IR 05000312/1979025
| ML19296D642 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 01/04/1980 |
| From: | Canter H, Faulkenberry B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19296D634 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-79-25, NUDOCS 8003120672 | |
| Download: ML19296D642 (8) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR RECULATORY CO.WISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFoRCEMEhT
REGION V
Report No.
50-312/79-25 50-312 DPR-54 Docket No.
treense 30, Safeguards croup Licensee:
Sacramento Municipal Utility District P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Facility Name:
Rancho Seco Inspection at:
Herald, California (Rancho Seco Site)
Inspection conducted:
November 1-30, 1979 Inspectors:
W 4,19 8
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Harvey L.V Canter, Resident Inspector Dat4 Si'gned
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Date Signed Date Signed Approved By:
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B. H. Faulkenberry, Ch{ef, ~ Rea'ctor Projects Section 2,
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Date Signed Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Suwary-Inspection between November 1 and November 30, 1979 (Report No. 50-312/79-25)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections of plant operations; physical security; training; requalification training; plant incidents; LER follow-up and reporting; review and audit; follow-up on inspector identified items; and, independent inspection effort.
The inspection involved 85 inspector-hours by the NRC Resident Inspector.
Resul ts:
No items of noncompliance were identified in seven areas. Two items of noncompliance were identified in two areas (Plant Incidents and LER follow-up and reporting).
RV Forr 719 (2)
8003120
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Rodriquez, Manager, fluclear Operations
- P. Oubre, Plant Superintendent N. Brock, Supervisor, fluclear Instruments
- G. Coward, Maintenance Supervisor
- R. Colombo, Technical Assistant W. Ford, Operations Supervisor H. Hechert, Engineering Technician J. McColligan, Mechanical Engineering Supervisor
- R. Medina, Quality Assurance Engineer
- R. Miller, Chemistry and Radiological Supervisor L. Schwieger, Manager of Quality Assurance
- J. Sullivan, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- T. Tucker, Acting Operations Supervisor The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees during the course of the inspection. These included shift supervisors, reactor operators, auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, security personnel, plant technicians, helpers and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.
- Denotes those attending the exit interviews.
2.
Plant Operations a.
Facility Operating Records The inspector examined the log entries contained in the control room log, the shift supervisor's log, and various other logs for facility operations performed during fiovember 1979.
Sone log entries were not consistent with the requirements of facility administrative orders contained in A.P. 23, Control Room Watchstanding.
During the perfor-mance of a surveillance test on the "A" diesel generator, the control room operator neglected to log that the diesel did not start.
He did log the follow-up entries, however, which indicates that the failure to log was an oversite. The shift supervisor did write in his log that there was a problem with the "A" diesel, so that, between the shift supervisor's log and the control operator's log, the A.P. 23 require-ments were addressed.
A licensee representative stated at the exit interview that a Standing Order on the importance of complete log entries will be issued as a result of this item.
(79-25-01)
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_2 Station orders issued by the operations supervision were consistent with the intent of the facility technical specfications, license con-ditions, and IE Bulletin requirements.
b.
Facility Tours and Observation of Operations Tours of the facility were made by the Resident Inspector in the auxiliary building, turbine building and other accessible vital areas.
During the tours, the following assessments of equipment and plant conditions were made.
(1) A number of limiting conditions for operation and limiting safety system settings were reviewed by the inspector and determined to be in compliance with technical specification and license requirements.
(2) Control room observations indicated that facility manning was in accordance with regulatory requirements.
Shift turnovers were found to be in accordance with presently approved watchstanding practices.
Two or more operators were noted to be in the control room at all times.
(3) System alignment and operability of various engineered safeguards systems were verified to be correct by the Resident Inspector.
(4) Piping systems which were observed, appeared to show normal vibration levels and leakage.
(5) Radiation controls appeared to be properly established.
(6)
Instrumentation for monitoring the status of the plant were in operation.
fio items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Physical Security Based on discussions with various licensee representatives, observations, and examination of facility procedures, the inspector verified that the measures employed for the physical protection of the facility were consistent with the requirements of the physical security plan, applicable administrative orders, and regulatory requirements.
Specific aspects of physical protection examined by the inspector included the following:
a.
Properly closed and locked protected area and vital area barriers.
b.
Properly conducted personnel, vehicle and package searches.
c.
Adequate security organization mannin.
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-3-d.
Proper shift turnover, shift routines, and communications procedures.
e.
Proper weapons qualifications and agility testing performed.
f.
Properly authorized, identified and badged personnel being provided access to the protected area and vital areas.
g.
