IR 05000309/1993009
| ML20045G511 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 07/01/1993 |
| From: | Meyer G, Prell J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045G509 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-93-09OL, 50-309-93-9OL, NUDOCS 9307140062 | |
| Download: ML20045G511 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 1 l
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OPERATOR LICENSING REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION REPORT i
REPORT NO:
50-309/93-09 (OL-RQ)
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LICENSE NO:
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LICENSEE:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company i
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FACILITY NAME:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station
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DATES:
May 24 - 27,1993
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EXAMINERS:
John Hanek, EG&G i
Steve Johnson, EG&G CHIEF EXAMINER:
Sh 7- /' 93 Mes PreII,'Sr Operations Engineer Date
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APPROVED BY:
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/dfe'nn W. Meyer, ChiefPWR Section, Operations Br Date l
anc Division of Reactor Safety
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SUMMARY: The licensed operator requalification training program was rated as j
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satisfactory..Requalification written and job performance measures (JPMs) examinations l
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were administered to six senior reactor operators (SROs) and three reactor operators (ROs).
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These examinations were administered in accordance with Revision 7 to NUREG-1021. All
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nine operators passed their examinations, as graded concurrently and independently by the
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NRC and Maine Yankee training department. Three licensed operators, two SROs, and one
RO, who had previously taken and passed an NRC requalification examination were added to the nine operators identified above in order to make up three crews consisting of four j
operators per crew. Two of the three crews were evaluated as satisfactory by both the NRC
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and Maine Yankee during the conduct of the simulator scenario examinations. The third
crew was graded unsatisfactory by the NRC. Maine Yankee graded the third crew as
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satisfactory, with remedial training required prior to returning to on shift duties.
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All three portions of the examination were found to be technically challenging and well
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administered. Upper management's involvement with evaluating crew performance during the simulator portion of the examination was a programmatic strength.
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9307140062 930702 I
PDR ADCCK 05000309 V
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DETAIIS i
I TYPE OF EXAMINATION: Requalification 1.0 EXAMINATION RESULTS:
I RO SRO TOTAL CREW Pass / Fail Pass / Fail Pass / Fail Pass / Fail
Written 3/0 6/0 9/0 NA Walk-through 3/0 6/0 9/0 NA Simulator *
4/0 8/0 12/0 2/1 t
Overall 4/0 8/0 12/0 2/1
- The NRC failed one crew on the simulator, but all individual members passed. The facility failed an RO member of one of the successful crews based on his performance during one of the simulator examinations. The facility passed all three crews on their simulator
examinations. Prior to returning the NRC failed crew to shift, the facility provided remedial
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training in those areas where the crew had exhibited weaknesses.
j 2.0 PROGRAM EVALUATION RESULTS:
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2.1 Background i
From May 4 - 6,1993, the NRC reviewed the proposed examination with training and operations representatives at the Maine Yankee site. This included a detailed review of the adequacy of the written examination questions, a walkdown of all job performance measures
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(JPMs) and the validation of the simulator scenarios. The validation of the simulator
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scenarios included reviewing expected operator actions and designated crew critical tasks.
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2.2 Overall Rating: Satisfactory
i The Maine Yankee program for licensed requalification training was rated as satisfactory m accordance with the criteria established in Revision 7 of ES-601, " Administration of NRC I
Requalification Program Evaluation." Those criteria are as follows:
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A.
At least 75% of all operators pass all portions of the examination. This number includes operators who participate in the simulator examination for the purpose of l
meeting crew composition requirements.
NRC grading is the only consideration for this criterion. There were three individuals I
who participated only in the simulator portion of the examination in order to meet crew requirements. Twelve of twelve operators (100%) passed the examination.
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At least two-thirds (66%) of the crews pass the simulator examination.
NRC grading is the only consideration for this criterion. Three crews were evaluated, and two crews (66.7%) passed the simulator portion of the operating examination.
The requalification program met these criteria.
2.3 Programmatic Strengths and Weaknesses
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Strengths:
f The administration of e.he examination was well planned and, as a result, very
few delays were encountered by the operators during the examination process.
