IR 05000315/1989001
| ML17328A194 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 10/05/1989 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17328A193 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-89-01, 50-315-89-1, 50-316-89-01, 50-316-89-1, NUDOCS 8910170018 | |
| Download: ML17328A194 (7) | |
Text
APPENDIX Enc1osure
SALP 8 SALP BOARD REPORT U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE 50-315/89001; 50-316/89001 nspec son epor os.
Indiana Michi an Power.Com an arne o
scensee Dona1d C.
Cook Nuc1ear P1ant Units 1 and
ameo ac~ )y March
1988 throu h June
1989 Assessment.
Per so 8910170018 891005 PDR ADQCK 05000315
PNU
0
Enclosure
Donald C.
Cook A.
Summar of Meetin with Indiana Michi an Power Com an on Se tember
1989 The findings and conclusions of the SALP Board are documented in Report No. 50-315/89001; 316/89001 and were discussed with the licensee on September 26, 1989, at Donald C.
Cook Visitors'enter.
Mhile the meeting was primarily a discussion between the licensee and NRC, it was open to members of the public as observers.
The following licensee and NRC personnel were in attendance.
Indiana Michi an Power Com an M. Alexich, Vice President, Nuclear S. Brewer, Senior Licensing Engineer A. Blind, Plant Manager Nuclear Re ulator Commission C. Paperiello, Deputy Regional Administrator M. Axelson, Chief, Projects Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects B. Dorgensen, Senior Resident Inspector J.
7homa, Acting Director Project Directorate III-I, Office of Nuc1ear Reactor Regu 1ation (NRR J. Giitter, Project Manager, NRR B.
Coments Received from Licensee The Indiana Michigan Power Company's response to the Donald C.
Cook SALP 8 Report dated September 29, 1989, included one comment that has resulted in revising the SALP Report.
This change is listed in Enclosure (2), Errata sheet, and the revised page is included as Enclosure 3).
Replace the page in error listed in Enclosure (2) with the corrected page included in Enclosure (3) into your copy of the SALP Report.
C.
Re ional Administrator 's Conclusions Based on Consideration of Licensee ommen s
I have concluded that the overall rating in the affected area has not change Enclosure
PAGE
LINE 2-4 ERRATA SHEET NOW READS
...onsite, which are...
SHOULD READ
...onsite.
Basis:
The original statement was in erro PAGE IN ERROR Enclosure
The lack of site involvement by corporate engineering contributed to design.implementation problems onsite, which p&e now being resolved by formation of an engineering group on ate that reports to corporate engineering.
Other observed modification design weaknesses included numerous desig calculation errors and root-cause analyses that fail to pursue the generic aspects of problems.
licensee routinely e calculations reviewe generally appropria e
licensee has begun h
er concep ibite conservatism in modification n4~the technical approaches used were 1so, after several years of delay, the
'lementation of an onsite system engine The licensee'
siveness to NRC initiatives was good.
The licensee's s
i t s in response to NRC initiatives generally demonstrated n i -depth, conservative approach.
Once des>gn control
'
u ies were identified, the licensee was very r espons
'eloping resolutions to all concerns including estab
'
g assessment task group to develop recommendations that i u
e the performance of a detailed, technically oriented
- 4
"Seismic Anal sis for design r c ss aud>t.
Bullet>n 79 1, As-Buil fety Related Piping Systems,"
resolution activities were a c cern when unacceptable conditions were found in work that ha previously been considered acceptable.
The licensee took t'ly corrective action to address these concerns and progr ss to date has been adequate.
NRC concerns were resolved with recently missed ECP calculations and boron-10 depletion wit the inspector's questions answered promptly, appropriate do uments provided, and procedures revised, when necessary.
qualification concerns, identified in a Confirmatory Action etter (CAL) issued during the previous assessment period, are considered resolved and the CAL closed.
Further inspection revealed that the licensee has begun to successfully implement its requalification program.
Reactor trip system reliability testing was thorough and responsive to the Generic Letter 83-28 requirements.
However, one licensee weakness was noted in the design bases in that data is not readily retrievable, with a major effort required following NRC requests.
The licensee's approach to resolution of t chni 1 issues from a safety standpoint was generally good.
T li nsee routinely anticipated potential concerns and prov d
oper controls, for such problems as high lake ambient wage@
peratures and the use of sealant injection materials 'sty-related systems, in advance of needs.
The licensee's o porte staff conducted a
thorough investigation into the p
m of missed estimated critical position (ECP) calcula i sPnd subsequently refined the ECP calculations and upd mputer codes for greater
- accuracy, which from a safe st dpoint was very good.
For EOP activities, technical deviatio
>from the Emergency Response Guidelines'were fully justlf.
/and appropriate.
However, this was somewhat offset by inconsi tent use of adverse containment setpoint values under advers environmental conditions.
The
The lack of site involvement by corporate engineering contributed to design implementation problems onsite.
Other observed modification design weaknesses included numerous design calculation errors and root-cause analyses that failed to pursue the generic aspects of problems.
The licensee's approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint was generally good.
The licensee routinely anticipated potential concerns and provided proper controls, for such problems as high lake ambient water temperatures and the use of sealant injection materials in safety-related systems, in advance of needs.
The licensee's corporate staff conducted a
thorough investigation into the problem of missed estimated critical position (ECP) calculations and subsequently refined the ECP calculations and updated computer codes for greater accuracy, which from a safety standpoint was very good.
For EOP activities, technical deviations from the Emergency Response Guidelines were fully justified and appropriate.
However, this was somewhat offset by inconsistent use of adverse containment setpoint values under adverse environmental conditions.
The licensee routinely exhibited conservatism in modification calculations reviewed, and the technical approaches used were generally appropriate.
Also, after several years of delay, the licensee has begun the implementation of an onsite system engineer concept.
The licensee's responsiveness to NRC initiatives was good.
The licensee's submittals in response. to NRC initiatives generally demon'strated an in-depth, conservative approach.
Once design control inadequacies were identified, the licensee was very responsive in developing resolutions to all concerns including establishing an assessment task group to develop recommendations that include the performance of a detailed, technically oriented design process audit.
Bulletin 79-14, "Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety Related Piping Systems," resolution activities were a concern when unacceptable conditions were found in work that had previously been considered acceptable.
The licensee took timely corrective action to address these concerns and progress to date has been adequate.
NRC concerns were resolved with recently missed ECP calculations and boron-10 depletion with the inspector's questions answered promptly, appropriate documents provided, and procedures revised, when necessary.
Requalification concerns, identified in a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) issued during the previous assessment period, are considered resolved and the CAL closed.
Further inspection revealed that the licensee has begun to successfully implement its requalification program.
Reactor trip system reliability testing was thorough and responsive to the Generic Letter 83-28 requirements.
However, one licensee weakness was noted 'in the design bases in that data is not readily retrievable, with a major effort required following NRC requests.
20