Proper escorts provided for personnel and vehicles when required inside the protected area.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Training The Resident Inspector verified by direct questioning of a sampling of employees in conjunction with a review of their records that training has been pro"ided in administrative controls and procedures, radiological health and safety, controlled access and security procedures, emergency plan, and quality assur-ance as per A.P. 700, the Rancho Seco Training Program.
One female employee interviewed indicated she had received instructions concerning prenatal radiation exposure.
A sample of Instrument and Control apprentices and journeymen were interviewed along with their supervision, to determine that on-the-job training and formal technical training commensurate with their job classification was being pro-vided.
It was not clear at this writing whether a formal up-to-date training program was being implemented.
Due to the policy of hiring people at high apprentice levels (greater than 42 months), the current program is not com-pletely applicable since the current program is tailored to low level appren-tices. A licensee representative stated that the Instrument and Control Apprentice Training Program will be revised and a consistent program established by July 1,1980. Another licensee representative stated that it is the intent of the authors of the revised program to allow all foremen and technicians to have a hand in revising the program.
This item will be followed-up at a later date by the Resident Inspector.
(79-25-02)
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Requalification Training The Resident Inspector attended a requalification lecture to determine the adequacy of technical content.
Lectures on Nuclear Instrumentation, Pressurizer Heater Control, and Pressurizer Spray Control were monitored and no problems were identified with the technical content of these lectures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
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_4 6.
Plant Incidents The Resident Inspector witnessed two events which occurred during flovember 1979.
a.
The first event was a manual shutdown to repair an unisolable leak in a one inch drain line downstream of the Makeup Pump.
The leak was estimated as 0.2 gpm a pressure of about 2600 gig.
Radiation levels in the area of the le sk were 40-50% of MPC (I
), so that there were few restric-tions for workers in the area.
A temporary mechanical jumper was fabricated to bypass the drain line so that HPI pump "A" could continue supplying seal water to the Reactor Coolant Pumps while the affected section could be isolated, drained down, repaired and returned to service.
The leak was detected by an auxiliary operator performing his normal rounds at about 0147 on Sunday morning, flovember 25, 1979.
Even though the technical specifications allow 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of operation with this size leak, the licensee commenced a power reduction immediately. By early afternoon, the mechanical jumper had been installed, leak checked, and placed in operation.
The repairs to the crack (a socket weld in the drain line) were completed and tested by early evening, at which time, the plan +
was returned to its normal configuration and heat-up was initiated.
The rods were pulled towards critical the next morning at about 0530.
Due to conservative operation of the plant (it was bocated to greater than 900 ppm) and the effects of Xenon, it took about seven hours to deborate to critical.
The Resident Inspector noted one problem with the shutdown.
Procedure B.4, Shutdown to Cold Shutdown, called for resetting the high flux reactor trip to 5% after going to the shutdown bypass mode.
(flote:
In the shutdown bypass mode, a new high pressure reactor trip is set at 1820 psig, and various at-power reactor trips are bypassed.
The 1820 psig trip prevents normal operation with part of the reactor protection system bypassed.)
The pur-pose of resetting the nuclear power trip to 5% of rated maximum is to pre-vent any significant reactor power from being p oduced when performing physics tests.
Si ce the trip was not reset in accordance with B.4 and n
Technical Specification Table 2.3-1, the Resident Inspector stated at the exit interview on December 3,1979, that this was an apparent item of noncompliance.
(79-25-03) Since no physics tests were performed, the safety effects of not resetting the trip were minimal.
This is an apparent item of noncompliance at the infraction leve.
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-5-b.
The second event was an anti-nuclear demonstration on November 29, 1979.
The demonstrators arrived about 11 a.m.
There were about 25 demonstrators and 20 news people involved.
Nine demonstrators climed over a three-foot barbed wire fence at about 1600 on November 29, 1979. They were read their rights and placed in Sheriff Department vans. All was back to normal by 1645.
7.
Licensee Event Reports The Resident Inspector conducted an initial screening, examination and follow-up on a licensee event report.
This inspection activity was conducted in part to determine whether or not the reporting requirements have been met, the re-ports are adequate to access the event, the cause appears accurate and is support-ed by report details, corrective actions are appropriate to correct the cause, generic aspectr of the events have been considered, and the Licensee Event Report (LER) forms are complete.
The inspector noted that LERs are not numbered consecutively.
The reason given was to separate the different types of occurrences being rcported. The inspec-tor stated that after the sequential report number on the LER form, is an " Occur-ence Code" block. This block defines the report occurrence type, whether it be an environmental technical specification problem, an Appendix A technical specification problem or any other occurrence type.
