IR 05000315/1987011
| ML17325A203 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 06/24/1987 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17325A201 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-87-11, 50-316-87-11, IEIN-87-004, IEIN-87-008, IEIN-87-010, IEIN-87-012, IEIN-87-10, IEIN-87-12, IEIN-87-4, IEIN-87-8, NUDOCS 8707150426 | |
| Download: ML17325A203 (24) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION F
REGION III
Reports No. 50-315/87011(DRP);
50-316/87011(DRP)
Docket Nos.
50-315; 50-316 Licenses No.
American Electric Power Service Corporation Indiana and Michigan Electric Company
'
Riverside Plaza Columbus, OH 43216 Facility Name:
Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and
Inspection At:
Donald C.
Cook Site, Bridgman, Michigan Inspection Conducted:
May 5 through June 15, 1987 Inspectors:
Bruce L. Jorgensen James K. Heller Approved By:
L.
urgess Chief Projects Section 2A Ins ection Summar Date Ins ection on Ma 5 throu h June
1987 Re orts No. 50-315/87011 DRP; No. 50-316/87011 DRP of actions on previously identified items, plant operations, reactor trips, radiological controls, maintenance, surveillance, fire protection/
housekeeping, outages, reportable events, Information Notices, and miscellaneous items.
Results:
Of the ll areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified in 10 areas.
One violation was identified ( Failure to properly dispose of weld rods Paragraph 6) in the remaining area.
S707i50426 S70629 PDR ADOCK 050003i5
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted W. Smith, Jr., Plant Manager
- A. Blind, Assistant Plant Manager, Administration
"J. Rutkowski, Assistant Plant Manager,'roduction
"L. Gibson, Assistant Plant Manag'er, Technical Support
- B. Svensson, Licensing Activity Coordinator
"T. Kriesel, Technical Superintendent, Physical Sciences
"K. Baker, Operations Superintendent E. Morse, Quality Control Superintendent
- T. Bei lman, IKC/Planning Superintendent
"J. Allard, Maintenance Superintendent
"T. Postlewait, Technical Superintendent, Engineering M. Horvath, Quality Assurance Supervisor D. Loope, Radiation Protection Supervisor The inspector also contacted a number of other licensee and contract employees and informally interviewed operations, maintenance, and technical personnel.
Denotes some of the personnel attending Management Interview on June 16, 1987.
2.
Actions on Previousl Identified Items a.
(Closed)
Open Item (315/82018-03; status boards
'nade uate and rot 316/82018-03):
reactor equipment q
p ective measures status boards not available in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
The inspector conferred with Emergency Preparedness specialists in NRC Region III and they recommended closure of this item providing (undocumented)
observations of upgrades in these areas were reverified.
The inspector toured both the TSC and the EOF and observed both are supplied with "live" plant and reactor equipment status via the Operating Technical Support Computer (OTSC) which is telemetered directly.
In addition, the TSC has two Plant Safety System Display (PSSD) terminals and controls for video cameras, located in each control room, for direct activity and parameter observations.
Concerning protective measures, an
"Offsite Radiation Assessment Board" is used to show status of dose projections and the latest protective action recommendation (PAR)..
Map transparencies of the site area are posted with sectors involved in any effective PAR being highlighted.
b.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (315/86015-03; 316/86015-03)
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (315/86022-05; 316/86022-05)
(Closed) Part 21 Report (315/86002-PP; 316/86002-PP):
each of these items involved potential Environmental Qualifications (EQ)
violations for unqualified valve motor internal wiring.,
The NRC has determined that no enforcement action will be taken for Environmental gualifications violations involving unqualified valve motor internal wiring.
This decision is based on the generic nature of the deficiencies, extenuating circumstances, and limited potential safety significance of the violations.
(Closed)
Open Item (315/84013-04; 316/84015-04):
the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps have a non-safety grade speed control system which is not subject to periodic testing or verified incapable of disabling safety equipment upon failure.
Routine monthly pump testing procedures have been revised to include determination of the correct speed control system setpoint, which is then maintained by an instruction permanently posted at the controller.
Special Procedure
OHP SP.040 was written to'est effects of system failure.
