IR 05000309/1993007
| ML20036B699 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1993 |
| From: | Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20036B696 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-93-07, 50-309-93-7, NUDOCS 9305270099 | |
| Download: ML20036B699 (12) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
REGION I
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Report 93-07 License DPR-36 Inspection At:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant Wiscasset, Maine (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company)
Conducted:
March 23 through April 27,1993 Inspectors:
Charles S. Marschall, Senior Resident Inspector William T. Olsen, Resident Inspector Approved by:
MM*V
'2.3 W. JdMrus, dhidf, Reactor Projects Section 3B Date SCOPE Resident inspection of operations, radiation protection, maintenance / surveillance, security, engineering / technical support, and safety assessment / quality verification.
OVERVIEW Operations The plant staff operated safely and conservatively during the inspection period.
Maine Yankee took excellent preparatory measures when the steam generator primary to secondary leak rate doubled from approximately 0.5 gallons per day (GPD) to 1 GPD. Due to a lack of attention to detail, the steam generator blowdown system radiation monitor was not properly restored to service after corrective maintenance. This resulted in a non-cited violation. The integral tank low fuel oil problem with emergency diesel generator (DG-1B) is another example of lack of attention to detail. Station management indicated that they intend to require some changes in the control of testing, including implementation of a face-to-face turnover for personnel involved in on-going testing.
Maintenance and Surveillance Maintenance personnel demonstrated excellent control of safety-related maintenance activities. This was evident during the performance of preventative maintenance activities on emergency diesel generator (DG-1B) and the overhaul of rvice water pump (P-29C).
Carity Maine Yankee security personnel properly responded to the inadvertent loss of ammunition by a security officer during his rounds of the turbine building.
Engineering and Technical Support The plant engineering staff performed a thorough, systematic evaluation of the AK-25 circuit breaker actuator failure.
Safety Assessment and Ouality Vedfication The station Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) received inaccurate information concerning the operability of the primary vent stack radiation monitor which had the potential to adversely affect problem identification and effective corrective action. Licensee management is investigating the poor communication between the operations staff and the PORC.
9305270099 930522
{DR ADOCK 05000309 PDR
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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OVERVI EW..............................................
i TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................ ii 1.
OPERATIONS I
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1.1 Control Element Assembly Testing........................
I 1.2 Primary to Secondary Leakage I
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1.3 Emergency Diesel Generator DG-1B Integral Fuel Oil Tank Level.....
1.4 Emergency Response Data System Testing
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1.5 Steam Generator # 1 Blowdown System Radiation Monitor
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RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS..............................
3.
MAINTENANCE and SURVEILLANCE
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3.1 Emergency Diesel Generator (DG-1B) Preventive Maintenance.......
3.2 Installation of Service Water Pump (P-29C)
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4.
SECURITY
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4.1 Loss of Ammunition by a Security Officer
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ENGINEERING and TECHNICAL SUPPORT.....................
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5.1 Engineering Root Cause Analysis.........................
6.
SAFETY ASSESSMENT and QUALITY VERIFICATION
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6.1 Plant Operation Review Committee........................
6.2 Licensee Event Reports (LERs)..........................
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ADMINISTRATIVE.....................................
7.1 Persons Contacted..................................
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7.2 Summary of Facility Activities
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7.3 Interface with the State of Maine......................... 10 7.4 Exit Meeting
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DETAIIS 1.
OPERATIONS On a daily basis, inspectors verified adequate staffing, appropriate access control, adherence to procedures and Limiting Conditions for Operation, operability of protective systems, status of control room annunciators, status of radiation monitors, emergency power source operability, and operability of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). Each week, the inspectors verified operability of selected Engineered Safety Features (ESP) trains and assessed the condition of the plant equipment, radiological controls, security and safety. The inspectors performed biweekly review of a safety-related tagout, chemistry sample results, shift turnovers, portions of the containment isolation valve lineup, the posting of notices to workers and operability of selected ESF trains. The inspectors evaluated plant housekeeping and cleanliness.
