage control teams (DCT) were sent out to troubleshoot and correct a number of problems with essential equipment, including a breaker for the east motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump, which tripped on overload, and an isolation valve on the RHR system, which required closure in order to terminate the release.
Post accident sampling (PAS) teams were also dispatched to obtain primary coolant and steam generator=
samples.
One of the offsite radiation monitoring=teams included the licensee's newly acquired "Mothership" van, capable of supporting offsite radiation surveys.
OSA members were well prepared to carry out their mission.
,Teams were properly briefed and debriefed by the team, leader.
Team briefing forms (PMP 2081 EPP 203, Exhibit E) included information on required tools, task description, method of communication, and radiation protection measures (turn back dose rates, dosimetry required, protective clothing required, respiratory protection required, need for potassium iodide, etc.).
N An inspector accompanied two of the teams and observed that proper radiological'precautions were taken.
Dose meters, protective clothing, and SCBA were utilized per instructions.
Turnback doses were emphasized.
Team tasks were simulated accurately.
Team members described
'exactly what they would do to actually carry out the prescribed task.
The team members encountered some problems with pre-packaged bags of protective clothing reserved for use by in-plant teams in an emergency.
One package selected by a team member'as missing some required protective clothing (boots).
Another team member could not fit into the coveralls provided in the pre-packaged bag (there was only one size of clothing provided).
Also, the first three flashlights selected by team members were defective.
The licensee demonstrated the capability to deal with a contaminated individual.
The decision was made to have the contaminated individual redressed into clean protective clothing and walk to the OSA area for decontamination.
It was noted however, that no smears were taken along the contaminated individual's path as a precautionary measure.
Communications between the teams and the OSA manager were generally effective, although some flaws were identified.
On occasion problems were encountered with radio communications between the teams in the field and the OSA.
For example, there was'confusion as to which individual (OSA manager or RPD) was being contacted from the field.
Phones were often busy, making it difficult for the in-plant teams to contact the control room in order to inform them of equipment status.
Requests for PAS were constantly changed, resulting in confusion and frustration among the PAS team members.
In one case, a task requested of a team dispatched from the control room was redundant to a task requested of a OSA-based team.
This task required the use of SCBA and required entry into a high radiation field.
Although entry into the high radiation area by the redundant team was ultimately avoided, the lack of coordination constituted a
potential for unnecessary risk to the redundant team and an inappropriate use of critical resources during an emergency situatio Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:
~
Varying sizes of anticontamination clothing should be made avai 1 abl e.
~
Consideration should be given to altering the emergency organization such'that all inplant teams would be controlled from the OSA, with requests for inplant actions coming from the Control Room and TSC.
d.
Emer enc 0 erations Facilit EOF The EOF was activated by plant staff per procedures following the Alert declaration.
Personnel began arriving at 0855, following the 0828 Alert declaration.
The Environmental Assessment Director (EAD)
showed good initiative by providing an informal briefing to incoming staff.
However, there were no briefings or status board information to indicate that EOF staff had been aware of the Unusual Event declaration that had been made by the Control Room Shift Supervisor roughly 10 minutes before the Alert declaration.
Incoming EOF staff efficiently prepared to perform their duties.
Dedicated communications lines were soon established with the Control Room and Technical Support Center, and with County, State, and NRC officials.
After brief consultation with the TSC's Site Emergency Director, the EOF Manager assumed command and control of emergency response efforts at 0915.
This transfer of lead responsibility was promptly communicated to the various emergency response facilities and to offsite officials.
EOF staff then assumed protective action decisionmaking and offsite notification responsibilities from their TSC counterparts.
.The EOF Manager and EAD were"well aware of the SAE declaration made by the TSC's'.Site Emergency Director at approximately 0841.
Offsite dose assessments were quickly begun for a potential release from Unit 2 containment when containment radiation levels rapidly rose to about 5000 R/hr.
By 0930, the EOF Manager had conferred with TSC staff on the need for a General Emergency declaration if containment integrity would be seriously threatened or lost.
The Recovery and Control Manager (RCM) relieved the EOF Manager
'of lead responsibility shortly after 0930.
While waiting for confirmation of Auxiliary Building vent stack alarms for iodine and particulates, the RCM reviewed Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) guidance based on "core/containment status".
The RCM conservatively declared a General Emergency at 0945, based on the high containment radiation level and the potential for a release from containment.
He chose the procedurally correct PAR to evacuate the 0-2 mile radius and downwind sectors out to 5 miles.
The EAD began determining the affected downwind sectors based on current and forecast wind data, which was impacted by several factors.
The EAD quickly recognized a 50 degree wind" direction shift that occurred a
few minutes before the General Emergency declaration.
There was brief confusion because this wind direction shift appeared inconsistent with the posted wind direction forecast.
This confusion was partially the result of having earlier obtained an actual forecast from the licensee's meteorological contractor versus the forecast prescripted in the exercise scenario.
State and county officials were initially notified of the General Emergency declaration and the initial PAR within 15 minutes of the declaration.
By this time, open line communications had been established with the simulated NRC duty officer.
The initial PAR at 0945 was procedurally adequate and based on current wind conditions.
This PAR was:
evacuate 0-2 miles, all sectors; evacuate 2-5 miles, sectors D, E, and F; Shelter 2-5 miles in sector C;
and shelter 5-10 miles in sectors D, E; and F.
A review of offsite notification forms was initially confusing.
The initial PAR was revised twice between 0945 and 1015, with Revision
issued at 0953.
While it correctly incorporated forecast wind direction information, it apparently deleted several sectors that were currently downwind and remained downwind until 1015, when a
forecast wind direction shift occurred.
