IR 05000313/2025002
| ML25206A369 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 07/29/2025 |
| From: | John Dixon NRC/RGN-IV/DORS |
| To: | Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| EPID I-2025-002-0002 IR 2025002 | |
| Download: ML25206A369 (1) | |
Text
July 29, 2025
SUBJECT:
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000313/2025002 AND 05000368/2025002
Dear Doug Pehrson:
On June 30, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One. On July 17, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mark Skartvedt, General Manager Plant Operations, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch D Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000313 and 05000368 License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000313 and 05000368
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000313/2025002 and 05000368/2025002
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-002-0002
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Arkansas Nuclear One
Location:
Russellville, AR
Inspection Dates:
April 1, 2025, to June 30, 2025
Inspectors:
M. Mondou, Resident Inspector
B. Tindell, Senior Resident Inspector
E. Tinger, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief
Reactor Projects Branch D
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 71111.1
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Maintain Backup Fire Suppression Water Supply Available Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000313,05000368/2025002-01 Open/Closed
[H.4] -
Teamwork 71111.13 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.(8) and Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.(3)(b) for the failure to maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish a backup fire suppression water supply within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of one high-pressure water pump becoming non-functional and failed to immediately initiate a condition report and determine limitations for continued operation of the plant within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at full power and remained there for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at full power and remained there for the entire inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal hot temperatures for the following systems:
1. Units 1 and 2, startup transformers, on May 16, 2025
2. Units 1 and 2, service water intake structures, on May 16, 2025
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk significant systems from impending severe weather including rain, hail, and tornados, on April 2, 2025.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 2, service water train B following maintenance on service water strainer 2F-6C, on May 2, 2025
- (2) Unit 1, emergency diesel generator train B following maintenance, on May 30, 2025
- (3) Unit 1, turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump while common feedwater was non-functional, on June 26, 2025
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 2 main steam system, on April 14, 2025.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 1, main control room, fire zone 1052, on April 9, 2025
- (2) Unit 1, condensate demineralizer area, fire zone 72-W, on April 21, 2025
- (3) Unit 2, turbine building elevations 335-feet and 368-feet, fire zone 2200-MM, on June 16, 2025
- (4) Unit 1, auxiliary building elevations 368-feet and 372-feet, fire area D, on June 20, 2025
- (5) Unit 1, boric acid addition tank room, fire zone 120-E, on June 26, 2025
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:
- Unit 2, auxiliary building vital electrical access corridor, room 2104, on April 16, 2025
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the main control room during a Unit 2 emergency diesel generator train B monthly test, on April 24, 2025.
- (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Unit 1 main control room during a reactor building cooling coil train B test, on May 21, 2025.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated Unit 1 continued training simulator activities, on April 30, 2025.
- (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated Unit 2 continued training simulator activities, on May 1, 2025.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Units 1 and 2, 480 Vac load center breaker overcurrent device trips, on April 22, 2025
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 2, service water to turbine-driven emergency feedwater out of service for isolation valve 2SW-49B planned maintenance, on April 28, 2025
- (2) Unit 2, service water pump C out of service for discharge check valve 2SW-2C planned inspection, on May 1, 2025
- (3) Unit 2, motor-driven emergency feedwater pump out of service for planned instrument calibration, on May 7, 2025
- (4) Unit 1, reactor protection system channel A out of service for emergent maintenance, on May 9, 2025
- (5) Units 1 and 2, diesel-driven fire suppression pump out of service for emergent maintenance, on May 12, 2025
- (6) Unit 1, emergency diesel generator train B out of service for planned maintenance, on June 24, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Units 1 and 2, Rosemount transmitter operability determination for process connections that were not environmentally qualified, on April 18, 2025
- (2) Unit 1, cable spreading room fire suppression system functionality determination due to clogged fire suppression piping, on May 28, 2025