Therefore, the inspector requested all reports in which the LER form is used, commencing in 1980, be submitted using a sequential numbering system.
The licensee will look into this item.
(79-25-04)
LER 79-13, Degraded Grid Voltage (0 pen)
At the request of the NRC, SMUD performed an analysis of the consequences of the Rancho Seco Switchyard voltage decreasing to 214 KV.
The SMUD analysis indicated that modifications to the diesel loading sequence and resetting of the undervoltage relay for the Nuclear Service Busses were necessary to prevent the voltage at the Safety Features equipment from dropping below the minimum design operating voltage of 75% of rated voltage.
Safety related motors may not start at the lower than normal voltages.
The Plant Review Committee (PRC) met on October 5,1979, and was briefed by a SMUD engineer on the results of the analysis. On October 19,1979, SMUD sent a letter to the NRC defining the results of the degraded voltage analysis and proposed remedial action which was to be completed by November 5,1979.
At a subsequent PRC meeting on November 1,1979, when an Engineering Change Notice (ECN) was reviewed for purposes of implementing some of the required changes, it was noted that this item should be an immediate notification item requiring a 14-day follow-up report.
The Chairman informed the NRC Resident inspector of this problem at that tim.. '
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-6-Since the problem was brought before the PRC on October 5,1979, communicated to flRR on October 19, 1979, and immediate notification was not issued until flovember 1,1979, this item is considered an apparent item of noncompliance.
Technical Specification 6.9.4.1.b defines the appropriate requirements which were not followed in this case.
(79-25-05)
This is an apparent item of noncompliance at the deficiency level.
8.
Review and Audit The Resident Inspector examined the results of the Joint Utility Management Audit team audit which was completed on October 12, 1979.
The audit was a review of functional activities of upper management in their routine and on-going assessment of portions of the Quality Assurance Program.
It was per-formed by an inter-utility audit team from the Washington Public Power Supply System, flebraska Public Power District, and Power Authority State of flew York.
The audit covered the functions of the MSRC and PRC, design control and engin-eering changes, and Security. Corrective actions on a majority of the findings have been taken.
flo items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Follow-up on Inspector Identified Items The following items were pursued as part of the Resident Inspector's flovember inspections:
a.
79-16-02, Emergency Plan Changes (Closed)
The PRC met on October 12, 1979 (#644) and discussed the change of locations of the self-contained breathing apparatus, b.
79-21-03, Serializing (Closed)
Resident Inspector discussions with Quality Assurance personnel clarified the purpose of serializing work requests on Q. A. I work.
Serializing is a method used to identify significant safety related work and allows for special retention techniques.
c.
79-21-05, IEB 79-13 Revision (0 pen)
Procedure D.13, Steam Supply System Rupture will receive PRC review and the Bulletin revision will follow shortly thereafter.
fio items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie,, -
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Independent Inspection Effort Discussion were held with operations, security and maintenance personnel in an attempt to better understand problems they may have which are related to nuclear safety.
These discussions will continue as a standard practice for the Resident Inspector.
On numerous occasions during the month of flovember, the Resident Inspector attended the morning status meetings.
These meetings are held by the Opera-tions Supervisor to provide all disciplines onsite with a daily update on the plant status and ongoing maintenance work.
The inspector was notified of a typographical error on Technical Specification Figure 6.2-2.
Senior Control Operators do not have to hold NRC Senior Operator Licenses.
Table 6.2-1 addresses the same subject and will supercede the error in Figure 6.2-2 until the figure is changed.
10.
Follow-up Item Summary The following items from this report will be followed-up at a future date by the Region V inspectors.
79-25-01 - Log Keeping; see Paragraph 2.a.
79-25-02 - I&C Training Program; see Paragraph 4.
79-25-03 - Failure to Reset High Flux Trip; see Paragraph 6.a.
79-25-04 - LER Sequential Numbering; see Paragraph 7.
79-25-05 - Failure to Promptly Report; see Paragraph 7.
The following items are closed.
See Paragraph 9.
79-16-02 - Emergency Plan Changes 79-21-03 - Serializing 11.
Exit Interviews The flRC Resident Inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on fiovember 9,1979, and December 3,1979.
During these meetings, the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the flovember Resident Inspection effort.
The inspector stated that he is aware of the work on a number of pipe supports utilizing concrete expansion bolts which were not identified earlier. The fiRC is interested in the status of the seismic analysis for safety factors on these supports, a schedule for completion of repair and testing work on these supports and bolts, and the results of an audit on the contractor per-forming the analysis. A licensee representative stated that the aforemen-tioned information will be supplied to the fiRC hen available.