The Revision
PAR was evacuate 0-2 miles, all sectors; evacuate 2-5 miles in sectors F,
G, and H; Shelter 2-5 miles in sectors C and D; and shelter 5-10 miles in sectors F,
G, and H.
To summarize the changes:
evacuation of sector D was changed to shelter for 2-5 miles; sector E
PAR for 2-5 miles was dropped entirely; shelter for 5-10 miles in sector D
and E was dropped.
The inadequate incorporation of current and forecast wind conditions in the Revision
PAR had the potential to be significant, since decisionmakers had no way of knowing how much longer the current wind direction would persist before shifting as had been forecast.
The PAR was revised for the second time at 1015.
This revision adequately incorporated the forecast wind direction shift that was just occurring, and added sector B along the shoreline for completeness.
This PAR was:
evacuate 0-2 miles, all sectors; evacuate 2-5 miles in sectors F,
G, and H; shelter 2-5 miles in sectors B,
C, and D; and shelter 5-10 miles in sectors E,
F, G,
and H.
One or more senior members of the EOF staff reviewed and approved all periodic (approximately 30 minute) update messages to the State, which included PAR information.
However, between 1030 and 1230, these update messages contained several errors in the PAR information.
Such as:
(1)
Message forms at 1200 and 1215 indicated PARs to evacuate sectors F,
G, H, 2-10 miles versus the intended 2-5 mile evacuation.
(2)
The message form at 1030 did not include the shelter PAR for sector B for 2-5 miles, as did the 1015 and 1045 messages.
Errors in PAR transmission could have caused needless confusion to offsite officials, and could have easily damaged the licensee's credibility to make reasonable PARs.
The inadequate review by senior EOF staff of PAR information on periodic update messages to State officials is an Open Item (No. 50-316/89027-01).
An Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)
map was prominently displayed and effectively used to depict the licensee's PARs.
However, there was no consistent method used to display what protective actions were being implemented by offsite officials.
Several message forms and several entries on the "Chronology of Events" status board contained implemented protective action information through approximately 1030.,
Subsequent press releases (numbers 3 and 4) issued by the licensee included updates on protective actions being implemented offsite which did not totally match the licensee's recommendations.
There was one communications breakdown between the EOF and CR/TSC, which the licensee also identified, that began after approximately 1000.
The RCM wanted to confer with the Control Room on: the desirability of isolating Residual Heat Removal (RHR) "East train" because of a pump leak versus the potential of causing fuel damage if the RHR "West train" became unavailable.
However, the Control Room did not return the RCM's call before the "East train" was isolated and the "West train" placed into service.
EOF staff adequately identified the RHR-East train's pumproom as the source of the Loss of Coolant Accident and the minor release through the Auxiliary building vent stack.
Overall; the turnover of lead responsibilities in the EOF from plant to Corporate staffs went smoothly, and was announced to all players as being completed at 1110.
The RCM and Vice President
- Nuclear were appropriately concerned about the cause of the high containment radiation levels, despite the lack of abnormal incore thermocouple readings and no indication of ever having uncovered the core.
An individual performed an initial, rough core damage assessment that indicated approximately 50K fuel clad damage.
At 1045 and later, the RCM and Vice President - Nuclear conferred on the status of Unit 1.
They concurred it was better to leave it at its steady state (100K power) versus risking potential complications and burdens on the operating staff if Unit 1 were shutdown.
The RCM and Vice President
- Nuclear remained adequately aware of, the field teams inability to locate the minor release, and an inplant team's progress in isolating the release path.
The Vice President
- Nuclear reviewed two press releases after assuming command.
He first reviewed earlier press releases to ensure those he authorized were not contradictory and provided useful updated information.
Procedures were followed regarding deescalation to a Site Area Emergency after release termination was verified.
The Vice President
- Nuclear conducted several good preliminary short and
longer term onsite and offsite recovery planning sessions.
The sessions only involved EOF staff, rather than TSC staff also actively participating during the sessions.
The EOF's action item lists were adequately detailed and comprehensive; however, no attempt at further deescalation was intended prior to achieving Cold Shutdown.
Overall activation, initial manning of the dose assessment portion of the EOF, and subsequent augmentation and turnover to the AEP staff was very smoothly performed.
Dose assessment procedures were followed very well.
Dose assessments were performed in a timely manner using the Dose Assessment Program (DAP) and backup DAP Personal Computers with the inputs from the meteorology and radiation monitoring system computer readouts.
Automatic PAR generation by the computer was a worthwhile aid.
Proper addressing/consideration of lake breeze effects was demonstrated.
Direct coordination and discussions with the State helped to quickly resolve variances with dose assessments and PAR issues befor'e they became major issues.
Having the same dose projection model helped to minimize potential problems.
The basis for performing the successive dose assessments was changed, following a proper sequence from conservative, default estimates of containment Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and gaseous releases, to any available field measurements as better information became available.
A reference cell of controllers was used to simulate county and NRC communicators to provide a more realistic challenge to several EOF communicators.
State agency communicators and dose assessment staff also participated in this utility-only exercise.
This provided a good information sharing challenge to the EOF's protective measures staff and other EOF communicators'o reduce background noise levels in the main EOF, the workspace has been carpeted and sound absorbing panels have been mounted on the walls.
The radio base station communicator has also been provided with headphones so that incoming radio communications from field teams would not disrupt other EOF participants.
Based upon the above findings, with the exception of the above Open Item, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
In addition, the following items should be considered for improvement:
~
The capability to directly enter information (like PARs different than those provided automatically by the computer)
onto the computer form should be used (or developed).
The next form could then contain all the information from the previous form for review.
Changed items could be flagged automatically to help subsequent reviewers.