This test was performed on both pum'ps and has demonstrated that loss of air to the speed control system does not render the auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable.
The pump governor manufacturer (Woodward) stipulates a 5-year life for some internals, and the licensee has established a routine to replace the governors at alternate refuelings or after 4 years, whichever is less.
Upon installation of a new governor, a verification of proper "no load" setting, equivalent to loss of air, is performed.
The inspector consulted with NRC Region III technical personnel on this item and received concurrence for item closure.
(Closed) Violation (316/85029-01):
MODE changes with the Unit 2 control room emergency ventilation system not OPERABLE.
The underlying cause was procedural failure to stipulate a functional check of the system following damper adjustments, such that a
mispositioned damper went undetected.
As described in the licensee's response dated November 27, 1985, the subject procedure was revised and now requires a system functional check after damper adjustments.
This violation was one of six violations from Inspection Reports No. 50-315/85027; No. 50-316/85027, No. 50-315/85028; No. 50-316/85028, and No, 50"315/85029; No. 50-316/85029 which were combined into one Severity Level III violation.
The associated civil penalty was paid.
(Closed) Violation (316/85029-02):
fai lure to perform an appropriate containment airlock test prior to establishing containment integrity at the end of a period 'when both doors had been open and integrity was not required.
The licensee's response (AEP:NRC:0948D) dated April 21, 1986, acknowledged that the violation occurred and was the result of an improper interpretation of the Technical Specification.
.When the problem was identified, the licensee satisfactorily performed the appropriate test.
As with Item d. above, this violation was one of several involving testing deficiencies which were combined in a single escalated enforcement actio I f.
(Closed)
Open Item (316/85010-01)
Unit 1 Technical Specification 4.5 '.a.4 requires that the listed valves be verified in the specified position with control power locked-out (emphasis added),
whereas Unit 2 Technical Specification 4.5.2.a requires that the analogous valves be verified in the specified position with power to the valve
~o crater removed-(emphasis added).
The surveillance procedure for both Units verifies that control power
.
is locked-out.
The inspector discussed this item with the Operations Administrative Compliance Coordinator (ACC), who stated that the intent of the Unit 2 Technical Specification is met by verifying that control power is locked-out.
The inspector does not disagree with this but notes that verifying that control power is locked-out is not in literal compliance with the Unit 2 Technical Specifications.
To resolve the word difference, the ACC issued a
Technical Specification upgrade sheet to the Corporate Nuclear Safety and Licensing group.
This sheet will formalize the need to review and possibly revise the Unit 2 Technical Specification.
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identified.
0 erational Safet Verification Routine facility operating activities were observed as conducted in the plant and from the main control rooms.
Plant startup, steady power operation, plant shutdown, and system(s)
lineup and operation were observed as applicable'he performance of licensed Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operator s, of Shift Technical Advisors, and of auxiliary equipment operators was observed and evaluated includirsg procedur=
use and adherence, records and logs, communications, shift/duty turnover, and the degree of professionalism of control room activities.
Evaluation, corrective action, and response for off normal conditions or events, if any, were examined.
This included compliance to any reporting requirements.
Observations of the control room monitors, indicators, and recorders were made to verify the operability of emergency systems, radiation, monitoring systems and nuclear reactor protection systems, as applicable.
Reviews of surveillance, equipment condition, and tagout logs were conducted.
Proper return to service of selected components was.verified.
Except for a brief time (see Paragraph 4.a "Reactor Trips" ) Unit
operated routinely at 80 to 90 percent power throughout the inspection period.
The nominal 90 percent power target, in effect for the current operating cycle to preserve steam generator tubing, was not achieved for a period between Nay 9 and May 26 due to a self-imposed restriction to 80 percent.
The Unit had performed a
reduced T-average test May 8 (see Paragraph 7. - "Surveillance" )
which resulted in a secondary system chemistry transient, primarily
due to increased sulphates believed to have originated from the moisture separator/reheaters.
Resolution of the elevated sulphates proved to be both difficult and time consuming, in part because the licensee has adopted a very low action level (less than 40 parts per billion) for routine operations.
