IR 05000309/1986003

Insp Rept 50-309/86-03 on 860223-0330.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Control Room,Accessible Parts of Plant Structures,Plant Operations,Radiation Protection,Physical Security & Fire Protection

ML20203F311
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	04/16/1986
From:	Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203F304	List: IR 05000309/1986003 ML20203F299
References
50-309-86-03, 50-309-86-3, NUDOCS 8604250116
Download: ML20203F311 (7)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket / Report: 50-309/86-03 License: DPR-36 Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Inspection At:-Wiscasset, Maine Dates: February 23 - March 30, 1986 Inspectors: Cornelius F. Holden, Senior Resident Inspector Eric Swanson, Senior Resident Inspector, Region III R

Jffrey/obertson,ResidentInspector Approved by: 1.b.Jup b E. E. Tdi3p, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3A / Date Summary: Inspection on February 23 - March 30, 1986 (Report No. 50-309/86-03)

Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection (355 hrs) of the control room, ac-cessible parts of plant structures, plant operations, radiation protection, physi-cal security, fire protection, plant operating records, maintenance ano surveil-

lanc Results: While shutdown for maintenance on the generator, inspection / replacement of jumper wires in Limitorque motor operators in containment was completed (Section 3.j.). Modifications to concrete block walls were also completed and are discussed in NRC Specialist Inspection Report 50-309/86-02. Chloride leakage from the main condenser resulted in high chloride concentrations in the steam generator (Section

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9). No violations were noted during this report perio ADOCK 05000309 T"

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with various licensee personnel, including plant operators, maintenance technicians and the licensee's management staf . Summary of Facility Activities At the beginning of the report period, February 23, the plant had been in hot shutdown for 2 days to repair a hydrogen leakage problem in the generato The plant was taken critical on February 27 but was returned to a hot shutdown condition on February 28 due to high chloride concentrations in the condensate, steam ganerators and demineralized water storage tank. The autage was ex-tended after chloride concentrations were reduced to normal levels in order to perform additional maintenance on the generator. The plant was taken critical on March 11 and, from March 13 to the end of the report period, re-mained at approximately 100% powe . Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) IE Circular (50-309/81-CI-10) Steam voiding in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) during decay heat removal cooldown. Procedures for Plant Cooldown, Plant Cooldown by Abnormal Methods, and Natural Circula-tion contain adequate instructions and precautions to prevent steam voiding in the RCS. Reactor vessel head vents have been installed and proposed Technical Specifications have been submitted to NRR for approva Specific operating instructions for the head vents will not be issued until after system related Technical Specification changes are approve (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-309/84-09-03) Repair of Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Channel Heads without use of an Engineering Design Change Request. The channel heads were replaced instead of repaired. The lic-ensee provided documentation which showed that one set of channel heads had to be ordered from a manufacturer other than the original supplie The licensee evaluated the channel heads and determined that they were comparable replacement (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-309/84-11-03) Diesel Generator Room fire doors. The 1-1/2 hour fire doors were replaced with 3-hour rated fire doors. This work was completed in October 198 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-309/84-11-07) Oil Collection System for the Reactor Coolant Pump By letter dated May 15, 1985, the licensee committed to install an oil collection system for each reactor coolant pump. The design details were reviewed by the NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement. In a Safety Evaluation dated July 31, 1985 it was con-l cluded that the design meets the requirements of Section 111.0 of Appen-

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dix The modifications were completed during the August 1985 refueling outag A review of the completed Engineering Design Change Request (EDCR 85-20) found no deficiencie (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-309/84-15-03) Unsealed piping and ventila-tion duct openings in walls identified in the SER and Fire Hazard Survey as Fire Rated. This item was unresolved pending receipt and review of the relevant documentation submitted by the licensee. The licensee's submittal was evaluated in a Safety Evaluation dated July 31, 1985, and it was determined that these penetrations have no safety significance in that they are on the outside perimeter of plant buildings or in in-terior walls that do not separate redundant safety equipmen (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-309/84-16-01) Inadequate adjustment to Steam Blowdown isolation valve packing after installation. Blowdown isolation valve packing was adjusted. Blowdown valves are time tested each month during routine Emergency Core Cooling System testing. The inspector reviewed the most recent test data of March 7, 1986 and found

- valve stroke times on the order of four to five seconds. Fifteen seconds is the limi (Closed) Violation (50-309/84-22-03) Failure to sample containment at-mosphere with a system sensitive to radioactivity. The licensee's re-sponse dated January 11, 1985 committedtorevisingprocedure1-12-7,