~
For consistency and to avoid potential confusion among PAR decisionmakers, the EOF status boards and/or EPZ maps should list and/or depict both the licensee's current -PAR and those protective actions currently being implemented by offsite officials.
Exercise Scenar'io and Control The licensee's scenario was sufficiently challenging for a utility-only
'exercise, including: multiple equipment failures, a minor release of radioactive material, and assembly/accountability.
The degree of challenge in an exercise scenario is considered when assessing observed exercise weaknesses.
Considerable effort was expended in attempting to determine the cause of the high radiation levels within containment and the cause of the "fuel damage".
This was due to the lack of any clear scenario information which would portray events leading to fuel damage.
The fuel was never uncovered (per the reactor vessel level indication system),
core exit thermocouple readings remained well below the level of indicating fuel damage.
Mhile the reactor coolant, system was depressurized rapidly during the plant cooldown, and a reactive control rod was stuck out of the core, neither event would be expected to result in fuel damage.
The high containment readings were placed in the scenario to provide a basis for the offsite plume and other actions.
It is recommended that, if artificially elevated readings are used, exercise players be advised that these readings are elevated for exercise scenario purposes.
This will preclude expenditure of efforts to determine the cause of readings which are not understood.
The scenario did not contain expected actions with which to gauge the
'esponse by the dose assessment team.
Overall, exercise control was considered adequate.
Licensee Criti ues The licensee held a Controller exercise critique, and a critique where the Controller/Evaluators presented their findings to the players.
NRC personnel attended critiques in the Control Room and EOF and determined that NRC-identified concerns had also been identified by licensee personnel.
Onsite Meteorolo ical Monitorin Pro ram (IP 80721)
A review of the upgraded meteorological monitoring program was conducted to determine how the monitoring equipment had been installed, compared to descriptive information submitted to the NRC since December 1986, and to determine whether the instrumentation met applicable regulatory guidance.
The availability of the upgraded system's data in the Control Room, TSC, and EOF was determined.
An evaluation was also made of the adequacy of the licensee's provisions for providing reasonable assurance that the onsite meteorological data, which may be utilized by various emergency response organizations, would be representative of conditions in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
Relevant sections of the Emergency Plan and its implementing procedures were reviewed to determine the accuracy of descriptive information regarding the upgraded program. 'he meteorological monitoring locations were visited.
A sample of monitoring program records and procedures were reviewed and discussed with cognizant licensee staff.
The previous meteorological monitoring system'ncluded sets of wind speed and direction sensors mounted at the 50 and 150 foot el'evations of the plant's microwave communications tower, plus temperature sensors at the 30 and 180-foot elevations of that tower.
Dewpoint temperature was measured at the 30-foot elevation, while precipitation was measured at ground level.
The microwave tower is located atop a sand dune near the Protected Area.
Although meteorological instrumentation remained mounted on the microwave tower at the time of this inspection, data from this measurement location were no longer avai'lable in the Control Room, TSC, or EOF.
In March 1986, the NRC evaluated the meteorological data from the microwave tower site.
The resulting report indicated that the monitoring location was not appropriate for determining meteorological conditions representative of the land portion of the 10-mile EPZ.
A study performed by the licensee's contractor later in 1986 confirmed the'findings of the, NRC-funded study, and included recommendations for an upgraded meteorological monitoring program.
In March 1987, the licensee engaged a contractor to design and construct an upgraded meteorological monitoring system.
The upgraded system was considered functional in June 1988, and was operated in addition to the microwave tower monitoring site.
In July 1989, the NRC approved a revision to the plant's Technical Specifications which incorporated the upgraded monitoring system and deleted reference to the microwave tower measurement location.
The upgraded meteorological monitoring system was released for operability on August 4, 1989, thus becoming the sole source of onsite meteorological measurements for emergency preparedness and routine environmental, impact assessment purposes.
The licensee's 1986 study of the onsite program, titled "Meteorological Assessment for the Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Power Station",
was reviewed.
The study included an evaluation of the microwave tower monitoring site, characterization of the local climatology (including local lake breeze and airflow channeling effects),
and recommendations for upgrading the monitoring program based on the results of the aforementioned portions of the technical study.
The study confirmed the existence of a lake'reeze effect at the plant site, occurring during portions of 43 days during the period April 1 through September 30, 1984.
This frequency of occurrence compared favorably with previous studies of lake breeze occurrence along the eastern shore of Lake Michigan.
Utilizing the methodology included in NUREG/CR-0936, it. was concluded that the microwave meteorological monitoring tower's instrumentation would typically be above the estimated, variable height of the Thermal Internal Boundary Layer (TIBL).
Since releases from the plant would be categorized
as ground level for dispersion modeling purposes, the meteorological instrumentation's location should be within the TIBL during onshore flow conditions in order to provide representative meteorological dat'a for local, inland conditions.
Thus, the microwave tower monitoring location was inappropriate -for providing protective action decisionmakers with a
.
set of meteorological measurements representative of conditions for land portions of the 10-mile EPZ during lake breeze situations.
The study also identified local channeling effects on the onshore wind flow during stable, lower wind speed conditions.
The channeling effects were due to the variable terrain (sand dunes) at the plant site and the major plant structures which would also affect airflow patterns downwind.
Since the microwave tower was on a sand dune overlooking the plant. site, its meteorological measurements would not likely indicate the nearsite effects on the onshore winds caused by the sand dunes and plant structures.
The study also identified several trees that were close enough to the microwave tower to probably also disrupt the airflow from several directions before it reached the meteorological instruments.
The study included a recommendation that a multi-tower meteorological monitoring program replace the existing program which utilized the plant's microwave tower as the only measurement location, The upgraded program's tower siting study was based on current regulatory guidance for coastal plant sites and current guidance regarding the accuracies and placement of the meteorological instrume'nts.