- (3) Units 1 and 2, safety-related 4160 Vac switchgear train A breakers due to notification of installed bell crank with an incorrect length, on June 10, 2025
- (4) Unit 1, borated water storage tank outlet valve CV-1408, operability determination due to low performance margin identified during testing, on June 24, 2025
- (5) Units 1 and 2, common feedwater system functionality assessment due to degraded conduit support beams, on June 25, 2025
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1, emergency diesel generator train A test after generator insulation test, on April 14, 2025
- (2) Units 1 and 2, diesel-driven fire pump test following starter replacement, on April 17, 2025
- (3) Unit 2, low-pressure safety injection pump train A test after bearing greasing and motor insulation testing, on May 13, 2025
- (4) Unit 1, emergency chiller condenser train A control valve CV-6034 post-maintenance test after valve replacement, on June 12, 2025
- (5) Unit 1, access hatch to general area on 335-feet elevation hatch 492, smoke test after hatch reinstallation, on June 24, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1, safety-related train A areas smoke detector surveillance test, on April 7, 2025
- (2) Unit 2, emergency diesel generator train B room smoke and flame detector surveillance test, on April 25, 2025
- (3) Units 1 and 2, electric-driven firewater pump flow surveillance test, on May 7, 2025
- (4) Unit 2, high-pressure safety injection pump C surveillance test, on May 22, 2025
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1, service water pump C inservice test, on May 20, 2025
Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Units 1 and 2, portable communications generator test, on April 22, 2025
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Required Emergency Preparedness Drill (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1, simulator-based emergency drill for excessive reactor coolant system leakage, on April 1,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Unit 2, procedure and work instruction updates for replacement of electrohydraulic fluid fittings and replacement of installed fittings following an electrohydraulic fluid leak on a main feedwater pump fitting, on May 15,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Maintain Backup Fire Suppression Water Supply Available Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000313,05000368/2025002-01 Open/Closed
[H.4] -
Teamwork 71111.13 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.(8) and Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.(3)(b) for the failure to maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish a backup fire suppression water supply within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of one high-pressure water pump becoming non-functional and failed to immediately initiate a condition report and determine limitations for continued operation of the plant within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Description:
On May 8, 2025, the diesel-driven fire suppression pump was non-functional for emergent maintenance. The licensee entered Unit 1 Technical Requirements Manual 3.7.8, Fire Suppression Water System, Action A and Unit 2 Technical Requirements Manual 3.7.1, Fire Suppression Water System, Action A for one high-pressure fire water pump non-functional. The required actions included establishing a backup fire suppression water supply.
By May 9, 2025, the licensee had staged hoses and a diesel-driven portable pump, designated as pump P-253, so that water from Lake Dardanelle could be pumped into the fire system as a backup fire suppression water supply. If needed to suppress a fire because the permanent electric-driven fire suppression pump failed, the backup hoses would need to be manually connected, and the pump manually started and operated.
The inspectors interviewed the main control room operators and determined that there was not a designated operator to manually connect the hoses and manually start and operate the backup fire suppression pump, designated as P-253. Procedure OP-1104.032, Fire Protection Systems, Revision 98, Section 24, Instructions for Operation of Standby Diesel Phase II Water Pump (P-253), step 5, states, Designate operator responsible to operate P-253. The inspectors talked to the main control room operators and determined that they were not aware of the procedural guidance which had been created in 2022. As a corrective action, the main control room operators referenced the procedure and designated an operator.
The inspectors reviewed the uncontrolled procedures for operating pump P-253, typically used for training, that were located on the pump trailer. Even though the operators were unaware of the guidance in Procedure OP-1104.032, they may have used this guidance in a fire scenario. However, the inspectors determined that the procedural guidance on the trailer was inadequate. Specifically, it did not contain guidance to establish a recirculation path to prevent pump overheating. To complete the lineup during a postulated fire, the operator would have to leave the running pump, potentially without a minimum flow path, and open fire hydrant 7. During this approximate 7-minute walk, the pump may overheat or lose suction without an adequate cooling path.