Except for a brief time (see Paragraph 4.
b "Reactor Trips")
Unit 2 operated routinely at 80 to 90 percent power throughout the inspection period.
In the case of Unit 2 the steam.generator preservation power target is 80 percent, but increased to 90 percent, when authorized in order to support system load demands as required.
The inspector reviewed procedures PMI-4010, "Plant Operations Policy", Revision 4 dated April 23, 1987; OHI-4011, "Shift Staffing",
Revision 2 dated June 12, 1986; and OHI-4013, "Operators:
Authorities and Responsibilities",
Revision 2 dated April 23, 1987.
The purpose of the review was to assess if several regulatory requirements or guidance were incorporated into complete, accurate and clearly expressed procedure form.
Items checked included staffing, independent verification, working hours, containment control, and cleanliness'lant and control room tours were conducted on the midnight shift on May 14, June 2,
and June 8 to assess off-shift attentiveness and professionalism.
No problems were noted.
In addition, the inspector met with Operations Department management to discuss various aspects of I.E. Information Notice (IEIN) No. 87-21
"Shutdown Order Issued Because Licensed Operators Asleep While on Duty".
This Notice identifies several items NRC believes to be significant in maintaining a properly professional control room atmosphere.
The licensee already had in place procedures, instructions or other controls addressing all but one item that relates to assurance that eating in the control room( s) will not.
compromise operator attentiveness or a professional control room atmosphere.
The licensee issued a memorandum to all Operations Department supervisors on May 21, in which IEIN No. 87-21 was attached and discussed with emphasis that eating in the control room (currently not prohibited) would not be permitted to affect attentiveness or professionalism.
On May 26, the same information was forwarded to the Training Department for inclusion in training for all the operating shifts.
The inspector has never observed an instance that would suggest that eating needs to be banned from the D.C.
Cook control rooms.
During a tour of the auxil'iary building on May 22, 1987, at the Unit 1 startup flash tank, the inspector observed what appears to be increased steam leakage at the blowdown lines to the flash tank.
Discussion with the equipment operator in the area indicated that system blowdown was being changed from the startup flash tank to= the blowdown flash tank.
The inspector noted that the steam was so dense that access to containment penetrations located near the roof of the room may be hindered.
This item was discussed with the operation production controlle Continued progress in the plant operations labeling project was observed during this inspection as stencilled labels on electrical switch gear in Unit 1 were being replaced with engraved labels.
The new labels are more strategically placed and contain identification terminology consistent with procedures, drawings, and the plant equipment data-base documents.
During a tour of the auxiliary building on May 27, 1987, the inspector found a carrying can, containing four weld rods, at the Unit 2 upper containment air lock.
Documentation associated with these weld rods showed five rods were issued May 13, 1987, for Job Order No. 702661.
The licensee has requirements to return or to dispose of any unused weld rod( s) at the end of each shift.
This is discussed further in Paragraph 6 - "Maintenance."
During a tour of the 569 elevation of the turbine building the inspector found a through wall leak to Valve 12 NSW 101 "Circulation Water Intake Tunnel to Steam Generator Blowdown Suppression Pots."
The inspector identified this item to the Shift Supervisor who stated that he was aware of the leak and that a Job Order was being written.
During power operations the inspector toured the Unit 1 upper containment, the Unit 1 ice condenser and the Unit 2 lower containment (accumulator rooms).
The inspector reviewed some aspects of containment integrity control, particularly the administrative controls for PCR-40
"Containment Service Air Isolation Valve".
The applicable system Drawing (OP-12-5120B)
has a note that is applicable tu PCR-40.
This note states:
Blind flanges to be removed and spool pieces inserted for maintenance purposes only.
Spool pieces to be removed prior to entrance to MODE 2.
The inspector found the Operation Department's procedure has the blind flange installed prior to MODE 4 (containment integrity is required in MODE 4 and above)
and the Performance Department maintains a current Type B&C Leakrate Test for both PCR-40 and the blind flange.
The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and the Technical Specifications identifies PCR-40 as the containment boundary and does not mention the blind flange.
