IR 05000309/1993008
| ML20045E365 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 06/21/1993 |
| From: | Lusher J, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045E355 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-93-08, 50-309-93-8, NUDOCS 9307020057 | |
| Download: ML20045E365 (9) | |
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1 Docket / Report:
50-309/93-08 License: DPR-36
' Licensee:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 83 Edison Drive Augusta, Maine 04336 Facility Name:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power station Inspection:
June 2 - 4,1993 Inspection At:
Wiscasset, Maine Inspectors:
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. Lusher, Emergency Pmparedness Specialist, Region I Date N. Dudley, Senior Resident Inspector, Seabrook D. Kern, Resident Inspector, Pilgrim D. Lew, Project Engineer, DRP Branch 3 B. Olson, Resident Inspector, Maine Yankee K. Battige, NRC Intern, Maine Yankee S.4 C. b 6/21/93
. Approved:
E. McCabe, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section Date Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
Scope Announced inspection of the licensee's annual, panial-participation emergency preparedness
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exercise. The inspection included scenario review, exercise observation, discussions with licensee personnel and review of selected records.
Results Overall, the on-site response to this exemise scenario was very good. In the Simulator Control Room, excellent crew briefings by the Shift Supervisor on plant conditions, status of pmcedums, and accident mitigation were an exercise strength. The most significant area for potential improvement was event documentation (log-keeping, checklist completion and procedure completion and sign-off).
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TAllLE OF CONTENTS 1.
Persons Contacted
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Emergency Exercise and Inspection Scope.......
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Scenario Planning
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Exercise Scenario
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Activities Observed
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Exercise Finding Classifications....
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General Findings..
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7.1 Event Documentation
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Simulator Control Room (SCR) Findings
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Technical Support Center (TSC) Findings.
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9.1 Technical Support Center Communications....
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Operations Support Center (OSC) Findings..
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10.1 Damage Control Team briefings
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10.2 Drill simulation
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Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Findings
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11.1 Calculating Offsite Dose Projections.....
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11.2 invoking 10CFR50.54(x).
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11.3 initial Notification of Responders
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Notification Timeliness
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Licensee Action on Previously Identified items...
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Licensee Critique
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Exit Meeting..
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted The following individuals were contacted during the inspection.
R. Blackmore, Plant hianager J. Brinkler, Principal Engineer A. Cayia, Manager Operations R. Dee, Scheduling Section Head S. Evans, Emergency Preparedness / Environmental Engineering Section IIead J. Frothingham, Manager, Quality Program Department J. liebert, Licensing and Engineering Support Manager R. Lawton, Manager, Operational Support B. Temple, Simulator Supervisor J. Temple, Senior Emergency Preparedness Coordinator J. Sanoski, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator / Shift Operating Supervisor D. Whittier, Vice President Licensing and Engineering The inspectors also interviewed and/or observed the actions of other licensee personnel.
2.
Emergency Exercise and Inspection Scope A partial-participation emergency exercise was conducted at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station on June 3,1993 from 0800 to 1300. NRC inspection of the exercise included scenario review, activity observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of selected records.
3.
Scenario Planning Exercise objectives were submitted to NRC Region I on March 8,1993. The scenario was submitted to the NRC on April 6,1993. Region I reviewers discussed scenario improvements with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff on May 12, 1993.
The final scenario adequately tested the major portions of the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures, and also demonstrated areas previously identified for further review.
On June 2,1993, NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on the revised scenario. The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent disrupting plant activities.
4.
Exercise Scenario The scenario included the following simulated event:-
The plant was at end of core life, preparing to shut down for an outage.
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Reactor vessel head inner 0-ring seal degradation and a 2.5 gpm leak in containment.
Reactor vessel head inner and outer 0-ring seal degradation with leakage increasing to
~ 80 gpm (An Alert due to >50 gpm reactor coolant leakage into containment.
The 345 KV power line was hit by lightning, resulting in the opening of breakers KGl i
and KGl/375, and a plant trip. Security reported a lightning strike on the 115 KV line.
The section 207 reserve power line was grounded on one phase of transformer X-16.
Breaker 4R failed to close on the plant trip, and power was lost to distribution buses 4
& 6. Diesel-generator IB auto-started.
