IR 05000315/1987013
| ML17325A193 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1987 |
| From: | Hueter L, Schumacher M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17325A192 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-87-13, 50-316-87-13, NUDOCS 8707100345 | |
| Download: ML17325A193 (10) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-315/87013(DRSS);
50-316/87013(DRSS)
Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316 Licensee:
American Electric Power Service Corporation Indiana and Michigan Electric Company 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, OH 43216 Licenses No.
D.
C.
Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and
Inspection At:
D.
C.
Cook Site Bridgeman, Michigan Inspection Conducted:
May 19-22 and June 1-2, 1987 Inspector:
L. J. Hueter Date Approved By:
M. C. Schumacher, Chief Radiological Effluents and Chemistry Section Date Ins ection Summar Ins ection. on Ma 19-22 and June 1-2 1987 Re orts No. 50-315/87013 DRSS No. 50"316/87013 DRSS Areas Ins ected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of gaseous and liquid radioactive program including; effluent release records and reports of effluents; effluent control instrumentation; procedures for controlling releases; primary and secondary coolant chemistry and activity; gaseous effluent filtration; audits; organization and training; and review of previously identified open items and selected LERs.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8707200345 870630 PDR ADOCK 05000315
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
'A.
1S.
S.
2J 1J 1L L.
1p M.
'R.
1B 1H.
S.
1 2T 2B 2J
2D J.
1T S.
1J W.
'M.
1J Blind, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations and Administration Brewer.,
AEPSC, Radiological Support Section Manager Dannhardt, Technical'hysical Science, Radwaste Supervisor Feinstein, AEPSC, Manager, Nuclear Safety, Licensing Fryer, Technical Physical Science, Environmental Coordinator Gibson, Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Support Gumns, Technical Physical Science, Administrative Compliance Coordinator Holmes, AEPSC, QA Auditor Holland, Technical Physical Science, Radiation Protection Supervisor Horvath, AEPSC, Site QA Supervisor Huerter, AEPSC, Site QA/Supervisory Auditor Jepkema, AEPSC, Site QA Auditor Jones, AEPSC, Engineer, Radiological Support Services Klementowicz, AEPSC, Health Physicist, Radiological Support Kriesel, Technical Physical Science, Superintendent Lauzau, AEPSC, Engineer, Nuclear Safety, Licensing Leichner, AEPSC, Senior Engineer, Radiological Support Services Loope, Technical Physical Science, Plant Radiation Protection Supervisor Nadeau, AEPSC, QA Auditor Postlewait, Technical Engineering Superintendent Ramz, Performance Engineer, Senior Rutkowski, Assistant Plant Manager Smith, Jr., Plant Manager Terry, Technical Engineering, Administrative Compliance Coordinator Wojcik, Technical Physical Science, Plant Chemical Supervisor U.S.
NRC J. Heller, Resident Inspector B. Jorgensen, Senior Resident Inspector
'Denotes those present at the plant exit meeting on June 2, 1987.
2Telephone. conversation on June 9, 1987.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s
~Closed 0 en Items 315/80-23-06; 316/80-19-06:
As noted in previous reports, licensee efforts were made to reduce the background levels of liquid radwaste effluent monitor R-18 to increase sensitivity of the monitor.
These efforts, including relocation of the monitor to an area
having a lower background radiation level and flushing (including acid)
have met with partial success.
Licensee plans to replace this monitor were delayed because of emphasis placed on completion of many post-TMI modifications.
The new liquid radwaste monitor has now been installed, calibrated and is currently being used along with the old monitor which still has the set-point function required by technical specifications'he delay in removal of the old monitor is due to a request by NRR for additional details regarding the new monitor in that it was not an identical replacement of the old monitor referenced in Technical Specification 3.3.3.9, Table 3.3-12.
3.
Licensee Event Re ort LER Followu The inspectors reviewed selected LERs to determine that reportabi lity requirements were fulfilled and adequate and timely corrective action was accomplished, including actions to prevent recurrence.
In addition, each event was evaluated for-previous similar events, root cause, and potential generic applicability.
The review consisted of in-office review, direct observations, discussions with-licensee personnel, and review of records.
The following LERs document the licensee's failure to meet Technical Specifications or other regulatory requirements.
The violations appear to meet the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C for self-identification and correction of problems.
Therefore, a Notice of Violation is not being issued and these LERs are considered closed.
'a
~
Closed LER 50-315/86009 Revision 0:
Possible 'partial sample flow bypass of particulate filter from Unit 1 vent effluent monitor due to missing 0-ring seal.