The primary tower's proposed location was an existing 100-meter tower sufficiently inland so that its instrumentation would be within the range of predicted TIBL heights.
Several alternate locations were proposed for a 10-meter backup monitoring location.
A 10-meter monitoring location was also proposed near the shoreline in order to measure the unmodified onshore airflow.
Recommended sensor accuracies, sensitivities, and mountings met current regulatory guidance.
The contractor's recommendations also addressed data transmission to a centrally located computer and some aspects of data quality control.
A tour of the upgraded system's meteorological monitoring locations indicated that the contractor's recommendations had largely been followed.
The primary tower was a 60-meter guyed tower located a few hundred meters from the proposed 100-meter tower and about one mile inland, so that this tower would be within the TIBL.
The terrain at this tower site was flat and sandy, with some brush and weeds.
The sensors were mounted on small elevator platforms to facilitate maintenance.
The sensors'ountings and orientations were acceptable.
A single set (train) of wind speed, wind direction, and temperature sensors were mounted at approximately the 10 and 60-meter tower elevations.
A dewcell for measuring dewpoint temperature was mounted at the 10-meter level.
A precipitation gauge was at ground level near this tower.
The tower and instrument shelter were surrounded by a fence.
The tower was equipped with a lightning rod and was grounded.
Surge protection was provided to signal transmission li"nes to the signal processors.
Heater elements were provided for the wind and precipitation sensors to minimize the combined adverse impacts of precipitation and low temperatures on the meteorological instruments.
The temperature and dewpoint sensors were enclosed in aspirated shields; however, there were no readouts in the instrument shelter to remotely
indicate adequate air flow past the sensors, or proper aspirator motor operation.
Wind speed and direction data were recorded on analog charts.
The licensee indicated that the microprocessor within the shelter could store in excess of one week of meteorological data from all the tower's sensors.
These data could be accessed by a technician dispatched to the tower site in the event of a data transmission problem to the plant's computer.
A supply of spare sensors and other monitoring system components were in storage.
The licensee planned to increase the stockpile of certain components based on lessons learned from a July 1989 lightning strike.
The backup meteorological monitoring site consisted of one set of wind speed and direction sensors which were adequately mounted at the 10-meter level of a pole near the eastern end of the plant access road.
This was one of the alternative backup tower locations recommended in the siting
.
study.
The sensors were provided with heater elements.
The monitoring equipment was grounded.
The licensee indicated that the signal processing and data recording components at this monitoring location were provided
. with electrical surge protection.
Although no tall vegetation was in the immediate vicinity of the backup monitoring location, several large trees located across the highway, and approximately west north west from the monitoring location, may be near enough to have an effect on airflow from that sector.
The shoreline monitoring location consisted of sensors mounted on a pole just beyond the northwestern corner of the Protected Area.
The pole was on a dune that was an estimated 20 feet above. the height of the beach.
Wind speed and direction sensors were adequately mounted on this pole, as was an aspirated shield housing sensors at about the 10 meter elevation.
A 2-meter temperature sensor was.also installed in an aspirated shield.
The pole was grounded.
The wind sensors were provided with heater elements.
The licensee indicated that electri'cal surge protection was provided to signal processing and data logging components at this monitoring location.
This location was adequate to monitor the unmodified, onshore airflow at the plant site.
Review of documentation on sensor specifications indicated that the wind speed, wind direction, temperature, and precipitation sensors met applicable accuracy and sensitivity standards in the regulatory guidance.
The stated accuracy of the dewpoint sensors was plus or minus 1.5 degrees Centigrade, versus the plus or minus 0.5 degree criteria in the regulatory guidance.
The licensee was advised that measurement of ambient dewpoint was unnecessary from an emergency preparedness standpoint.
Therefore, barring any licensing or other commitment to monitor that parameter, the licens'ee could delete the dewpoint sensors from the monitoring program after verifying that dewpoint data collection was not required per some commitment.
Records review and discussions with cognizant licensee staff indicated that an engineer from the plant's environmental staff was primarily responsible for day-to-day monitoring program activities.
A vendor was currently responsible for semi-annual system calibration, with some assistance by plant Instrument and Control (I8C) personnel.
I8C staff were also responsible for non-routine component checks and replacement
on an as needed basis.
The most recent system calibration occurred in late July 1989.
The system calibration was thorough and adequately documented by separate reports prepared by the vendor and by the I&C
staff.
Review of Job Order records indicated that the I&C staff had been adequately responsive to investigating a variety of data collection and transmission problems identified by operations or environmental personnel during performance of their daily checks of the digital, data.
Suspected or actual monitoring program problems had been adequately documented on the Job Order forms, including corrective actions taken.
The licensee indicated that timely detection of data collection and transmission problems was largely dependent on daily checks of the digital data.
These checks were performed daily by Control Room personnel in accordance with an approved Operations Procedure.
The environmental staff also performed daily reviews of digital data by polling time-averaged data stored in the plant's computer.
MIDAS software capabilities included data quality control tests that were proprietary in nature.
questionable or obviously erroneous data would be-"flagged" as such on the displays accessed by the user.
Recognition of these "flags" was sufficient justification for issuance of a Job Order, resulting in a monitoring equipment investigation by I&C personnel.
The licensee indicated that I&C personnel-typically did not perform a periodic surveillance at the monitoring sites.
Although wind speed and wind direction data were'ecorded on strip charts at the three monitoring sites, the charts were not reviewed as a further measure to ensure data quality.
The charts were, however, stored with other analog records at
'he plant.
Records review indicated that the 1989 recovery rates for data from the 60 and 10 meter towers exceeded 93 percent for those combinations of parameters utilized in offsite dose calculations.
These recovery rates were good.