Imss of vacuum occurred due to loss of all condensate and circulating water pumps.
- Total reactor vessel head seal failure, with ~ 2000 gpm leakage to containment.
- Pressurizer level dropped, and high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump P-14A failed
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to auto-start ( A Site Area Emergency due to inability to maintain pressurizer level).
Containment isolated, but ventilation purge valve VP-A-3 indicated mid-position.
- The nuclear plant operator (NPO) reported VP-A-3 had drifted off its closed seat and
closed VP-A-3, receiving first degree burns and contamination to his lower leg. The valve was closed, but the leak continued into the emergency feed water pump room.
- HPSI pump P-14A was returned to service.
Containment spray was initiated and containment pressure was decreased.
The radioactive release to EFW room was terminated.
Recovery discussions and actions were initiated.
The exercise was terminated.
5.
Activities Observed The NRC inspection team observed the activation and augmentation of the Emergency Response Facilities and the actions of the Emergency Response Organization staff.
The following activities were observed:
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Selection and use of control room procedures.
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Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events.
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Direction and coordination of emergency response.
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Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencie l
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Communications /information flow, and record keeping.
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Assessment and projection of off-site radiological doses 7.
Protective Action Recommendations (PARS).
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Provisions for in-plant radiation protection.
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Provisions for communicating information to the public.
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Accident analysis and mitigation.
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Accountability of personnel.
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Post-exercise critique by the licensee.
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Exercise Finding Classifications Inspection findings were classified, where appropriate, as follows:
Exercise Streneth: a strong positive indicator of the licensee's ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions and implement the emergency plan.
Excreise Weakness: less than effective Emergency Plan implementation which did not, alone, constitute overall response inadequacy.
Area for Potential Improvement: an aspect which did not significantly detract from the licensee's response, but which merits licensee evaluation for potential improvement.
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General Findings Activation and use of the emergency response organization (ERO) and emergency response facilities (ERFs) were generally consistent with the emergency plan and its implementing procedures (EPIPs). The following general area for potential improvement was identified.
7.1 Esent Documentation (IFl 50-309/93-08-01)
The on-site ERO did not maintain logs describing events and actions taken to mitigate scenario accident sequences, checklist completions, and procedure completion sign-offs. Specifically:
A complete log describing events and control room actions was not maintained.
e The personnel exposure log (Attachment E of OSC Procedure 2-50-was not kept up
to date. Only two persons were logged in and none were logged out. There were, however,15 in-plant response teams of between one and four people.
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Simulator Control Room (SCR) Findings No exercise weaknesses or areas for potential improvement were noted. The following strength was identified:
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Crew briefings by the Shift Supervisor on plant conditions, status of procedures, and
accident mitigation were excellent.
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. Technical Support Center (TSC) Findings 9.
No exercise strengths or weaknesses were identified. Overall, the performance of the technical support center was very good. The TSC was staffed and declared activated 21 minutes after the Alert declaration. Also,' good initiatives were demonstrated in the recommendating of an alternate ventilation lineup for reducing the release of radioactive materials to the environment, j
and in coordinating with off-site engineering support (Bolton) on recommending concerning reactor vessel cool-down rate and control of the HPSI injection rate.
The following area for potential improvement was noted.
9.1 Technical Support Center Communications (IFI 50-309/93-08-02)
l Effectiveness of TSC briefings could be improved.
The TSC manager could not be heard when he attempted to continue speaking during
plant-wide announcements. Lost information was not repeated.
l Several TSC workers were not attentive to briefings.
- Safety parameter display system (SPDS) printouts were run continuously during briefings
and generated distracting noise.
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Operations Support Center (OSC) Findings No OSC exercise strengths or weaknesses were observed. Overall, OSC performance was good.
Specific examples follow, i
The initial response of the OSC staff was very good.
Equipment was promptly set up.
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Personnel radiation monitoring and habitability checks were promptly initiated. Personnel accounting in the OSC was timely; the OSC was manned at 0849 (Alert announced at 0828).
Additional staff augmentation was requested for health services and stores personnel. Personnel a
were reminded of eating, drinking and smoking restrictions.
The OSC Manager initially provided good information to the OSC staff. For example, even though he did not know the status of the emergency, he briefed his staff on what he knew and on actions in progress.