The simulator scenarios were challenging and allowed the evaluators ample
opportunity to judge operator skills.
The Operation Manager's critiques to the crews following their simulator
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examinations were probing and insightful, and provided good feedback to the operators.
B.
Weaknesses:
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In two of the three scenario sets the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) provided
l little or no assistance to the Shift Operating Supervisor (SOS). The STAS devoted most of their effort to working closely with the Plant Shift Supervisor (PSS) to determine the emergency classification of the events that had taken place. This overemphasis on classification of the event precluded the STA from providing a broad perspective on the events that were occurring.
2.4 Crew Failure on the Simulator The NRC failed a crew that Maine Yankee passed. The failure was based on the crew's response to a loss of heat sink scenario. In the scenario lightening strikes the 345 KV yard which in turn causes a loss of off-site power. The emergency feedwater pump failed to auto start on low steam generator level due to an electrical failure. The crew was not able to start the turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and transitioned to FR-H.1, Imss of Secondary Heat Sink. The crew then attempted to establish feedwater flow by reducing steam generator pressure and using the condensate pumps. At approximately 615 psig steam generator pressure, feedwater flow from the condensate pumps was established. Stearr merator levels at this point were approximately 80 inches. The reasons NRC failed the crew were:
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The crew failed to meet the Crew Critical Task for this event which specified that the crew restore feedwater via the condensate system OR initiate feed and bleed in accordance with FR-H.1. Feed and bleed is required to be established if any one of three criteria listed in FR-II.1 is met. One of the three criteria for establishing feed and bleed is when the levels in any two steam generators decrease to less than 100 inches. Steam generator levels in two of the steam generators decreased to less than
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100 inches with steam generator pressures at about 830 psig in ali three generators.
At this point condensate feedwater Cow had not yet been established.
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From the time that the criteria were satisfied for establishing feed and bleed to when condensate feedwater flow was established was between 3% to 5 minutes. This time was determined from the graphs provided by the facility. During this time, SG 1evels
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decreased to 80 inches, 20 inches below the point at which feed and bleed should have been established.
The Technical Bases document states that the wide range steam generator level is used as om of the criteria for establishing feed and bleed because experience on the simulator has demonstrated that heat removal capabilities deteriorate when steam generator levels uccrease to less than the stated criteria. By failing to initiate feed and bleed, the crew jeopardized the ability to establish Feed and Bleed later if it was needed.
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2.
In the process of deviating from the procedure, apparently the Shift Operating Supervisor (SOS), with the Plant Shift Supervisor's (PSS's) concurrence, chose to continue te, 'nd establish condensate feedwater flow. Neither the SOS's decision to deviate i EOP specified path or the PSS's concurrence with this deviation were clear to tw waluators. Such a major deviation from the EOPs should have been clear and deliberate. Futher the SOS did not fully inform the crew that this was a conscious deviation from the procedure and failed to establish revised criteria ( e.g.
duration, reactor conditions and/or steam generator levels) for initiating feed and bleed operation if condensate feedwater flow could not be established or was lost.
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3.
Once feed and bleed has been established, FR-H.1 directs the operators to continue efforts to try and establish a heat sink to at least one steam generator via any one of
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several methods, including using condensate feedwater flow. The conservative action
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would have been to establish feed and bleed once the steam generators levels decreased to 100 inches and then resume attempts to establish condensate feedwater flow. The initiation of feed and bleed is a relatively straight forward process that would have represented a minimum disturbance to efforts to establish condensate feedwater flow.
Maine Yankee passed the crew with the stip"b r. that they receive remedial training on Feed and Bleed requirements. Maine Yankee clicluded that although the crew 4M cot
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demonstrate sufficient appreciation for the feed and bleed criteria listed in FE D '."i
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demonstrated some lack of understanding of the criteria listed in step 1 of FR-H.1,
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evaluation of the crew using the Crew Competency Checklist did not indicate sufficient deficiencies to warrant a failing grade. The specific reasons Maine Yankee passed the crew were:
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Feedwater was successfully restored via the Condensate System in a deliberate and controlled manner.
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2.