Recovery rates had been effected by a July lightning strike and subsequent repair and calibration activities.
Fifteen minute averaged, digital data from the primary monitoring location were available on computer displays in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Rooms, the TSC, and in the EOF.
In addition, time averaged data from the primary monitoring tower were available on Light-Emitting Diode (LED) displays located on a front panel in each Control Room.
Parameters available in the computer terminal displays included 10 and 60-meter wind speed and wind direction,, 10-meter temperature and dewpoint temperature, and the temperature difference between the 10 and 60-meter measurement heights.
The Control Room's LED displays consisted of the aforementioned parameters with the exception of the dewpoint parameter.
The licensee indicated that Control Room personnel had the capability to switch between the primary and backup monitoring sites for 10-meter wind speed and direction data available as LED readouts.
The meteorological data readouts in the Control Rooms, TSC and EOF were adequate for emergency preparedness purposes and were clearly labeled with respect to the parameter and its units of measure.
Meteorological data availability in the Control Rooms has been upgraded with the 'implementation of the upgraded monitoring program.
The inspector understood that analog data from the discontinued microwave tower monitoring location had only been available in the Unit 1 Control Room.
The current revision 4 to the licensee's
'Emergency Plan contained a
concise description of the recently discontinued meteorological monitoring program, without references to the associated maintenance and calibration provisions, data quality control measures, or even data availability in the Control Rooms and Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs).
The licensee indicated that the upgraded monitoring. program replaced the previous program subsequent to issuance of this Emergency Plan revision.
Therefore, the next annual revision to the Plan would incorporate the upgraded monitoring program's description.
A review of relevant Emergency Plan Procedures (EPP-series)
indicated that procedure 2080 EPP. 108, "Initial Dose Assessment",
had been revised in August 1989 to address the upgraded monitoring system, including data access and availability.
One statement in the procedure had not been accurately revised..
The statement was'hat the meteorological data was only available in the Unit 1 Control Room, as had been the case for the data from the discontinued monitoring program.
At the inspection exit interview, the licensee committed to revise procedure 2080 EPP. 108 by November 1989 to accurately describe meteorological data availability in both Control Rooms.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:
~
The description of the upgraded monitoring program in the next Emergency Plan revision should include a description of the parameters measured at each of the monitoring locations; data availability in the Control Rooms and ERFs; and a summary description of the program's maintenance, calibration, and data review provisions.
8.
Dose Calculation and Assessment (IP 82207)
Dose Assessment Model The licensee's dose assessment capability was evaluated in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9)
and the gui.dance of NUREG-0654,Section II.
The licensee currently uses a dose assessment model referred to as the Dose Assessment Program (DAP).
DAP was jointly developed by Detroit Edison, American Electric Power and Consumers Power as a uniform dose assessment method that could be used by the State of Michigan and the Michigan power reactor licensees.
Validation of DAP is documented in the licensee's System Validation and Verification (V8V) Plan.
The V8V involved comparing results from the DAP computer program to hand calculations using the same inputs.
~ 303 and EPP.304 provide the necessary guidance f'r running DAP using a menu-driven PC or an HP-41CV
handheld calculator.
It is conservatively assumed in the DAP model that all releases are at ground level (there is no elevated release option).
The DAP model is capable of analyzing releases through monitored and unmonitored pathways.
Monitored release pathways include the unit vent (iodine and noble gas),
the steam generator power operated relief valves, the steam jet air ejector, and the gland seal leak off.
Radiation monitor readings can be directly entered into the PC version of DAP but must be adjusted when using the handheld calculator.
Dose projections for unmonitored releases from containment (e.g.,
containment leakage)
can be made based on containment radiation monitor readings.
DAP also has provisions for incorporating field data into dose projections.
The licensee ran several test cases using DAP, and the results were in close agreement with the inspector's hand calculations.
The licensee's analysts were familiar with the DAP program and were able to respond to questions about dose assessment modeling for several accident scenarios (e.g.,
containment failure).
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
Protective Action Decisionmakin Since 1982, a task group consisting of representatives from the utilities and the State of Michigan has been meeting on a regular basis to develop and refine the DAP program.
The State of Michigan is currently running DAP on a handheld calculator.
With the PC version of DAP, a Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) report can be automatically generated in a format for direct facsimile to the State.
Discussions with licensee dose assessment analysts indicated an adequate recognition of dose assessment uncertainties and limitations.
The analysts appeared to be aware of the potential for meteorological phenomena that can significantly affect population dose (e.g.,
lake breeze effects).
The licensee also understood the importance of making protective action recommendations to the State based on plant conditions.
This understanding was demonstrated during the September 20, 1989 exercise when the'licensee's protective action recommendations to the State were based on containment radiation monitor readings, not on field team results or dose assessments.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
0 erational Readiness On a quarterly basis, the licensee tests the equipment and procedures used for dose assessment in the Control Room, TSC, and EOF by conducting a drill.
According to the licensee, equipment
deficiencies or operability problems discovered during the drill are normally corrected prior to the next drill.
Contingency planning by the licensee is also evident.
For example, diskettes containing backup copies of the DAP program were located with the PC's.
Manual dose assessment methods (i.e, nomographs)
are available.
Manual backup methods are not necessary if the PC's are supplied by a vital power source, and backup PC's and software are available.
Licensee analysts also discussed a backup procedure (PMP 2081 EPP. 107) for monitoring releases from normally monitored release points if the Radiation Data Display System (RDDS) monitors/channels are unavailable or inoperable.
The method involves sending out radiation monitoring teams to predesignated locations to obtain dose rate measurements.
A release rate is then determined by multiplying the dose rate by the effluent flow and by the proper value from the activity factor curve (based on time since shutdown and release pathway).
