IR 05000312/1974002
| ML19309A390 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 04/15/1974 |
| From: | Book H, Andrea Johnson, Spencer G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309A374 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-74-02, 50-312-74-2, NUDOCS 8003270840 | |
| Download: ML19309A390 (13) | |
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t U. S. ATCMI'C ENE?.GY CO:OtIF"0:!
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h DIEECTotATE Cf idGLUTORY OPL.IIONS
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REGION V
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20 Inspection Report No.
50-312/74-02
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Sac'ramento Municipal Utility District Docket No.
50-312
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Sacramento, California License No.(s) CPPR-56
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Priority
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Facility: _19ncho Seco Category n
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Imcation:
lay Str1on, California
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Type of Facility:
Type of Inspection:
u n,i ri n o. An n n,,.,,..a
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Dates of Inspection:
March 4-5, 11-13, 18-20 and 22. 1974
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Dates of Previous Inspection:
January 14-16 & Februarv 1. 4-6. 1974
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Principal Inspector:
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(Date)
A. D. Jo so'n,.R.eactor Inspector Accompanying Inspectors:
PA M_ %\\ '
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L. Jt/ Garvin, Reaccor Anspector
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R. F. Fish, Ra'diation Specialist (D' te)
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a Other Acco$panying Personnel:
L. Beratan, RO:HQ,
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Technical Support Br. (March 18 & 19, 1974)
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Reviewed by:
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(Date)
G. Ss Spenchr, Chief, Reactor Construction
and Operations Branch O
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H. E. Book, Chief,'Rddiological'and
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Envitonmental Protection Branch 8 0 0~3 270 290 -
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
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Enforcement Action
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None
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e Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items Not required.
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Unusual Occurrences _
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None
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" Design Char es
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The approved vendor field change requ' iring installation of
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overcurrent protection in each reactor protective undervoltage cir suitable of the control rod drive (CRD) trip breaker system had been co cuit and was found to have been satisfactorily tested.
ee 312/73-03, paragraph 4)
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Other Significant Findings A.
Several deficiencies were identified in the QA Manual to g operation of the nuclear plant.
overn corrected prior to the conclusion of the inspection.The document de
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included in the management control sytcertain items r In addition, plant.
(Paragraph 2 of Details)
em for operation of the
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B.
Hot functional testing commenced on-March 9, 1974
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to continue for six to eight weeks.
and was expected
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commence the first part of June 1974. Fuel loading was expected to
. estimated to be approximately 97% complete. Construction activities were C.
The discolored areas observed on the control ro
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the vendor and were f 2d to be of a harmless nature e
y was believed'to have been from contact with the plastic pack The cause
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during shipment to the site.
(Daily Report, n
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2'13/74)
D.
Testing of the defective tendon (H-50) in the containment b ild was unsuccessful.
tendon indicated that repeated testing of a given tendin u
ng progressive damage.
(Section II of Details)
on may cause E.
been revised to incorporate the items cons a
provide an adequate preoperational test of the system.
No. 50-312/74-01, Paragraph 4 of Details)
(R0 Report
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F.
The licensee's inspection of siesmic snubbers disclosed defects which were pending resolution with the vendor.
(Paragraph 5 of Details)
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Mcnagement Interview The inspectors met with the following personnel on March 22, 1974 to l
l discuss the scope and findings of the inspection.
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I Sacramento Municipal Utility District i
J. Mattimoe, Assistant General Manage::, Chief Engineer l
D. Raasch, Manager, Generation Engineering R. Rodriquez, Manager, Nuclear Operations
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R. Colombo, Technical Assistant i
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P. Oubre, Assistant Superintendent, Operations
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J. McColligan, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Support
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L. Schwieger, QA Director J. Hiltz, Resident Engineer
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J. Jewett, QA Engineer
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i Bechtel W. Stinchfield, Project Manager W. Chapla, Project QA Engineer A. Stenersen, QA Engineer
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The licensee made the following commitments:
A.
Containment Building Tendons - The licensee stated that the dcfective tendon (H-50) will be replaced prior to loading fuel in the reactor.
In addition, a test program will be developed and executed to determine the effects of repetitive testing of a particular tendon.
. (Section II of Details)
B.
Process Radiation Monitors - The licensee statad that the results of their evaluation related to inplace calibration of process monitors prior to fuel loading ihdicated that the vendor's calibrad tion of one liquid monitor would be confirmed by using liquids with two different concentrations of radioactivity. The vendor's calibrations for gas monitors will be confirmed using gases accumulated after initial operation of the plant has begun.