During calibration of the monitor on May 7, 1986, it was noted that an 0-ring seal was missing from the particulate filter holder which may have allowed a portion of the sample flow to bypass the particulate filter.
This in turn affected monitor operability/continuous monitoring of vent effluent particulates required by technical specification.
It could not be determined how long the 0-ring had been mi ssing.
The filter is normally changed weekly and the last previous calibration occurred about 18 months earlier.
The 0-ring was replaced and the unit was returned to service.
The inspector reviewed filter analysis data for several weekly periods both before and after the discovery of the missing 0-ring.
No detectable activity was identified on any of the filters.
Lower Limits of Detection were significantly lower than required by Technical Specification.
Further, licensee personnel stated that normally no activity was detectable on particulate filters from the vent stack of either unit.
The inspector verified that procedures have been modified to require verification of the presence of 0-rings during weekly filter changes which should preclude recurrence of this problem.
b.
Closed LER 50-316/86-027 Revision 0:
Failure to collect continuous tritium sample from the auxiliary building vent due to inadequate procedural guidance.
Since there is no action statement
for an, inoperable tritium sampler and any-non-routine surveillance interruption of tritium sampling is a violation of technical specifications, the licensee provides backup tritium sampling capability.
This backup system i s normal ly maintained on-line in case the primary tritium sampling system becomes unavailable.
However, during a six hour and 12 minutes period on August 6, 1986, while the vent stack SPING unit was removed from service (which also removes the primary tritium sampler) for non-routine calibration, the backup tritium sampler could not be verified's being operable.
Both the inlet and the outlet valves of the backup tritium sampler were subsequently found closed and a licensee investigation concluded that the backup system had been removed from service sometime during the period of August 2-29, 1986.
There were no abnormal releases during the six hour period.
Samples before and after the event showed normal releases of tritium which are a small fraction of Technical Specification limits.
Personnel involved with the calibration did not recognized the need to insure continuous tritium sampling capability.
The inspector verified that procedural changes have been implemented which should insure continuous tritium sampling capabilities, Closed LER 50-315/87-001 Revision 0:
Liquid effluent monitors not calibrated over their measurement range.
The licensee hired a
contractor to evaluate previous calibrations of nine Westinghouse liquid effluent monitors and to perform a primary calibration of a new Eberline liquid monitor.
An LER was issued on January 12, 1987, after the contractor observed that calibrations of the Westinghouse monitors did not literally comply with Technical Specification requirements because it did not cover the full span of the highest (6th) decade of the monitor range.
Initial calibrations covered about 40 percent of '.his decad. while subsequent calibrations covered about ten percent of the decade.
A review of calibration, set-point, and effluent data and procedures showed that the maximum activity the monitors observed would give a count rate within the calibrated range and that the set-points are routinely in that range for all monitors except the liquid radwaste effluent monitor which frequently is set higher and, on occasion, is set near its maximum count rate, 1E6 cpm.
A review of set-point determination methodology found it to be valid.
Upon discovery, all nine Westinghouse monitors were declared inoperable while the calibration procedure was revised to add a linearity check of the monitors, followed by a recalibration which was completed January 23, 1987.
All but two of the monitors passed the linearity test (less than 20 percent fall-off in count rate at the upper end of the monitor range).
The exceptions were the Unit 2 steam generator blowdown treatment monitor (23 percent fall-off) and the Unit
essential service water effluent monitor (50 percent fall-off).
These problems were resolved by replacement of both detectors with new ones which met the criteri d.
Closed LER 50-315/87002 Revision 0:
Nonrepresentative steam generator blowdown sampling due to procedure deficiency.
The sampling procedure permitted more than one flow path, and did not require verification of flow in the path being sampled.
This allowed sampling of a stagnant section of piping not representative of the blowdown being discharged.
The'licensee's investigation suggests only a sample collected March 16, 1987, which had suspiciously high suspended solids that precipitated the investigation, was discrepant.
Technical Specifications require compositing discharge samples for radionuclide analysis.
The licensee's determination that one daily sample was not representative of the discharge amounted to finding a violation of technical specification.
Neither prior nor subsequent samples, nor an "online" radiation monitor, indicated other than minimal radioactivity.
The monitors isolation function was not affected.
The procedure was changed to require verification of flow before sampling.
4.
Review of a Nonre ortable Event The inspectot reviewed condition Report -No. 12-10-86-1165 regarding an unplanned partial release of No.
1 waste gas decay tank (WGDT) while maintenance made a cut in a line in preparation for maintenance on the system on October 4, 1986.
The release resulted from a faulty isolation valve (bad diaphragm)
located between the WGDT and the cut line.
The maintenance workers promptly detected gas leakage from the cut, and notified operations.