Although characterized by the licensee as a "last resort",
this method could provide beneficial release rate information in the event that the RDDS information is unavailable.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
9.
~0en Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee which will be reviewed further by the inspector and which involve some actions on the part of the NRC or licensee or both.
An open item identified during this inspection is discussed in Section 5.d of this report.
10.
Exit Interview (IP 30703 The inspectors held an exit interview pertaining to the exercise evaluation on September 21, 1989,.with the representatives denoted in Section 2.
A second exit interview was held on September 22, 1989, regarding evaluations of the onsite meteorological monitoring system and dose projection and assessment capabilities.
The NRC Team Leader discussed the scope and tentative findings of the inspection, including the only open item identified, which related to the inadequate review of PARs on periodic update messages to State offici'als.
The licensee was also asked if any of the information discussed during the exit interview was proprietary.
The licensee responded that none of the information was proprietary.
Attachments:
1.
D.
C.
Cook 1989 Exercise Scope and Objectives 2.
D.
C.
Cook 1989 Exercise Scenario Outline
DONALD C.
COOK NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISE EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY INITIALCONDITIONS:
E i ment ardware Unit 2AB Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) out on clearance for governor replacement.
EDG went out on overspeed testing on September 19th and is not expected to be repaired before September 21st.
~
Evidence of fuel cladding leaks has been worsening over the recent past with present leakage just under plant administrative limits.
The CVCS cross tie is inoperable to replace the oiifice on QFI-201.
~sseem Unit 2 is at 100% power.
Unidentified RCS leakage has been trending upward over the last three days with the latest surveillance test results showing 0.6 gpm leakage.
This was completed at 0400 hrs the morning of 9-20-89.
The mid-night shift performed those tasks outlined in the "Excess Leakage Procedure",
2-OHP 4022.002.004, but were unable to either isolate or determine the source of leakage.
1.
Lab requested to check activity level of Steam Generator blowdown.
Results reported at 0600 hrs indicate no primary to secondary leakage.
2.
The operators on mid-shift switch letdown over to excess letdown in an attempt to identify the leakage source.
The results were inconclusive in identifying the leakage source.
3.
Waste inventory was checked and found to be constant over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> except for 420 gallons pumped out of the lower containment sump.
4.
Reactor Coolant Filters and Seal Water Filter were checked for proper line-up and found to be properly aligned.
ERE-09/20/89 6-1
5.
During the bi-monthly inspection of the Pipe Tunnel Sump nothing was found that would identify the source of the leakage.
6.
The levels of the Pressurizer Relief Tank and Reactor Coolant Drain Tank were trended to determine in-leakage.
No leaks were indicated.
The Unit has been operating at 100% rated thermal power for the last 198 days.
A second
"Reactor Coolant System Leak Test",
2-OHP 4030 STP.016 was started at 0500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> on 9-20-89 to verify the leakage found at 0400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br />.
This test is underway.and should be completed by the day shift operators around 0800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br />.
ERS-2300/2400 setpoints have been set upward.
I Boron concentration is ll ppm.
Cycle Burnup
= 17,500 MWD/MTU. EFPD
= 399 Primary coolant activity is:
131 I
132 I
133 I
134 I
135 7.4 E-2 pCi/cc 8.1 E-2 pCi/cc 1.8 E-1 pCi/cc 2.0 E-1 pCi/cc 4.2 E-1 pCi/cc 4.6 E-1 pCi/cc 7.9 E-1 pCi/cc 6.0 E-1 pCi/cc Kr 85m 4.0 E-1 pCi/cc Kr 87 6.9 E-1 pCi/cc Kr
9.5 E-1 pCi/cc Rb 88 6.4 EO pCi/cc Xe 133 5.0 EO pCi/cc Xe 131 2.6 E-2 pCi/cc Xe 135 7.5 E-1 pCi/cc Xe 135m 6.2 E-1 pCi/cc Meteorological conditions for typical September morning are:
1.
Temperature 2.
Wind Speed 53oF 2-5 mph 3.
Wind direction 300-330 4.
No precipitation Both 50 and 150 pound auxiliary steam headers are being supplied by Unit l.
ERE-09/20/89 6-2
EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY REAL TIME SCENARIO TIME EVENT CONDITION Initial Conditions:
0730 00 00
~ Turn-over from 12 8 crew (controllers).
Problem with RCS leakage and steps taken to find leak discussed.
0800 00:30
~ Unit 2 operators finish reactor coolant system leakage surveillance (2-OHP 4030 STP.016)
which gives a result of 1.4 gpm.
0810 00 40
~
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLAIMED (optional).
ECC-14 leakrate in excess of Technical Specifications.
Operators may elect to shut-down Reactor.
0827 00:57
~ A step change in RCS leakage has occurred (approx.
400 gpm) which results in the necessity of starting a second charging pump to maintain pressurizer level.
Simultaneously the following occur:
~ Ice Condenser Doors open.
~ Receive upper containment high pressure alarm
~ Receive low pressurizer level deviation alarm.
0829 00:59 The operators start a second charging pump to maintain pressurizer level.
ERE-09/20/89 6-3
EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY CONTINUED REAL TIME SCENARIO TIME EVENT CONDITION 0831 01:01 Controlled, unit shutdown initiated as per 2-OHP 4022.002-004, Excessive Reactor Coolant Leakage.
0833 01:03 Reactor trips on Low RCS Pressure due to inability to maintain pressurizer level.
Safety Injection Phase A is received due'o low RCS/high containment pressure.
The following active failures occur upon receipt of SI signal:
~ Rod G-3 stuck out Shutdown Bank B,
,Group
~ Relay K602 in safeguards cabinet fails.