1.1 Control Element Assembly Testing (71707)
On April 1, a Maine Yankee reactor operator observed a partial drop of control element assembly (CEA) 31 to step 164, during the performance of monthly surveillance procedure 3.1.8, CEA exercising. The testing inserts the CEA from the fully withdrawn position of step 180 to the insertion limit of step 170, then withdraws the CEA to step 180. The testing verifies that each CEA is free to move and capable of being inserted into the reactor core in the event of a reactor trip system actuation. In addition, all associated alarms, interlocks and indicat;ons are verified for each CEA during the surveillance testing.
The dropped CEA was realigned to step 172 to be within the technical specification requirements of section 3.10.A and Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-2-21. After a maintenance department instrument and controls technician installed a trace recorder to monitor the CEA 31 control circuit, the assembly was fully withdrawn. The traces did not indicate any control circuit abnormality. The inspectors reviewed Maine Yankee's response to this event and determined that they met the requirements of plant technical specifications and AOP 2-21.
1.2 Primary to Secondary Izakage (71707)
On April 5,1993, station chemistry personnel observed the primary to secondary leak rate to increase from 0.0003 GPM to slightly over 0.0007 GPM, which is well below the limit of 0.15 GPM. An increasing trend has been noted since October of 1992. Maine Yankee management directed that primary to secondary leak rate determination be made every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to more closely monitor the rate of change. In addition, on April 26, the Maine Yankee vice president of nuclear operations conducted a meeting with all station management personnel to map out strategy for dealing with the leak in the event the rate continues to increase.
At the end of the inspection period the leak rate had stabilized at 0.0008 GPM for several days and station chemists were still monitoring the leakage every four hour.
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The operations department manager has increased the amount of training at the station
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simulator for operators on emergency operating procedures to prepare in case the leak rate escalates. In addition, Maine Yankee plans to inject argon gas into the primary coolant in an
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attempt to identify which steam generator has the leak. An outage for a tube leak, if it occurs before the refueling outage planned to begin July 31, would last about two weeks.
The # 2 reactor coolant pump seal, which has been degraded for some time, would be replaced at the same time.
The inspectors determined that the actions by station management and the operations department are appropriate to prepare for and respond to increased tube leakage. Their foresight and vigilance demonstrate excellent safety perspective.
1.3 Emergency Diesel Generator DG-1B Integral Fuel Oil Tank Ixvel (71707)
On April 6, Maine Yankee operations personnel conducted monthly surveillance testing for emergency diesel generator DG-1B. This testing demonstrates equipment operability as required by station technical specifications, section 4.5 A. Station procedure 3.1.4, Emergency Diesel Generator Surveillance Testing, step 6.2.15 directs the nuclear plant operator (NPO) to refill the DG-1B integral fuel oil tank from the day tank after one hour of engine run time. This insures an adequate fuel oil supply for the entire two hour test period.
DG-1B testing commenced at 10:10 p.m., almost one hour before the 11:00 p.m. shift turnover. The swing shift personnel did not fill the integral tank as they believed that flow testing of the lube oil transfer system was imminent and on-coming midnight shift personnel supporting the test would refill the tank. Plant Engineering Department (PED) personnel conduct quarterly testing to verify operability of the fuel oil transfer system as required by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code,Section XI.
At 11:30 p.m. a mid shift NPO, sent to the DG-1B room to investigate a trouble alarm, found the integral tank level low (165 gallons). The tank was not refilled because the NPO was not sure if refilling would affect the PED flow test, and there appeared to be enough fuel oil to finish the surveillance. However, at approximately midnight, the NPO found the diesel with less than 50 gallons of fuel, and engine speed appeared to be oscillating slightly. The integral tank was refilled immediately by the NPO after discussing the situation with the plant shift supervisor and PED personnel.
Maine Yankee operations management determined that the confusion associated with the test was caused by the shift turnover and numerous Temporary Procedure Changes (TPC's) added into the test procedure. The licensee plans to incorporate these TPC's into procedure 3.1.4, and limit the number of TPC's on other procedures to prevent similar problems. In addition, the licensee now requires face-to-face turnovers for shift personnel when a dynamic evolution or test spans a shift turnover. The inspector considered this event to be of minor safety significance as it occurred during testing and the licensee's corrective actions were appropriat.
