IR 05000315/1989026
| ML17328A198 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 10/06/1989 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17328A197 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-89-26, 50-316-89-26, NUDOCS 8910180042 | |
| Download: ML17328A198 (14) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report Nos. 50-315/89026(DRP);
50-316/89026(DRP)
Docket Nos.
50-315; 50-316 License Nos.
American Electric Power Service Corporation Indiana Michigan Power Company 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, OH 43216 Facility Name:
Donald C,
Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Units l and 2.
Inspection At:
Donald C.
Cook Site, Bridgman, MI Inspection Conducted:
August 30 through October 3, 1989 Inspectors:
B. L. Jorgensen Approved By B. L.
Bu ess, Chief Reactor rojects Section 2A Date /oS fP Ins ection Summary Ins ection on August 30 throu h October 3, 1989 (Re ort Nos.
50-315/89026 p
reas ns ec e
ou one unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors o
- actions on previously identified items; plant operations; maintenance; surveillance; emergency preparedness; and quality program activities.
No Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) items were reviewed.
Results:
Of the six areas inspected, no violations or deviations were iie~t~7ied in any areas.
The inspection did not disclose any notable new strengths or weaknesses in the licensee's programs or activitie DETAILS Persons Contacted
- A. Blind, Plant Manager
- J. Rutkowski, Assistant Plant Manager - Production
- L. Gibson, Assistant Plant Manager - Technical Support
- B. Svensson, Licensing Activity Coordinator
- K. Baker, Operations Superintendent J.
Sampson, Safety and Assessment Superintendent E. Norse, gC/NDE General Supervisor
- T. Bei Iman, I8C Department Superintendent J. Droste, Maintenance Superintendent
- T. Postlewait, Technical Superintendent
- Engineering L. Matthias, Administrative Superintendent
- J. Wojci k, Technical Superintendent
- Physical Sciences M. Morvath, Quality Assurance Supervisor D. Loope, Radiation Protection Supervisor I
The inspector also contacted a number, of other licensee and contract employees and informally interviewed operations, maintenance, and technical personnel.
- Denotes some of the personnel attending the Management Interview on October 5, 1989.
Actions on Previously Identified Items* (92701)
'ith regards to the Unit 2 reactor trip on August 14, 1989 (ref.
Inspection Report No. 50-315/89025(DRP);
50-316/89025(DRP),
the licensee formulated a "Guideline" for checkout of CRID inverters to eliminate the chances of a reactor trip similar to that which occurred on-that date.
The guideline, entitled "Guideline For Checking the 7.5 KVA Inverters Before the Inverter is Switched Back From Alternate Source to Inverter Load," will be performed before the operators are allowed to switch back to the inverter supplying power to the CRID.
The inspector questioned whether the 'licensee had received inquiries regarding the CRID and its relation to the reactor trip from other nuclear utilities.
The response from other utilities has been mostly nonexistent, the reason being that D.
C.
Cook is somewhat unique.
Most other plants use an "auctioneered" type system.
At least one other utility, however, did contact D.
C.
Cook regarding this event.
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items 'were identified.
0 erational Safety Verification (71707 71710 42700)
Routine facility operating activities were observed as conducted in the plant and from the main control rooms.
Plant startup, steady power operation, plant shutdown, and system(s)
lineup and operation were observed as applicab-l The performance of licensed Reactor Operators and Senjor Reactor Operators, of Shift Technical Advisors, and of. auxiliary equipment operators was observed and evaluated including procedure use and adherence, records and logs, communications',
shift/duty turnover, and the degree of professionalism of control room activities.
The Plant Hanager, Assistant Plant Hanager-Production, and the Operations Superintendent were well-informed on the overall status of the plant, made frequent'isits to the control rooms, and regularly toured the plant.
Evaluation, corrective action, and response to off-normal conditions or events, if any, were examined.
This included compliance with any reporting requirements.
Observations of the control room monitors, indicators, and recorders were made to verify the operability of emergency systems, radiation monitoring systems and nuclear reactor protection systems,'s applicable.
Reviews of surveillance, equipment condition, and tagout logs were conducted.
Proper return to service of selected components was verified.
Units I and 2 operated at 100 percent rated thermal power throughout the inspection period except for periods when special tests (e.g.
control vaive testing were required to he performed.
b.
The inspector reviewed an error in plant configuration control documented in Problem Report (PR)89-974,
"Packing adjustment was made to I-IHi0-911, making the valve administratively inoperable, while the opposite Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) train Residual Meat Removal (RMR)pump was inoperable."
The Unit Supervisor approved the packing adjustment on 1-IHO-911 (Hest Centrifugal Charging Pump suction from the refueling water storage tank, Train 8), not realizing that redundant Train A had an inoperable RMR pump.,
Control room log entries indicated 1-IHO-911 was administratively
. inoperable for two minutes.