(R0 Report No.
50-312/74-01, Paragraph 12.b)
C.
QA Program Implementation - The licenseu indicated that:
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The need for a special procedure to assure prompt reporting m
of abnormal occurrences to the Plant Review Committee will be evaluated.
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A system will be formulated to assure appropriate periodic review of operating procedures.
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3.
An administrative procedure will be issued to govern the control of special operating instructions.
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The proposed work request form will be revised to include provisions to assure that inspection and/cc t.sseing is per-formed as appropriate prior to returning a system to operation after maintenance.
(Paragraph 2 of Details)
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REPORT DETAILS - SECTION I
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Persons Contacted
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Sacramento Municipal Utility District J.-Mattimoe, Assistant General Manager, Chief Engineer
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D, Raasch, Manager, Generation Engineering R. Rodriquez, Manager, Nuclear Operations
P. Oubre, Assistant Plant Superintendent, Operations J. McColligan, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Support R. Colombo, Technical Assistant L. Keilman, Project Mechanical Engineer J. Hiltz, Resident Engineer
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G. Drew, Civil Engineer
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R. Daniels, Electrical Engineer D. Cass, Maintenance Superintendent R. Ozment, Maintenance Foreman P. Rouse, Mechanical Foreman R. Dean, Acting Instrument & Control Supervisor R. Miller, Chemical & Radiation Protection Engineer D. Martin, Plant Health Physicist
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D. Whitney, Plant Nuclear Engineer R. Wilson, Nuclear Engineer L. Schwieger, QA Director
.J. Jewett, QA Engineer
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J. Sullivan, QA Engineer
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Babcock and Wilcox Company J. Kennedy, Site Operations Manager
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Bechtel
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W. Gross, Stress Engineer
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Westinghouse Corporation
F. Cook, Site Installation Manatger VSL Corporation
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E. Davis, Site Installation Manager
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J. Bond, Western Division Superintendent
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Implementation of QA_ Program for Operations
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The Quality Assurance Manual prepared in accordance with the
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with the Quality Assurance Director on March 4 an with plant maintenance, modifications and repairs. pro The The licensee representative indicated that nuclear operations were governed by the provisions of the AEC operating license and, thm efore of the Nuclear Operations Group. This interpre
, the in Appendix 13 of the FSAR and related answers
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licensee in response to questions posed by the Directorate of Licensing concerning the establishment of a QA program to provide control of facility operations.
The management of the licensee stated en March administrative controls for operation of the nuclear plant were 11, 1974, that by AEC Regulatory Guide 1.33 and that these m imposed on the operations group through the QA manual by incorp tion.
On March 19, the inspectors confirmed that the QA manual had N
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nuclear operations was found deficient as relate modification and repair activities as shown below.
1974, changes to the manual to correct the deficiencies wereOn March confirmed as indicated after each item.
1.
The QA Director had been given authority only to accept or Such authority was incorporated in the program
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2.
The QA procedure for control of nonconforming material appurtenances, components, parts and systems excluded those
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items that were to be reworked in a short period of time evaluating or accounting for such items. program failed t
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QAP-17 was chani;ed abnormal, off-normal or alarm conditions.to require a N
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work permits.
el v rify ng p r o rso nee o a ac iv t SMUD personnel was undefined b he program. y performed by A
were defined in QAP-6 which The requirements (sj tion of inspectors of variou ged to require qualifica-
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isc plines by the QA Director.
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4.
The program required functional testing of equipment only af ter a major modification to the effected system rather than
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after any activity that could have adversely affected equipment operation. QAP-13 was modified to require testing cf a system after maintenance to ensure proper, operation.
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Design review procedures prescribed by the program failed to include consideration of the requirements imposed by 10 CFR 50.59.
The topics and appropriate controls were incorporsted in QAP-2 -
Design Review.
6.
Provision had not been included in the program to assure that significant maintenance work be performed and controlled in accordance with approved written procedures. QAP-24, Procedura Requirements, was added to the manual and prescribes that
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detailed written procedures shall be developed and used for preventive or corrective maintenance operations involving
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nuclear safety of the facility.
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Corrective action requirements were stated to be a part of the
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nonconforming material control procedure. Although that
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procedure addressed corrective action for a particular nonconforming item, the procedure failed to establish provisions to assure that appropriate measures were taken to preclude recurrence of identified signific9nt deficiencies. QAP-17 was modified to impose the acceptability of corrective measures after considering
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cause, seriousnes.4 and frequency of the nonconformance. QCI-1 was found to control the implementation of the requirements.
8.