The inspector asked onsite licensing personnel why must the blind flange be installed and why the MODE 2 restriction since containment integrity is required prior to MODE Licensee investigation revealed that the bli'nd flange is installed to prevent an inadvertent containment pressurization if PCR-40 is inappropriately operated.
This information is documented on Engineering Control Procedure Revision Record 1-2-PO-01 dated March 10, 1980.
k.
The licensee declared an unusual event at 7:55 p.m.
on June 10,1987, based on the response of seismic instrumentation.
The seismic event was not felt in either control room.
Inspection of plant structures was completed with no abnormalities observed.
Vender analysis of tapes from the seismic instrumentation indicated that the
.
instrumentation was operating properly and that no acceleration above
.01g was recorded.
The minimum acceleration the instrumentation can resolve is.Olg.
No open items, violations, deviations, or unresolved items were identified.
Reactor Tri s
a.
Unit
The Unit tripped from 90 percent power on June 4 at 10:34 a.m.
due to a turbine/reactor trip caused by high water level in Steam Generator No.
12.
The high water level occurred during the performance of a steam flow/feedwater flow surveillance test.
Prior to the test, the operator attempted to place 'the feedwater regulating valve in manual (this step was not required by the procedure but was the operator's preference prior to starting the test).
Apparently he moved the switch but it returned to the auto position.
In addition the test requires that the operator change the channel selector switch to the channel not in test.
The operator switched from channel I but did move the switch all the way to channel II, leaving the switch in a intermediate position.
Subsequent investigation shows that the position was not the full travel of the switch but was in alignment with the labeling for channel II.
Also disclosed was that the intermediate position removes the actual feedwater flow signal from the circuit and feeds a feedwater flow of zero to the control logic. 'With the controller still in automatic and the feedwater flow indicating zero, the feedwater regulating valve went "full open" leading to the reactor trip.
While in MODE 3, reactor trip signals were received at 9:05 p.m.
on June 4,
(
no rod movement - reactor trip breakers still open)
and again at 5:38 a.m.
on June 5 ( only the shutdown rods, which had been withdrawn, tripped).
The trip signals were caused when a
leaking secondary side valve allowed the right moisture separator reheater to pressurize to an indicated 10 percent power which enabled the reactor trip from turbine trip (the turbine trip had not
been reset from. the June 4 trip).
The licensee repaired the leaking valves and made the reactor critical at 8:53 a.m.
on June 5.
The Unit was returned to its target power level.
b.
Unit 2 The reactor tripped from 90 percent power at ll:41 p.m, on June 1,
due to a turbine/reactor trip caused by low condenser vacuum.
The low vacuum occurred during valve installation on the line between the miscellaneous drain tank and the "B" condenser.
Removal of a blind flange, a leaking isolation valve and draining of some water that may have been a loop seal, combined to cause the low vacuum.
All safety systems functioned as intended and the reactor was made critical at 7: 19 p.m.
on June 2,
1987.
The reactor again tripped at 7:50 p.m.
on June 2, from low-low water level in Steam Generator No. 23.
Water level control for all four steam generators was in manual at the time of the trip.
The trip was classified as personnel error.
The reactor was made critical at 12:28 a.m.
on June 3,
1987 and returned to its applicable target power levels The reactor trips will be reviewed further during the close out of the associated LERs.
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identified.
5.
Radiolo ical Controls During routine tours of radiologically controlled plant facilities or areas, the inspector observed occupational radiation safety practices by the radiation protection staff and other workers.
Effluent releases were routinely checked, including examination of on-line recorder traces and proper operation of automatic monitoring equipment.
Independent surveys using a licensee controlled portable meter (E-130)
were performed in various radiologically controlled areas.
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identified.
6.
Maintenance Maintenance activities in the plant were routinely inspected, including both corrective maintenance (repairs)
and preventive maintenance.
Mechanical, electrical, and instrument and control group maintenance activities were included as availabl The focus of the inspection was to assure the maintenance activities reviewed were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the Limiting Conditions for Operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; and post maintenance testing was performed as applicable.
The i'nspector reviewed the Job Order system to determine if the number of
"Open" Job Orders is declining, steady or increasing.
The number appears to have increased since July 1986.
