IR 05000312/1989022
| ML20005G251 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 01/02/1990 |
| From: | Good G, Yuhas G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20005G250 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-89-22, NUDOCS 9001180335 | |
| Download: ML20005G251 (10) | |
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S.' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION Y Report No..
50-312/89-22 g
Docket No.-
50-312 p
L License Na.
DPR-54 Ll '
Licensee:
Sacramento Municipal Utility District 14440 Twin Cities Road Herald, California 95638-9799 y
Facility Name:
. Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station Inspection at:
Clay Station,' California
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Inspection Conducted:
December 4-7, 1989 Inspector:
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) /a/Cin (L M. Goon,' Emergency Preparedness Antlyst Date Signed Team Leader.
Team Members:
'P.:M.-Qualls, Resident Inspector, Rancho Seco
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G. A. Stoetzel, Pacific Northwest Laboratories
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- G. W. Bethke, Comex Corporation
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Approved by:
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G. P.
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Date Signed
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2-Emerg Preparedness and Rad ological Protection Branch
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SUMMARY:
Inspection on December 4-7, 1989 (Report No. 50-312/89-22)
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Announced inspection to follow-up on open items identified
,1 during previous emergency preparedness inspections, to follow-up on an NRC
Information Notice and to observe the 1989 emergency exercise and associated
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. critiques.
Inspection procedures 92701, 82301 and 30703 were used as
_ guidance.
Results:
The exercise demonstrated the licensee's ability to adequately respond.to an emergency at the facility and to protect the p.iblic s health and safety.. No deficiencies, violations of NRC requirements, or exercise weaknesses were identified.
Several items for improving the emergency
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response program were identified during the exercise.
All of the follow-up items were closed and one new open item was identified (see open item 88-11-01 inSection2).
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
M. Borter, Supervising Radiological Engineering Specialist, Contractor i
M. Bua, Manager, Radiation Protection (RP)
b R. Dorr, Emergency Preparedness (EP) Specialist, Contractor C. Eichhorn, Jr., Supervisor EP, Contractor R. Nelson,Supervlsor,learPlant P. Lydon, Manager Nuc Electrical P. Noisworthy, EP Specialist W. Peabody,i, Supervisor, RP Instrumentation Manager. Technical Services C.-Podgarsk J. Shetler,-Deputy Assistant General Manager (AGM), Nuclear P. Steiner, EP Specialist, Contractor F.' Thompson, EP Specialist D. Yount, Superintendent, Electrical D. Yows, Area Head, Environmental Nonitoring and EP (EM&EP)
2.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings and NRC Information Notices (IN)
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-(Closed) 0)en Item (88-11-01):
Examine changes to the Emergency Plan and Emergency )lan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) to remove errors and ensure conservative event classification, EPIP-5001, " Recognition and Classification of Emergencies" was revised on August 22, 1988 to correctly categorize an event involving reactor coolant leak rate greater than make-up ) ump capacity as a Site Area Emergency (SAE) rather tian an
Alert.
The clange also clarified the emergency action level (EAL)
i concerning reactor coolant leaks greater tian 50 gallons per minute (GPM).
These changes addressed the specific examples identified in the open item.
The licensee indicated that EPIP-5001 is reviewed on an on going basis.
During the review of EPIP-5001, the inspector noted that the EALs contained in Tab 17 (Fire) are not consistent with the examples listed in NUREG-0654 and are not conservative when compared.
For example, Appendix i
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I, to NUREG-0654, states that a fire within the plant lasting more than l
10 minutes is an example initiating condition for an Unusual Event (UE).
EPIP-5001, Tab 17, states that a fire which may affect the operation of safety-related equipment and which lasts for more than 10 minutes would be declared a UE.
The licensee's initiating condition appears to be comparable to the NUREG-0654 Alert initiating condition; a fire L
potentially affecting safety systems.
For tracking' purposes, open item 88-11-01 is considered closed; however, L'
the licensee s response concerning the inconsistencies between Tab 17 of I
EPIP-5001 and NVREG-0654 will be tracked as open item 89-22-01, j
(Closed) Open Item (89-07-01):
Need to evaluate call-tree capabilities l
of augmenting emergency response personnel (ERP).
This item was opened
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because the licensee had not conducted a drill to test its procedures and
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its capability to augment ERP within the response goals identified in NUREG-0654 (60 minutes).
It is important to note that the licensee has changed its system for notifying off-duty ERP.
The licensee now uses
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pagers to notify off-duty, essential ERP.
Non-pager ERP are still
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contacted via the telephone.
The licensee conducted an emergency response activation " test" on October 19 1989.
The test results were documented in Office Memorandum EMEP 89-6751,-datedOctober 30, 1989.