The measr.es to preclude operation of systems and components
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with nonconforming conditions and during maintenance, modifica-i tion and repairs had not been clearly defined in the program, QAP-17, 16 and 25 were changed to include appropriate provisions t
to satisfy the requirement.
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9.
The quality assurance procedure controlling records pertained only to those involving construction activities. The program was changed and incorporated the appropriate provisions of
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10. The requirement of tr'ainihg'df personnel performing activities affecting quality to assure' that suitable proficiency is achieved and maintained was found to pertain only to quality assurance personnel, operators and welders. QAP-1 was revised to require that all supervisors insu'a that their employees are appropriately trained. QAP-18 requires that records be kept of the training of personne?.
11. Quality documents were not required to be distributed to and used at the location where the prescribed activity is performed.
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QAP-1 was modified to incorporate this requirement.
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s 12. The control.of special processes by u;ing qualified procedures was not required for Nuclear Operations personnel. A requirement
was added to QAP-9 to insure that operations personnel are properly qualified and use the approved procedures when performing special processes.
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13. -The quality assurance manual did not require that normal t
surveillance testing be performed in accordance with approved.
procedures.
QAP-26. Test Control, was written to control all testing. The QAP was found to require that all testing be
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done in accordance with approved procedures.
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On March 12 and 13, the inspectors examined selected portions of the licensee's administrative control to govern plant operations against those recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33.
A,reas examined
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included the administrative policy and procedure documents relatr1 to:
a.
Assignments of authorities and responsibilities
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Expertise available on staff
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Review and audit (1) Plant Review Committee (2) Management Safety and Audit Review Committee
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(3) QA Department (4) Technical Assistant
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Surveillance testing
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Plant records'
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Maintenance program and procedurcs
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Emergency operating procedures i
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Clearance procedure
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Review and approval of procedures and temporary changes thereto
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During the examination of the above subjects, the following program deficiencies were identified by the inspectors:
The mechanism for assuring abnormal occurrences will be promptly a.
reported to the appropriate review committee had not been clearly defined in the written procedures.
b.
A system to assure periodic review of operating procedures had not been developed.
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Measures to control special operating instructions had not been incorporated into the administrative procedures.
d.
-The measures to control maintenance work (work requast) did not provide provisions ta assure inspection or testing as appropriate prior to retarning a system to operation after maintanance.
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3.
Preoperational Test Results Results of the following test were examined by the inspectors. No deficiencies were iduttiff ad.
1.
Control rod drive system calibration.'
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Control rod drive mechanism functienal test.
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Decay heat removal system safety feature actuation test.
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Containment spray functional test.
4.
Preoperational Test Procedures The following preoperational test procedures were examined. No
. deficiencies were noted.
1.
Reactor coolant vessel and internals inspection.
2.
Piping, strain and displacement tests. This effort included examination of installed strain and scratch gages on the high pressure injection and wain steam piping. Instruments were
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also reported to have been installed on the high stress areas
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of the primary coolant and letdown systems.
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Hot functional test controlling procedure.
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5.
Bergen-Paterson Siesmic Snubber.
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. licensee to Licensing summarized The January 21, 1974 letter frow
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their inspection of the Bergen-Pacerson si'smic snubbers and the e
corrective actions taken.
During this inspection, the licensee's documents concerning.this matter vore examined. NCR 6128, tavfalon 2,.
disclosed that the inspection found 13 leaking snubbers, 11 of which were on safety related systems. Discussion with the licensee indicated that the repair work had been finished, but that the inspection of the work had not been completed. Later discussions dis-
' closed that a Bergen-Paterson representar /e had inspected all of
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their installed snubbers at Raucho Seco and had found several (not l
in the containment building) that did not meet purchase crder i
requirements. No fix had been agreed upon. The licensee's represen-tative said' that it would be several weeks before.the problem would
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the next inspection.
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Pressurizer Relief Valves
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Daring a' tour of the construction site it was noted that the pressurizer relief valves were unsupported. The licensee's design engineer was questioned about'this condition. He stated that all forces, both horizontal and vertical, exerted during flow through
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the valves had been included in the design of the valves. He supported his statements about the suitability of the as-built condition of the valves to function during all conditione with the
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design documents. No deficiencies were noted in the design documents
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reviewed.
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Radiological and Environmental Protection
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.a.
Procedures The test procedures for the reactor coolant and miscellaneous
liquid radwaste systems were examined. These procedures had
all received the required SMUD approvals. The procedures covered the following topics: purpose, references, limitations
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and precautions, required plant status, prerequisite system conditions, test method, data required, acceptance criteria and detailed test procedure with pr ovision for recording results or data. The reactor coolant waste ion exchanger functional test had been completed and signed by the test
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coordinator, however, the results were still to be accepted.