The increase is apparent whether the backlog is expressed in total numbers or weeks of incomplete work.
This matter was discussed with the Assistant Plant Manager (Production)
and the Administrative Compliance Coordinators from the Instrument and Control ( IEC) group and the Maintenance Department.
The inspector found that the licensee has shown both an awareness of and sensitivity to the development of some minor adverse trends in completing equipment repairs, and has initiated some actions to address them.
The following activities were inspected:
a.
Job Order 705994 Remove vent plug from pressure transmitter ( Fi l e:
IN-CE I-2-N100)
NPP-153.
The Job Order and associated Condition Report No. 2-12-86-1428 documented that IKC personnel discovered a plug in the vent to pressurizer pressure transmitter NPP-153.
The Job Order documents the plug removal and the Condition Report documents the unsuccessful investigation to determine when/why the plug vas installed.
The licensee concluded, based on steady state readings before and after the plug removal, that the operability of the transmitter was not affected.
The inspector questioned if operability was proven, since the transmitter has a response time and trip settings which may be affected during transient conditions.
To resolve the inspector concerns the licensee bench calibrated an identical transmitter, with the vent plug installed and removed.
The transmitter was not affected by the plug.
b.
Job Order 713639 Repair excessive vibrations on circulation (File: ME-PP-1-PP-2-3)
water pump No.
13.
Job Order 702661 As noted above in Paragraph 3 "Operations,"
the inspector found leftover weld rods from this job still present in the auxiliary building two weeks after issuance.
This was discussed with the Maintenance Superintendent who had the weld rods removed and issued a Condition Repor Licensee Procedure
MHP 5050 SPC.001
"Maintenance Procedure for Control, Requisition and Distribution of Weld Rods" at Paragraph 3.8, requires that all unused electrodes, usable bare rod and rod stubs will be disposed of at the end of each shift, either by being returned to the tool crib attendant with the yellow copy of the weld rod requisition, (Paragraph 3.8. 1) or by being placed in a designated disposal container (Paragraph 3.8.3).
Technical Specification 6.8. 1 requires implementation of the applicable procedures of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, November 1972 which includes (at Section I) procedures for performing maintenance.
Failure to comply with 12 MHP 5050 SPC.001, as shown above, is a violation of Technical Specification.6.8. 1 (Violati on 315/87011-01; 316/87011-01)
.
d.
Job Order 008167 Repair 1-IFI-261 fitting leak.
This activity was reviewed when the inspector found a Job Order tag on. the instrument involved but there was no evidence of leakage.
Followup showed the repair had been completed but the Job Order tag
.on the instrument was not removed.
The licensee removed the tag upon notification from the inspector.
e.
Job Order 714500 Repair low discharge pressure for West (File: ME-PP-PP-7W-0)
Essential Service Water Pump.
This activity was reviewed because of the amount of work required to be performed within a relatively short LCO time window and the augmented security measures required to complete the work.
One violation, and no deviations, unresolved or open items were identified.
7.
Surveillance The inspector reviewed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing as described below and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that Limiting Conditions, for Operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were properly accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The following activities were inspected.
a.
""12 THP 4030 STP.333
"Flux Map" b.
- "2 THP 6030 IMP.231
"Power Range Nuclear Instrument
'alibration N41, N42, N43, N44"
,
c.
"*12 OHP 4030 STP.023
"Heat Tracing Inspection and Boron Injection Tank Heat Tracing Operability and Operation" This program was reviewed, in part, to validate the routine verification, process that boron injection flowpath temperatures are adequate, as described in Paragraph 1 "Reportable Events."
d.
~"1 THP SP.141
"Unit 1 Turbine Volumetric Flow Test" This test was performed to determine secondary side parameters for full power operation with a.reduced primary coolant system T-average.
The inspector reviewed the licensee, safety evaluation and discussed the procedure with the System Engineer, Technical Superintendent and the NRR Project Manager; all questions were answered and no problems were identified.
In addition, the inspector attended one of the pre-job briefings conducted by the System Engineer.
The test commenced at 5:00 a.m.
on'May 8, 1987, and lasted approximately six hours.