The inspector reviewed EMEP 89-0751 and discussed the call-out system and the results of the test with members of the EP staff.
The inspector concluded the following:
A.
Thetestdocumentationdidnotincludespecificobjectivestobe met.
B.
No determination was made regarding the ability to augment the emergency organization within 60 minutes.
C.
No corrective actions were identified in the test documentation even though EM&EP personnel indicated that a memorandum was issued based on the results of the test.
D.
The efficiency of the licensee's system is hampered because there is no method for pager-holders to acknowledge receipt of pages.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) Open Item (IN-89-19):
In response to IN-89-19, the Nuclear Licensing Coordinator responsible for the Computerized Commitment Tracking System (CCTS) issued a formal request to the Manager, EM&EP, on March 6, 1989, to review the IN and
. implement corrective actions.
The review was made and the following corrective actions were implemented by March 28, 1989:
A.
Revision 3 of both EPIP-5200, " Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center (TSC)," and EPIP-5400,(" Activation and 0)eration of the Emergency Operations Facility EOF)," identified t1e Communication Systems Advisor in each facility as being responsible for notifying the telephone company directly for HPN repairs during an emergency.
B.
The Radiological Assessment Coordinator (RAC) Assistant in the TSC has been given the responsibility of establishing and maintaining communications with the NRC via the HPN.
After reviewing the licensee's corrective actions, the inspector concluded the following:
(1) It appears that it would be difficult for the RAC Assistant (in the TSC) to continuously man the HPN telephone because the individual has e number of other responsibilities.
(2)
EPIP-5400 does not identify a specific person to man the HPN telephone in the MF during an emergency.
(3) The licensee's " Monthly Communications Test Guide" discusses routine checks on the HPN telephones; however, it does not specifically state that Pacific Bell should be notified for any repairs.
This item is considered closed, i
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3.
Emergency Preparedness Exercise Planning (Inspection Procedure 82301)
n The Manager, EM&EP has the responsibility to ensure that the licensee's b
drill and exercise program is imp"lemented.
In accordance with EPIP-5610. " Drills and Exercises, and the " Drill and Exercise Manual,"-
F the Manager, EM&EP selected an Exercise Director (ED).
The ED has the i
overall responsibility for developing, conducting, evaluating and j'.
documenting the annual emergency exercise.
Guidelines for these
'L activities are contained in the aforementioned manual.
The ED functioned as the chairman of the Scenario Review Group (SRG).
The SRG consisted of individuals with the appropriate expertise.
Persons involved in the
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scenario development were not participants in the exercise.
j Exerciseobjectiveswereestablishedaspartofthescenariopackageand
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lo included specific objectives for each of the emergency response
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facilities (ERFs) (Control Room (CR), TSC, 0)erations Support Center-(OSC), EOF, Unified Dose Assessment Center (JDAC)^and Emergency News P
Center (ENC)).
NRC, Region V, was provided with an opportunity to
- comment on the exercise objectives and scenario package.
The offsite
'res)onse was not evaluated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency-(FE4A) this year.
The complete scenario package included an introduction andscope, objectives,limitationsandprerequisites, participant
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instructions, event scenario, timeline, drill messages, plant data,
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radiological data, meteorological data and evaluation criteria.
The I
scenario package was tightly controlled before the exercise.
Players did not have access to the scenario package or information on the scenario
events.. The exercise was intended to meet the requirements of IV.F.2 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
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Exercise Scenario
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-The scenario began with the plant in the final stages of reactor defueling.
The last three spent fuel bundles had ;tial conditions ust been off loaded to the spent fuel pool for ultrasonic inspection.
Ini provided for one spent fuel assembly to be positioned above the spent
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fuel rack.
The initiating event was a Magnitude 6.5 earthquake along the Green Valley Fault near Vacaville.
Theearthquakewasfeltonsitejust as the spent fuel assembly was being lowered into the spent fuel rack.
L The lateral movement from the earthquake caused one of the Fuel Grapple Fingers to bend.
The spent fuel assembly was lowered into the rack L
~ without incident, but the bent fuel Grapple Finger was not noticed.
In accordance with EPIP-5001, the earthquake prompted the declaration of a UE.
A team was dispatched to conduct a plant walkdown to assess damages.
A) proximately one hour later, based on the fact that no damages were
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caserved, the UE was terminated and normal plant activities were resumed.
A few minutes after fuel movement resumed, the bent finger on the Fuel Grapple allowed a spent fuel assembly to fall from the transfer machine onto an assembly in the rack.
The impact also punctured the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) liner, which resulted in a 60 GPM leak.
The dropped assembly s
prompted the declaration of an Alert.