The other tests had not been completed.
b.
Instrument Calibration
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Randomly selected instruments, located in the reactor coolant and miscellaneous liquid radwaste systems, were checked to assure they had been calibrated.
These instruments, which included flow meters and a pressure gauge, had been calibrated
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by the licensee. The data and pertinent information had been recorded on cards which were fil2d numerically. The cards
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showed the date of the calibration, the initials of the person performing the calibration had the calibration data. The licensee has also established a record system for the repair and recalibratica of the instruments According to the
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l licensee, a computerized maintenance system will be established for instruments which will also include calibration, however, it-is not expected to be operational for about a year.
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Environmental Monitoring Program The licensee performed an audit of the service organization who will be analyzing the environmental samples for activity.
The audit team consisted of representatives of the QA and
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l Chemical and Radiation Protection organizations. Two reports of this audic had been prepared and were examined during this
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inspection. The audit showed that.(1) written proc.Edures existed, (2) personnel were qualified to perform the services,
(3) there was a quality assurance organization with unambiguous and independent responsibilities, (4) a record system with document control was in effect 'and (5) there was an audit system to inform top management whether the overall program was functioning properly.
d.
Radiation Control Manual and Emergency Plan Copies of the licensee's Emergency Plan and the Radiation
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Control Manual were obtained during this inspection. These will be examined in the near future and the results of the
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examination discussed in a subsequent inspection report.
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DETAIL SECTION. II
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30 3 aport No. 50-312/74-02
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h,r o hr y-2.'7-74
DETAIL Prepared by:
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Date L. L. Beracan Senior Structural Engineer Technical Assistance Branch Directorate of Regulatory Operations
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Date of Inspection: March 18,19,1974 3@ 7'/
Reviewed by:
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K. V. Seyfrit, Chief Date Technical Assistiance Branch
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Directorate of Regulatory Operations 1.
Persons Contacted Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco)
John Mattimoe, Chief Engineer and Assiscant Manager D. G. Raasch, Manager, Generation Engineering O
R. L. Wilson, Supervising Nuclear Engineer L. G. Schwieger, Q. A. Director John Ililtz, Supervising Civil Engineer George Drew, Civil Engineer John Jewitt, QA Engineer
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2.
Tendon Lift-off Test As part of the inservice surveillance program a lift-off test was performed on tendon H50.
This tendon consists of 56 strands, each strand made up of seven wires. During the original installation of this tendon, four of.the strands slipped through the cone grips in the stressing washer, one almost co=pletely through and five more slipped in the wedges 3/4 to 8 inches. Since this tendon was dis-counted as an active tendon, it was decided to use it to prove the adequacy of the lift-off test and to check the testing procedures
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and equipment.
The stressing jack was located over the stressing washer and the tendon The cones strands ensr ged the cone grippers in the head of the jack.
were seated by tapping them with a crescent wrench.
In total, only 46 strands were engaged by the jacking head, and these were not uniformly stressed.
Because of the slippage experienced during installation, the 10 short strands were not engaged by the jack.
The full jacking force was applied to the 46 engaged strands and the strands were released by
the cone grippers in the stressing washer.
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When the cone grippers are engaged, they bite into the wires creating a " notch". When the strands were stretched beyond the grippers, the notched wires were required to carry their proportional share of the load and at least 5 wires broke at the notches produced by the grippers.
The failure of the wires was a brittle mode of failure.
Since it is required by the application that groups of tendons be tested at specified intervals as part of the inservice surveillance is program, and that the tendons be selected on a random basis, it possible that the same tendon may be selected more than once and that progressive damage as a result of repeated lift-off tests could destroy the reliability of the tendon system.
This was pointed out at the exit interview by the inspectors and the following commitments were made by
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the applicant:
A new tendon will be installed in the space occupied by tendon H50.
a.
A test tendon will be installed in a test bed at a testing facility b.
to be designated and stressed. Lift-off tests will be repeated to
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determine the extent of the damage that is inflicted on the tendons.
b-A study will be made to determine what modification to the VSL c'.
system is necessary' to permit inservice inspection without degrading
'the system.
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The applicant will notify Region V when the test tendon is ready for testing so that the test program can be witnessed by the inspectors.
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The inspectors stated to the applicant that the Directorate of Licensing would be appraised of the test on the tendon H50 and that Licensing =ay wish to review this matter with the applicant.
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