" Containment Particulate and Gas Monitor Operation , to include a re-quirement for daily containment samples whenever the Air Particulate Detector and gas monitor are inoperable. The inspector verified that this change has been entere (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-309/85-36-01) Pressure in the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) Header. During routine Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) monthly testing, no pressure was observed in the LPSI header associated with check valve LSI-12. The inspector will con-tinue to follow this item during routine tours and observations of sur-veillance testin (Closed) Bulletin (50-309/85-BU-01 and TI 25-15-67) Steam binding of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump In accordance with the actions required by this Bulletin, AFW pump discharge piping is monitored to ensure it is maintained at ambient temperature. This is accomplished each shift by the Primary Auxiliary Operator touching the pipe and documenting this in the log. The Primary Auxiliary Operator logs are required by operat-ing procedure 1-24-4, " Responsibilities and Authorities of Operating Personnel". Completed logs are reviewed and signed by the Plant Shift Supervisor or the Shift Operating Superviso Procedure E0P 2-70-6, " Loss of Feedwater" has been revised to specify action necessary to restore the AFW system to operable status if steam binding occurs. Training on this subject has been included in the Auxiliary Operator Qualification Program and the annual requalification program for licensed and non-licensed personne _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _

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In response to this bulletin, the licensee stated in a letter dated-February 27, 1986, that, " Maine Yankee has never experienced conditions that would be indicative of steam binding of the Auxiliary Feedwater System."

-j . (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-309/86-01-02) Limitorque Motor Operated Valves located inside containment. Between February 21 and 27, while the reactor was shutdown, the licensee completed their inspection of Limitorque valve operators inside containment satisfying the commit-ment made in a February 19, 1986 letter. All jumper wires that could not be determined to have been designed to operate under harsh environ-mental conditions were replaced with qualified wir . Routine Periodic Inspections Daily Inspection During routine facility tours, the following were checked: manning, ac-cess control, adherence to procedures and LCOs, instrumentation, recorder traces, protective systems, control rod positions, Containment, tempera-ture and pressure, control room annunciators, radiation monitors, radi-ation monitoring, emergency power. source operability, control room logs, shift supervisor logs, and operating orders. No deficiencies were note System Alignment Inspection Operating confirmation was made of selected piping-system trains. Ac-cessible valve positions and status were examined. Power supply and breaker alignment was checked. Visual inspection of major components was performed. Operability of instruments essential to system perform-ance was assessed. No deficiencies were note ' Biweekly Inspections During plant tours, the inspector observed shift turnovers, chemistry sample results and the use of radiation work permits and Health Physics procedures. Area radiation and air monitor use and operational status was reviewe Plant Housekeeping and cleanliness were evaluate No deficiencies were note Plant Maintenance The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulations, administrative and maintenance procedures, codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement, safety tag use, equipment alignment, jumper use, personnel qualifications, radiological controls for worker protection, fire protection, retest requirements, and reportability per Technical Specification ,

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o Bearing replacement for fan 48 (FN-48), B charging pump relief valve work, Wide Range Log NI channel D troubleshooting and Secondary Component

' Cooling Pump-(P-108) thrust bearing replacement were observed. Other

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incidental maintenance was reviewed during daily plant tours. No dis- '

.crepancies were note Surveillance Testing The. inspector observed parts of tests to assess performance in accordance-with approved procedures and LCOs, test results, removal and restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolutio ,

CEA exercising was observed on March 26. When rod 56 was inserted the i two upper electrical limit (UEL) reed switches opened and grounded out '

'the power supply. Since the power supply is common to other UEL reed switches, the licensee opened slide links to the rod 56 UEL circuit in order to restore indication for the other rods affected. Outward motion of rod 56 will be stopped by the computer pulse counting system at 183 steps. 'No other discrepancies were identifie During the plant shutdown which ended on March 11, 1986, the steam flow venturis were cleaned. After the plant reached full power,.a full flow calorimetric was performed. The inspector witnessed portions of the Plant Calorimetric, procedure 12-5, and reviewed the results. No dis-crepancies were note On February 27, 1986, the licensee identified a surveillance test that was not performed within the time required by Technical Specification After the on-line containment purge was secured, a ventilation and purge valve (VP-A-1) was determined to be leaking past its seat. The valve seat was repaired and the valve was cycled from the control room and then leak tested satisfactorily. The valve was then tagged shut to maintain containment integrity. The automatic closure feature of the valve was not tested within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> as required by Technical Specification 3.1 This was discovered and the auto closure feature was tested and the leak test was reperformed within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of the maintenance. The PORC re-viewed this item on February 27 and recommended writing specific main-tenance procedures for the two containment ventilation and purge valves in order to highlight the Technical Specification requirements and pre-vent a reoccurrence. No further concerns were identifie Onsite Review Committee The inspector attended Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meetings on February 25 and 27, and March 3,1986. Auditionally, the inspector ;

attended the PORC Procedure Review Subcommittee on March 11, 198 The i inspector verified that Technical Specification requirements for attend- l ance, expertise and Unresolved Safety Question determinations were me No discrepancies were note g.-