("N" Train battery charger was not stripped from the 600V bus.
Other symptoms of the failure will be evident as time goes on.)
~ U2-Control Room Pressurization Fan did not start.
~ Relay K610 also fails which results in "A" Train ECCS pumps failing to start.
All pumps should be manually started by the operator.
The east, motor driven aux.
'feed pump starts but instantaneously trips on overload.
0839 01:09 Resetting of SI signal attempted.
"A" Train components fail to reset due to malfunctioning K602 relay.
"B" Train'components reset.
ERE-09/20/89 6-4
EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY CONTINUED REAL TIME 0840 0850 SCENARIO TIME 01:10 01:20 EVENT CONDITION ALERT DECLARED based on ECC-14/4-Inability to maintain pressurizer level above 22% with one charging pump.
Containment Spray actuated (Phase B)
when containment pressure reaches
.
2.9 psig.
0855 01:25 Reactor coolant pumps manually tripped due to loss of thermal barrier and s'eal injection flow 0900 01:30 SITE AREA EMERGENCY declared as per ECC-14 due to SI initiation followed by containment spray.
0903 01:33 Began natural circulation cool down due,to loss of RCPs.
0910 01 40 TSC and OSA should be activated by this time.
0919 01 49 Natural circulation cool down confirmed by hot leg/cold leg temperature differentials.
0925 01:55 Post Accident Sampling Team dispatched.
0930 02: 00 EOF should be activated by this time.
0942 02:12 East RHR pump is started to establish recirculation from the containment sump seal ruptures resulting in 20 gpm leak.
ERE-09/20/89 6-5
EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY CONTINUED REAL TIME 0943 SCENARIO TIME 02: 13 EVENT CONDITION Received containment vent stack alarm.
0945 02:15 RHR pump room sump level alarm is received and a damage control team requested to check on RHR pump level.
1007 02:37 K602 jumpered to permit SI reset.
1010 02:40 Reset Phase
"A" and "B" and Safety Injection.
1015 02:45 Isolated Boron Injection Tank=
1020 02:50 Charging flow is realigned from Boron Injection Tank (BIT) to normal charging line flow path.
1022 02:52 Due to the inability to maintain pressurizer level/pressure, BIT injection is reestablished.
1025 02: 55 Begin post LOCA cooldown by natural circulation due to absence of reactor coolant pumps.
1030 03: 00 To terminate release, the East RHR pump is shut off and the suction line from recirculation sump isolated resulting in removal of east containment spray pump from service due to loss of its suction source.
ERE-09/20/89 6-6
EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY CONTINUED REAL TIME 1033 SCENARIO TIME 03:03 EVENT CONDITION Release Terminates 1035 1200.
03: 05 04: 30 Establish approximately 50'F/hr.
cooldown rate using the steam generator PORVs for heat removal.
Accumulators are isolated as RCS pressure decreases below 1000 pounds.
Ongoing During Cooldown RCS pressure is reduced as cooldown continues using the pressurizer PORVs venting to the Pressurizer Relief Tank.
1206 04:36 Post Accident Sampling Team reports their sampling results.
1330 06 00 RCS has been cooled to 350'F and depressurized to 400 psi which allows RHR cooling to be initiated.
1335
05 Initial recovery process begins.
1400 06:30 Exercise terminates.
ERE-09/20/89 6-7
1989 EVALUATED EXERCISE SCOPE This exercise is being conducted to satisfy the NRC requirement for an annual demonstration.
In accordance with the schedule precedent based on NRC and FEMA guidance, this exercise involves primarily the licensee.
The State of Michigan may participate in support of the licensee's response in the form of communications but not for purpose of evaluation.
The exercise will be conducted on September 20, 1989. It will be initiated at approximately 0800 and will terminate at approximately 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />.
For the first time, it is intended to conduct the exercise using the Unit 2 simulator and the simulated Technical Support Center in the Cook Nuclear Plant Training. Center.
Scenario development efforts are underway to accommodate either a simulator driven or controller driven exercise, providing a back-up in the event of simulator equipment problems.
It is planned to initiate the event with an unidentified RCS leak which escalates into a loss of coolant accident, eventually resulting in a safety injection and containment spray actuation.
A leak in the residual heat removal system will release radioactive water into the auxiliary building and radioactive gases to the atmosphere through the plant vent.
I The meteorology will be simulated to reflect the weather one would anticipate on a September morning. on the shore of Lake Michigan.
The DCCNP emergency response organization, as well as the I&M Public Affairs and AEPSC or'ganizations will participate in this exercise.
The following licensee emergency response facilities will be exercised o Technical Suppo'rt Center (TSC)
o Operations Staging Area (OSA)
o Emergency Operations Facility o Emergency News Center.
Specific actions to be demonstrated in this exercis'e are reflected in the objective DONALD C.
COOK NUCLEAR PLANT 1989 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE OBJECTIVES OBJECTIVE A.
OVERALL LICENSEE OBJECTIVES A-1 Demonstrate the ability of the emergency response organization to implement DCCNP Emergency Plan and Procedures, the I&M Emergency Response Manual and the AEPSC Emergency Response Manual.
A-2 Demonstrate the ability to establish emergency management command and control, and maintain continuity of this function for the duration of the postulated event.
A-3 Demonstrate the ability to establish communications and information flow between DCCNP emergency response facilities and participating.offsite agencies.
A-4 Demonstrate the ability to designate subsequent shifts of the emergency response organization.
CONTROL ROOM OBJECTIVES B-1 Demonstrate the ability to recognize symptoms and parameters indicative of degrading plant conditions and to classify degraded conditions as emergencies.
B-2 B-3 Demonstrate the ability to initiate notification of off-site authorities and plant personnel.