Operations personnel noted a gradual loss of pressure (initially, about 90 psig)
from the No.
WGDT and took measures to mitigate the release by bleeding the tank via the recirculation header to a CVCS holdup tank.
During this phase the pressure of the WGDT decreased from about 80 psig to about 25 psig.
The remainder of the tank contents were then pumped to another WGDT via the waste gas compressor with nitrogen being used during the latter stage to purge the waste gas decay tank.
The licensee'
evaluation showed. no evidence of significant personnel exposures from the noble gases involved.
'i'ne release was conservatively quantified as about 0.93 curies, primarily krypton-85, and was,reported in the semiannual effluent report.
No violations or deviations were ident)fied.
5.
Gaseous Effluents The inspector reviewed selected records of radioacti~e gaseous effluent sampling and analysis for 1987 and the semiannual effluent reports for 1986.
The pathways sampled and analysis performed appear to comply with Technical Specification Table 4. 11-2.
Total curies of noble gas released in 1986 was about 165 Ci per reactor unit, a sharp decline from the 2470 Ci per unit released in 1985 (most of which. was released in the first half of 1985).
A refueling outage occurred
for one unit in 1985 and for the other unit in 1986.
The sharp reduction was attributable to repair/replacement in 1985 of a leaky unit pressurizer safety valve, fuel cladding failures and Unit 2 steam generator tube leaks.
Problems of this nature did not recur in 1986 other than continued problems with unit 2 steam generator tube leaks.
In 1987, the licensee experienced continued problems with Unit 2 steam generator tube leaks and renewed problems with fuel cladding for both units.
Mith no fuel cladding problems the dose equi.valent I-131 concentration is typically about 3 E-3 yCi/ml in both units.
Unit 1 had a contolled shutdown in early April that lasted for several days to repair a primary system leak from a valve in the let down line.
There was evidence of minor fuel cladding leaks based on a dose equivalent I-131 concentration of about 4.5 E-3 yCi/ml before the transient.
Following the transient, the dose equivalent I-131 concentration exceeded the Technical Specification limit of 1 yci/gm for about a
60 hour6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> period beginning about 7:00 a.m.
on April 8 and reached a maximum of 1.72 yCi/gm near the mid-point of the event.
A report describing this event was submitted to the commission on May 8, 1987.
No degassing activities took place during this event and applicable technical specification action items were met.
Following reactor restart, the concentration has remained at about the level that existed before the transicent (4.5 E-3 yCi/gm).
Unit 1 is scheduled for refueling in July and August 1987.
The licensee anticipates a dose equivalent I-131 spike at the time of shutdown.
Ultrasonic testing will be used to identify leaking fuel at that time to aid in resolving the problem.
Unit 2 was exhibiting a fluctuating but gradual rise in dose equivalent I-131 activity before an 18 day shutdown beginning March 3, 1987, to repair a
steam generator tube leak.
The transient resulted in a rise in the dose equivalent I-131 concentration but it did not reach the 1 pCi/gm limit.
The concentration has continued to show a gradual rise since the outage and is currently about 1 E-2 yCi/gm, about a factor to two increase over the past two months.
The Unit 2 refueling is scheduled for early 1988 but may be delayed due to a planned early Fall 1987 shutdown for steam generator surveillance.
Preparations are in progress for replacement of the Unit 2 steam generators in late 1988, or in 1989.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Li uid Effluents The inspector reviewed selected records of radioactive liquid effluent sampling and analysis for 1987 and the semiannual effluent reports for 1986.
The pathways sampled and the analysis performed appear to comply with Technical Specification Table 4 ~ 11-1.
Total liquid radioactive effluent (excluding tritium) in 1986 was 0.22 Ci per reactor unit, a rather sharp decline from the 1.1 Ci per reactor unit released in 1985.
Total curies in liquid effluents (excluding tritium)
per reactor unit for the first three months of 1987 is about 0. 125 Ci (an annual rate of about 0.38 curies),
higher than that for 1986 but still well'elow the 1985 level.
No problems were identified in review of selected records.
The records show that releases were maintained within applicable limits.
In about October 1986, the licensee switched from processing liquid radwaste with the 30 gpm radwaste evaporator to use of organic resins for a short period.
Then the licensee switched from organic resins,to inorganic resins.
The 30 gpm evaporator is being maintained for backup.
The goal is to maintain cleanup via the resins as good or better as with the evaporator while reducing solid radwaste volume generated by about 95 percent compared to solidification of evaporator bottoms.
Early data suggests that the goal is being attained.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Effluent Control Instrumentation The inspector reviewed calibration records and selected set-points for essential service water, blowdown, blowdown treatment, liquid radwaste, and low range noble gas monitors for lower containment, gland exhaust, steam jet air ejector and unit vents.