The event was determined to be nonreportable since 1-IHO-911 had stroked satisfactorily after adjustment, within the code allowable limits, and during the packing adjustment the flow capabilities of the valve remained unimpeded (i.e. would have opened on a Safety Injection Signal).
c'.'uring one tour, the inspector noted a large, crumpled plastic bag at a job site in the Unit 1 North safety injection pump room.
The bag was lying adjacent to the pump motor and just below the ventilation intake.
S'ince the ventilation system auto-starts upon pump start and it could be called upon at any time, the intake area must be kept free of light weight debris even while work is ongoing.
The inspector notified Operations Department management, who ordered area tours of all similar ventilation systems.
Loose, light weight debris was collected and removed from the area which was noted by the NRC inspector, and from other areas.
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie Maintenance (62703 42700)
Maintenance activities in the plant were routinely inspected, including both corrective maintenance (repairs)
and preventive maintenance.
Mechanical, electrical, and instrument and control group maintenance activities were included as available.
The focus of the inspection was to assure the maintenance activities reviewed were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review: the Limiting Conditions for Operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; and post maintenance testing was performed as applicable.
The following activities were inspected:
a ~
Job Order A011996, "Provide painting support as needed for RFC-DC-02-2892 (Rev. 1)."
The inspector observed the activities of a contracted Quality Control (QC) technician during his inspection of this job.
The work referenced by the Job Order involved application of paint to a modified floor-mount pipe support (No.
12-ACS-R936) for the Chemical and Volume Control System's (CVCS)
monitor tank north transfer pump recirculation line.
The painting was performed under two procedures.
Both procedures (**12 MHP 5021.100.003 and **12 MHP 5021.100.004)
deal with application of protective coatings to surfaces classified as
"Service Level II," which covers work outside of the Containment Buildings but subject to radiation and decontamination.
One procedure (.003)
per tains to steel surfaces, while the other (.004)
pertains to concrete and block surfaces.
The QC technician appeared knowledgeable of his duties based on inspector discussions with and observations of the -technician.
For example, the QC technician knew what temperature conditions were applicable to the job; specifically, that surface temperature should be five degrees Fahrenheit above dew point prior to paint application, and he explained how to measure this using a
psychrometer.
Additionally, the technician verified the wet film thickness (3.5.to 11 mi ls.) of the first coat for the NRC inspector.
b.
Job Order B010940, "Fabricate and install new security barrier and gate per drawings to protect Unit 2 N-train battery room."
The work was being performed as directed by a Request For Change (RFC 12-3019) to upgrade the N-Train batteries and support 'equipment.
Two procedures were required for the job, one of which (**l2 MHP 5021.001.066)
provided instructions for the fabrication and erection of structural steel, and the other (**12 MHP 5021.001.003)
provided instructions for anchor bolt installation.
Review of these items identified no problem At the time of the inspection, welding activities were in progress almost directly above an unprotected (no fire blanket) Unit 2 Train B N-Train battery charger.
When the inspector questioned the firewatch, the hot work ceased and corrective action was taken.
On a subsequent tour, the inspector verified that.hot work was in accordance with the permit.
A meeting was held at the plant on September 8, 1989, to discuss the status and findings of the licensee's review of examples of incompletely or ineffectively performed maintenance.
These items had been the subject of previous discussions during a telephone conference call on July 7, 1989 (reference NRC 'Inspection Report No.
50-315/89021(DRP ); 50-316/89021(DRP ) ).
The NRC Region III Branch Chief, to whom the D.
C.
Cook project is assigned, was present and opened the meeting with an expression, of the NRC's concern that these examples had occurred, and requested the licensee to address root causes and actions taken.
The Plant Manager and several principal staff involved in the
'lanning, implementation, support, and assessment of maintenance were present representing D.
C.
Cook..
They indicated'hey had independently developed and shared the same concerns in this area.
Two common, underlying characteristics were determined to apply to the problems:
(1)
accurate, detailed, understandable maintenance implementation criteria were not always provided to the working level; (2)
ve~ ification of compliance to all implementation criteria was not always completed in a timely enough way.
The licensee indicated that they did not find maintenance workers either unwilling or unable (by lack of skills, training, motivation, etc.) to perform to specified instructions.
The problems involved
'administrative controls.
To address the two-fold weakness, the licensee has already implemented two changes to their administrative controls.
First, when repairs involve followup verification testing, a separate Job Order will be written to assure the testing is performed.
It will be 'tied to plant MODE.
Second, the evaluation of Condition/Problem Reports now involv'es a determination of MODE applicability, to assure resolution of the. matter before startup, if required.