The inspectors performed a walkdown of Procedure OP-1104.032, Section 24, and determined that it would take approximately 20 minutes of walking. In addition, the operator would need time to perform the procedural actions at each location. However, the fire brigade responds within 15 minutes of a fire to begin suppression. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that there was insufficient time to complete the backup fire suppression pump strategy to support the fire brigade when they may call for fire suppression water.
The inspectors interviewed three operators on the fire brigade and determined that the operators had no personal experience drafting water from the lake with pump P-253. They had discussed drafting in training, and there were procedures on the pump trailer. The inspectors determined through interviews that other members of the fire brigade did have personal experience drafting water but could not determine how many due to lack of details in the training records. However, the inspectors determined that the potential lack of operator experience may slow or prevent the operator from overcoming the other challenges listed above.
The inspectors also walked down the associated hoses and backup fire suppression pump P-253. The inspectors discovered that the suction hose between Lake Dardanelle and the pump was almost completely severed. The inspectors determined that there was another suction hose on the pump trailer, and the fire brigade could replace the hose if they correctly diagnosed the issue and took non-proceduralized corrective actions. Diagnosis and repair without adequate time or procedures significantly increase the probability of error.
The inspectors determined that the pump was unavailable because the licensee had not designated an operator, the suction hose was severed, the on-trailer procedure was inadequate, the fire brigade did not have actual experience with drafting from the lake, and there was inadequate time to complete the evolution before fire suppression water was needed.
Corrective Actions: The licensee repaired the suction hose and implemented the procedural guidance, including designating an operator.
Corrective Action References: Condition Reports CR-ANO-1-2025-00677 and CR-ANO-C-2025-00825
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to maintain a backup fire suppression water supply available while the permanent diesel-driven fire suppression pump was unavailable was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish the backup fire suppression water supply in accordance with site procedures, failed to designate an operator to connect, start, and operate the backup fire suppression pump, and failed to maintain the suction hoses for the pump so that the pump was ready to operate.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the inspectors determined the backup fire suppression water supply was unavailable when required due to emergent diesel-driven fire suppression pump maintenance.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process Worksheets, revised January 1, 2025, the inspectors assigned the finding category of Fire Water Supply. The inspectors determined that the finding was very low safety significance (Green) because adequate fire water capacity would still be available from the permanent electric-driven fire suppression pump for protection of equipment important to safe shutdown in the most limiting location onsite.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.4 - Teamwork: Individuals and workgroups communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. Specifically, the licensee added procedural guidance to designate an operator and how to operate the pump in 2022 but failed to communicate the procedural addition so that main control room operators were aware of the guidance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.(8) states, in part, that the licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c), as specified in the license amendment request dated January 29, 2014. The license amendment request dated January 29, 2014, Attachment A, Section 3.2.3, Procedures (2), states, in part, that compensatory actions are implemented as identified in the ANO-1 Technical Requirements Manual. The Unit 1 Technical Requirements Manual, Revision 81, Section 3.7.8, Fire Suppression Water System, Action A.4, states, in part, with one high-pressure water pump non-functional, establish a backup fire suppression water supply within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Action D of the same section states, in part, if the required action and associated completion time for condition A are not met, immediately initiate a condition report and determine any limitations for continued operation of the plant within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.(3)(b) states, in part that the licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c), as specified in the license amendment request dated December 17, 2012. The license amendment request dated December 17, 2012, Attachment A, Section 3.2.3, Procedures (2), states, in part, that compensatory actions are implemented as identified in the Unit 2 Technical Requirements Manual. The Unit 2 Technical Requirements Manual, Revision 90, Section 3.7.1, Fire Suppression Water System, Action A.1, states, in part, that with one high-pressure water pump non-functional, establish a backup fire suppression water supply within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Action D of the same section states, in part, that with Action A not met, immediately initiate a condition report and determine any limitations for continued operation of the plant within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Contrary to the above, prior to May 12, 2025, the licensee failed to maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program, as specified in the license amendment request dated January 29, 2014, for Unit 1, and December 17, 2012, for Unit 2. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish a backup fire suppression water supply within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of one high-pressure water pump becoming non-functional and failed to immediately initiate a condition report and determine limitations for continued operation of the plant within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71111.15 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.49, Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants, Section
- (f) requires, in part, that each item of electric equipment important to safety must be qualified by one of the following methods:
- (1) Testing an identical item of equipment under identical conditions or under similar conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable.