Implementation of Procedure 2-50-8, OSC Operation, Attachment B, Emergency Ventilation System, was complicated because the rest room and the general exhaust fans could not be i
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secured' until technical support assisted in locating and opening the associated breakers.
Attachment B was initiated about 0845, but was not completed until about 0945.
Individual team briefings were generally good, but with the following potential areas for-impmvement.
10.1 Damage Control Team briefings (IFI 50-309/93-08-03)
Some information stated in the drill scenario was not provided to the OSC teams prior
to team dispatching (e.g., the previously identified location of the air leak and the stripped threads on the connection for the air controller on atmospheric steam dump valve MA-162, and the amount of fuel overDowed from the EDG day tank when filling it).
The brieGng forms were not fully completed, in that reporting frequency for teams was
generally not documented. Additionally, in the repair of containment ventilation purge valve VP-3-A, a reporting frequency was specified on the sheet, but the frequency was not communicated to the team during the briefing and the report frequency was no, met.
10.2 Drill simulation (IFI 50-309/93-08-04)
Some activities could have been performed rather than simulated (e.g., setting up the
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decontamination room, covering a contaminated man with coveralls, etc.).
During the VP-3-A steam leak, the pre-leak dose rates reported were 60-100 mR/hr.
- The Radiation Technician for the VP-3-A work did not take readings when leaving the room. Instead, he gave dose reports for readings prior to the steam release. The information was treated as though it were post-leak data, 11.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Findings
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No exercise strengths or weaknesses were identified.
The following areas for potential improvement were noted.
11.1 Calculating Offsite Dose Projections (IFI 50-309/93-08-05)
The EOF did not perform timely off-site dose projectione for the unmonitored release.
- The EOF manager did not appear to understand the basis for or the units of the bounding
values used for the off-site integrated dose.
The initial bounding value for the off-site integrated iodine dose was understated by a
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11.2 Invoking 10CFR50.54(x) (IFI 50-309/93-08-06)
In accordance with the emergency operating procedures, the main control room operators
invoked 10CFR50.54(x) when the steam generator atmospheric steam dump valve was opened after a containment isolation signal actuated. When informed by the control room communicator, the TSC did not forward the information to the emergency director that the main control room had invoked 10CFR50.54(x).
11.3 Initial Notification of Responders (IFI 50-399/93-08-07)
The pagers for emergency responders were not reliable when used in the staff building.
- The volume of the plant paging system was turned down in the staff building, making
the announcement of emergency plan activation hard to hear.
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Notification Timeliness Unless not applicable (N. A.), the following table lists the times of notifications for Unusual Event (UE), Alert (Al), Site Area Emergency (SAE), and General Emergency (GE)
classifications. These include simulated emergency occurrence, recognition, declaration, State and local (S & L) notifications, NRC notification, emergency response organization (ERO)
callout, and emergency response facility activation and full staffing.
NOTIFICATION TIMELINESS MILESTONE UE Al SAE GE Occurrence N.A.
0824 0946 N.A.
Declaration N.A.
0828 0955 N.A.
S & L Notifications N.A.
0828-0831 1001-1007 N.A.
NRC Notification N.A.
0841 N.A.
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ERO Callout N.A.
0828-0835 N.A.
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-The above table shows that all notifications were timely.
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Licensee Action on Previously Identitled items Based upon discussions with the licensee representatives, examination of procedures and records, j
and NRC observations during the exercise, all areas for potential improvement identified in the j
previous exercise were acceptably demonstrated ' nd not repeated. The inspector had no further a
questions on these item _
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Licensee Critique On June 4,1993 the NRC team attended the licensee's exercise critique. The Emergency Preparedness / Environmental Engineering Section llead summarized the licensee's observations.
The licensee's critique was assessed as thorough and critical, and it identined all of the NRC inspection concerns. No licensee critique inadequacies were identified. However, it was observed that evaluation of controller organization activities in critiques would b'e beneficial to future exercise play.
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Exit Meeting
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On June 4,1993, the NRC inspection team met with the licensee personnel listed in Detail 1 of this report. Team observations were summarized. The licensee was informed of the following:
Overall, the on-site licensee response to this exercise scenario was very good.
No violations were found.
The specific areas for potential improvement identined.
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The licensee indicated that they would evaluate and take appropriate action on the NRC items.
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