IR 05000312/1989019
| ML19354E840 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1990 |
| From: | Wong H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19354E839 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-89-19, NUDOCS 9002020027 | |
| Download: ML19354E840 (8) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION Y Report No. 50-312/89-19 Docket No.
50-312 License No. DPR-54
Licensee: Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station i
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Sacramento Municipal Utility Oistrict 14440 Twin Cities Road Herald, California 95633-9799 Facility Name: Rancho Seco Unit 1
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Inspection at: Herald, Californio (RanchoSecoSite)
Inspection conducted: October 21 through December'8,j1989.
f Inspectors:
A. J. D'Angelo, Senior Resident Inspector
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C. J. Myers,--Resident Inspector
P. M. Qualls, Resi ent Inspector
Approved By:
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H/ Wong, Chief ~
V Date Signed
Reactor Projects'Section II
Suninary:
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Inspection between October 21 and December 8 1989 (Report 50-312/89-19),
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Areas Inspected: This routine inspection by the Resident Inspectors invclved
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theareasofoperationalsafetyverification, health'physicsandsecurity-
'I observations, engineered safety features system walkdown. maintenance,
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surveillance and testing, quality assursnce and follow-up items. During this
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inspection, inspection Precedures 71707, 71710, 61726, 62703, and 30703-were
used.
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Results:
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l General Conclusions:
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Observed weaknesses existed in the area of verbatim compliance with
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procedures. During the defueling activity two examples were noted in which personnel failed to have either an adequate procedure describing the work
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activity or failed to follow the established procedure and did not propose a
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procedure change when they deviated from an esteblished procedure. Since the-a potential violations appear to be isolated.and prompt management attention was focused on the occurrence, these items are characterized as non-cited violations.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Centacted a.
Licer._<
mnel
- D. Keuter. Assistant General Manager (AGM), Nuclear J. Shetler, Deputy AGM
- S. Crunk, Manager, Nuclear Licensing P. Bender, Manager, Quality and Safety
- B. Gibson, Manager, Support Services
- P. Lydon, Manager, Nuclear Plant D. Brock, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance
- W. Peabody, Manager, Technical Services
- D. Yows, Manager, Environmental Monitering & Emergency Preparedness J. Clark, Nuclear Chemistry L. Houghtby, Manager, Nuclear Security M. Bua, Nuclear Radiation Protection J. Delerenski, Supervisor, Regulatory Coordination, Licensing 0. Coleman, Quality Assurance Other licensee employces contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security, and of fice personnel.
- Attended the Exit Meeting on December 8, 1989, 2.
Operational Status of Rancho Seco The plant started this inspection period in the shutdown refueling mede.
Activities throughout this inspection period were conducted to defuel the reactor and place the fuel in the spent fuel poul.
This inspection period concluded at the completion of plant defueling activitfes.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors reviewed control room operations which incluoed access-control, staffing, observation of system elignments, procedural adherence, and log keeping. Discussions with the shift supervisors and operators indicated an unJerstanding by these personnel of the reasons for annunciator indications, ebnormal plant conditions and maintenance work in progress. The inspectors also verified, by observation of valve and switch position indications, that emergency systems were properly-aligned as required by technical specifications for existing plant conditions.
Tours of the auxiliary, reactor, and turbine buildings, including exterior areas, were made to assess equipment conditions and plant conditions. A!so, the tours were made to assess the effectiveness of radiological controls and adherence to regulatory requirements. The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness, looked for potential fire and safety hazards, and observed security and safeguards practice.
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During this inspection period, several isolated housekeeping discrepancies were identified by the inspector.
In particular, housekeeping deficiencies in the spent fuel pool area, due to work activities, were noted. These were promptly resolved by the licensee.
During work activities, it appeared that the health physics managers were conducting plant tours and monitoring work in progress. They appeared aware of significant work which occurred during this period.
The inspector's Radiation Work Permit (RWP) review revealed that the RWP did include: job description, radiation levels, contamination, airborne radioactivity (if expected), respiratory equipment, protective clothing, dosimetry, special equipment, RWP expiration, health physics (HP)
coverage, and signatures. The RWP radiation and contamination surveys
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were kept current.
Employees understood the RWP requirements.
t The inspectors observed that personnel in the controlled areas were wearing the proper dosimetry and personnel exiting the controlled areas were using the monitors properly. Labeling of containers appeared appropriate.