A Site Area Emergency (SAE) was declared 9 minutes later when it was determined that two assemblies were involved.
The fuel handling accident caused a release of fission gases to the building atmosphere and eventually to the environment.
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Federal Evaluators
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Four NRC inspectors evaluated the licensee's response.
Inspectors were stationed in the CR TSC,0SC and EOF.
The NRC inspector who was assigned to the OSC accompanied various repair / monitoring teams in order to evaluate their performance.
6.
Control Room The following aspects of CR operations were observed:
detection and classification of emergency events, mitigation, notification and protective action recommendations (PARS).
The following are NRC observations of the CR activities. The observations, as appropriate, are considered to be suggestions for improving the program.
A.
Public address (PA) announcements made from the CR, concerning the event, were via the Shift Supervisor's (SS) telephone rather than the CR handset which overrides all other PA system inputs and which is intended for emergency use.
7.
Technical Support Center The following aspects of TSC operations were observed:
activation, accident assessment and classification, PARS and support to other ERFs.
The following are NRC observations of the TSC activities.
The observations, as appropriate, are intended to be suggestions for improving the program.
A.
Communications with offsite authorities was transferred from the CR to the TSC in a very smooth and efficient manner. This was facilitated by the following:
(1) immediate transfer of all communications logs and prior notification sheets to the TSC, and-(2)havingtwowelltrainedcommunicatorsreadytocommenceworkIn the TSC.
B.
-Briefings by the Emergency Coordinator (EC) in the TSC were frequent and detailed.
'C.
Initial computer based dose projections by the TSC, both for
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instrument measured release rates and for several upper bounding
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conditions, were extremely rapid.
Threeorfourprojectionswere completed before-the TSC was even officially activated.
D.
TSCpersonnelpostedalmostnoplantstatusinformation, major concerns or chronological events on TSC status boards.
The lack of conspicuous posting of status and concerns eliminated the primary a-means for managers in the TSC to ensure that they all understood and agreed upon events in progress.
For the scenario presented, the effect was minimal, but there were some points o? confusion between the EC and his Technical Support Coordinator during the turnover to the Recovery Manager (RM).
1.
The number of fuel assemblies damaged by the dropped assembly.
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2.
Was the SFP in recirculation with the V-600 tank or was batch L
makeup in progress from the Condensate Storage Tank with concentrated boric acid addition, t
3.
Was the new video camera installed in the SFP area or was it awaiting installation.
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Had the scenario been more complex, the lack of such posted i
i information might have caused more problems and confusion.
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Operations Support Center
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The following aspects of OSC operations were observed:
activation, I
functional capabilities and disposition of various inplant repair / monitoring teams.
The following are NRC observations of the OSC l
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activities.
The observations, as appropriate, are intended to be
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suggestions for improving the program.
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A.
Teams dispatched from the OSC were briefed and debriefed in a very
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thorough manner.
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B.
All teams dispatched from the OSC were effectively tracked during the exercise.
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C.
There was a shortage of friskers (portable count rate instruments)
in the OSC during the early stages of the exercise.
There was 1 count rate instrument, 1 ion chamber and 2 high range Geiger-Muellers (GMs) in Warehoul,e A.
The inventory is the same for the other OSC, but it is located closer-to the access control point.
Supplies are supplemented by the RP technicians who respond to the OSC, but this process is not proceduralized.
During this exercise, the RP technicians did not bring an adequate number of friskers.
This delayed the dispatch of the offsite team.
O.
Accountability took 45 minutes from the time the Alert was declared.
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The delay appeared to be associated with the need to use an accountability exemption list.
Use of this list is an artificiality of the exercise; however, there also appeared to be a 10 minute delay between the Alert declaration and the announcement which called for personnel dismissal (evacuation of nonessential personnel).
E.
Dispatch of the Fuel Storage Building (FSB) team (Team 5) was delagedabout30minutesbecausea"WorkAuthorization"waswritten.
The Work Authorization" process does not appear to be required by the EPIPs.
F.
The team dispatched to the FSB (Team 5) did not wear appropriate protective clothing and/or the surface contamination levels used in the scenario were not consistent with what would be expected from this scenario.
G.
Team 5 was briefed in the OSC and dispatched to the FSB to install a camera.
One member of the team was briefed and dispatched from the
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The TSC team member entered the FSB without adequate emergency dosimetry and it aid not appear that his exposure records p
were checked prior to dispatch.
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9.
Emeroency Operations Facility The following EOF operations were observed:
activation functional
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PARS interfacewithoffsileofficialsand i'0 capabilities, notifications,ing ar,e NRC observations of the EOF'
r dose assessment.
The follow
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activities.