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6 Operator Training The licensee has developed Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) and Functional Recovery Guidelines in order to replace the existing proce-dures with systematic procedures. The inspector discussed procedure development with the Operation Support Staff. The development of the new E0Ps has involved contractors and licensed personnel. Periodic re-views for technical adequacy and verification were conducted including four weeks of site-specific simulator verification with operating crew The inspector witnessed portions of the licensed operator requalification training. The training department has scheduled two weeks of requalifi-cation training for E0P and FRG training. Approximately one half of this training time is spent in the classroom with the remaining time spent practicing these procedures on the site specific simulator. The inspec-tor witnessed portions of the classroom and simulator training. No de-ficiencies were note . Observations of Physical Security Checks were made to determine whether security conditions met regulatory re-quirements, the physical security plan, and approved procedures. Those checks included security staffing, protected and vital area barriers, vehicle searches and personnel identification, access control, badging, and compensatory meas-ures when required. The inspector also received training from a Region Based inspector following the guidelines of Temporary Instruction 2515/68. No de-ficiencies were note . Radiological Controls Radiological controls were observed on a routine basis during the reporting period. Standard industry radiological wo-k practices, conformance to radio-logical control procedures and 10 CFR Pact 20 requirements were observe Independent surveys of radiological boundaries and random surveys of non-radiological points throughout the facility were taken by the inspecto No discrepancies were note . Review of License Event Reports (LERs)

The inspector reviewed the following LERs to verify that the details were clearly reported, including accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector had previously verified that appropriate corrective action was taken or responsibility assigned and that continued operation of the facility was conducted in accordance with Technical Specifi-cations and did not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in

10 CFR 50.59. No discrepancies were identifie LER N SUBJECT 85-19 Plant trip caused by turbine control system failur Manual reactor trip on condenser differential pressure.

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L Demineralized Water Storage Tank (DWST) Leak

=The licensee identified leakage (80 to 150 ml/ min.) from the DWST telltale drains. This item was discussed by PORC on March 13, 1986. Their concern was that the DWST is supported by a bed of oil-soaked sand. If leakage sig-nificantly eroded the sand under the DWST it would not be properly supporte No evidence of sand or increased leakage has been observed. The Operations Department is measuring the leak rate at least daily. Current leakage rate is approximately 1.5 gal /hr. Normal level in the DWST is 160,000 gallon The licensee currently plans to make repairs to the DWST during the next re-i fueling outage.

!- Chloride Leak Chloride Leak from the Main Condenser - On February 27, 1986, the plant ex-perienced a large chloride leak from Waterbox 0. At the time of the leak, i the plant was critical (less than 2% power) following a five-day outage for

main generator hydrogen leakage repairs. The highest chloride concentration l in the steam generators was 30 ppm. Initial efforts to locate the waterbox

, were complicated because the detection of chlorides in the condensate was l coincident with starting the B circulating water pump. This caused the operators to initially suspect B waterbox. Once this waterbox was ruled out, waterbox A was checked and then waterbox D. The difficulty in locating the

leaking waterbox resulted in a higher chloride level in the steam generators.

i The plant returned to hot shutdown condition on February 28 and waterbox D was isolated. Steam generator blowdown was increased to maximum and conden-

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sate was dumped. Over the next several days chloride levels were reduced.

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The cause of the chloride leak was attributed to one of the plugging devices falling out of a previously plugged tube in waterbox D. After discussions with the manufacturer, the licensee revised the installation instructions to l

L require a higher torque value for the plugs. All other waterboxes were checked and plugs were retorqued to the higher value. The inspector witnessed and discussed with plant management, the actions taken to reduce chloride concentrations, including changes of plant condition . Exit Interview Meetings were periodically held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A summary of findings was presented to the licensee at the end of the inspection. Preliminary inspection findings

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' were discussed with licensee management periodically during the inspectio A summary of findings for the report period was also discussed at the con-clusion of the inspection.

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