At no time during the scenario did key plant parameters deteriorate to the point where core cooling was lost. Reactor coolant system (RCS) temperatures and pressure remained stable.
i The NRC position regarding Maine Yankee's passing of the crew is that the crew took an unacceptable and unnecessary risk in deviating from the specified feed and bleed comse of action. In some courses of action, such as feed and bleed, a time delay exists before the L
actions become effective. To delay such actions until absolutly needed is imprudent.
Further, additional delay in initiating a course of action could prevent or diminish the effectiveness of that action when eventually it is taken. Lastly, the benefits of delaying feed and bleed were minimal and performing these actions would only have caused a minimum delay in establishing condensate feedwater flow. Deviations from the EOPs should only be taken when an overriding safety basis exists for alternate actions. No such safety basis
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existed in this case.
i It should be noted that Maine Yankee revised step I to FR-H.1 the day before the simulator
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examination took place. Prior to the revision, step 1 read as follows:
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Check if Feed AND E.bd is required:
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Check for loss of secondary heat sink:
WR level in any two SGs-LESS THAN 100 INCHES
[110 INCHES FOR HARSH CONTAINMENT]
-OR-Pzr. pressure - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 2385 PSIG e
After the revision, step 1 read as follows (changes are in6icated in Bold type):
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Check if Feed AND Bleed is required:
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Check for loss of secondary heat sink:
WR level in any two SGs- - LESS THAN 100 INCHES
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[RCS PRESSURE AND CORE REGION TEMPERATURES INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER FOR HARSII CONTAINMENT]
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-OR-Pzr. pressure - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 2385 PSIG DUE
TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK.
-O R-j CORE REGION TEMPERATURE INCREASING IN AN l
UNCONTROLLED MANNER Based on post-scenario questioning, Maine Yankee concluded that the SOS may have misinterpreted the changes to the ncie of the first bullet to mean that steam generator levels had to be less than 100 inches and RCS pressure and temperatures increasing in an uncontrolled manner. NRC concluded that this possible misinterpretation had no effect on the crew grade.
Before returning the crew to on-shift duties, the facility provided remedial training to them on feed and bleed criteria, discussed the technical basis for the criteria, and reviewed the recent change to the procedure.
NRC NUREG - 1021, Revision 7, Opemtor Licensing Examiner Standards, ES-604 requires that a Simulator Crew Evaluation Form, ES-604-2, be filled out to grade crew competencies
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following the scenario evaluations. On a crew receiving a rating factor of 1 in a single competency, a crew failure is not mandatory but is possible. Both the facility and the NRC gave the crew a rating of I for the competency relating to correctly implementing procedures. Maine Yankee concluded that this grading was insufficient for a crew failure.
Based on this grade and the reasons cited above, NRC Region I management decided, subsequent to the exit meeting, that the crew should fail the simulator exam.
On June 10, 1993, Maine Yankee management was notified by telephone of the NRC results.
The crew was subsequently removed from shift and tested on the remediation training they received earlier. The facility was required to test the crew so as to be in conformance with i
their requalification program criteria regarding NRC failures.
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3.0 EXIT MEETING
On May 27,1993, at the conclusion of the requalification examination, the NRC conducted
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an exit meeting at the Maine Yankee site. Those personnel who were in attendance are noted
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below. Examination development and conduct, general observations noted during the examination, and programmatic strengths and weaknesses were discussed. Examination i
results, as determined by both the NRC and Maine Yankee, were also discussed.
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Maine Yankee Personnel at Exit Meeting:
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R. Blackmore Plant Manager E. Brand 1. cad Nuclear Safety Engineer
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A. Cayia Operations Manager
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M. Evringham Operations Training Section Head
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D. Lauterbur Operations Training Supervisor A. Shean Training Manager
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M. Swartz Specialty Training Section Head
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i ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT
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i Facility Licensee: Maine Yankee j
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Facility Docket No: 50-309
i Dates of Operating Tests: May 25 - 27,1993
i This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not constitute
audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of
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noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b). These observations do not affect NRC certification or approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information that may be used in
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future evaluations. No licensee action is required in response to these observations.
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While conducting the simulator portion of the operating tests, there were no items identified indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b).
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