The observations, as appropriate, are intended to be
, suggestions for improving the program.
A.
The UDAC did a good job asking questions which stimulated responses in the EOF.
For example, the UDAC questioned whether there was any chance the fuel pool leak could be released offsite via the storm drain.
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B.
The EOF did not have a systematic method to track information requests.
For exam)1e the Emergenc M havetheFSBteamo)tainanairsampke.anaker(EM)askedtheECto T e results were never received.
C.
Although individual members of the EOF appeared to maintain good,
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individual logs, there was no central events status board to log key events to ensure that everyone had all nf the correct, current information.
This situation was exacerbated because briefings were an hour apart and because the TSC may not have provided the information to the EOF.
The following examples provided the basis for this observation:
1.
The start and sto) time of the release was not specifically defined in the E0:.
The UDAC did not know when the release terminated.
2.
The dispatch / progress of the team sent to the FSB was not well known in the E0F.
At 12:33 P.M. the EM was under the impression that a team was getting ready to be dispatched.
At 1:07 P.M. the EM asked the TSC to have the team take an air sample.
During the 1:45 P.M. EOF briefing, the EM stated that a team was being sent to the FSB.
The EM did not know whether the team had already been dispatched.
D.
The EPIPs were noted to be inconsistent with one another regarding the closeout of emergency events.
The following examples were identified:
1.
EPIP-5001 and 5200 appear to give the responsibility to the EC.
During the exercise, it appeared that the EM closed-out the emergency.
2.
Step 5.1.1 of EPIP-5210, " Recovery / Reentry," states that the EM declares the closecut after receiving concurrence from the EC.
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Step 5.2.1 of EPIP-5210 states that the EC declares the closeout after receiving concurrence from the EM.
E.
The distinction between the Alert and SAE, for the type of event presented in this scenario, appeared to be difficult to distinguish using the wording in EPIP-5001 and the method for downgrading appeared to be unclear to certain EOF personnel.
F.
Although it is recognized that accident mitigation is a primary h
responsibility of tie licensee, the E0F, staff did not speculate, nor did they:seem to be concerned about, the reason for the dropped
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assembly or the cause of the SFP leak.
The sequence of events was not discussed in an attempt to determine what happened or if it was a result of the earthquake.
G.
The controllers in the EOF did not summarize the scenario events during the post-exercise critique.
10.
Critiques
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Immediately following the exercise, critiques were held in each of the ERFs.
A formal critique involving site management personnel was conducted on December 7, 1989.
The purpose of the formal critique was to summarize the individual ERF critique session observations and present them to upper management.
The AGM and Deputy AGM, Nuclear, were both present during this meeting.
The following represent some of the licensee's findings presented during this meeting:
A.
Accountability was not completed within 30 minutes.
B.
The RP technicians in the OSC were low on survey instruments.
C.
Refresher training needs to be conducted for those who use self contained' breathing apparatus (SCBA).
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D.
A drawing was missing in the EOF.
E.
The UDAC did not request area radiation monitor (ARM) data.
F.
The classification procedure is difficult to use because it is geared to the number of fuel bundles involved.
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EOF personnel need more training / practice on certain E0F communication systems.
H.
There were problems when a team member was dispatched from the TSC, instead of the OSC.
.I.
The EC did not check-off the items on his checklist.
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Exit Interview
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An exit interview was held on December 7, 1989, to discuss the preliminary findings of the inspection.
The attachment to this report identifies the licensee )ersonnel who were present at the meeting.
The NRC was represented by t1ree members of the inspection team.
The licensee was informed that it appeared that no deficiencies, violations
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of NRC requirements or exercise weaknesses were identified during the iiispection.
TheNRdTeamLeaderpresentedthefindingsdescribedin Sections 2 and 6-9 of this report.' During the exit interview, the NRC Team Leader stated that, under the circumstances, the licensee was to be
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commended for the drillsmanship, attitude and enthusiasm displayed by the
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participants during the exercise.
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ATTACHMENT
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l EXIT INTERVIEW ATTENDEES
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I P. Bender, Manager, Quality and Safety l
Licensing R. Bowser, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance
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D. Brock -
J. Delezenski, Supervisor, Licensing
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C. Eichhorn, Jr., Supervisor, EP Contractor R. Gibson, Manager, Support Services D._Keuter, AGM, Nuclear
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i P. Lavely, Manager. Nuclear P1antSupervisor, licensing
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Lydon LM.'MeredIth, Manager, Training
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' W. Peabody, Manager, Technical Services
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'R.-Scott, Public Information l
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J. Shetler,' Deputy AGM Nuclear P.Steiner,EP. Specialist, Contractor D. Yows, Area Head, EM&EP
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