- (2) Testing a similar item of equipment with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable.
- (3) Experience with identical or similar equipment under similar conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable.
- (4) Analysis in combination with partial type test data that supports the analytical assumptions and conclusions.
Contrary to the above, prior to February 22, 2024, the licensee failed to qualify items of electric equipment important to safety by one of the following methods:
- (1) Testing an identical item of equipment under identical conditions or under similar conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable.
- (2) Testing a similar item of equipment with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable.
- (3) Experience with identical or similar equipment under similar conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable.
- (4) Analysis in combination with partial type test data that supports the analytical assumptions and conclusions.
Specifically, the licensee determined that a total of 55 safety-related Rosemount transmitters in Unit 1 and 48 safety-related Rosemount transmitters in Unit 2 did not have environmentally qualified process connections due to using an unqualified thread sealant.
Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of the transmitters, but the transmitters maintained their operability or PRA functionality.
Corrective Action References: Condition Reports CR-ANO-1-2024-01607 and CR-ANO-C-2025-00525
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On July 17, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mark Skartvedt, General Manager Plant Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CALC-89-D-
2001-05
Unit 2 Intake Structure Free Convection Cooling
Calculations
CALC-93-D-
5015-06
Unit 1 Intake Structure Natural Convection-GOTHIC Model
EN-FAP-EP-010
Severe Weather Response
OP-1015.044
Summer Reliability Operations
OP-1203.025
Natural Emergencies
OP-2104.029
Service Water System Operations
29
Procedures
OP-2203.008
Natural Emergencies
Work Orders
WO 573402, 52982693, 53004861
M-204, Sheet 3
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Emergency Feedwater
M-204, Sheet 6
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram EFW Pump Turbine
M-217, Sheet 4
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Emergency Diesel
Generator K-4A/K-4B Starting Air System
M-2202, Sheet 4
Piping & Instrument Diagram Lube Oil, Lube Oil Cooling,
Electro/Hydraulic Controls & Main Steam
M-2206, Sheet 1
Piping & Instrument Diagram Steam Generator Secondary
System
157
Drawings
M-2210, Sheet 1
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Service Water System
ULD-1-SYS-12
ANO Unit 1 Emergency Feedwater System
ULD-2-SYS-10
ANO-2 Service Water System
Miscellaneous
ULD-2-SYS-21
ANO-2 Main Steam System
OP-1104.036
Emergency Diesel Generator Operation
OP-1106.006
Emergency Feedwater Pump Operation
2
OP-2104.029
Service Water System Operations
29
OP-2105.008,
Exhibit 3
Steam Dump and Bypass Control System Operations
Procedures
OP-2106.006
Emergency Feedwater System Operations
2
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CALC-85-E-0053-
Fire Area D Combustible Loading Evaluation
CALC-85-E-0053-
Fire Area B-1 Combustible Loading Evaluation
Calculations
CALC-85-E-0053-
Fire Area B-2 Combustible Loading Evaluation
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2021-03018, 1-2025-00520
Drawings
Fire Zones Intermediate Floor Plan EL 368-0 and 372-0
Control of Combustibles
Fire Watch Program
OP-1203.049
Fires in Areas Affecting Safe Shutdown
ANO Prefire Plan (Unit 1)
2, 23
Procedures
ANO Prefire Plan (Unit 2)