The inspector arrived in the control room shortly after the test commenced and found, in addition to the normal shift complement, members from site/corporate engineering staff and middle/senior plant management.
The inspector found the additional management attention appropriate because, when secondary side parameters approached the trip setpoints for high steam flow coincidental with low steam pressure, the appropriate decision to terminate the test was made.
Data evaluation to support a decision on future plant operation at full power with reduced T-average is ongoing.
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identified.
8.
Fire Protection/Housekee in Fire protection program activities, including fire prevention and other activities associated with maintaining capability for early detection and suppression of postulated fires, were examined.
Plant cleanliness, with a focus on control of combustibles and on maintaining continuous ready access to fire fighting equipment and materials, was included in the items evaluated.
During a tour of the turbine driven auxiliary feed pump rooms at approximately 11:30 a.m.
on May 12, the inspector found the rooms unattended with three pieces of electrical conduit piping laying on the floor, preventing closure of Fire Doors 227B and 228A.
This was identified to the Unit 2 control room supervisor who had the piping removed and issued Condition Report No. 12-5-87-688.
The configuration is a violation of the fire protection plan and would normally be the subject of a Notice of Violation.
However, during the Condition
Report followup, the licensee identified that Fire Door 228A had been declared inoperable because of a faulty door latch mechanism and was the subject of scheduled firewatch tours'ecause of the plan configuration in this area and the generic instructions provided to the firewatch, the required compensatory measures were also taken for Door 227B; no violation was issued.
During a tour of the 609 feet level of the turbine bui.lding at approximately 10:30 a.m.
on May 7, 1987, the inspector found a fork lift parked next to, and the forks-raised above, Valve 2-AR4-500
"Hainsteam reducing."
The fork lift was apparently being used to facilitate repair of a fan located above the valve.
When the inspector found this setup no workmen were in the area.
The inspector questioned the wisdom of leaving a fork lift parked in the manner.
This was discussed with the Shift Supervisor who had the for k lift moved.
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identified.
9.
~Octa es Following the Unit 1 reactor trip (see Paragraph 4.a) the inspector attended an outage meeting which would determine if Unit 1 was to return to service, enter a mini-maintenance outage, or start the refueling outage two weeks early.
The meeting format allowed each department the opportunity to discuss the items which had previously been placed on the forced outage scheduled.
As a result, the decision was made (by senior management)
to return the plant to service.
No violations, deviations, unresolved ur open items w':re identi'.ied.
10.
Re ortable Events The inspector reviewed the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) by means of direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records.
The review addressed compliance to reporting requirements'and, as applicable, that immediate corrective action and appropriate action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished.
In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy at
CFR Part 2, Appendix C, certain violations of regulatory requirements are not normally subject to issuance of a formal Notice of Violation providing they meet five criteria.
Such violations must have been identified by the licensee, reported if required, corrected, determined not to be of major safety significance, and non-repetitive of previous similar problems for which corrective action proved ineffective.
Of the events reviewed below, Items b., c.,
and h. involve'd apparent violations meeting these criteria.
a..
(Closed)
LER 50-315/86016, Revision 0:
Failure to perform power range nuclear instrument time response testing in accordance with requirements of the Technical Specifications due to procedural
deficiency.
This matter was identified by an NRC inspector and was subject to a Notice of Violation issued with I.E. Inspection Reports No. 50-315/86027(DRS);
No. 50-316/86027(DRS).
As such, the LER serves primarily to satisfy reporting requirements associated with identification of an event or condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications'he LER does discuss corrective and preventive actions, which NRC will examine further in close out review of the violation, which is assigned Tracking No. 315/86027-01 and currently remains open.
(Closed)
LER 50-315/86021, Revision 0 and Revision 1:
Lack of specificity in the Technical Specifications resulted in operation with unanalyzed emergency core cooling configuration in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system.
This item was identified by the licensee in review of a violation involving an unanalyzed configuration of the safety injection system - see Item i. below.
As the unanalyzed configuration (isolation of cross-tie piping between RHR headers)
was considered an important option for occasional testing and maintenance, the licensee performed analyses to establish acceptability of the previously unanalyzed configuration against design basis requirements.