The following were reported as additional changes planned for the maintenance administrative arena:
(I)
maintenance schedulers will perform periodic progress reviews during lengthy or complex jobs'to verify the work is being properly administered (instructions available and in use, documentation being completed, etc.);
(2)
outage Job Orders and operational MODE Job Orders will be identifiably distinct; (3)
an immediate post-completion review, independent of the Maintenance Supervisor review, wi 11 be performed to focus on operability verification.
In addition, the licensee expressed an intent to improve the availability and control of technical data central to effective maintenance (setpoints, torque values, etc.).
The costs and benefits of an integrated "start-up test program" approach to conclude each major outage will be evaluated.
Job Order A000025,
"Inadequate bearing on Southeast 3/4 inch anchor between washer/nut on the base plate.
Replace existing washer with new beveled washer."
While accompanying a gC technician on a
coatings inspection (Paragraph 4.a),
the inspector noted that an anchor bolt on the ground support was out of plumb by six degrees and no bevel washer was installed, as required by licensee procedure
- 12 MHP 5021.001.033.
The inspector reviewed the resultant condition report (No. 12-09-89-1563)
and Job Order and observed the corrective actions, which appeared to be satisfactory.
During a tour of the No.
1CD emergency diesel generator room on September 16, 1989, it was observed that the fuel line grommet on one line had slipped out of position such that it would not serve to prevent metal-to-metal contact between the fuel line and the fulcrum box housing as designed.
The licensee was informed and took timely corrective action.
The inspector attended a one-day licensee seminar, the subject of which was the application of "Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)."
This type of maintenance approach is designed to focus on development of a systematic evaluation, by using a decision logic tree, to identify the maintenance requirements of equipment according to the safety and operational consequences of each failure and the degradation mechanism responsible for each fai lure.
The licensee intends to incorporate three systems (Auxiliary Feedwater, Main Feed, and Service Water) into the initial pilot program.
The primary components in each system wi 11 be analyzed for RCM application, then compared to the existing preventive maintenance program.
The plant hopes to reap some potential benefits from the program, including increased component and plant avai lability, reduced corrective maintenance, better failure awareness, and improvement in the overall cost-effectiveness of the maintenance program.
Problem Report (PR) 89-1062,
"On September 13, 1989, while performing cosmetic repairs on the Unit 1 Containment, plant personnel discovered a 3/16 inch high by 2 1/4 inch wide void in the concrete."
The void was located at elevation 655 ft. - 10 1/2 inches, at the top of the closure pour for the North side temporary opening, and extended through to the liner plat Initial and confirmed assessments by American Electric Power's Design and Civil Engineering Departments found that the effects of the void on the capacity of the containment wall to resist design
.
loads were essentially nonexistent.
The 1'icensee believes the cause of the problem to be due to'mproper use of a concrete vibrator during construction.
The corrective action plan calls for the void to be filled with epoxy resin.
The licensee intends to perform nondestructive mapping of the joints at'ther similar locations around both containments to ensure no other voids exist.
Condition Report (CR) 1-09-89-1630,
"During the continuation of concrete repairs on the Unit 1 containment dome exterior,...a pocket
'f spalled concrete located approximately.25 feet above the 681 foot West main steam enclosure roof...
was.discovered."
The spalled area was excavated to determine the extent of the damaged area and was found to be 4 I/2 inches wide by 3 inches high by 6 inches deep.
The end of a 3/4 inch to 1 inch diameter rust covered bar was found in the excavation about 1 inch inside the wall face.
Personnel from the licensee's corporate Nuclear Design, Structural and Analytical Section determined that the effect of the spalled area on the capacity of the containment wall to resist design loads was also insignificant.
The bar is believed to be part of the anchorage system used to
,
support the containment dome formwork, and is not believed to present a problem.
The exact cause of the spalling is unknown; however, a small vertical crack directly above the affected area could have easily 1'et in moisture, thereby causing the concrete to chip from the seasonal freezing and thawing process.
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identified.
Survei 1 lance (61726 42700)
The inspector reviewed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing as described below and verified that testing was performed in
'ccordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were properly accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The following activities were inspected:
I a..**2-0HP 4030 STP.017E,
"East hIotor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System Test."
This test was performed September 16, 1989, for two purposes.
One was accomplishment of the required routine periodic operability verification.
The other purpose was to demonstrate
return to operability after system maintenance.
Repairs had been made to test line flow control valve 2-FRV-255 because it was oscillating about plus/minus
gpm rather than steadily controlling flow.
The initial test run observed by the NRC inspector on September
was unsatisfactory, because valve 2-FRV-255 was experiencing even more severe osci llations (about plus/minus 50 gpm) than before.