Demonstrate communications flow to and from the Technical Support Center.
B-4 Demonstrate the, ability to transfer emergency authorities and responsibilities from the on-shift emergency organization to the DCCNP-emergency response organization.
C.
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OBJECTIVES C-1 Demonstrate the ability to activate the facility within one hour of declaration of an emergency requiring facility activation.
C-2 Demonstrate the ability to provide analytical assistance and operational guidance to the Control Room.
C-3 Demonstrate the ability to coordinate on-site activities in response to an emergency.
ERE-89 2-1
OBJECTIVE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OBJECTIVES Cont'd.
C-4 Demonstrate the ability to establish'nd maintain hard copy
'communications with the EOF and verbal communications with the EOF,-OSA, IAG, and ENC.
C-"5 Demonstrate the ability to provide analytical and radiological assistance to the OSA and Control Room.
C-6 Demonstrate the ability to obtain data from the OTSC/PSSD system.
C-7 C-8 C-9 Demonstrate the ability to request emergency response teams from the OSA.
Demonstrate the ability, to designate a second shift for TSC operation.
Demonstrate the ability to evaluate the results of TSC/OSA habitability surveys and'assess the need to evacuate these facilities.
C-10 Demonstrate the ability to recognize degrading plant conditions and classify plant conditions as an emergency C-11 Demonstrate the ability to determine the level of core damage based on plant parameters provided.
C-12 Demonstrate the ability to direct the implementation of site assembly and accountability.
C-13 Demonstrate the ability to display key plant systems status and trends on TSC Status Board.
D.
OPERATIONS STAGING AREA OBJECTIVES D-1 Demonstrate the ability to activate the facility within one hour of declaration of an emergency requiring facility activation.
D-2 Demonstrate the ability to assemble, brief and dispatch the following emergency response team(s):
a.
b.
C.
d.
Damage Control Team Post Accident Sampling Team On-Site Radiation Monitoring Team Off-Site Radiation Monitoring Team ERE-89 2-2
OBJECTIVE D.
OPERATIONS STAGING AREA OBJECTIVES Cont'd.
D-3 Demonstrate the ability to designate a second shift for OSA operation.
D-4
.
Each emergency response team assembled and dispatched shall demonstrate the following actions as applicable to the team type and mission:
a.
b.
c
~
d.,
e.
Assembly of tools/equipment Preoperation checks of equipment and communications devices Performance of appropriate radiological precautions Performance or simulation of team mission Post-mission debriefing and radiological controls D-5 Demonstrate the ability to provide emergency radiological support.
As a minimum the following activities should be demonstrated:
a.
Establishment of emergency dosimetry and exposure tracking system.
Establishment of emergency control points.
Performance of habitability'surveys prescribed by procedure.
d.
Analysis of radiological conditions to be encountered by emergency response teams.
e.
Specification of radiological controls and precautions for emergency response teams.
D-6 Demonstrate the ability to perform off-site radiological monitoring.
As a minimum, two teams should be dispatched and direct radiation monitoring as well as airborne radioactivity analysis should be demonstrated.
D-7 Demonstrate the ability to perform on-site radiological monitoring in accordance with applicable Emergency Plan Procedures.
This monitoring should include direct radiation surveys and analysis of airborne radioactivity.
D-8 Demonstrate the ability to obtain environmental samples in accordance with applicable Emergency Plan Procedures.
The following s'amples should be obtained:
a.
Vegetation b.
Soil ERE-89 2-3
OBJECTIVE D.
OPERATIONS STAGING AREA OBJECTIVES Cont'd.
D-9 Demonstrate the abilit to obtain os p t accident samples from the reactor coolant system and complete appropriate chemical and isotopic analysis within three hours of the sample request.
D-10 Demonstrate the ability to respond to a contaminated person.
Included in this demonstration, personnel decontamination shall be simulated.
E.
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY OBJECTIVES E-1 Demonstrate the ability to activate the facility within one hour of declaration of an emergency requiring emergency activation.
E-2 Demonstrate the ability to establish overall command and control of the DCCNP emergency response within one hour of declaration of an alert, site area emergency or general emergency, as applicable.
E-3 Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain effective emergency communications with each of the following 'agencies and facilities:
a.
b.
C.
d.
NRC (if participating)
Technical Support Center Emergency News Center Initial Assessment Group E-4 Demonstrate'the ability to establish and maintain hard copy data transmission and reception with each of the following facilities:
a.
Emergency News Center c.
Initial Assessment Group E-5 Demonstrate the ability to direct Offsite Radiation Monitoring Teams in order to determine the geographical location and radiological magnitude of any postulated offsite release.
I'-6 Demonstrate the ability to designate a second shift for EOF operation.
E-7 Demonstrate the ability to develop protective action recommendations based on projected dose and/or core and containment status.'RE-89 2-OBJECTIVE E,
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY OBJECTIVES Cont'd, E-8 Demonstrate the ability to update the State of Michigan on the status of the emergency at 15 minute intervals.
E-9 Demonstrate the ability to respond to inquiries from the TSC, ENC, IAG and State of Michigan in a timely manner.
E-10 Demonstrate the ability to pro]ect the magnitude of offsite dose using the Dose Assessment Program and the IBM PS/2
=Personnel Computer.
E-11 Demonstrate the corporate augmentation of the EOF staff.
E-12 Demonstrate recovery associated with emergency termination.
E-13 Demonstrate the ability to display key plant systems status and trends on EOF Status Boards.
F.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OBJECTIVE F-1 Demonstrate activation of the Emergency News Center.
F-2 Demonstrate the ability to conduct media briefings.
F-3 Demonstrate the ability to respond to actual or simulated inquiries from media representatives.
ERE-89 2-5