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1.4 Emergency Response Data System Testing (71707)
On April 13, Maine Yankee nuclear safety engineers tested the Emergency Response Data System by establishing a telephone link with the NRC Headquarters Operations Center system to verify operability and the ability to meet the one hour criteria to establish monitoring capability in the event of an accident. Maine Yankee personnel used station procedure 2-50-5, Emergency Notification, to establish the telephone link and several individuals were trained using the procedure. These personnel displayed excellent knowledge of the NRC requirements for this system and initiated several procedure changes to aid personnel during use of the procedure.
1.5 5 team Generator No.1 Blowdown System Radiation Monitor (71707)
On March 31, a Maine Yankee nuclear plant operator (NPO) found the No.1 Steam Generator (SG) blowdown system radiation monitor isolation valve BD-16 in the closed position while in the process of performing a safety tagging order, which required closing the valve. This valve was replaced under station work order (WO) 91-3741 on March 3,1993, due to excessive leakage. After installation of the replacement valve, the on-shift operating supervisor functionally tested the new valve by verifying no external leakage, flow in the line l
when opened and no flow when closed. The work order and the tagging order did not specify what position to leave the valve upon completion of testing.
With this valve closed, the radiation monitor is inoperable and the station Off Site Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) requires a daily grab sample if the blowdown system is not being recycled through blowdown demineralizer I-6 before being discharged to the environs.
On five occasions between March 3 and March 31, the steam generator blowdown system effluent was not recycled through demineralizer I-6 prior to discharge when the radiation monitor was not operable. The station chemistry department routinely takes daily grab samples; however, these samples do not have the required lowest level of detection that is required by the ODCM. The normal discharge path of steam generator blowdown system effluent is to the station service water system, which is equipped with an independent radiation monitor. This system was in service during the above periods and no abnormal alarms were noted.
Maine Yankee station management directed that a Human Performance Evaluation (HPES) be conducted to determine the root cause for the failure to properly position BD-16 after replacement, and make recommendations to resolve the issue. A station nuclear safety engineer conducted the evaluation and determined the root cause to be inattention to detail on the part of the on-shift plant shift supervisor and shift operations supervisor. They did not recognize that the position of the affected component (BD-16) within the tagging boundary also needed to be verified upon completion of maintenance and functional testing.
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The on-shift plant shift supervisor initiated a steam generator blowdown system valve alignment in accordance with station operating procedure 1-105-2, Steam Generator
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Blowdown System Operation. This procedure requires that the inlet valves for all three steam generator blowdown system radiation monitors be full open. No other valves were found out of position during the valve lineup process.
The inspector determined that Maine Yankee's root cause determination was appropriate and the requested corrective actions were immediate, comprehensive, and proper to prevent recurrence. The licensee-identified violation was an isolated incident, and the staff did not willfully violate the requirements of the ODCM. The safety significance of the event was slight due to additional radiation monitoring equipment and daily chemistry sampling available during the period that the blowdown system radiation monitor was out of service. As a result, this violation will not be subject to enforcement action because licensee efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet the criteria of the enforcement policy as specified in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section VII.B.
2.
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROIE Inspectors periodically reviewed radiological controls including Organization and Management, external radiation exposure control and contamination control. The inspectors also monitored standard industry radiological work practices, and conformance to radiological control procedures and 10 CFR 20 requirements. All observed conditions were acceptable 3.
MAINTENANCE and SURVEILLANCE The inspectors observed and reviewed maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulations, administrative and maintenance procedures, codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement, safety tag use, equipment alignment, jumper use, personnel qualifications, radiological controls for worker protection, retest requirements, and reportability per Technical Specifications. The inspectors observed portions of the following activities:
WO 93-1522, Realignmem of Operator to Valve Linkage for SCC-T-23; WO 92-5281 and procedure 5-29-1, Disassembly, Repair, and Reassembly of Service Water Pumps (P-29A, P-29B, P-29C, P-29D) for pump P-29C; and For the activities listed above, the inspectors concluded that Maine Yankee implemented adequate maintenance controls to insure compliance with regulatory requirements.