Subsequently, the licensee succeeded in repairing the valve and in performing a satisfactory test prior to expiration of the applicable Limiting Condition for Operation.
The inspector also reviewed procedure
- 1-OHP 4021.056.001,
"Filling and Venting Auxiliary Feedwater Syst'm and Placing System in Standby Readiness,"
to verify improved instrument/root valve position control specificity.
The procedure was found to be enhanced since a previous inspection (ref.
NRC Inspection Report No. 50-315/89023(DRP);
50-316/89023(DRP))
found these valves left in various configurations after testing rather than uniformly controlled.
The inspector had no further questions or concerns on this subject.
- 12 THP 6030 IMP.066, "Generic Ca libration Procedure,"
as used for calibration of the Post Accident Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System (PACMHS) sample recording instrument 2-CP-A.
On September 1, 1989, the licensee discovered that a required surveillance test on a hydraulic restraint ("snubber")
had not been performed, as required during the April-July 1989 refueling outage.
The problem was documented on Problem Report 89-1005.
The snubber in question, No.
1-GRC-S559, is located on the Unit
pressurizer spray line.
Testing was required under a special test requirement applied to snubbers which failed previous testing.
Snubber 1-GRC-S559 failed a test criterion involving lock-up velocity during the Unit
1987 refueling outage.
The test called for'ock-up to occur at 15.1 inches/minute or less, but it occurred at 16.3 inches/minute during the 1987 test.
The snubber was rebuilt, retested satisfactorily, and returned to service.
Subsequently, when the list of snubbers to be tested during 1989 was developed, the special test requirement was overlooked and No.
1-GRC-S559 was not included in the designated test sample.
On discovering.the problem September 1, 1989, the licensee declared the snubber inoperable and entered a 72-hour Limiting Condition for Operation.
Because the unit would have to be shut down to MODE 5 to perform testing (the unit was in normal full-power operation)
the licensee reviewed alternatives.
By letter (AEP:NRC: 1094) dated September 1, 1989, the licensee requested a one-time change te Unit 1 Technical Specifications to permit inspection and testing of snubber No.
1-GRC-S559 upon the occasion of the next unit entry into NODE 5.
Evaluations and justifications involving the potential risks of deferring the testing were included in the licensee's reques l On September 1,
NRC granted a Temporary Waiver of Compliance to permit continued operation of Unit I until,September 6 while the Technical Specification change was completed.
On September 6,.the change was issued; it requires performance of the specified surveillance upon the next Unit I entry into MODE 5 or concurrent with the next occasion of ice condenser surveillance, whichever comes first, but in no case later than February 28, 1990.
No violations; deviations, unresolved or open items were identified.
-Emer enc Pre aredness (82301)
On September 13, 1989, the inspector participated in and observed the conduct of an emergency preparedness drill utilizing the Unit 2 control room simulator and the simulator-driven Technical Support Center'(TSC).
The licensee was accomplishing training and practicing for the September 20, 1989 emergency exercise which was evaluated by a team of HRC and contracted special.ists in emergency preparedness functions. - ref.
NRC Inspection Report Ho. 50-315/89027(DRSS);
50-316/89027(DRSS).
The activities observed on September 13 were deemed to be well disciplined, properly focused and demonstrative of the capability to respond properly to the scenario presented.
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identified.
Safet Assessment/gualit Yerification (38702)
The effectiveness of management controls, verification and oversight activities, in the conduct of jobs observed during this inspection, was eva lua ted.
The inspector frequently attended management and supervisory meetings involving plant status and plans, with a focus on proper co-ordination among Departments.
The results of licensee audits and corrective action programs were routinely monitored by attendance at Problem Assessment Group (PAG)
meetings and by review of Condition Reports, Problem Reports, Radiological Deficiency Reports, and security incident reports.
As applicable, corrective action program documents were forwarded to NRC Region III technical specialists for information and possible followup evaluation.
The inspector toured the station warehouse and reviewed receipt inspection processes.
This included discussions with receipt inspectors and observation of receipt inspection activities in progress.
Reference was made to procedure
- 12 OAP 3120 SRI.001,
"Stores Receipt Inspection" during these discussions and observations.
A general emphasis was placed on means of identification of nonconforming materials and components, especia lly counterfeit items, and how nonconformances are dispositioned and tracked.
The inspector concluded that the receipt inspection process at the plant, as described in the procedures and as reported by receipt
inspectors,'s not limited to paperwork reviews but involves practical physical verifications when possible.
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identified; 8.
Yiana ement Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
on October 5, 1989 to discuss the scope and findings of the inspection, as described in these Details.
In add'ition, the inspector also discussed, the likely informational content of'the inspection report with regard to documents or -processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietary.
10