The instruments have been calibrated on a timely basis.
The status of a new liquid radwaste effluent monitor is discussed in Section 2.
Calibration and set-point of liquid monitors are discussed in Section 3 in response to LER 50-315/87-001 Revision 0.
The contractor who perform;-d the pririary calibration of the new liquid radwaste monitor and evaluated previous calibration of the other liquid monitors also performed new primary calibrations of selected noble gas monitors for the Eberline SPING 3/4 units.
For the low range noble gas monitors this included:
(1) -detector alignment of the low energy threshold operating point using a Tc-99 source; (2) energy response determination using a
beta reference source set; detector fall-off characteristics using a
Sr-90 Linearity Source Set.
The low range noble gas monitors tested had a linear response.
This work and resultant data is being used to develop an improved calibration procedure for the SPING 3/4 units.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Primar and Secondar Coolant Radiochemistr The inspector selectively reviewed the licensee's reactor coolant and secondary coolant chemistry and radiochemistry results for 1986 and through Nay 21, 1987 to determine compliance with technical specification requirements for chemistry and radiochemistry limits and surveillance frequencies.
For the primary coolant systems, the inspector reviewed data
'
for chloride, fluoride, gross beta-gamma and dose equivalent I-131.
For the secondary systems, the inspector reviewed gross activity determination and dose equivalent I-131.
The selective review and discussion with licensee personnel indicated that all parameters for both primary and secondary systems remained less than applicable technical specification limits throughout the review period with the exception of the dose equivalent I-131 for-the unit I primary system on one occasion; This event is detailed in Section 5 of this report.
No violations or deviation were identified.
9.
Air Cleanin S stems Technical specifications require testing of the control room emergency ventilation systems, the ESF ventilation systems and the fuel storage pool ventilation systems.
The in-place leakage test criteria specified both for DOP testing of HEPA filters and for freon testing of charcoal absorbers is equal to or less than one percent.
The laboratory test criteria for carbon sample removal efficiency for radioactive methyl iodide is equal to or greater than 90 percent.
A review of surveillance test data, covering the period from the last inspection, showed that the surveillances for the above ventilation systems had been timely and met test criteria.
Also, records of hours of filters usage show that the 720 hour0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> limit is never approached between the routine 18 month surveillance tests.
10.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Audits The inspector reviewed three 1986 plant gA Surveillance Reports, S/R 2-86-67, S/R 2-86-68 and S/R 2-86-89.
These surveillances involved review of licensee's determination of dose from liquid effluents, cumulative air dose from gaseous effluents and dose rates due to noble gases in gaseous effluents.
The audits were to verify that doses were determined in accordance with ODCM methods and procedures including the required frequency of the determination.
No significant findings were identified in the audits.
Some minor recommendations had been addressed by the licensee.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Or anization and Trainin Staffing has been relatively stable in chemistry and environmental but significant changes have occurred in the radiation protection group where the plant radiation protection supervisor and two engineers have left in the past few months.
A person was promptly selected in-house to fill the supervisory position.
A replacement for one of the engineering jobs is
to report for duty in early July.
This individual has recently obtained a masters degree in Health Physics and has previous experience as a
Senior Technician at another plant.
Efforts are being made to fill the other engineering position.
The'adiation protection group oversees calibration of liquid and gaseous monitors.'he two individuals primarily responsible for the calibr'ations for the past several years, a supervisor and an engineer, are still on the staff and performing this activity.
Personnel conducting activities such as instrument calibrations, set-point determinations, air cleaning system surveillance, primary and secondary coolant chemistry surveillance, and semiannual effluent report preparation who were interviewed during the inspection, in general, appeared to have a
good understanding of their areas of responsibilities, including regulations and procedures.
The licensee has developed a training qualification matrix system designed to aid in selection of qualified person for specific tasks.
The training sign-offs for this system were about 25% complete as of March.
'Although personnel interviewed regarding the set-point determination for the liquid radwaste effluent monitor could readily use the designated procedure (which included use of either a computer program or manual method computation) for establishing the set point, they could not readily identify the rationale or bases for the methodology used in the determination.
Although this may be reflective of the need for additional training in this area, it is the inspectors judgement that it is more indicative of a need for improved clarity in the written procedure (12 THP 6010.RAD.332, "Liquid Waste Release" ).
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Exit Interivew The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection with licensee representatives (Section 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on June 2, 1987 and during a subsequent telephone conversation on June 9, 1987.
The inspector discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify such documents or processes as proprietary.
9