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
C-2025-00665
Drawings
M-2225, Sheet 1
Piping and Instrument Diagram Turbine Building Sumps
Miscellaneous
PSA-ANO2-01-
IF-AS
ANO-2 PRA - Internal Flooding Accident Sequence Analysis
Procedures
OP-2203.051
250502
AOP-Fires in Areas Affecting Safe Shutdown
Miscellaneous
SES-1-016A
Unit 1 Simulator Evaluation Guide
Conduct of Operations
OP-1104.033
Procedures
OP-2104.036
Emergency Diesel Generator Operations
106
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
2-2022-01010, C-2018-03568, C-2019-00993
Procedures
OP-1416.043
K-Line Circuit Breaker Overhaul
Work Orders
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2025-00665, 1-2025-00677
Drawings
M-2210, Sheet 1
Piping & Instrument Diagram Service Water System
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
ULD-2-SYS-12
ANO Unit 2 Emergency Feedwater System
COPD-024
Risk Assessment Guidelines
Troubleshooting Control of Maintenance Activities
Valve Packing Procedure
On Line Risk Assessment
OP-1104.032
Fire Protection Systems
OP-2301.237
Unit 2 Emergency Feedwater Flow and Pressure Red
Channel Calibration
OP-2402.133
Unit 2 Service Water Strainer Cleaning 2F-6A, B, & C
Procedures
OP-3305.004
ANO Transformer Yard Controls
Work Orders
WO 54095153, 54166355, 54240470
Calculations
CALC-V-CV-
1408-10
MOV Torque Switch Setpoints for CV-1408
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2021-02107, 1-2025-00434, 1-2025-00634, 1-2025-00754,
2-2025-00705, C-2024-00396, C-2025-00525, C-2025-
00736
E-630, Sheet 2
Na Br/Na OC1 Building Conduit Plan
Drawings
M-276-1, Sheet 1
Cable Spreading Room Corridor #98
Engineering
Changes
Engineering Input for Siemens Breaker Operability
Rosemount
Report D2013003
IEEE Qualification Report of Rosemount 3154N Pressure
Transmitters
C
Rosemount
Report D8300040
Qualification Report for Pressure Transmitters Rosemount
Model 1153 Series D
F
Rosemount
Report D8400102
Qualification Report for Pressure Transmitters Rosemount
Model 1154
G
Miscellaneous
SEP-ANO-1-IST-
ANO Inservice Testing Plan
Operability Determination Process
Procedures
OP-1104.032
Fire Protection Systems
Work Orders
WO 549374, 52974862, 53026459, 54056418
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
2-2017-05817, 2-2019-01775, C-2022-00608, C-2025-00584
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Drawings
M-2232, Sheet 1
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Safety Injection System
23
Engineering
Changes
New Baseline Pump Curve for P-4C following Maintenance
Miscellaneous
ULD-2-SYS-02
ANO Unit 2 High Pressure Safety Injection System
CEP-PT-001
ASME Section XI Pressure Test Program
313
Post-Maintenance Testing
EN-OP-201-01
Arkansas Nuclear One FLEX Program Document
OP-1104.029
Service Water and Auxiliary Cooling System
130
OP-1104.032
Fire Protection Systems
OP-1307.012
Unit 1 Fire Detection Performance Test
OP-1402.240
Inspection of Watertight Hatches
OP-1416.045
Unit 1 K4A/K4B Periodic Maintenance
OP-2104.039
HPSI System Operation
OP-2104.040
LPSI System Operations
Procedures
OP-2307.012
Unit 2 Fire Detection Instrumentation Operability
Work Orders
WO 54070742, 54136619, 54137025, 54178725, 54189499,
203389, 54207616, 54241961, 54262773
OP-1903.010
Emergency Action Level Classification
Procedures
OP-1903.011
Emergency Response/Notifications
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2024-00704, 2-2025-00298, 2-2025-00492
Regulatory Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet
71151
Miscellaneous
Narrative Logs
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
2-2023-01929
Corrective Action Program
055
Planning
Procedures
OP-1000.006
Procedure Control
Work Orders
WO 534337, 52910943