This information was summarized in Revision 1.
Pending NRC review and approval of formal safety evaluation submittals, the effect of which will be to permit the subject configuration for specified time periods, the licensee is maintaining strict administrative controls on all the valves capable of effecting a cross-tie isolation.
(Closed)
LER 50-315/87003, Revision 0:
Failure to restore heat trace circuit required by the Technical Specifications due to inadequate desgn change co-ordination.
Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.5.4.2 requires both trains of heat tracing for boric acid flowpaths associated with the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) to be OPERABLE or, with one not OPERABLE, the plant can operate no longer than 30 days.
ACTION requirements then specify shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
The subject flowpaths include BIT inlet piping, Circuit No. 261.
The subject LER 87-003 reports the licensee's conclusion that heat trace Circuit No.
261 Train B was not OPERABLE for approximately 18 months from September 1985 through March 1987, a time period during which the Unit -repeatedly operated longer than 30 days'.
ACTION items associated with verifying line temperature above 145 degrees F.
were complied with, since the line was continuously monitored by an OPERABLE low temperature alarm and in addition, daily readings are documented showing the temperature actually remained above 155 degrees F.
The Technical Specification BASES require OPERABLE heat tracing to assure that temperature remains above 135 degree F.,
the saturation temperature for boric acid at 21,000 ppm.
Though the subject inoperative Train B,was found disconnected from its power supply and while this train was "in service" during alternate months throughout the subject period Train A was "OFF",
temperatures remained sufficiently high because of the proximity of
BIT heaters and other OPERABLE heat tracing.
Therefore, the functional requirements to maintain temperature conditions prohibitive of boric acid precipitation, were met.
The above, facts were reviewed within NRC Region III, including consultation with the Enforcement Section, because the circumstances appear to involve failure to
~literall comply with a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation.
This review concluded there was little safety significance to the matter and enforcement action was not indicated.
To correct the apparent underlying cause (poor co-ordination among plant and contractor maintenance personnel in restoration from a design change),
the licensee made a clear assignment of responsibility for controlling electrical lead installation and/or termination to the Design Change Coordinator for the respective activity.
More numerous and more specific Job Orders and documentation had been developed for Design Changes independent of this event.
(Closed)
LER 50-315/87004, Revision 0:
Unit 1 shutdown due to unidentified reactor coolant system leakage.
The licensee complied with applicable Technical Specifications, shut down the Unit, located and repaired the leakage, and returned the Unit to service These activities are discussed in greater detail in I.E. Inspection Reports No. 50-315/87009(DRP);
No. 50-316/87009(DRP).
(Closed)
LER 50-315/87005, Revision 0:
Technical Specification limits for reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure/temperature were exceeded due to operator error.
This matter has been the subject of both Special Reports No. 50-315/87010(DRP);
No. 50-316/87010(DRP),
and Notice,of Violation and an Enforcement Conference in NRC Region III on April 27, 1987.
The violation is assigned Tracking No. 315/87009-01, which remains open and licensee corrective and preventive actions will be further reveiwed.
(Closed)
LER 50-315/87006, Revision 0:
Main steam line isolation actuation due to component failure.
With Unit 1 in MODE 4 (temperature at 330 degree F.) and one high steam flow channel in
"trip" because the indication had failed upscale, a second channel tripped when an associated instrument failed, satisfying the logic for main steam isolation actuation.
- The isolation valves all functioned as designed.
Prior to Unit startup and return to applicable MODEs requiring their protection, the failed instruments were repaired or replaced, (Closed)
LER 50-316/86011, Revision 0 and Revision 1:
Ice condenser ice basket weights were found during routine surveillance to be below values stipulated in the Technical Specifications.
Maintaining ice weights at levels satisfactory to Technical Specifications has been a generic problem
-.in both Units the subject LER is at least the eight occurrence and is-due to sublimation of ice from within the baskets and redeposition on
condenser frames, doors or other structures.
Several modifications have been made over the years to minimize this naturally-occurring process with limited success.
Analyses exist which bound the conditions described, showing adequate safety margin despite certain non-uniform ice distribution.