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3.1 Emergency Diesel Generator (DG-1B) Preventive Maintenance (62703)
On April 6, plant staff performed the following preventive maintenance activities on DG-1B:
WO 93-1255 and Preventive Maintenance (PM) M-26-A-H, Clean and Inspect the Air Start Solenoids; Open and Inspect the Airline Y Strainers.
WO 93-1051 and PM M-26-M-E, Check Operation of the Lube Oil Pump.
The inspectors noted many measures to insure high quality safety-related maintenance. Plant staff used well-written work orders. The work orders utilized an appropriate level of detailed instructions and references to vendor technical manuals and drawings. A lead mechanic oversaw the work performed by other mechanics. The mechanics closely observed the condition of components, such as rubber o-rings. A continuously present Quality Control (QC) inspector demonstrated familiarity with the maintenance activities and the contents of the work orders. A Quality Assurance inspector observed the maintenance activities as part of the Quality Programs Department (QPD) performance based inspections.
The inspectors concluded that, overall, maintenance and QPD staff performed the maintenance and observations skillfully. The inspectors found one minor discrepancy associated with inspection of the airline Y strainers. Step 5 of WO 93-1255 instructed the mechanics to open and inspect the two Y strainers, and stated: "see instruction manual section 14-6. " Section 14-6 of the instruction manual had not been attached to the package, and maintenance personnel involved in the Y strainer inspection had not reviewed it prior to performing the inspection. Section 14-6 of the instruction manual contained diagrams of the strainer, a paragraph describing the purpose of the strainer, and a paragraph describing the inspection process in simple terms. The information contained in section 14-6 was not critical to effective EDG maintenance. Maintenance personnel were familiar with the procedure for inspecting the strainer based on previous experience; however, failure to review or include the information from section 14-6 of the instruction manual was an example of lack of attention to procedural detail. In this case, the weakness had no immediate safety consequences, however, it may be an indication of weak preparation for maintenance work.
The licensee agreed that referenced material should be reviewed prior to performance of maintenance.
3.2 Installation of Service Water Pump (P-29C) (62703)
On April 9, maintenance personnel landed Service Water pump P-29C in its normal location in the Circulating Water pump house. Plant staff performed the work using WO 92-5281 and procedure 5-29-1, Disassembly, Repair, and Reassembly of Service Water Pumps (P-29A, P-29B, P-29C, P-29D). The mechanical maintenance section head and a supervisor monitored the activity. Workers proceeded cautiously, followed procedures and implemented appropriate controls to insure completion of the work without risk of damage to the pum.
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The inspectors concluded that Maine Yankee personnel installed the service water pump safely, using proper controls, and demonstrated a conservative approach to safety related maintenance.
4.
SECURITY The inspectors verified that security conditions met regulatory requirements, the requirements of the physical security plan, and complied with approved procedures. The checks included security staffmg, protected and vital area barriers, vehicle searches and personnel identification, access control, badging, and compensatory measures when required. No discrepancies were identified.
During the installation of the service water pump, discussed in Section 3.2, above, plant staff required that security open a normally locked door. For the duration of the maintenance activity, security guards and supervisors insured proper implementation of the compensatory measures required by the Maine Yankee security plan. The inspectors noted that the guards maintained positive control of access to the area, and that supervisory personnel took an active role in monitoring and supporting guard force performance.
4.1 Loss of Ammunition by a Security Officer (71707)
On April 24, a Maine Yankee security officer on patrol noticed that ammunition had fallen out of the gun case pouch carried on the officer's back. After notifying his supervisor he retraced his steps and found five of seven missing rounds. At the end of the inspection period the remaining two rounds had been recovered. The cause for the lost rounds was a worn out velcro fastener on the pouch. The Maine Yankee security department has taken prompt corrective actions to eliminate the problem to prevent recurrence. The inspectors reviewed Maine Yankee's actions to resolve this matter and determined that the area where the rounds were lost had minor safety significance and the licensee was diligent in their search to retrieve the missing rounds of ammunition. The inspector determined that Maine Yankee's actions were in accordance with the NRC approved security plan and station implementing procedures and that the Maine Yankee security force responded properly to the event.