The inspectors walked down portions of the protected and vital area boundaries to ensure that they were intact and that security personnel were properly posted where known deficiencies existed. The inspectors also observed protected area access control, personnel screening, badge issuing and maintenance on access control equipment. Access control was observed.
Personnel entering with packages were properly searched and access control was in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors observed no obstructions in the isolation zone which could conceal a person or interfere with the detection / assessment system.
Protected area illumination appeared adequate.
Throughout the inspection period the inspectors reviewed licensee staffing on a weekly basis to ensure adequate staff remained onsite.
Personnel staffing onsite appears to be adequate with the maintaining of personnel to comply with requirements. Staffing levels remained at approximately 630 licensee personnel until defueling operations were completed and there were 483 direct licensee personnel 30 contract support and 146 security personnel at the end of the inspection period.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
ESF System Walkdown (71710)
During the inspection period the inspectors walked down the spent fuel pool cooling, fuel transfer equipment, fuel handling equipment and the decay heat removal system.
The inspectors concluded that:
All observed hangers and supports were properly made up and aligned.
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Housekeeping was adequate except as noted in paragraph 7.
- No excessive packing leakage was observed on valves.
Major system components were properly labeled, lubricated and
cooled.
No excessive leakage was apparent.
- Instrumentation appeared to be properly installed.
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No out of calibration gauges were identified.
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Flow path components appeared to be in the correct position.
- Required support systems were available, l
Proper breaker and switch positions were verified.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Surveillance' Observation (61726)
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Technical Specification (TS) required surveillance tests were observed and reviewed to ascertain that they were cw dJcted in accordance with Technical Specification requirements.
The following surveillance activities were observed:
SP.56A Bruce GM Diesel Monthly Surveillance.
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SP.38 Refueling Interval Surveillance of the Fuel Handling
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System Interlocks.
SP.64 Special frequency Spent Fuel Cooling System
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Surveillance Test Prior to Refueling..
The following items were considered during this review:
testir,g was in
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accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for operation were met; removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished; test results conformed with TS and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; the reactor. operator, technician or-engineer performing the test recorded the data and the data was in agreement with observations made by the inspector, and that any
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deficiencies identified during the testing were properly-reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Monthly Maintenance Observation-(62703)
Maintenance activities for the systems and components listed below were observed and reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards, and the Technical Specification _-
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Maintenance on the "A" Bruce GM Emergency Diesel Generator.
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Certification for Divers in the Spent Fuel Pool.
- Maintenance on the fuel Handling and Fuel Transfer Equipment.
- Troubleshooting of the fuel handling Upender and the Fuel Handling Bridge Capsten.
The following items were considered during this review: ;Thelimiting I
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were
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removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the
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work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing or calibration was performed
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prior to returning components or systems to service; activities were
accomplished by qualified personnel; radiological controls were l
l implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
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A.
Fuel Upender Pit Inspection
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During the preparations for spent fuel, transfer, the licensee observed a bulge of the liner plate'in the fuel upender pit.
The
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liner bulge was located on the north wall, located near the bottom of the wall and was approximately six feet long.
The licensee staff had begun an engineering investigation to determine the cause and effect of the liner bulge..The result of
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their investigation indicates that the bulge was most likely from hydrostatic force ap)1ied to the concrete side of the liner.
The applied force could lave been generated by a known spent fuel pool
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liner leak which accumulated water behind the liner when the spent
fuel pool liner leak chase system was isolated.
The leak chase system had been isolated a number of times during the plant history
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and if this coincided with a period of tine when the spent fuel pool
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upender ')it was dry, the hydrostatic load applied by the entra water be11nd the liner could be sufficient to cause the bulge.pped
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A concern raised'to the licensee was whether concrete failure behind
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the bulge could be a possible contributor to the bulge or the accumulation of borated water behind the bulge possibly attacking the concrete reinforcement.
The licensee had pursued the issue by
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conducting a boroscope inspection of the concrete surface behind the liner bulge.
The inspection revealed what appeared to be normal
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structural concrete with no apparent failure or loose concrete behind the bulge.
At the close of the inspection period, the licensee was considering-what other structural investigation should be done to resolve this
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issue.
Based on the licensee's investigation to date, the. inspector
concluded that the liner appeared to be adequate to perform its intended function without removal of the bulged liner plate.
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Spent Fuel Pool Liner Inspection During this inspection period, the licensee continued with their inspection of the liner to identify the source of the fuel pool leak using divers. The inspection method used was a vacuum box with slightly pressurized helium on the leak chase side of the liner.