Ice was added to the low-weight baskets sufficient to predict acceptable results the next surveillance cycle, which proved to be the case.
Continued migration of ice, however, caused excessive buildup in flow passages as discussed in Item k. below.
(Closed)
LER 50-316/86020, Revision 0:
A Technical Specification surveillance was not performed when required due to failure to identify appropriate post-design change testing.
Upon completion of a design change involving replacement of loop T-average resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) the instruments were declared OPERABLE based on satisfactory instrument 'testing.
The control room was notified and proceeded with plant heatup above 541 degree F.
The associated instrument channels, however, had not been verified OPERABLE via a channel functional test as required for heatup above 541 degrees.
The discrepancy was discovered within a few hours, temperature was reduced below 541 degrees, and requisite testing was performed yielding satisfactory results.
Design Change Coordinators were all briefed concerning this oversight.of required testing, and an independent verification was placed in plant heatup procedures requiring a separate 541 degree F. signoff check that the requisite channel functional test is complete.
(Closed)
LER 50-316/86026, Revision 0 and Revision 1:
Lack of specificity in the Technical Specifications resulted in operation with unanalyzed emergency core cooling configuration in the safety injection (SI) system.
An example of this condition, which existed on September 4 and 5, 1986, for a period of time in excess of the maximum permitted by the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was identified by NRC.
A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty was issued March 12, 1987 based on findings documented in I.E. Inspection Reports No. 50-315/86042(DRP);
No. 50-316/86042(DRP).
The licensee has paid the civil penalty.
The licensee's corrective and preventive actions will be based in part on NRC acceptance of formal safety evaluation submittals as discussed for Item b. above.
Meanwhile, strict administrative controls are in place to prevent recurrence in the short term.
Longer term actions will be reviewed further in closeout of the violation, which is assigned a separate Tracking No. 316/86042-01 and which currently remains open.
(Closed)
LER 50-316/87001, Revision 0:
Inadvertent reactor trip signal in MODE 3 due to source range nuclear instrument channel failure.
The failure was traced to the detector, which was replaced.
All safety equipment response to the trip signal was as designed.
k.
(Closed)
LER 50-316/87002, Revision 0:
Ice buildup in ice condenser flow passages due to sublimation.
This was a voluntary LER discussing discovery during routine surveillance that sublimation and redeposition of ice within the ice condenser had caused buildup of frost and ice on several lattice frames to greater than three-eights inch thickness, thereby slightly reducing cross-sectional area of associated flow passages.
Removal of buildup greater than three-eights inch thickness was done as required by Technical Specifications.
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identified.
ll.
Information Notices By memorandum dated May 18, 1987, the NRC Region III Office requested that the inspector review the Information Notices (IN) listed below.
The inspector verified that the Information Notices were reviewed for applicability, that appropriate di stribution was made to corporate and site personnel and, if applicable, corrective action was scheduled or implemented.
a.
IN 87-04 b.
IN 87-08 c.
IN 87-10 Diesel Generator Fails Test Because of Degraded Fuel.
Degraded Motor Leads In Limitorque DC Motor Operators.
Potential For Water Hammer During Restart of Residual Heat Removal Pumps.
(This is not applicable to a PWR).
d.
IN 87-12 Potential Problems With Metal Clad Circuit Breakers, General Electric Type AKF-2-25.
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identified, 12.
Miscellaneous a.
An NRC "Morning Report" dated May 1, 1987 identified that a licensee had dismissed a
Non Destructive Testing company from the site because of apparent falsification of records.
The inspector discussed this item with the site guality Control Supervisor and verified that the licensee is and has not used that company.
An NRC "Morning Report" dated April 29, 1987 identified that a
licensee had found flux mapping system thimble wall degradation.
This was discussed with the Technical Superintendent-Engineering who indicated that eddy current testing of Unit 1 flux mapping system had been performed.
Reviews are continuing to determine if additional testing is necessary.
'I No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identified.
13.
Mana ement Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
on June 16 to discuss the scope and findings of the inspection.
In addition, the inspector asked those in attendance whether they considered any of the items discussed to contain information exempt from disclosure.
No items were identified.
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