5.
ENGINEERING and TECIINICAL SUPPORT 5.1 Engineering Root Cause Analysis (40500)
In response to failure of the General Electric (GE) AK-25 circuit breaker cut-off switches (described in NRC Inspection Report 50-309/93-03), the Plant Engineering Department (PED)
performed a root cause analysis. The PED staff found that the cut-off switches had either a gold-colored actuator (zinc-chrome plated) or a silver color actuator (cadmium plated). The three cracked and one broken actutiors had zinc-chrome plating. Of these four switches, the three cracked actuators were original equipment, and the broken switch had been installed as
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a replacement on December 27,1989. In addition, the broken switch had a commercial grade label on the part. The replacement switch was supplied by General Electric and was accompanied by a Certificate of Compliance. All four of the failed switches were installed in Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs). Actuators in RTBs are subjected to a larger numbers of cycles than switches in other circuit breaker applications. The PED staff could not determine the exact reason for failure due to switch location and the fast-acting operating mechanism.
However, PED postulated four theories that might explain the actuator cracking:
The mechanical levers of the breaker operating mechanism first contact the metal tab of the cut-off switch actuator producing a force which could cause the cracking to occur on the top of the actuator. Plant engineering noted that the width of the metal tab is less than the total width of the meal on both sides of the tab. Due to the shape of the actuator or the manufacturing proc'ss used to bend and form the metal, it is possible that the area where the cracks occurred may be weakened.
During breaker closing the force generated by the operating mechanism levers causes the actuator to travel beyond the point where the switch contacts are made up. The actuator strikes a cross pin as a result of the overtravel. This action may also cause cracking in the actuator.
A combination of the two causes, postulated above, may produce a force sufficient to explain why the cracking occurs on the top of the cut-off switch actuator.
The failed and cracked cut-off switch actuators may be of the old design and material used by General Electric. General Electric redesigned the part after their product department identified similar failures five years ago. There is no indication of any communication from General Electric to licensees regarding the failures.
Plant engineering generated, and management approved, a purchase order for GE failure analysis of the actuators. The PED staff concluded, pending the results of the GE failure analysis, that the metal actuators failed due to cyclic fatigue. The staff recommended replacing all zine-chrome plated actuators, and adding an actuator inspection step to the AK-25 maintenance procedures. The PED staff also recommended training electricians on failure indications, and reassessing technical specification requirements for RTB testing for a possible amendment to reduce surveillance frequency.
The Plant engineering staff performed a thorough, systematic evaluation of the actuator failure. The results of the evaluation were logical, and based on evidence, knowledge of AK-25 circuit breaker design and operation, and engineering principles. In addition, the recommendations for corrective action appropriately addressed the postulated causes for actuator failure. The inspectors concluded that the PED root cause analysis demonstrated a positive contribution to safe plant operation. The licensee is evaluating the generic significance of this issue and the need for a 10 CFR Part 21 repor.
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SAFETY ASSESSMENT and QUALITY VERIFICATION 6.1 Plant Operation Review Committee (PORC) (40500)
On April 5, PORC met to discuss the affects of the inoperability of the Primary Ventilation Stack (PVS) high range radiation monitor of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS).
Procedure 1-26-6, Administrative Controls of Selected Non-Technical Specification Plant Equipment, required that PORC evaluate the degradation of SPDS to consider the need for further action.
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hiaine Yankee declared the PVS high range radiation monitor inoperable on September 12, 1992. The maintenance staff could not repair the monitor within the seven days allowed by Technical Specification 3.9.C due to the unavailability of parts. Technical Specification 3.9.C required the licensee to either restore the inoperable channel to operable status within seven days or submit a report to the NRC describing plans to restore the channel to operable status. The licensee issued a letter to the NRC, dated September 18, 1992, stating that the monitor was inoperable, and repairs would be implemented on an expedited schedule. On November 5,1992, in a letter to the NRC, Maine Yankee stated that the equipment could not be repaired, and would be replaced with a new model on an expedited schedule. On November 10, 1992, Maine Yankee installed a new electronic unit to replace the old drawer.