Approximately eighty percent of the liner butt welds were accessible to the driver and were inspected for leakage. The licensee was not able, at the close of the inspection period, to detect any through-weld leakage in the north wall liner plate welds. The licensee believes the pool liner leakage is through the north wall due to the measured leakage coming from the north wall leak chase system.
At the close of the inspection period, the location of the leak had not been located end the licensee was in the process of developing additional plans. The inspector concluded the licensee's inspections to be adequate and will continue to observe additional licensee inspections when they are conducted.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Defueling Operations (71707)
During this inspection period the inspectors observed defueling of the Rancho Seco reactor and storage of the fuel in the spent fuel pool. The inspectors also reviewed applicable procedures, observed health physics activities, reviewed training of the bridge operators, and monitored licensee onsite staff to ensure Technical Specification compliance. The following discrepancies were observed:
During activities in the spent fuel pool, in preparation for'
defueling, the operators were moving burnable poison assemblies using a rope with a hook to stabilize the assembly for the grapple on the bridge.
There was no procedure which described the activities that were perfomed.
This appeared to have been due to the fact that at some time in the past, the burnable poison rod assemblies were removed by their respective fuel bundle and stored in a spent fuel pool cell by themselves.
Due to the construction of the burnable poison rod assemblies, they are very limber and are not well supported by themselves in a spent fuel pool cell. When the burnable poison rod assemblies needed to be moved to permit diver access in the spent fuel pool, alignment of the grappling device to the burnable poison rod assembly.became difficult because of the geometry.
The licensee could not generate an explanation for the storage of the burnable poison rod assembly outside of a fuel bundle; however, they stated this was acceptable to the NSSS vendor.
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The work activity was sto) ped when the problem was identified to f
licensee management and tie involved personnel were counseled.
The failure to have a procedure to cover the move of the burnable poison assemblies was an isolated event and therefore is considered to be a non-cited violation.
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Prior to the commencement of fuel movement, when the inspector was reviewing the status of plant procedure B.8, Refueling Operations, i
the ins WRGM R pector noted that SP.447A, Monthly Test of Reactor Building 15044, was initialed as completed in Attachment 1 of B.8.
There was no record of this SP being completed in the control-room.
The SP was to provide a value from a flow measuring device, which
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'was out of service at the time.
When questioned, the licensee roduced a technical. directive that gave direction to enter the p' default" value in the WRGM vice doing SP.447A since the flow
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measuring device was out of service.
The technical guidance i
appearedsatisfactory,efault"valueinlieuofperformingtheSP.but Procedure stated to enter the d
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The licensee revised SP.447A such that it could be signed off as
complete if the flow measuring device was out of service.
The failure to adhere to procedures was considered to be a non-cited violation, t
During fuel handling evolutions, near the reactor vessel, the inspectors observed an employee in anti-contamination clothing with an unsecured badge inside of the area designated as a-foreign
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material controlled " Clean" area (to prevent things falling into the j
open reactor vessel).
When questioned, the employee unzip)ed his anti-Cs using his potentially contaminated gloves and put 11s badge inside of his anti-Cs and rezipped the coveralls.
This was inside i
of the potentially contaminated area.
The occurrence war, raentioned
to licensee management, who promptly re-emphasized proper health
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i physics practices with their staff.
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On one occasion a plant employee was observed on the refueling'
bridge, leaning over the side of the refueling bridge inside
containment over the reactor vessel shaking a cable without wearing
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his safety belt.
The inspector was concerned over a potential for the person slipping from the refueling bridge into the refueling'
canal water.
The activity that the person had performed was described by procedure for dealing with a stuck fuel assembly After plant management was informed no further examples of this were noted.
- Two non-cited violations were noted.
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Non-Cited Violations (NCVs)
NRC Enforcement Policy provides the Staff with the flexibility and discretion not to issue a Notice of Violation (NOV) for (1) inspection I
findings which involve an isolated Severity Level V violation; regardless of who identified it, and (2) licensee identified Severity Level IV:
violations that meet certain criteria.
Two NCVs are noted in Paragraph 7 above.
Both concern failure to adhere to verbatim procedural compliance.
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Exit Meetino (30703)
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The inspector met with licensee representatives (noted in paragraph 1) at
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various times during the report period and formally on December 8, 1989.
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The scope and findings.of_the' inspection activities
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~.N. x described in this report were sumarized at the meeting. Licensee
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representatives acknowledged the: inspector's findings at that time.
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