Since the new drawer performs daily self-checks, on March 4,1993, the licensee submitted a request to change the Technical Specification 4.1, required source check frequency, from daily to monthly. At the end of the inspection period, the public comment period for the proposed change had not expired.
During the meeting on April 5, the PORC members concluded that the SPDS degradation was solely due to the technical inoperability of the PVS high range radiation since the monitor was functioning. The members of PORC incorrectly believed that plant staff had been routinely performing the monthly source check documented in the proposed Technical Specification amendment. The plant staff had temporarily landed leads for operational testing of the radiation monitor during initial installation. At the conclusion of the testing, the plant staff lifted the leads, since permanent lead installation required a special crimping tool that was not available onsite. The plant staff had not performed monthly source checks, and the radiation monitor was not functioning at the time of the PORC meeting. The inspectors requested that PORC verify the functioning of the PVS high range radiation monitor, since the primary to
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secondary leak rate was slowly trending upward (as discussed in Section 1.2). After confirming that the leads had not been landed, PORC took action to ensure the Instrument and Controls Department acquired the necessary crimping tool, and made the PVS high range radiation monitor functional. At the end of the inspection period, the monitor functioned properly, and Maine Yankee planned to declare it operable upon receipt of the approved Technical Specification amendment.
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The inspectors concluded that, in this case, the lack of accurate information available to PORC did not affect safety, since the radiation monitor was not operable and plant staff had implemented the compensatory measures required by Technical Specifications. The inspectors observed, however, that this represented an example of ineffective communication between the plant staff and management.
6.2 Licensee Event Reports (LERs) (92700)
The inspectors reviewed the following LERs to verify that Maine Yankee idena;ied the root cause of the event, took timely and appropriate corrective action, addressed generic implications, implemented action to prevent recurrence, and met the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73:
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LER 93-001, Inoperable Emergency Core Cooling Subsystem During Recirculation Valve Stroke Testing
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LER 93-002, Control Room Ventilation Trains Inoperable Due To Preventative Maintenance Maine Yankee submitted both of these LERs due to entering plant technical specification (TS)
remedial action step 3.0.A. This step is entered if a limiting condition for operation in TS section 3 is not met. A plant shutdown is required after one hour, if the safety systems cannot be restored to operability status. Each of the activities required placing both systems in a condition of inoperability while performing a surveillance or maintenance activity.
Maine Yankee completed the required tasks within the one hour allowed outage time and restored the systems to service.
Maine Yankee is currently considering submittal of a technical specification amendment to allow exception to technical specifications for testing or maintenance on systems where both safety trains are caused to be inoperable to complete required testing or maintenance.
7.
ADMINISTRATIVE 7.1 Persons Contacted During this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with various licensee personnel, including plant operators, maintenance technicians and licensee management.
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7.2 Summary of Facility Activities Maine Yankee operated at full power throughout the period, with the exception of a reduction to 75 percent power on April 9 for condenser backwashing. James C. Linville, Chief, j
Division of Reactor Projects, Branch 3, NRC Region I, visited Maine Yankee on April 13 and 14. William J. Imrus Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, Section 3B, NRC Region I,
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visited Maine Yankee on April 19 and 20. Joseph Furia, Senior Radiation Protection
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Specialist Inspector from NRC Region I, conducted a routine radiation program inspection t
from March 29 through April 2.
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7.3 Interface with the State of Maine (94600)
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Periodically, the resident inspectors and the onsite representative of the State of Maine discussed findings and activities of their corresponding organizations. No unacceptable plant
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conditions were identified.
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7.4 Exit Meeting (30702)
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Meetings were periodically held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection
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scope and findings. A summary of findings for the report period was also discussed at the i
conclusion of the inspection.
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During the inspection period the inspectors conducted backshift inspection on March 23, 24,
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J 25, and April 14,15,19 and 22. Deep backshift inspections were conducted on March 25,
and April 16,19 and 23.
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